At a national scale, effective citizenship is a necessary condition of democracy. Without effective citizenship, no regime provides sufficient breadth, equality, binding consultation, or protection of participants in public politics to qualify as democratic (Tilly 1999: 256).

Citizenship is at the core of democracy. It is also at the core of indigenous mobilization in Latin America and beyond. For if Indians are contesting the terms of citizenship, they are also contesting their unequal experiences with it. But what is citizenship? Who gets to be a citizen? And how is citizenship experienced? These are basic questions. Yet they have been largely sidelined in studies of third wave democracies. Indeed, democratization studies for the most part have tended to assume that the category, boundaries, and experiences of citizenship are given and preconstituted. While there have been notable exceptions, most recent studies have tended to focus on the institutions that define democracy rather than the people who take part and the terms by which they do so.1

It is no longer possible to ignore citizenship (and its links to ethnicity) in democratization studies. For with the turn to competitive electoral regimes, we have witnessed the (re)emergence of groups committed to

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1 For important exceptions in studies of democratization, see Fox (1990 and 1994a); O’Donnell (1993); Jelin and Hershberg (1996); Linz and Stepan (1996); and Chalmers et al. (1997). Studies of nationalism, ethnic conflict, multiculturalism, immigration, and genocide, by contrast, have acknowledged and explored why and how citizenship is a highly contested good and concept.
redefining citizenship. These are not “simply” struggles to expand the suffrage to excluded groups. Rather, the new struggles have increasingly assumed an ethnonational cast and have taken two broad forms. First, in their most extreme and exclusionary form, social and political movements have formed to redefine the boundaries of citizenship by restricting membership to a given ethnonational group. Informed by nationalist ideas and international rhetoric about self-determination, groups in Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East have mobilized in multiethnic politics to construct nation-states where membership is allocated along ethnonational lines. This program has often had destructive consequences as nonnationals have been excluded, often violently, from the polities that they once identified as theirs. These concerns have dominated studies of ethnic conflict (Sri Lanka, Rwanda, Ireland, Israel/Palestine) and studies of genocide (Germany, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia). In both cases, struggles to restrict citizenship along ethnonational lines have commonly resulted in violence.

While we are perhaps most familiar with these violent conflicts, not all struggles over citizenship have resulted in violent struggles over national boundaries. A second form has occurred over the content rather than boundaries of citizenship in multiethnic settings. We have found that indigenous groups, in particular, have mobilized in recent years to demand a redefinition of citizenship that would maintain their rights as citizens of a polity but also accommodate their community-based demands to local autonomy. These struggles have most often been discussed in studies of multiculturalism and have tended to focus on the more established democracies, including the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and even India. However, these nonviolent movements to redefine the content of citizenship are not restricted to these older democracies. Indeed, during the last part of the twentieth century, these movements also started to emerge in the new democracies of Latin America.

This book is fundamentally interested in the intersection of democracy, citizenship, and ethnic politics. But rather than focus on the most familiar cases of ethnic violence in new democracies or multiculturalism in the established democracies, it casts its gaze on the least likely region: Latin America.

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2 Multiculturalism has come to mean many things. It is used here to refer to public policies that recognize ethnoracial diversity and that allocate some goods/resources along those lines. It is not used to describe a diverse society or to refer to individuals whose parents come from different ethnoracial backgrounds.
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America. Latin America has developed a reputation as an anomaly in studies of cultural pluralism, ethnic conflict, and multiculturalism. In several classic studies, it is described as the region where ethnic identities have had little political salience. Ethnic cleavages are comparatively weak; violent ethnic conflicts are rare, isolated, and small; and assimilation and miscegenation have been described as giving way to a new cosmic race, a racial democracy, or at the very least a melting pot. Consequently, efforts to allocate or redefine citizenship have been understood as issues of democratization rather than issues of ethnic politics – whether viewed from the perspective of ethnic conflict or multiculturalism. In other words, citizenship is understood as civil and political rights – independent of any particular ethnic content or conflict. Indeed, with the transition to democracy, Latin American constitutions granted to all individuals (independent of ethnic origins) the right to participate as citizens with relatively few formal political restrictions. Compared to other regions, this equalization and universalization of citizenship is noteworthy. For whereas democratization in much of Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe resulted in the activation and/or intensification of ethnic violence – as different ethnic groups vied for power and/or sought to carve out new nation-states – Latin America democratized with no apparent ethnic hitches – no ethnic violence; and no challenges to carve up the nation-state.

Ethnic relations in Latin America have played out historically in quite different ways from African and Asian countries. Latin American countries gained independence more than a century earlier than Africa and much of Asia. Latin American independence and national liberation movements in the nineteenth century referred to European settlers who subsequently set out to construct a nation-state coincident with the ethnicity of the conquerors. In Africa and parts of Asia, where many countries maintained colonial status through the 1950s and 1960s, independence movements developed within indigenous communities against settler populations. National liberation movements set out not only to capture state power but also to refashion a “truer” national identity. Following independence any semblance of national unity within many African countries broke down and gave way to ongoing conflict between ethnic groups, as in Nigeria, Rwanda, or Burundi. Hence, while pluriethnic states compose both Latin America and Africa, ethnic relations and conflict have played out on different terrains. In Latin America, ethnic cleavages have tended to occur between horizontal groups (white/mestizo groups that effectively occupy the state and indigenous groups that do not). In Africa, excluding important examples such as South Africa and Eritrea, ethnic cleavages since independence tend to exist between more vertically integrated groups competing, when democratic conditions prevail, to gain political power.

Gurr (2000: ch. 2) highlights that whereas ethnopolitical conflict generally increased in the post–World War II period and peaked in the early to mid-1990s, Latin America followed a different path. In Latin America, there has been little ethnopolitical conflict although there was a rise in ethnic protest in the 1990s.
Most analysts, therefore, assumed that ethnicity and citizenship were nonpolitical issues in the new Latin American democracies. By the end of the twentieth century, however, the entire landscape of Latin American politics shifted as indigenous movements formed to contest contemporary citizenship in one country after another. Vocal and increasingly powerful indigenous movements have emerged throughout the region. We have seen a rise in movement organizing and protest in countries as diverse as Ecuador, Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and beyond. Unlike the new democracies in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe, these new movements did not mobilize to redefine the boundaries of citizenship and did not spiral into ethnic conflict (or genocide). Rather, the newly formed indigenous movements mobilized to redefine the content of citizenship, in ways that paralleled but cannot be reduced to the multicultural struggles found in the older democracies of North America, Australia, and New Zealand.

This book sets out to explain the politicization of ethnic cleavages in late-twentieth-century Latin America. It focuses, in particular, on explaining the emergence and proliferation of these indigenous movements in the region. I argue in this book that the erosion of prior citizenship regimes throughout Latin America unwittingly challenged local autonomy, thereby politicizing indigenous communities in new ways. The rest of this book explains these changes in citizenship regimes in light of variations in social networks and political associational space.

This chapter engages in a prior and essential task. It conceptualizes citizenship regimes (as boundaries, form, and content). In particular, it analyzes who has citizenship (the boundaries), under what terms (the forms of interest intermediation), and with what rights and practices (the content). This three-dimensional analysis of citizenship regimes not only makes clear why one cannot reduce citizenship to democratization but also why one should not analyze it absent a concern for social cleavages and state capacity, more broadly. This discussion thus provides the conceptual framework for the analytical concerns of the rest of this book: namely why and how indigenous movements are contesting the contemporary terms of citizenship in Latin America.

See Linz and Stepan (1996) for an example of scholars who see ethnonational issues at play in all democratizing regions save Latin America.
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Conceptualizing Citizenship: The Who, How, and What

Who Can Be a Citizen? Drawing Boundaries

Who is in and who is out? – these are the first questions that any political community must answer about itself (Walzer 1993: 55).

We live in a world of bounded and exclusive citizenries. Every modern state identifies a particular set of persons as its citizens and defines all others as noncitizens, as aliens. . . . In global perspective, citizenship is a powerful instrument of social closure. . . . Every state claims to be the state of, and for, a particular, bounded citizenry, usually conceived as a nation (Brubaker 1992: ix–x).

So who is and should be a citizen? Who is included and what is the legitimating mechanism for doing so? Should boundaries be tied to the state system and, if so, should citizenship be restricted to certain categories of people? As discussed next, the question of who is eligible to be a part of a political community is fundamentally tied to the boundaries that are drawn – both vis-à-vis the resident population (a question of restrictiveness) and vis-à-vis those who reside beyond those state borders (a question of the primacy of state borders). For boundaries are drawn both within states as well as between them. These boundaries are drawn to define and uphold the relevant political community and have implications for the public (generally national) identity.

Four principles (the Aristotelian ideal, jus sanguinis, jus soli, and universality) have been used to define the relevant political community. Viewed together, these four principles provide a framework for thinking about how different states allocate citizenship. While each principle privileges a different template for determining the political community for citizenship, they each have implications for national perceptions of public identities and ethnonational relations in multiethnic states, including those in Latin America. As with all frameworks, however, these four principles serve more as heuristic markers rather than absolute descriptions of the principles used by all cases. Some cases fall neatly into one category. Others bridge categories. I elaborate on these four ways of allocating citizenship, in order of increasing inclusiveness (see Table 2.1).

The Aristotelian Ideal  The first principle used to define who can be a citizen builds on normative beliefs about who is capable or fit. Drawing on political theorists such as Aristotle and J. S. Mill, this approach evaluates
Table 2.1. *Principles for Allocating Citizenship*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Restrictive Identities</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Jus Sanguinis</em></td>
<td>National descent</td>
<td>Territorial and civic community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Jus Soli</em></td>
<td>National sovereignty</td>
<td>State sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Not Necessarily</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Aristotelian Ideal</em></td>
<td>Those who are fit/capable</td>
<td>Universal Citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Universal Citizenship</em></td>
<td>Open borders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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*a* While scholars of immigration have tended to focus on the columns in Table 1, theorists of citizenship have tended to focus on the rows. See Rubio-Marín (2000) and Honig (2001) for efforts to bridge these divides. Honig (2001) analyzes how categories of foreignness have defined and valued what it is to be a citizen.

*b* This category can theoretically apply either to open or closed borders. In practice, however, it has been defined by states.

who is capable of reason and who is able to calculate the general will of the community as a whole. While this principle can theoretically be used to include all human beings, it has historically been used to restrict citizenship within existing states to white, property-owning males. Those who “fit” this Aristotelian ideal were granted full citizenship rights. Those who did not were relegated to either secondary or tertiary status; they were subjects rather than citizens. This principle was obviously not confined to Athenian times. It has been widely applied in the twentieth century to exclude groups deemed unfit to assume the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. Women, Indians, blacks, slaves, and Jews, among others, have commonly been denied the full status of citizenship. These groups were commonly described by political elites as lacking reason, as tied to particular interests, and/or as lesser beings; they were consequently excluded from full citizenship rights. Indeed, Shklar (1991) reminds us, in her powerful discussion of citizenship in the United States, that citizenship has historically been defined and valued precisely in terms of those who were excluded. It was democratic for the few; it was undemocratic for the many.

In Latin America, this principle has been used at different times to deny citizenship to women, Indians, and Blacks. As revisionist historians of the past couple of decades have so clearly illustrated, the arrival of Columbus
and the ensuing conquest by Spanish and Portuguese settlers occurred at the expense of many indigenous communities that were subsequently subordinated to the political authority of newly created Latin American states and the spiritual authority of the Catholic Church. Military expeditions against the indigenous population were particularly brutal in Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile and, to a lesser degree, in Brazil. These same countries, similar to many others in Latin America, enacted legislation to attract European immigration, arguing that this would improve the racial composition and, therefore, the economic and political prospects of the new states. Latin American nation-states treated indigenous peoples as heathens, a threat to security, an impediment to economic development, and a source of cheap, if not free, labor. The various states enacted corresponding, if at times internally contradictory, policies to address these fears, perceptions, and goals. They killed those perceived as a threat to an emerging nation-state, isolated and/or denied the existence of those in remote areas, coerced populations for their labor, and/or promoted a policy of assimilation. Where and when it became difficult to repress or formally exclude these social groups, literacy requirements were used effectively to exclude the majority of these same groups. Literacy requirements were in place until 1945 in Guatemala, 1970 in Chile, 1979 in Ecuador, 1980 in Peru, and 1985 in Brazil and effectively excluded many indigenous men and most indigenous women from taking part in elections and exercising their political voice (Lapp 1994: 3). Remarkably, no sustained or widespread organization or mobilization occurred in Latin America to extend citizenship to Indians, until recently.

