

# **POLITICS IN PLURAL SOCIETIES**

**A Theory of Democratic Instability**

**ALVIN RABUSHKA**

*University of Rochester*

and

**KENNETH A. SHEPSLE**

*Washington University, St. Louis*

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## Majority Domination

We turn in this chapter to an analysis of ethnic politics in dominant majority configurations. A major theme that emerges from this analysis is the denial by majorities of political freedoms to minorities as well as access to a proportional share of the public sector. First we explore ethnic politics in Ceylon to illustrate how a dominant Sinhalese majority deals with an important Tamil minority; second, we extend the empirical coverage with a comparative treatment of majority domination in Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Mauritius, Rwanda, and Zanzibar (now part of Tanzania).

### Ceylon

The most important source of division and disruption in Ceylonese politics and the greatest impediment to integrative trends has been the persistence of sentiments of identification and solidarity with broader primordial groups generally referred to as communities.<sup>1</sup>

The Sinhalese, constituting about seventy percent of the population, is the majority community in Ceylon. The remaining minorities consist of Ceylon Tamils who arrived from India between the fourth and twelfth centuries, eleven percent; Indian Tamils who arrived in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to work on the tea estates, twelve percent; Moors

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1. Robert N. Kearney, *Communalism and Language in the Politics of Ceylon* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1967), p. 4. We rely heavily upon the evidence Kearney provides of Sinhalese politics. See also W. Howard Wriggins, *Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); Calvin A. Woodward, *The Growth of a Party System in Ceylon* (Providence: Brown University Press, 1969); and I. D. S. Weerawardana, *Ceylon General Election 1956* (Colombo: M. D. Gunasena & Co., Ltd., 1960).

who are Islamic descendents of Arab traders, six percent; and very insignificant minorities of Burghers, Eurasians, Malays, and others. These communities also tend to be regionally concentrated: Tamils reside in the northern and eastern portions of the island in numbers large enough to insure Tamil constituency pressures in those regions, while Sinhalese generally predominate elsewhere. In particular, more than ninety-five percent of the residents in Jaffna are Tamils, whereas Sinhalese form eighty percent or more of the population in much of the west and south.<sup>2</sup>



### Ceylon

**Ethnic Cooperation.** Modern Ceylonese nationalism materialized in the early part of the twentieth century. Since 1798, when they obtained Ceylon from the Dutch, British colonial rule had been very autocratic. Authority was concentrated in the hands of the colonial officials while the native Ceylonese were almost entirely excluded from participation in the government. It was the growth of an English-educated middle class that stimulated a demand for Ceylonese participation in government.

By 1900 many Ceylonese had entered middle-class professions. Christian missionary schools, disproportionately concentrated in the Tamil north, expanded literacy in English thereby encouraging social mobility. On this

2. Kearney, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

point Woodward observes that "a small class of wealthy Ceylonese emerged, and, more important, a large indigeneous middle class developed that sought entry into the professional, commercial, and public service career