Democratization scholars who focus on the extension of the suffrage are generally looking at those cases where the Aristotelian principle of fitness has been used historically to exclude certain categories of people. And indeed, with the third wave of democratization in Latin America, states have rescinded restrictive literacy clauses (where they still existed) and have consequentially extended formal citizenship to indigenous peoples. In other regions, as well, we find the declining legitimacy of Aristotelian evaluations

6 See Maybury-Lewis (1991) and Mallon (1992) for a discussion of the varied ways in which nineteenth-century states set out to control indigenous communities through violence, isolation, and assimilation. See Stern (1992) for a sobering discussion of the need to adopt a more nuanced understanding of the colonization of the Americas and the multiple roles and actions of the colonizers and indigenous peoples in this process. See Yrigoyen (2000) for a discussion of the trajectory of different legal systems in Latin America.

of who is and can be a citizen. Most dramatically, we have seen in South Africa the dismantling of apartheid and the extension of citizenship rights to all South Africans, regardless of race and ethnicity. Ironically, it is in this period of more democratic access to citizenship that indigenous mobilization in Latin America has grown in strength and power. We return to this point in Chapter 3.

*Jus Sanguinis*  
While it is no longer acceptable to exclude people according to the Aristotelian principle of fitness, we commonly accept the rights of states to extend and restrict citizenship according to the principle of national descent or kinship. Indeed, the prevailing type of citizenship operates according to the principle of *jus sanguinis*. Rooted in nineteenth- and twentieth-century ideas about the nation-state, this ideal type is predicated on the idea that the fundamental political community is based on descent or ethnonational origins. Citizenship, therefore, should be restricted to the ethnonational community. Each nation should have a state, each national should be a citizen of his/her nation-state, and each nation-state should allocate citizenship rights along national lines. In short, states and citizenship are and should be the political manifestation of ethnonational identity.

Germany is the prototypical model of *jus sanguinis*; but this principle applies to a broader range of cases. In countries that apply this model, those presumed to share a common lineage are automatically extended citizenship rights (even if they are born and live abroad). Those who are presumed to herald from other national backgrounds, are commonly denied these rights in their new home countries. Consequently, those countries with multiethnic populations that use this principle of determining citizenship face a serious challenge. Guest workers who have resided in Germany for generations, for example, have demanded the right to become citizens – a status that is highly restricted.  

Moreover, in much of Africa and Asia, this principle has given way and informed the ethnic conflicts that have emerged – leading some ethnic groups to mobilize to demand either inclusion (where it is denied), to create their own polity (so that nation and state coincide), or to fight to gain control of the state that now excludes or marginalizes them. In many cases, they appeal to international norms about self-determination. It is striking that citizenship in cases of *jus sanguinis* assumes a primordial community that can

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8 The discussion of *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli* draws extensively on Brubaker (1992).

Citizenship Regimes, the State, and Ethnic Cleavages

and should govern itself. As such, those sharing ascriptive characteristics are in; those who do not are out.

This principle is foreign to Latin America. As a region populated largely by immigrants, it is hard to sustain the principle of jus sanguinis. And in a region where ethnic identities are understood to be malleable, it is hard to maintain a rigid and legal analysis of identity and citizenship. Indeed, Latin American states have promoted policies that encourage indigenous people to shed their “Indian ways” and to assimilate into a mestizo (or mixed) culture. In doing so, they gain the possibility of becoming full citizens – although for most indigenous people, citizenship has proven elusive in practice.

**Jus soli**  
Jus soli provides an alternative way of allocating (and restricting) citizenship in this age of sovereign states. The principle of jus soli grants citizenship along territorial lines. Jus soli begins with the assumption that a community is primarily defined by geography and civic ties. States therefore generally extend citizenship to those who are born in a given territory. They naturalize those migrants who meet a set of conditions, including knowledge of and commitment to the principles of a given state. Citizenship is self-consciously tied to ideas of civic inclusion, equality, freedom, and fraternity. In other words, there is no claim that the political community is one of blood, kinship, and descent. Rather jus soli sanctifies the individual and her political allegiances and civic ties to a given state. Today this form of citizenship is common in the Americas – but can also be found to one degree or another in Britain and France.\(^\text{10}\)

Given this territorial and liberal/civic understanding of citizenship, it is perhaps no surprise that many of these states have come to include ethnically diverse populations. And in the ex-colonial countries, these immigrant populations have come to reside on lands that were once populated and governed by indigenous peoples. It is in these states that the multicultural debates have found greatest resonance – with Indians often demanding a certain degree of autonomy and immigrants and former slaves demanding greater inclusion. The Latin American cases discussed in this

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\(^\text{10}\) Jus soli is not an absolute and, therefore, varies according to national norms. Whereas some countries automatically grant citizenship to those born in a given territory (e.g., United States, Britain), others grant citizenship to children of immigrants only when they turn eighteen and only if they are still residents of the country (France). See Brubaker (1992) for a discussion of the exceptions and details in the British case (81 fn. 14) and France (ch. 4).
book fall squarely into this camp. Indigenous people in Latin America have questioned the degree to which this liberal, civic, and territorial basis of citizenship is in fact inclusionary. Or, more precisely, they have challenged the consequences of this form of inclusion— for cultural identities, local autonomy, and land ownership. Ironically, land, which indigenous peoples claim as theirs, has become the contemporary territorial basis for determining access to citizenship in the national polity.

**Universal Citizenship/Open Borders** The fourth principle for allocating citizenship builds on the idea that the fundamental political community is humanity writ large— independent of fitness, national identities, or territorial boundaries. Citizenship should be a universal good— with no political restrictions. Universal access and open borders should define a world system. This principle remains an unrealized project that could take various forms— including the existence of states that agree to open up borders and access to citizenship; or the creation of a world government to which all would belong. In this model, passports would become obsolete, or at the very least their role would change. While this fourth approach to citizenship remains (at present) no more than an ideal, some of its ideas are approximated at a global level in UN ideals of human rights (Soysal 1994) and at a regional level within the European Union (EU) (Weiner 1999). In its purest form, this ideal type is based on universalism— no individual is excluded (regardless of race, ethnicity, ideology, or capacity); everyone is a citizen. This last type of citizenship is a political project rather than a political reality— as it is implemented nowhere. As such, it is not discussed at length here. But when juxtaposed against the prior three models, it helps to highlight where citizenship inheres, how restrictive it is, and the central role of the state in this process.

**Prevailing Citizenships, Prevailing States** *Jus sanguinis* and *jus soli* are the prevailing forms of allocating citizenship today. Juxtaposing them against the fourth principle of universal citizenship/open borders places in sharp relief the fact that these prevailing modes of allocating citizenship are predicated on and reinforce the state system. Both presume that the state is the natural and preferred basis for determining the political community. In this regard, citizenship becomes a way of defining who is “in” and who is “out.” It is a form of “social closure,” as noted by Brubaker (1992: ch. 1). And it is the state that is understood as the final arbiter in determining and allocating these rights (see Table 2.1).
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*Jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* are therefore not just about extending citizenship as a form of inclusion but also about delimiting membership in the state system. Some people have citizenship in a given state; others do not—a political decision that has more often than not had an ethnic bias. *Jus sanguinis* makes this explicit by stating its ethnocentric bias. For this practice of allocating and determining citizenship according to national membership remains exclusionary precisely because we do not live in a tightly contained world where nations and states coincide in a neat way. There are many more self-proclaimed nations than states. Self-proclaimed nation-states often have, in fact, multinational populations. Colonialism, war, refugee flows, and migration patterns (both forced and voluntary) have further complicated the fit between nations and states. Indeed, in the postcolonial world, one could say that there is a poor fit between states and nations and between country residence and national membership. Consequently, the construction of nation-state boundaries and citizenship provides a way of excluding not only those beyond national borders but also those nonnationals residing within them. Otherwise stated, *jus sanguinis* provides the logic for treating nonnational residents as second-class citizens (even when they have lived in these countries for several generations). These problems are not restricted to authoritarian times but are prevalent in many contemporary democratic regimes that extend citizenship according to this principle. The question of who can be a citizen is an ethnic question—pure and simple. And often the ethnic movements and conflicts that emerge in these cases are about who can become a citizen and how that happens.

*Jus soli*, by contrast, claims to be ethnoblind, when it comes to the allocation or extension of citizenship. And comparatively speaking, access to citizenship is more open and accessible to those residing in a given state territory. However, this should not blind us to the fact that *jus soli* begs the question of who can legally emigrate to that country. And of particular importance for this book, it presents other kinds of challenges for ethnic

11 For a similar point with respect to dual citizenship, see Carens (2000: 162–6).
12 *Jus soli* is not a policy of open borders. Indeed, these countries often have rather restrictive laws for immigration, residence, travel, and visas—even while they have comparatively liberal citizenship laws. The story of Jews who were trying to escape the Holocaust but were turned away from many Allied states that operated on the principle of *jus soli* is a horrifying example of how strictly these same states protect their borders. Similarly, political and economic refugees from Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean have more often than not been turned away from the United States—one of the prototypical cases of *jus soli*.

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groups residing in their borders. These challenges have less to do with access to formal citizenship (which is theoretically granted to those born in a given country) and more to do with how citizenship is experienced once it is granted.\textsuperscript{13}

In other words, while discussions of who can be a citizen might lead one to conclude that \textit{jus sanguinis} and the Aristotelian principle are ethnocentric and \textit{jus soli} is ethnoblind, discussions of how citizenship is experienced lead one to question this simple dichotomy. Indeed, if one is to make sense of ethnic mobilization in \textit{jus soli} states (i.e., those in the Americas), then one must consider other aspects of citizenship (form and content) and compare them against the experiences of its citizenry.

\textbf{How Do Citizens Relate to States? Different Forms of Interest Intermediation}

There are competing principles, therefore, for determining membership in any given polity. But what form does the relationship take between citizens and the state?\textsuperscript{14} What are the terms of interest intermediation? Who is the subject of citizenship? And who is the object of state norms, rules, and regulations? It is now commonplace among scholars of democratization to assume the primacy and relevance of the individual. Yet as comparativists once highlighted, and as political theorists continue to do so, interest intermediation can privilege the collectivity just as it can privilege the individual.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{13} See Yrigoyen (2000: 206–8) for a discussion of the Latin American legal tradition that presumed correspondence between one nation, one state, and one law – thereby negating the juridical existence of Indians.

\textsuperscript{14} For the rest of the chapter, I assume that states are sovereign entities vested with the power to decide who can be a citizen.

\textsuperscript{15} Comparativists once tackled these questions with an eye toward analyzing competing institutional arrangements of interest intermediation. They analyzed pluralist modes of interest intermediation (that privileged the individual) against corporatist and consociational forms of doing so (that privileged the group). This fascination stemmed from a profound realization that countries in Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East often institutionalized state–society relations in radically distinct ways from the classic liberal democracies in Great Britain, the United States, and both of their former colonies. With the recent round of democratization, comparativists have regrettably lost interest in these questions as liberal ideas gain ascendency. For an exception in comparative politics, see Janoski (1998). For particularly important normative debates in political theory on the topic of individual and group rights, see the edited volumes by Kymlicka (1995) and Shapiro and Kymlicka (1997).
Political theorists and philosophers, unsurprisingly, have pursued these questions with the greatest vigor. Debates about liberalism and communitarianism, in particular, speak to this question—albeit from a largely normative rather than empirical perspective. Liberals privilege the individual as the primary unit or subject of political life. The individual possesses certain rights and responsibilities and, in large part, acts to maximize personal autonomy, interests, and capacities. She is free to do so provided that she does not harm others. While individuals rely on the state to maintain law and order and to establish relations with other states, individuals seek to keep the state to a minimum. It is this freedom to actualize individual liberties free from state intervention that is the hallmark of contemporary democratic citizenship, according to prevailing liberal political norms.

The individual, in either the utilitarian or the contractual liberal view, is the sovereign author of her life who pursues her private rational advantage or conception of the good. The role of politics in this approach remains negative: only to aid and protect individuals from interference by governments in exercising the rights they inalienably possess and in return for which they have to undertake certain minimal political duties (pay taxes, vote periodically, obey the law, serve in the military). Consequently, citizenship, in the liberal view, is an accessory, not a value in itself (Shafir 1998: 10).

Liberalism therefore is an individual affair. Rights and responsibilities inhere in the individual. And it is the individual who relates to and is regulated by the state. Ethnicity and multiculturalism are irrelevant to a discussion of citizenship and the formal mechanisms of interest intermediation. While any individual has the right to participate in ethnic (or any other) associations, ethnic groups should not be privileged in designing the institutions of interest intermediation. This school of thought has become hegemonic in political theory, comparative politics (including American politics), and policy circles.

But citizenship has obviously not been confined theoretically or empirically to a set of individual rights and responsibilities. Groups have also assumed a formal political role in defining some state–society relations. Theoretically speaking, communitarians question the assumption that we can analyze individuals outside of the social context. Indeed, communitarians argue that identities, interests, preferences, meanings, and capacities are socially constructed and are rooted in communities. Interest intermediation and political mobilization cannot be understood, therefore, independently of the community, for individuals do not operate independently and autonomously from their community context. From this starting point,
communitarians argue that we need to privilege the community as the basis for understanding political subjects and their relationship to the state.

The communitarian philosophy has an empirical correlate in countries that have institutionalized corporatism, consociationalism, and/or legal pluralism. Each of these forms of interest intermediation and representation privileges the group as the primary political actors. Hence we find that corporatist systems privilege labor and business in their negotiations with the state. The underlying idea is that these groups should have a monopoly of representation for their sector and should have collective representation in shaping economic policy. Consociational systems set out to institutionalize interest intermediation and representation in societies deeply divided by social cleavages such as ethnicity, race, religion, and/or political ideology; in these cases, states do not allow the accumulation of individual decisions to decide who their executive and legislators will be but allocate these offices depending on group identities, quotas, alternation in power, veto rules, among other things. Finally, multiethnic countries with legal pluralism institutionalize systems where different groups maintain jurisdiction over their own communities – according to different and at times contrary legal precepts. What all of these cases share is that groups rather than individuals are the political subjects who have the right and responsibility to take political action. Under these circumstances, the state obviously must play an active role to determine which groups are privileged (and which ones are not), what the rules are, and how national politics is regulated. At base, states actively intervene to create more equal outcomes among groups rather than focusing exclusively on providing equal opportunities for individuals. It is the state-sanctioned group, therefore, that maximizes autonomy rather than the individual.

These two classical frameworks, therefore, have quite different ways of looking at state–society relations, with very distinct ways of thinking about the role that ethnicity plays in defining citizenship – with communitarians seeing it as primary and liberals seeing it as secondary.16

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16 That said, a new generation of liberals has tried to evaluate how states can accommodate a group-based understanding of ethnicity and ethnic rights within the liberal tradition. See for example, Gutman (1994); Taylor (1994); Kymlicka (1995); Williams (1998); and Carens (2000). Kymlicka (1995) notes in his edited volume, for example, that it is not that culture does not matter for liberals; but the idea is that in liberal democracies, national cultures should be able to “accommodate” and “incorporate” other ethnic groups through a process of assimilation. This, at least, is the self-understanding in countries such as France (Brubaker 1992), the United States (Kymlicka 1995: 23–4), Australia (Chesterman and Galligan 1997),
These debates are rooted in Western thought and context. They are not restricted, however, to the West. These foundational questions are relevant to the new democracies in Latin America, Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe – even if comparative scholars of these regions have more often than not ignored the liberal-communitarian debate that speaks to the philosophical foundations of ethnic diversity and democratic representation. But the questions that these theories raise cannot be ignored. What is the central unit of political life? To what extent should these institutions be informed by liberal or group principles? Should communities be granted special (i.e., different) rights by virtue of being a community? What are the appropriate institutions to mediate between citizens and states? And does the state have the capacity to enforce one type of citizenship or the other? These questions and answers are at the heart of democratic institution building and social policy. In the process of addressing these issues, regime-founding actors have made decisions about the appropriate form of citizenship and the corresponding relationship between society and state. In general, the liberal/pluralist version has been ascendant in the advanced industrial and developing world. This is increasingly so with the third wave of democracy, but was not historically the case.

What Does Citizenship Entail? Content and Marshall’s Trilogy of Rights

The third component of citizenship speaks to content. What does citizenship entail? While it is common to note that citizenship entails rights and responsibilities between citizenry and state, the actual content of that relationship has varied over time. Most studies of democratization have failed to take these changes into account. As they discuss democratization in the third wave, they have tended to equate citizenship with the extension of the suffrage and civil rights. However, as T. H. Marshall (1963) made...
clear in his masterful study (if idealized picture) of Great Britain, the twentieth century has witnessed the standardization of three different kinds of rights: civil, political, and social.

- Civil rights refer to “the rights necessary for individual freedom” and have come to include, among other things, freedom of association, expression, faith, and religion as well as freedom to own property, engage in contracts, and seek justice; these rights are backed up by the courts (71).
- Political rights refer to the right to take part in government – whether by participating in a legislature or local government or by exercising the right to suffrage (72).
- Social rights refer to “the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society. The institutions most closely connected with it are the educational system and the social services” (72). By assuring a certain standard of living (through welfare programs in housing, education, and health), social rights helped to raise up the impoverished and provide them with the opportunity and the resources to act equally as citizens in the political realm. It is not that all people should live as equals, but that all should live above a certain line. In this regard, Marshall acknowledged and accepted that citizenship provides the architecture for legitimating social inequality (70, 106).

Marshall derived these rights from the British experience but projected that they would be extended (in this order) in other cases as well. The scope, sequencing, and depth of citizenship in other cases, however, have not occurred in the sequential and nonconfictual ways outlined by Marshall. For if in Europe citizenship rights were extended sequentially and relatively slowly, in the developing world, they have generally been granted sparingly, simultaneously, in a different sequence, and/or intermittently. In other words, there is no simple and universal logic to the content of citizenship in the twentieth century. By the end of the twentieth century, the idea of social rights was everywhere challenged by conservative politicians and neoliberal

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17 Marshall assumed that citizenship coincided with and bolstered the idea of a common civilization. In this regard, his argument assumed that citizenship is a trilogy of rights restricted to a given ethnonational community that shared a given “civilization.” This point is made in passing in several points in this classic text but is not a point on which he elaborated.

18 Also see O’Donnell (2001).
economists who successfully reframed it as an expensive and unsustainable entitlement rather than a fundamental right of the citizenry. By the end of the twentieth century, the social rights that Marshall outlined as a sign of humanity’s progress were dismissed as a dispensable luxury. To further complicate the picture, several advanced industrial countries have extended political, civil, and even some social rights to noncitizens residing in their country. In other words, the content of citizenship has been subject to enormous variation across time and across region.

Given this variation, any discussion of citizenship must account for the content of citizenship and the rights that are upheld in any given state. Marshall’s categories of three rights provides an extremely useful framework for doing so. For the trilogy of citizenship rights makes abundantly clear that we cannot reduce citizenship to suffrage, as many democratization studies have presumed, but must identify rather than assume its content.

**Citizenship Regimes**

Who has access to citizenship? What rights does citizenship entail? What are the appropriate institutions to mediate between citizens and states? To what extent should these institutions be informed by liberal or group principles? These questions and answers are the stuff of democratic institution building and social policy. Each of the third wave democracies has had to make decisions about these issues. In the process of doing so, they have defined the boundaries, form, and terms of citizenship. In doing so, they have put in place patterned combinations that I refer to here as “citizenship regimes.” To recap, a citizenship regime refers to the patterned combination of choices about the three fundamental questions posed in this chapter:19

- Who has access to citizenship? Is this based on the principle of “fitness,” *jus sanginis*, *jus soli*, and/or open borders?
- What is the form of citizenship? In particular, what are the primary modes of interest intermediation? Are they based on liberal/pluralist

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19 I borrow the phrase “citizenship regime” from Jenson and Phillip (1996). They use the term to refer to the varying bundles of rights and responsibilities that citizenship can confer. I use the term in a more expansive sense. In Yashar (1999), I used the term to refer not only to the content of citizenship but also to its accompanying modes of interest intermediation. Upon reflection, I have decided to expand the scope of the term further to also refer to who has access to citizenship.
Theoretical Framing

Table 2.2. Citizenship Regimes in Latin America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Characteristics</th>
<th>Corporatist</th>
<th>Neoliberal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Rights</td>
<td>Yes (w/ constraints)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Rights</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Rights</td>
<td>Yes (Limited)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Intermediation</td>
<td>Corporatist</td>
<td>Pluralist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privileged Unit</td>
<td>Class</td>
<td>Individual</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Context and Cases                |                                     |                                 |
| Regime                           | Democratic or                       | Democratic or                   |
|                                  | Authoritarian                       | Authoritarian                   |
| Time Period                      | Mid-20th century                    | 1980s on                        |
| Cases                            | All – to varying degrees            | All                             |

principles that privilege the individual or corporatist/consociational/communitarian principles that privilege the group.

- What is the content of citizenship rights? Drawing on T. H. Marshall, content refers to the civil, political, and social rights extended to the citizenry.

There are various combinations that could take place and that have in fact done so. In the twentieth century, corporatism and neoliberal citizenship regimes have been the most significant (see Table 2.2). These two citizenship regimes are neither equal to nor derivative of political regime type (democracy and authoritarianism).

Corporatist citizenship regimes were constructed by Latin American states in the mid-twentieth century. Latin American countries started to extend social rights (including labor rights, pensions, subsidies, credit, health care, education, and the like) and institutionalized corporatist modes of interest intermediation for workers and peasants in particular. As such, states privileged collective units and offered corresponding social programs to address collective concerns. Importantly, corporatist citizenship regimes did not necessarily extend political rights alongside these social ones given that they were constructed by both democratic and authoritarian regimes. Military regimes in fact had a rather ambiguous relationship to

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20 I use the terms corporate and corporatist to refer to state-designated forms of political representation and mediation between the state and societal groups. I do not use the term to suggest the presumed closed nature of indigenous communities, as discussed in Wolfe’s classic (1957) article.
corporatism. The military in Peru and Ecuador actually initiated these corporatist projects, although the same could not be said for the militaries in the Southern Cone and Central America.

In the third wave democracies, states have tended to promote neoliberal citizenship regimes. The expansion of political and civil rights has tended to coincide with the decline in social rights and the promotion of liberal or pluralist modes of interest intermediation. Organized social sectors (such as workers and peasants) have lost their state assurance of a basic standard of living and similarly have lost their main institutional means of accessing and occasionally influencing the state. Seen as a whole, neoliberal citizenship regimes in the third wave of democracy, and particularly in Latin America, have celebrated the individual as the political subject of citizenship. This book analyzes why and how this development sharpened the very ethnic cleavages that liberalism should theoretically have accommodated.

While citizenship regimes have such distinct consequences for state–society relations, they share one important feature. They both assume the irrelevance of ethnicity and the prevalence and salience of some other kind of identity. As argued in the following chapters, this assumption was misplaced. For while all Latin American states tried to remake Indians into other identities (peasants, nationals, individuals), these were only partially successful endeavors. Indeed, by the end of the twentieth century, ethnic cleavages were repoliticized and indigenous identities became politically salient. To understand these developments, we must look at citizenship regimes in light of existing social cleavages and the reach of the state.

**Concluding with Social Cleavages and the State**

This chapter has argued that the boundaries, form, and content of citizenship regimes matter. They provide the formal institutional context within
which societal actors operate. In this regard, they fundamentally define formal aspects of state–society relations. But should one generalize from the institutions of different citizenship regimes to the experiences within them? For if most democratization scholars and contemporary political regimes have privileged a liberal understanding of citizenship, they have also assumed that the experience of citizenship at any given point in time is, for analytical purposes, more or less constant among citizens of a given state.\(^2\)

At any one point in time, citizens are assumed to have equal rights and responsibilities. But the formalism associated with this approach, which assumes that each citizen gains certain rights, independent of a set of social cleavages and conflicts, falls prey to the very shortcomings once noted by Schattsneider (1975) in his criticism of legal formalism. They mistake institutions for practice and formalism for experience. Indeed, studies of democracy have done precisely this by taking citizenship as a given institution that is extended and experienced equally by all individuals. Schattsneider noted: “The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent.”\(^2\)

In other words, liberalism (or pluralism, according to Schattsneider) assumes an equality that belies differential opportunities and experiences. As Foweraker and Landman (1997: 13) have also noted: “citizens may enjoy equality before the law, but the law ‘is silent on their ability to use it’ (Bendix 1964).” For these reasons, it would be shortsighted to elevate citizenship regimes to a new kind of formalism.\(^2\)

To tackle how citizenship regimes matter, therefore, we must situate them in the context of the societal cleavages, inequalities, and tensions that exist in society. Societal cleavages and inequalities can compromise, hinder, and at times undermine the political equality promised by citizenship. Different social groups do not necessarily identify with the national political community, gain equal representation or voice in the prevailing forms of interest intermediation, and/or encounter equal access to the rights acknowledged by a given citizenship regime. These points are eloquently and convincingly made by a diverse set of scholars, whose work has greatly influenced the kinds of arguments made in this book. This list includes, but is not

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\(^2\) Important exceptions include O’Donnell (1993); Fox (1994a and 1994b); Foweraker and Landman (1997); and Yashar (1999).


\(^2\) Also see Wiener (1999: 199).
Citizenship Regimes, the State, and Ethnic Cleavages

limited to, Marx, T. H. Marshall, Walzer (1983 and 1993), and Young (1995). One does not have to agree with their distinct (and different) policy recommendations to appreciate the eloquence, power, and implications of their arguments about citizenship and inequality. Despite fundamental differences in ideological orientations, all of these scholars note that while citizenship legally grants equal rights, in practice these rights can be and have been minimized and blocked for significant parts of the citizenry. This tension can result from the inequalities posed by capitalism (Marx and Marshall) and/or the persistence of social exclusions (Walzer and Young). In short, citizenship regimes can grant formal equal rights for an officially defined political community, but they cannot do away with unequal experiences – vis-à-vis citizenship regimes, other citizens, and the state. For given

25 Marx argued that citizenship was epiphenomenal. It did not and could not extend equal political rights insofar as it was derivative of material conditions that were at their core unequal. So long as capitalism prevailed, material conditions would generate inequality among classes. So long as material inequality persisted, political equality of individuals would remain ideational rather than actual.

26 T. H. Marshall observed that there is an inherent and deep tension between capitalism and democratic citizenship. The former creates economic inequality while the latter creates political equality. He argued that these two systems would always be in tension with one another. While a supporter of both, he argued that extreme economic inequalities undermined the capacity of the impoverished to act as political equals. In particular, extreme economic inequalities made it difficult for individuals to take part in a “civilized” life – which he saw as the sine qua non of citizenship. Marshall therefore saw the need to tame and counteract the extreme inequalities that capitalism could and had created.

27 Walzer argued in his classic 1983 book, Spheres of Justice, that the extension of formal citizenship holds great promise but does not result in equality. He wrote that it would result in a world where no particular group would dominate in all spheres; some groups would prevail in some spheres; other groups would prevail in other spheres. He called this social equilibrium “complex equality.” “No one would rule or be ruled all the time and everywhere. No one would be radically excluded.” In 1993, Walzer observed that this ideal form of complex equality had not occurred. The inclusive democracies of the late twentieth century had reproduced inequalities that existed previously in all spheres of society, by systematically disadvantaging certain groups through stereotyping, discrimination, and disregard.

28 Young (1995) argues that despite citizenship's formal equality, historically marginalized and excluded groups do not operate on a level playing field in public debates. Citizenship grants these groups the right to vote and to organize, but it does not actually grant an equal voice. This is not least because the public sphere is not a neutral-free zone. Powerful groups have defined the rules and called them neutral. However, the rules and associated norms in fact reflect, if not favor, the practices, discourses and interests of some groups over others. As such, historically marginalized groups come to the public sphere with distinct disadvantages – finding it difficult to speak out and to be heard.
different social backgrounds and social contexts, experiences are uneven, social marginalization can persist, and other kinds of exclusions and inequalities can result – particularly for subordinated or marginalized ethnic groups.

If I draw explicitly on these authors for their insight into the tension between citizenship and social inequality, the same cannot be said for their assumptions about state capacity. Marshall, Walzer, and Young have all argued that the state has intervened or should do so to address the tension between citizenship’s political equality and societal inequalities: be it through social rights (Marshall); neocorporatist forms of representation (Young); or greater education and civic life (Walzer). At base, all of these scholars trust that the state has the capacity to play this corrective role. Given their focus on the advanced industrial democracies, this political analysis and policy recommendation perhaps are compelling.

They are right to highlight the potentially corrective role of the state. And they are right to pinpoint that state intervention can perhaps alleviate the tension between citizenship and social inequality. However, they are wrong to assume that state capacity exists. State capacity cannot be assumed but has to be empirically substantiated. This is true for all cases, but particularly for the new democracies, where one does not always find a fully functioning and capable state. In this context, it is not only that other social cleavages and practices can seriously compromise the ideals of liberal citizenship (a point forcefully made by Marshall, Walzer, and Young). It is also, fundamentally, that states cannot always deliver on the political promise to correct this situation.

Most political constitutions of Latin America have guaranteed the basic bundle of citizenship rights since Independence, but there exists “an appreciable gap between protection on paper and environment in practice” (Panizza 1993: 209).

The failure of the rule of law leaves a yawning gap between the formal legal structure and the real reach of the law, between rights-in-principle and rights-in-practice, and this gap...is of fundamental importance to the relationship between citizenship rights and social movements (Foweraker and Landman 1997: 20–1).

Indeed, as we will see in the cases of Latin America, the incomplete and uneven reach of the state has compromised indigenous peoples’ access to and experiences with different types of citizenship regimes. In the absence of a state that can actually govern across a territory – what Michael Mann (1986: 59) refers to as infrastructural power – citizenship regimes are
Citizenship Regimes, the State, and Ethnic Cleavages

compromised, at best, and sacrificed at worst. Under these circumstances, it is not only that citizenship regimes might fail to deliver on the promise of unified political communities, equal political rights, and standardized forms of interest intermediation, but they might also mask the local autonomies and deep social inequalities that already exist.
The Argument

INDIGENOUS MOBILIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA

The Latin American anomaly has yet to be explained. Why were ethnic cleavages weak in Latin America? Why did they reverse course at century’s end, as indigenous mobilization proliferated throughout the region? And why have significant regional and national movements emerged in all cases except Peru? This chapter addresses the contemporary and yet uneven emergence of indigenous movements in Latin America by analyzing the five cases outlined in Chapter 1: Ecuador, Bolivia, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru. I compare these cases cross-temporally and cross-nationally.

This chapter highlights the role of citizenship regimes vis-à-vis existing social cleavages and uneven state penetration – as conceptualized and discussed in Chapter 2. I argue here that different types of citizenship regimes first diffused and then activated ethnic cleavages. Earlier citizenship regimes unintentionally enabled indigenous communities to carve out spaces of local autonomy, with limited interference from the state in matters of local governance. Subsequent citizenship regimes, however, threatened the autonomy that had been secured and, consequently, politicized ethnic cleavages. Hence we must trace the comparative historical arc of citizenship regimes and the associated patterns of state formation to understand the politicization of these ethnic cleavages and the motive for organizing. Where autonomy was possible, ethnic cleavages were weak. Where autonomy was subsequently challenged, ethnic cleavages became more salient.

This comparative historical discussion of citizenship regimes explains why ethnic cleavages have become more politicized in the contemporary period but were comparatively weak in earlier periods. But this variable alone does not explain when and where those cleavages translated into

This chapter is a revised and expanded version of Yashar (1998 and 1999).
Indigenous Mobilization in Latin America

indigenous organizations. For as theories of social movement and collective action have made clear, alongside motives one must also consider the capacity and opportunity for organizing. One must therefore ask not only why indigenous people would want to organize along indigenous lines, but also when they confronted the opportunity to do so, and where they had the capacity to mobilize accordingly. In Latin America, the preexistence of transcommunity networks provided the capacity to organize while political associational space (freedom of association and expression) essentially provided the political opportunity to do so.

This chapter makes the case that only where these three factors (changing citizenship regimes that challenged local autonomy, transcommunity networks, and political associational space) came together did indigenous movements emerge. As Tables 3.1 and 3.2 lay out, these three factors concatenated in Ecuador, Bolivia, Guatemala, and Mexico by the end of the twentieth century and gave rise to significant indigenous movements in each country. These three factors did not appear together in Peru, where political associational spaces were elusive and community networks were weak – thereby working against indigenous organizing beyond the local level. This chapter develops this three-pronged comparative historical argument against the five most densely populated indigenous countries in Latin America.

The Motive: Changing Citizenship Regimes, States, and Autonomy

The politicization of ethnic cleavages and the motive for organizing resulted from the shift in citizenship regimes and the challenge to local autonomy that ensued. Latin America essentially experienced an arc of citizenship regimes that moved from corporatist citizenship regimes toward neoliberal ones, as noted in Chapter 2 (and summarized in Table 2.2). While corporatist citizenship regimes advanced civil and social rights (and at times political rights) alongside class-based forms of interest intermediation, neoliberal citizenship regimes advanced civil and political rights alongside pluralist forms of interest intermediation.

Both corporatist and neoliberal citizenship regimes profoundly and intentionally reshaped state institutions and resources, as well as the terms of public access to them. Because of the uneven reach of the state, however, they had unintended consequences. Thus, in attempting to restructure...
### Table 3.1. Emergence of Indigenous Movements in Latin America: Scoring of Variables and Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motive/Incentive</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>Opportunity</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Changing Citizenship Regimes</td>
<td>Transcommunity Networks</td>
<td>Political Associational Space</td>
<td>Indigenous Movements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>For Highland Peasants</th>
<th>For Lowlands</th>
<th>Amazon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

*Changing citizenship regimes explain the contemporary politicization of indigenous identities. This variable is therefore key to explaining variation over time: namely, why indigenous movements emerge in the contemporary period but not earlier. Networks and political associational space are used to explain variation in capacity and opportunity, respectively, within the contemporary context of politicized indigenous identities. These two variables are therefore used to explain variation among the cases: namely why indigenous identities emerge in all cases but Peru. They are also used to explain subnational variation within the five cases.*

*This column focuses on the changing political associational space in the more state-penetrated highland regions of the Andes and Mesoamerica. This is because in the Amazon, low state penetration for most of the century meant that there has been a relatively constant opportunity for political organizing.*
society into class-based federations with social rights, corporatist citizenship regimes unwittingly provided autonomous spaces that could shelter rural indigenous communities from state control. And for their part, neoliberal citizenship regimes, setting out to shatter corporatism’s class-based model and social rights and replace them with a more atomized or individuated set of state–society relations, in fact challenged the indigenous local autonomy that corporatism had unintentionally sheltered. As such, corporatist and neoliberal citizenship regimes had foundational projects for state and society that were consequential but unevenly institutionalized. From the top looking down, these projects restructured society in radical ways. From the bottom looking up, however, these new projects of state formation and interest intermediation have been contested at many steps along the way. This section juxtaposes the formal goals and the unintended consequences of these two citizenship regimes as a way to explain both why ethnic cleavages were once weak and why they subsequently became politicized.

Corporatist Citizenship Regimes and Local Autonomy

It is commonly acknowledged that Latin American politicians, in both democratic and authoritarian regimes, set out to address the social question in the mid-twentieth century with corporatism. As the working class and peasantry started to mobilize for resources, inclusion, and justice, political parties and the state sought to capture political support and to control the masses with the creation of new modes of interest intermediation and social rights. Corporatism did not necessarily grant free and universal suffrage. But it did create and/or promote labor and peasant associations that 1) structured, and often monopolized, official representation, 2) received state subsidies, and 3) were controlled by the state. A new type of state–society relations, therefore, was adopted that a) institutionalized a new mode of class-based interest intermediation and that b) extended social rights through the extension of social policies designed to provide a modicum of social welfare (including education, health, credit, subsidies, and the like). In other words, at mid-century, Latin American countries started to institutionalize corporatist citizenship regimes.

### Table 3.2. Emergence of Indigenous Movements in Latin America: Description of Variables and Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motive/Incentive</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>Opportunity</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Changing Citizenship Regimes that Challenge Local Autonomy</td>
<td>Transcommunity Networks</td>
<td>Political Associational Space</td>
<td>Indigenous Movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>For Highland Peasants</strong></td>
<td><strong>For Lowlands/Amazon</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Military-Peasant Pact (1960s) and Banzer dictatorship (1970s) erode corporatist citizenship regime; culminates in neoliberal citizenship regime in 1980s–1990s</td>
<td>State development programs, beginning in 1960s but particularly in 1990s</td>
<td>Peasant unions, church networks, and NGOs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 
- ECUARUNARI: Confederación Andina de Nacionalidades Indígenas Rurales-artesanales del Ecuador
- CONFENAIE: Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Populares del Ecuador
- CONAIE: Confederación de Nacionalidades Andinas de Ecuador
- CSUTCB: Confederación Sindical Unitaria de los Trabajadores Campesinos del Bajo Chicamocha
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Peasant Unions and Church Networks</th>
<th>Political Opening</th>
<th>Movements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Erosion of corporatist citizenship regime beginning in 1940s culminates in neoliberal citizenship regime in 1980s and 1990s</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Partial political opening from 1988 on</td>
<td>Significant Regional Movements particularly EZLN (emerged in 1994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Overthrow of Velasco regime in 1975 coup; reverses much of corporatist citizenship regime and culminates in neoliberal citizenship in 1980s and 1990s</td>
<td>State development programs, beginning in 1960s but particularly in 1990s</td>
<td>Growing restrictions, 1980–1992; 1992 autogolpe; end of civil war in 1990s provided greater associational space</td>
<td>Weak Regional Movements AIDESEP (founded in 1980) and UNCA (founded in 1983)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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*ECUARUNARI was founded in 1972, although it subsequently wavered between a class-based and ethnic-based agenda. While it adopted an ethnic agenda initially, it pursued a class-based agenda from 1977–1985, after which it adopted an explicit identification with and primary concern for an “ethnic” agenda.*

*The founding dates for these two regional organizations is somewhat arbitrary. The Kataristas first started to emerge in the early 1970s but their organizing efforts were cut short by the Banzer dictatorship; they assumed a public face and gained public notoriety in 1979. CIDOB was founded in 1982 as a subregional organization but expanded in the 1980s to encompass all of the Bolivian lowlands.*
Less commonly explored, or even questioned, are the ways in which indigenous peoples were affected by the corporatist project. I argue in this book that corporatist citizenship regimes unwittingly institutionalized autonomous spaces for indigenous peoples. Relatively unmonitored local spaces were created where indigenous people could sustain their local indigenous identities and forms of governance. So too they gained institutional mechanisms to access the state and its resources. As such, many indigenous communities survived and grew beyond the de facto reach of the state.

The new modes of interest intermediation and the new social programs fostered this autonomy in the following ways. Labor laws freed Indians from slave labor, debt peonage, and other forms of repressive labor control. Accordingly, these laws provided Indians with a degree of freedom previously denied them. The laws recognized indigenous peoples as candidates for citizenship rather than objects of local control. Land reforms alongside other social programs granted indigenous communities land titles and social services and, in the process, provided them both with a basis for securing a basic standard of living (i.e., social rights) and with the geographic space to secure cultural practices and political autonomy. Moreover, peasant federations, as the primary mode of interest intermediation, provided Indians with institutional avenues for accessing and interacting with the state.

Land reforms in Mexico (1934), Bolivia (1953), Guatemala (the short-lived reform of 1952), Ecuador (1964 and 1973), and Peru (1968), for example, weakened landed elites’ control of the countryside, redistributed significant tracts of land, and provided incentives for Indians to register as peasant communities. This registration reorganized the countryside along

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3 Some scholars working on social movements and oppositional consciousness have underscored the importance of “free spaces” (see, in particular, Evans and Boyte [1986]). A more recent round of scholarship has emphasized, in particular, that physical segregation and the capacity to talk in unmonitored spaces can ironically provide the free spaces for oppositional consciousness and mobilization (see Groch 2001 and Morris and Braine 2001: 30–1). This general idea maps onto the argument developed in this book. Indigenous people were removed from the centers of power but were also alienated from it. As such, they had the spaces to maintain and develop ideational and political autonomy. While this argument broadly parallels the ideas about “free spaces,” I have chosen not to use this term, which was developed for the United States and presumes a commitment to democracy (which I did not find) rather than autonomy (which better describes the de facto practices found in many indigenous communities).

state-regulated corporatist lines, with many peasant communities joining peasant federations in hopes of gaining access to land and the state. These corporatist reforms brought with them the creation and expansion of social services in the areas of agricultural support, infrastructure, education, and health. Access to land and these services were often gained through corporatist associations.

In other words, the corporatist citizenship regime recognized Indians’ freedom from elite control, recatalogued Indians as peasants, and as such, granted them rights and access previously denied them. The state and union organizations imposed a peasant identity on Indians as the ticket for political incorporation and access to resources. With the distribution of land, extension of agricultural credits, and provision of agricultural subsidies, peasants developed a new relationship with the state, one that subordinated them into official channels in exchange for clientelistic rewards. While the actual implementation of these reforms was quite uneven within and across countries, they generated political ties with those rural sectors that had gained (or hoped to gain) access to land and the state.

The registration of peasant communities and the growth of peasant federations, in particular, fostered the fiction that the state had turned Indians into peasants and stripped indigenous ethnicity of its salience. Official political discourse promoted assimilation into mestizo culture and extended resources to rural citizens insofar as they identified and organized as peasants. Until recently, studies of corporatism highlighted the strong reach of these corporatist institutions and their capacity to control and remake these social sectors. Latin American corporatist states presumably centralized state–society relations.

Yet this enterprise was compromised by the absence of a rationalized bureaucracy, the failure to establish authority, and a lack of monopoly of the legitimate use of force. For in contrast to Weber’s classic definition of the state, many of Latin America’s central political institutions remain weak, commitment to those institutions remains questionable, and the territorial scope of those institutions remains ambiguous. This is nowhere more apparent than from the vantage of the countryside. From that perspective, it is difficult to argue that there is a single human community (as opposed to

5 Weber (1946: 78) argued in his classic definition of the state: “The state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” In Latin America, however, as in most of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, this standard is still largely unmet.
many), that the state claims a monopoly of the legitimate use of force, or that the territory is clearly defined. National identities, borders, and legitimacy are all in question and often in flux. Indeed, Latin America remains very much in the throes of state formation, where the identities, borders, and legitimacy of the state are highly politicized and contested processes, particularly in the countryside. Even in Guatemala, where the military state of the 1970s and 1980s was presumed omnipotent and omnipresent, the state was unevenly institutionalized, thereby leaving spaces for autonomous action.

Hence, despite official statements and institutions of corporatist control, large areas of the country operated beyond the reach of the state. Authoritarian enclaves were dominated by patronage and clientelist networks. Caudillos and landlords at times deployed their own paramilitary forces, created their own political rules, displayed greater allegiance to sub-national politics than to national politics, and/or deployed state institutions for their benefit.

The weak reach of the state had implications for both those areas that were targeted by corporatist citizenship regimes (the Andean and Mesoamerican highlands) and those that were not (the Amazon). Studies of the Amazon have long noted the failure of states to govern the Amazon – leaving large swaths of territory and significant numbers of Indians beyond the political and military control of the state. States did not actively seek to harness the Amazon region until the latter part of the twentieth century. Prior to that they had mapped out boundaries that de facto included Indians as members, though not necessarily citizens, of the given state. With this de facto policy of disregard, Indians did not gain access to state resources but they did maintain substantial, if not complete, political autonomy from the state – leaving indigenous authorities and practices to govern social, political, economic, and cultural relations therein. And while colonization schemes beginning in the 1960s (which in some places coincided with land reforms) did pose a threat in some places, these schemes did not initially change the circumstances for most indigenous communities in the

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6 State formation is a process of political mapping. As Scott (1998) has argued, it requires a situation of mutual intelligibility. The state must be able to read, identify, and defend the territory it governs. Those governed should be able to identify (with) and depend on the state for basic functions.

7 Yashar (1997b).

8 Fox (1994a and 1994b); Joseph and Nugent (1994); Nickson (1995); and Hagopian (1996).

9 See Ruiz (1993); Santos-Granero (1996); and Smith (1996).
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Amazon, which remained beyond the reach of the colonists or who resettled in areas not yet claimed by them. In short, while corporatist citizenship regimes granted access to the state and social rights, the uneven reach of the state de facto undermined the centralizing program and allowed for local authorities – indigenous and otherwise – to act with relative autonomy in the Amazon.

The uneven reach of the state also had an impact on the capacity of Latin American countries to incorporate those areas most affected by the corporatist citizenship regimes. In the agricultural highlands of Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador as well as the rural areas in Mexico and Guatemala, the state could not assert the pervasive control that the overwhelming majority of studies of corporatism have tended to assume. To the contrary, indigenous communities managed to carve out a degree of local autonomy that remained beyond the reach of corporatist institutions. Indeed, due to labor laws, land reform, and credit programs (fundamental components of the corporatist citizenship regimes in the countryside) Indians secured the spaces in which they could institutionalize indigenous community practices at the local level. In more ways than one, the distribution of inviolable communal lands to registered peasant communities provided Indians with the physical space not only for farming but also for securing governance by traditional indigenous authorities and the public expression of cultural ties. In this way the legal registration of communities and granting of community-based property created a legally defined, state-sanctioned, geographic area that allowed for the growth and/or maintenance of politically autonomous local enclaves, indigenous culture, and political practices. Otherwise stated, land reforms (which extended social rights in the countryside) masked the maintenance of indigenous autonomy and in some cases even engendered the (re)emergence of indigenous leaders, the (re)constitution of communities, and the expression of (evolving) indigenous identities at the community level.

In Mexico, for example, the land reform accompanied the creation of a national peasant federation, the Confederación Nacional Campesina

10 Rubin (1997), for example, highlights how corporatism in Mexico is much more porous than commonly portrayed and that alternative spaces for organizing were therefore present for social movement formation and political contestation.

11 In Eugen Weber's classic (1976) study of nation building, he illuminates how the French state turned peasants into Frenchman. I suggest here that Latin American efforts to turn Indians into peasants in fact created the space in which they could defend and develop a local indigenous identity.
Theoretical Framing

(CNC), and distributed property in many forms. Of these, the distribution of *ejidos* (communally owned land) unwittingly provided the greatest latitude for local indigenous autonomy – they were community based, inalienable, and, while regulated, often beyond state control.12 In Bolivia the National Revolutionary governments of the 1950s and the subsequent military governments between 1964 and 1974 also incorporated Indians into the state as peasants. As in Mexico, they depended on alliances and pacts with peasant federations, which were expected both to deliver votes to the government and to control the local communities. Contrary to the hopes of politicians and military officers, Bolivia witnessed the maintenance of *ayllus* (kinship groups governed by a set of local-level indigenous authorities) in several regions in the Andean countryside.13 In Ecuador the 1937 community law and later the 1964 and 1973 land reforms defined indigenous men and women as peasants and gave them access to the state insofar as they represented themselves as peasant communities and/or unions. Greater state penetration, land reforms, and freedom of movement often increased indigenous peasant independence from local landlords and, moreover, enabled indigenous communities to strengthen and (re)construct local public spaces for community authority structures and customary law.14 Indeed, the number of registered peasant communities skyrocketed in the 1960s and 1970s.15 However, at the local level, many indigenous communities continued to maintain some form of indigenous practices and institutions. These clientelist and corporatist arrangements were most advanced in Mexico and Bolivia, followed by Ecuador; the broad outlines of these arrangements endured in these three countries until the 1980s. Short-lived state efforts to incorporate the peasantry and pass land reform programs also occurred in Guatemala (1944–1954) and Peru (1968–1975).

Corporatist citizenship regimes, therefore, created a dynamic dualism, with identities shifting according to the locale. Before the state, Indians assumed identities as peasants – thereby gaining access to the social services and goods (in other words, *social rights*). Within the community, peasants assumed their identities as Indians – thereby securing local cultural

12 Fox (1994a); Mattiace (1997); Rubin (1997); Harvey (1998); and Napolitano and Leyva Solano (1998).
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enclaves. Location mattered for the expression of identity. Where the state incompletely penetrated local communities (nowhere more evident than in the Amazon), Indians sustained and asserted varying degrees of political autonomy by retaining authority systems and customs. For even if states did not respect indigenous jurisdiction in these communities, indigenous communities often did.

Shifting Citizenship Regimes and Challenging Local Autonomy

This particular balance in state–society relations, however, would not survive the century. Military and economic elites did not necessarily accept the rising power of class (including peasant) federations, and economic constraints made it difficult for states to sustain social programs that had extended the host of social programs associated with the corporatist citizenship regimes. Moreover, states increasingly responded to economic pressures to open up markets that had protected or ignored indigenous lands. As elites started to erode corporatist citizenship regimes and to try to gain command of national territories, they politicized ethnic cleavages by challenging the two types of autonomy that had developed 1) among the peasantized and corporatized areas of the Andes and Mesoamerica and 2) within the Amazon.

The erosion of corporatist citizenship regimes began as early as 1954 in Guatemala and culminated throughout the region with the replacement of corporatist citizenship regimes with neoliberal citizenship regimes in the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, by the end of the twentieth century, citizenship regimes had changed radically as neoliberal ideas came to define the rights of citizens and the predominant mode of interest intermediation. With the third wave of democracy and the economic crises of the 1980s and 1990s, in particular, politicians throughout the region started to advocate individual autonomy and responsibility, a program based on granting individual political and civil rights (but not necessarily social rights), the emasculation

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16 This duality is captured by disciplinary differences in the social sciences. Political scientists working on this period have highlighted the centrality of class, the peasantry, and corporatist organizations, as if they displaced community autonomy and ethnic identities. Anthropologists have historically focused on the local level and, in turn, have highlighted community autonomy and ethnicity, often at the expense of broader patterns of state–society relations.

17 Corporatist citizenship regimes barely penetrated the Amazon. Amazonian Indians rarely formed part of peasant federations, and states did not have the resources to control them. Consequently, Amazonian Indians had even more autonomy than Andean and Mesoamerican Indians.
of corporatist organizations, and the promotion of free markets in land and labor. The last of these amplified the challenge to local autonomy that had begun in earlier periods and provided the language that movements would use to challenge neoliberalism and to articulate a postliberal challenge. The rest of this section lays out how changing citizenship regimes politicized ethnic cleavages and provided the motive for organizing in two regions differentially affected by the state.

**Eroding Corporatist Citizenship Regimes and Politicizing Ethnic Cleavages in the Andes and Mesomerica** One wave of ethnic politicization occurred in the very areas that had been explicitly targeted by the corporatist citizenship regimes: the Andes and Mesomerica. In these areas – which had been formally granted labor freedoms, social rights in the form of land and social services, and peasant-based representation – Indians eventually confronted the erosion of corporatist citizenship regimes and a corresponding challenge to local autonomy. In some cases this was a slow process (as in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Mexico); in others it was a sudden reversal (as in Guatemala and Peru). But in all cases, it eventually resulted in the political project and economic “imperative” associated with the neoliberal citizenship regimes of the 1980s and 1990s.

In Ecuador, Bolivia, and Mexico the weakening of rural peasant programs was a slow and steady process. The military government in Ecuador initially extended these corporatist rights but subsequently backpedaled on their promises. In Mexico, it was a slow process that occurred over decades as the state decreased its commitment to the land reform program initially passed in the 1930s. In Bolivia, the military governments of the 1960s sought to reassert control over the peasantry in the “Military-Peasant Pact,” which essentially imposed leaders on peasant federations and imposed stabilization packages during the 1970s.

In each of these cases, there was a steady erosion of corporatist citizenship regimes – which resulted in the steady weakening of state-sanctioned peasant federations, the slowing down of land reform commitments, and increasing efforts by the state to control local politics. In each case, Indians started to organize along ethnic-based lines – with particularly important organizing efforts in each case in the 1970s.18

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18 Indigenous movements did not emerge immediately following the motive provided by the changing citizenship regimes. As argued here, two other variables (networks and political associational space) were also necessary as they provided *capacity* and *opportunity*, respectively.
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Neoliberal citizenship regimes were implemented in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s and delivered the final coup de grace against corporatist citizenship regimes, in general, and local autonomy, in particular. While neoliberal citizenship regimes did not cause indigenous mobilization in the first place, they did subsequently catalyze additional mobilization (and shaped the political agendas that emerged). Neoliberal citizenship regimes resulted in reduced ministerial budgets for ministries of agriculture; social services; and economic programs, including protection of peasant lands, access to credit, and agricultural subsidies. Real wages in the agricultural sector steadily declined from the 1980s and by 1992 had declined by 30 percent in Latin America as a whole.\(^{19}\) By the mid-1990s, land reforms had been proposed to privatize land markets in Mexico (1991 – with the decision to dismantle the constitutional protection of communal held lands, ejidos), Ecuador (1994 – with the land reform proposal), and Bolivia (1996 – with the land reform proposal). All of these were designed to make previously inalienable lands open for sale. In short, indigenous communities definitively lost their interlocutors with the state, land security, and social resources. Under these circumstances the ability to maintain local autonomy and secure a stable relationship with the state seemed increasingly remote.

In Guatemala and Peru (in contrast to Ecuador, Bolivia, and Mexico), the overthrow of corporatist citizenship regimes did not occur slowly but took place suddenly in counterreform coups in 1954 and 1975, respectively. In post-1954 Guatemala and post-1975 Peru, militaries repressed peasant unions, weakened and even reversed land reform distribution, and weakened social programs that had granted social rights to this sector. In other words, they reversed the corporatist citizenship regimes that had incorporated Indians into the polity and promised to support indigenous communities as economically viable entities. With the turn to civilian rule (an uneven and torturous process in both cases), states neither recognized social rights from earlier periods nor supported the formation of corporatist peasant federations. To the contrary, they enacted reforms that further cut state-run social programs – except for targeted safety net programs – and delimited the spaces for class-based organizing. Neoliberal reforms, in particular in Peru, further inserted instability into the countryside as poverty and inequality rates soared in the 1980s and 1990s. In Guatemala and Peru, local

\(^{19}\) Urioste (1992); Conaghan and Malloy (1994); de Janvry et al. (1994); Lustig (1995); Morley (1995); and Wilkie, Contreras, and Komisaruk (1995: Table 3107, 990).
autonomy was challenged not only by the reversal of state reforms in the
1950s and 1970s, respectively, but also by subsequent civil wars that ravaged
the countryside in both countries through the 1980s and part of the 1990s.

Both the slow (Ecuador, Bolivia, and Mexico) and sudden (Peru and
Guatemala) reversal of corporatist citizenship regimes have had significant
consequences – not least for indigenous peoples. In sum, class-based fed-
erations have lost political and social leverage throughout the region, and
consequently Indians have lost their formal ties and access to the state. Most
dramatically for Indians, states have slowed down (in some cases re-
versed) land reforms, privatized land markets, liberalized agricultural prices,
eliminated agricultural subsidies, and diminished credit programs.20 The
reforms threaten a communal land base that the state had once made in-
viable.21 In other words, they have threatened the social rights that had
been extended with the earlier corporatist citizenship regimes.

In all five cases, the weakening of corporatist modes of interest inter-
mediation and the dismantling of rural programs (including land reforms,
credit programs, and the like) have further increased uncertainty about
property regimes among peasants in Mesoamerica and the Andes. Libera-
izing states have made it clear that they will not maintain (in Mexico,
Ecuador, and Bolivia) or reestablish (in Guatemala and Peru) special forms
of property rights, credit, and subsidies for peasants. Consequently, the
contemporary period challenges the poor’s access to the state and its re-
sources. In all five countries, one’s status as a peasant now provides limited
political purchase – as peasant programs are dismantled and peasant orga-
nizations weakened. Rural organizing and protest respond to this material
uncertainty, as peasants fear indebtedness, declining incomes, and the loss
of land. The indigenous character of the contemporary movements, however,
extends beyond material concerns for land as a productive resource. The
potential loss of land also affects the viability and autonomy of local indige-
nous political institutions that had operated in, and assumed, a relatively
well-defined and stable geographic space.

In this context of reduced spaces for local autonomy and access to
the state, ethnic cleavages have been politicized. Indigenous movements –
particularly those that mobilize in the countryside – have protested the state

20 Conaghan and Malloy (1994); de Janvry et al. (1994); Morley (1995); and Urioste Fernández
21 These reforms (particularly efforts to privatize land markets and to privilege the individual
over the corporate unit) echo late-nineteenth-century Liberal reforms that were incontro-
vertibly detrimental to indigenous peoples.
reforms that have placed restrictions on the inalienable community rights and de facto local autonomy that they had secured earlier with corporatist citizenship regimes. Indigenous movements, in short, have come to demand that the state officially recognize indigenous communities. In Mexico as well as Guatemala, we find separate efforts to negotiate autonomy for the Mayan populations residing on either side of the border. In Bolivia, indigenous activists have worked to recognize, reconstitute, and/or register the ayllus (communal organizations) that have dotted the Andean countryside; through the Ley Inra, this became legally possible. In Ecuador, indigenous movements and NGOs have started to dialogue and initiate projects to strengthen and/or reconstitute systems of elders that have receded in importance over the years.

Promoting Development and Politicizing Ethnic Cleavages in the Amazon

A second type of indigenous movement occurred in areas that had fallen beyond the scope of corporatist citizenship regimes. In the Amazon, as noted previously, the state has historically been weak – with limited impact on policy, social services, infrastructure, government access, or institution building. Corporatist citizenship regimes did not find significant institutional expression in the Amazon. While the state expanded in the three decades after World War II in the Andes, the Amazon remained relatively marginalized from contemporary politics, the market, and the state’s role in each. Colonization programs did develop, starting in the 1960s, but they affected pockets of the Amazon, not the region as a whole. As such, incidents of colonization were interpreted as isolated events, rather than collective slights.

22 For discussions of autonomy debates in Mexico, see Ojarasca (1995); Díaz-Polanco (1997); Mattiace (1997); and Stephen (1997).
23 Ayllus often claim sovereignty over discontinuous land bases. This geographical spread poses a challenge to Western ideas of state formation, which generally assume that continuous areas coincide with a single political administration.
24 Several interviews with each of the following people between May–August 1997: Constantino Lima, Aymaran nationalist activist since the 1970s; Carlos Mamani, María Eugenia Choque Quispe, and Ramón Conde, researcher-activists at Taller de Historia Oral Andina (THOA); and Ricardo Calla, former-director of Taller de Apoyo a Ayllus y Pueblos Indígenas (TAYPI). Also see Molina and Arias (1996), Albó and Ayllu Sartañani (n.d.).
25 Based on several interviews with José María Cabascango of ECUARUNARI, several interviews with Luis Maldonado of Centro de Estudios Pluriculturales (CEPCU), three interviews with Fernando Rosero, Director of the United Nations Volunteers (March 11, 1997, March 18, 1997, and May 7, 1997), and one interview with Congressman Luis Macas (May 6, 1997). All interviews conducted between February 1997 and May 1997.
These colonization programs and the expansion into the Amazon, however, have become increasingly consequential. Development programs have encouraged colonization by Andean peasants (indigenous and nonindigenous) and the expansion of cattle ranching, logging operations, and oil exploration. In many cases, foreign companies took advantage of these development schemes alongside domestic migrants and domestic companies. Whether international or national in origin, these developments have challenged indigenous communities in the Amazon that had remained relatively independent from the state and had sustained political and economic control over vast land areas. Indigenous movements have emerged to oppose these developments and, in the process, have demanded that the state recognize indigenous territories. In Ecuador, for example, the first indigenous organization formed in the 1960s among the Shuar in order to protect their lands against colonization plans. This pattern was replicated throughout the Ecuadorian and Bolivian Amazon as colonizers, oil companies, cattle grazers, and loggers started to penetrate the region. These Amazonian movements assumed particular visibility in the 1980s and 1990s when states accelerated programs to promote more open land markets in the Amazon—culminating in significant marches in Ecuador (1992) and Bolivia (1990).

Throughout Latin America (including Peru), therefore, the contemporary period has challenged the space for indigenous local autonomy that was secured during the prior corporatist citizenship regimes and its associated developmentalist state. In Mesoamerica and the Andes, the state has supported the dismantling of corporatist forms of representation, agricultural subsidies, and protection of communally and individually held lands. In the Amazon, the state has increased its presence and promoted colonization by Andean nationals and foreign companies. In both cases, the state’s challenge to land tenure and use has threatened material livelihoods and indigenous forms of autonomous local governance—both of which had depended on more stable property relations. In this context, indigenous movements are asserting the right to new administrative spheres with a certain degree of political autonomy at the local level. This is not just a call for more land, although that is certainly a core component of the demands. It is also a demand that the state recognize and respect autonomous indigenous political jurisdiction and authority over the communities that inhabit that geographic space.

These movements gained momentum in the context of neoliberal citizenship regimes. They were not caused by them but they were spurred on
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by them. For as Richard Chase Smith wrote, in the years prior to neoliberal hegemony:

The issues of land and ethnic identity coalesced the ethnic federations. In each case, a particular group felt its collective land base and identity threatened by both state policies of colonization and integration and by the expanding capitalist market economy. Virtually every ethnic federation began as a meeting of headmen or representatives of different settlements of a particular ethnic group who were looking for common strategies to defend the land and their nationality (Smith 1985: 17).

Smith was insightful and prescient. While he was talking about the Amazon in 1985, his observations resonate throughout Latin America as a whole.

The Capacity: Transcommunity Networks

Movements, however, do not emerge mechanically as new needs and motives present themselves. They must build (upon) organizational capacity to initiate and sustain a movement. Organizational capacity must be demonstrated (rather than assumed), particularly for indigenous communities, which are often separated by great distances, and for indigenous identities, which have historically been more clearly defined by and embedded in local communities. In the absence of ties between and among communities, it is extremely difficult to scale up demands, to organize, and to launch protests.

Networks provide this organizational capacity. They fostered the communication and cooperation that was essential for transcending geographic dispersion, language barriers, and cultural unfamiliarity (and in some cases hostility). In doing so, networks provided the forum for future indigenous leaders to meet, share common experiences, develop a common language, identify common problems, and articulate common goals. In turn, indigenous men developed ethnic identities that referred not only to their local Indian communities but also to a transcommunity indigenous identification. This “indigenous” identity was a product more than a cause of the first generation networks that were in place. It did not necessarily include a close national identification with all indigenous communities. Indeed, as elaborated in Part II, Andean and Amazonian indigenous movements in Ecuador and Bolivia (and even Peru) formed separately and did not

26 I thank Arang Keshavarzian for his insight into networks and suggestions for improving my argument, not all of which I have been able to incorporate.
necessarily or easily translate those regional ties into national ones. Indeed, different historical experiences had resulted in very different cultural norms, understandings of autonomy and land, and styles of negotiation. Without networks, it was impossible to bridge these divides.

Networks, therefore, constitute a second part of the explanation about indigenous movement formation in Latin America insofar as they provided the organizational capacity necessary to build indigenous movements. I take networks to refer to the repeated exchanges and resulting relationships that are constructed among individuals or social units by formal and informal institutions. Networks can take many forms. The one distinguishing feature that proved essential for indigenous movement formation was geography. Only where transcommunity networks were in place could and did indigenous communities possess the organizational capacity to forge broad indigenous movements. The existence of these networks more than their organizational features (vertical or horizontal; coercive or cooperative; social, political, economic, cultural, and/or religious; etc.), proved key to explaining where indigenous leaders possessed the organizational capacity to build indigenous movements.27

This argument builds on the vast literature on networks (and its kindred literature on social capital and civil society). Granovetter (1995) argued that the capacity to secure jobs is best explained by personal contacts and networks, rather than by education, training, or skill. Social movements theorists have also made similar arguments about movement building (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Tarrow 1998). McAdam, for example, found that churches played this role in the development of the civil rights movement in the United States and that personal contacts played this role in explaining who joined Freedom Summer (McAdam 1982 and 1988). Putnam (1993) has looked at the civic networks that have engendered more effective governance. And Varshney (2002) analyzes how networks of civic engagement shape trajectories of ethnic violence. In general, networks enable people (or communities) to interact, to exchange information, to build social capital, and to mobilize for change. They help to overcome distances that otherwise might appear insurmountable. And in so doing, they provide the basis for building movements. In Ecuador,

27 These other organizational features of networks do not explain movement emergence, although they probably do provide insight into the types of movements that did emerge. Further work is needed to explain why some networks lead to unified movements in a given area and why others lead to competitive ones. In this regard, the discussion of networks still requires further analysis, as also noted by Podolny and Page (1998: 73).
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Bolivia, Mexico, and Guatemala, networks provided the spaces within which indigenous leaders built ties, developed trust, gained leadership skills, and forged new ideas. These networks allowed for “brokerage,” which McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) discuss as a relational mechanism that connects sites, creates new collective actors, and/or speaks on their behalf. The very social interaction that occurs through and by brokers can create autonomous spheres in which actors can identify their shared circumstances, scale up their reference group to transcend local geography, and recast identities (e.g., assuming an identity as Indians rather than solely as distinct indigenous communities).

Networks and movements, therefore, are analytically and temporally distinct. They cannot be reduced to one another. Indigenous activists drew on existing networks to build new movements. These movements, in turn, had very different organizational identities and goals than the networks on which they built. Indeed, indigenous movements often severed ties to the prior networks and, in some cases, critiqued these networks for subordinating indigenous peoples. Consequently, the existence of prior networks does not equal the formation of new ones; rather, older networks provided the basis for generating new ones.

The state, unions, churches, and NGOs have played a crucial role in this regard. While pursuing their respective missions, these institutions (unwittingly) provided links that have become a basis for forging translocal (and subsequently transnational) indigenous identities and movements. The state, for example, attempted to mobilize support and control rebellions within peasant communities, as part of the corporatist and populist developmental policies previously discussed. With the passage of land reforms, states attempted to construct a loyal national peasantry, to weaken more localized ethnic identities, and to forge a nation-state. In Mexico and Bolivia, where these processes were most advanced, peasant unions were linked to corporatist state-parties that promised access to land, economic support, and social services. In Ecuador, the state agrarian reform program promoted rural organizing, resulting in a significant increase in the registering of rural comunas, cooperatives, and associations. This state-sanctioned rural organizing in Mexico, Bolivia, and Ecuador engendered cross-community networks that were later used in these countries to organize indigenous movements – in some places tied to and in some places autonomous from the peasant unions.

28 See Brysk (2000) for a discussion of the transnational dimensions of these networks.
Guatemala’s democratic regime (1944–1954) and Peru’s military reform government (1968–1975) also passed land reforms and encouraged peasant organizing, but subsequent counterreform governments in Guatemala (1954) and in Peru (1975) undermined this process. As a consequence, the Guatemalan and Peruvian peasantry of the 1980s and 1990s has not sustained transcommunity peasant networks as a result of patron-client ties with the state, as in Mexico, Bolivia, and Ecuador. The Guatemalan and Peruvian states have been hostile to peasant demands and have attempted to localize, disarticulate, and repress rural organizing efforts. Consequently, Peru has never really achieved and sustained a national peasant network – except briefly (if then) during the Velasco government (1968–1975). In the absence of sustained political liberalization and a more sustained developmentalist state in the Peruvian countryside, it has been difficult to construct a national peasant movement. And in the absence of these kinds of networks, it has been difficult to construct an indigenous identity and organization that transcends its more localized referent. Guatemala, unlike Peru, did subsequently organize an opposition peasant movement on the basis of networks constructed by the Catholic Church. In Guatemala, many post–Vatican II clerics and lay persons organized Christian Base Communities (CEBs) in the countryside. Many CEB members subsequently forged a new peasant movement and used the base communities to reconstruct intercommunity networks that had been repressed by the military.

In Latin America, more broadly, churches have helped to construct and strengthen rural networks between communities not only in Guatemala but also in Mexico, Bolivia, and Ecuador. Churches often provided the means of communication, the locus of interaction, and literacy skills that linked one community to another. So too, church leaders inspired by liberation theology created CEBs that encouraged activism and created lay leaders that could travel between communities to address local and national problems. Catholic and Protestant churches played a crucial role in constructing networks in Chiapas, Mexico. Bishop Samuel Ruiz, for example, organized indigenous fora, brought resources to indigenous communities, and encouraged more active forms of localized organizing. In Bolivia and Ecuador, a more heterogenous church presence – Salesians, Franciscans, Protestants,

29 Cotler and Portocarrero (1969); Handelman (1975); McClintock (1981); and Seligmann (1995).
30 Little has been written on the impact of liberation theology and theologians on the Peruvian countryside. See Peña (1995).
31 See Brown (1993); Chojnacki (1995); Floyd (1995); and Santana (1995: chs. 6–7).
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Summer Institute for Linguistics (SIL), etc.\(^{32}\) – also played a particularly important role in the Amazon in bridging significant differences between communities, addressing literacy, providing radio services, and organizing against land invasions.\(^{33}\) Again, while churches were active in Peru, they never managed to sustain transcommunity ties – in large part, as we shall see, because of the repression that ensued in the countryside.

In short, states, unions, churches, and, more recently, NGOs (particularly in Bolivia) have provided networks that enabled indigenous communities to transcend localized identities and to identify commonly trusted leaders. In some cases these networks were internationally inspired and supported (Brysk 2000); in many they were not. In all cases, however, these networks built literacy skills and cross-community social capital that enabled indigenous leaders to move between communities, build support, and develop frames that resonated within and across communities. In turn, indigenous leaders gained access to information and resources that enabled them to communicate with the state. When confronted with changing rural–state relations that threatened property relations and local autonomy, these networks provided the organizational bases for coordinating significant indigenous mobilizing from the 1970s on.

**The Political Opportunity:**\(^{34}\) **Political Associational Space**

If state reforms politicized indigenous identity and networks provided the organizational capacity, indigenous movement organizing would still

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\(^{32}\) See Castro Mantilla (1996: 20) for a chart on the SIL in Latin America – including where it began working, contracts, and ministries.

\(^{33}\) In Bolivia, church influence largely occurred centuries earlier through missions that created nuclear settlements; these settlements became the centers of indigenous organizing in the 1970s and 1980s. In Ecuador and Peru, church influence occurred much more clearly through boarding schools, where future indigenous leaders met one another and acquired leadership and communication skills that were later used to organize regional indigenous organizations in the Amazon. In both cases, churches along with NGOs provided the networks, resources, and skills for indigenous organizing in the region. I thank Diego Iturralde and Sergio Delgado for first bringing these patterns to my attention in an interview held in La Paz, Bolivia on October 20, 1995.

\(^{34}\) See McAdam (1996: 27). McAdam lays out four dimensions that constitute political opportunity structures: the degree of political opening; elite alignments; presence of elite allies; and the state’s capacity and propensity to use repression. In the case of Latin America’s indigenous movements, elite alignments and access to elite allies do not uniformly play a role in movement formation – even if they do affect policy success. Consequently, I rely more on McAdam’s first and fourth dimensions to analyze movement emergence.
only emerge in the presence of one more variable: political associational space. The need for associational space is painfully obvious (particularly for scholars of social movements) but often overlooked in discussions of ethnic politics, as it is all too common to assume that ethnic cleavages naturally translate into political organizations and protest. Political associational space (in conjunction with changing citizenship regimes and transcommunity networks), however, proved crucial to the emergence and growth of indigenous movements.35

So what is political associational space? Political associational space refers to the de facto existence of freedom of association and expression. It is not reducible to regime type; it is not equal to democracy.36 To the contrary, political associational space can exist (to varying degrees) in different political contexts, including the following: where states are virtually or largely absent (as in the Amazon); in democratic regimes where states protect civil rights in practice; and in transitional regimes where authorities initiate a process of political liberalization that includes a decline in repression and a corresponding increase in respect for civil rights. The common denominator in these three contexts is that the state does not trample on the capacity to associate and to speak out.

35 One might point out that where political associational spaces have been closed off, innovative activists have been known to create them (see, e.g., Keck and Sikkink 1998; Navarro 1998; Tarrow 1998; and Tilly 2002). They have used “nonpolitical” fora to engage in political activities; and/or they have built alliances with domestic elites and/or international activists to overcome political obstacles. This exceptional heroism on the part of some activists is incontrovertible. However, the examples are noteworthy precisely because they have been the exception. In general, closed political associational spaces have worked against movement building – particularly in indigenous rural areas where activists could not organize, speak out, and mobilize without incurring repression against them and their communities.

36 As commonly noted, political liberalization is not synonymous with democratization. Democratization can coincide with political crackdowns – as in Peru and Guatemala in the 1980s. Moreover, political liberalization can occur independently of democracy – as in Brazil during the distensão period and Mexico in the 1990s. Empirically speaking, while political liberalization has provided the political opportunity for movement organizing in the Andes and Mesoamerica, the same cannot necessarily be said of electoral or formal democracy, per se. See Eisinger (1973) for a discussion of the curvilinear relationship between democracy and protest. Eisinger noted that protest is least likely where democracy is both foreclosed and fully achieved. It is in the spaces in between, where democracy fulfills only part of its promises, that social groups are most likely to protest. See Davenport and Armstrong (2002) for a statistical analysis of the relationship between democracy and repression.
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It is also important to make clear that associational space is not the same as networks. The former refers to the political opportunity to organize while the latter refers to the existing capacity to do so. These two variables can affect one another but do not necessarily covary. During times of political closure networks can persist (as with military-dominated corporatist associations and churches). Moreover, associational space does not necessarily translate into the existence or growth of social networks.

Empirically speaking we can see how political associational space has mattered in both its de facto and de jure forms. In the Amazon, where the state has historically been weak (in many places relatively absent), a generalized associational space existed independent of changes in the national political regimes. Even when national governments deployed repression in other areas, this violence rarely affected the Amazon in a direct way. In this regard, associational space existed de facto and was relatively constant in the Amazonian regions.37 Amazonian indigenous communities had the opportunity to organize transcommunity movements absent state regulation, control, and repression (although they often confronted local forms of oppression from landlords and churches).

In the Andean and Mesoamerican regions, where the state had incorporated and penetrated the highlands to a greater degree than that found in the lowland areas of the Amazon, political associational space has been more variable. It fluctuated in tandem with periods of national political closure and political liberalization. During periods of political closure and militarization, states restricted freedom of association in these regions and, therefore, closed off opportunities for legal organizing among communities. This type of closure occurred in Bolivia in the 1970s; Guatemala from 1954 through the mid-1980s and sporadically again in the 1990s; Peru from the mid-1970s through much of the 1990s (with a brief opening at the end of the 1970s and early 1980s). During these periods of political closure, indigenous organizing did not emerge or simply dissipated. Indeed, Jenaro Flores of Bolivia and Demetrio Cojti of Guatemala, both prominent indigenous leaders who helped to cofound indigenous movements in their respective countries, commented on separate occasions that political closure preempted incipient efforts to organize indigenous movements and weakened those that had started organizing during earlier and more open

37 Again, Peru is a partial exception in this regard and is discussed at greater length in Part III.
times. Where, however, political liberalization legally and practically resulted in the freedom to organize, there was greater opportunity to mobilize along indigenous lines.

In the Andean and Mesoamerican regions, a strong correlation exists between indigenous organizing and the extension of political associational space. National political associational space was extended the furthest in Bolivia (late 1970s and early 1980s) and Ecuador (late 1970s); and it is in these two countries that we find the first two and strongest movements in the region. National political associational space was extended the least in Peru (with an ongoing and violent civil war for much of the 1980s and 1990s) and it is here that indigenous movement organizing was largely foreclosed. Guatemala and Mexico pose intermediate cases of indigenous movement organizing, with indigenous movements emerging in a context of rather uneven processes of political liberalization and political associational space. In Guatemala, a staggering history of repression in the 1970s and early 1980s gave way to the extension of some political associational space in the mid-1980s and mid-1990s. Indigenous movements emerged in these periods of relative political opening, although their growth and strength was hampered by a rise in political violence in the late 1980s and again the late 1990s. Mexico also extended political associational space in the 1990s, although it did so against a less repressive background than in Guatemala. During 1995, 1996, and 1997 research trips, indigenous leaders generally stated that political liberalization had created a more propitious environment for organizing. And indeed, the establishment and growth of indigenous movements largely coincides with or follows the increased respect for civil liberties.

Only where associational space was in evidence did national indigenous movements emerge, including CONAIE in Ecuador, CSUTCB and CIDOB in Bolivia, COMG in Guatemala, and the EZLN in Mexico. Each of these movements built on preexisting dense social networks that allowed for both the construction of transcommunity ties and the creation of panethnic movements (as illustrated by quadrants II and IV in Table 3.3). Where these networks did not exist, it was close to impossible to organize beyond the local community level – particularly when combined with non-existent or limited associational space. Where, however, widespread repression

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38 Several interviews in 1995 and 1997 with Jenaro Flores in La Paz, Bolivia and one interview in February 1996 with Demetrio Cojti in Guatemala City, Guatemala.
### Table 3.3. *Latin American Indigenous Movements in the Context of Contemporary Challenges to Local Autonomy*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Associational Space</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No: Closure/Militarization</td>
<td>No indigenous mobilization, as in Peruvian Andes</td>
<td>Panethnic movements but politically constrained in Bolivia 1970s (Andes); Ecuador 1970s (Andes); Guatemala 1970s–1980s; and Mexico 1970s–1980s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yes:  
- Amazon: Relatively Constant  
  - Localized and mono-ethnic mobilization occurs in isolated cases everywhere, including the Peruvian Amazon  
  - Panethnic regional and/or national mobilization in Bolivia and Ecuador (Andes and Amazon); Guatemala 1990s; and Mexico 1990s

*  
- Mexico has experienced national political liberalization, as noted in the text. However, political associational space remains uneven – with increased (although fluctuating) political associational space at the national (and international level) and increased and ongoing political closure at some local levels.

continued and freedom of association was foreclosed, political closure preempted indigenous movement formation.

Peru falls into this latter category. Several anonymous 1997 interviews in Peru also commented on the insurmountable obstacles that authoritarian rule and civil war, in particular, posed for indigenous and peasant organizing. The violent civil war closed off avenues for freedom of organization and expression. Moreover, it destroyed existing organizations and obstructed the formation of trans-community networks that have proved so important elsewhere. In this context, sustained regional and national indigenous organizing has proved elusive in all but some isolated locations in the Peruvian Amazon, as discussed in Chapter 6.

In short, shifting citizenship regimes challenged local autonomy and politicized ethnic cleavages. Social networks provided the capacity to organize beyond local communities and to scale up efforts into regional and national indigenous organizations. And political associational space provided the necessary political opportunity for doing so. For these reasons, the existence
and interplay among these three causal factors best explain the contemporary and uneven emergence of Latin America’s indigenous movements.

Concluding with Second-Generation Movements: Learning, Modularity, and Strategy

One could end the story here. Challenges to local autonomy politicized ethnic cleavages. Movements emerged where activists could draw on existing resources in a context of political spaces for association. This outline explains the first wave of organizing that occurred in Ecuador, Bolivia, Mexico, and Guatemala. Were these conditions to extend to Peru, then we would forecast that significant indigenous organizing would occur there as well. The findings in this book lead to these conclusions. But it is important to note that the emergence of these movements (and the political successes that they subsequently have had) have also shifted the circumstances within which other social movements operate and the shape of the movements themselves.

For the first generation of indigenous movements gained a degree of success that no one predicted. They have at times successfully pressured states to engage in policy discussions about democratic representation, land reforms, territorial autonomy, constitutional reforms, peace accords, bilingual education, and international loans, among others. In several of these cases, these discussions have translated into legislation and, in a smaller subset, into the implementation phase. In other words, these movements have become new interlocutors with the state, have gained national and international notoriety, and have delivered goods to their community.

These successes have not gone unnoticed. Indeed, the successes of these early movements have actually contributed to the growth of a second generation of indigenous movements that have followed, learned from, and replicated the language adopted by the first round. This second generation has not necessarily mobilized to defend local autonomy, as in the first-generation cases. Rather they have observed the successes of indigenous movements before them, and the failures of many other types of movements, and strategically decided to use ethnic identities as the marker for mobilization. In other words, indigenous movements that were once new have become a prototype for modularity and a duplication of sorts. These second-generation movements have started to label their movements as ethnic or indigenous – to gain a toehold into national and international debates.
These second-generation movements do not necessarily have common goals. They include coca growers who initially lost their jobs in the national mines and have turned to coca production for their livelihood; youth who want to increase their professional opportunities and help their community; and scholars who have traveled to international conferences and gained increased knowledge, contacts, and resources, etc. All of these movements mobilize Indians. Most mobilize for noteworthy causes. But the rationale for mobilizing as Indians appears to be tied to the knowledge gained by learning what others have done and how they have succeeded. It is strategic behavior not because it is inauthentic but because the activists could have chosen to do otherwise. Their choice to mobilize along *ethnic* lines is a consequence of the successes of those that have preceded them.

Hence timing and sequence matter. The first generation of movements set the stage for the second. And the second generation of movements has in turn emerged according to a different logic and with a different set of demands. In other words, they are modular, in the sense highlighted by Tarrow (1998) and borrowed from Anderson (1991). Their identity is no less authentic. But the process of politicization and the adoption of that identity are different – in many ways because these movements could have mobilized along different lines. For many of these activists, their ties to the *community* are less clear; their migratory context appears more prevalent; and their discourse more calculated and strategic.

So too, once indigenous movements became prevalent, international funding agencies, NGOs, and the like developed important programs that aided existing movements where they existed, and occasionally catalyzed movements where they did not. Movements borrowed strategies from one another and examined comparative successes/failures. Brysk (2000) highlights the various linkages that exist between indigenous movements and transnational forces and the ways in which these ties have increased the chances of success in one campaign after another. She also highlights (2000: 21) how indigenous movements across borders have mimicked successful protests. Apparently, Ecuadorian activists examined videos of the 1990 Bolivian indigenous march before launching a protest later that same year. The first generation of indigenous organizing was therefore consequential for those movements that followed – opening the door for more cross-movement and cross-border interaction. In short, we cannot look at indigenous movements in Latin America outside of a comparative historical context. Historical changes in state–society relations politicized ethnic
cleavages. And the emergence of these movements in turn has become a reference for new rounds of movement formation and agenda setting.

Viewed together these first- and second-generation indigenous movements pose fundamental challenges that Latin America’s democracies are beginning (or will need) to tackle. They are forcing Latin America’s new regimes to confront the limited reach of prior rounds of state formation, to address the indeterminacy of the current round of democratic institution building, and to consider how new democracies might reform states more effectively to accommodate plural identities, political units, and administrative heterogeneity. Part II elaborates on why and how these movements have emerged. Part III elaborates on the implications of these movements for democracy and the postliberal challenge.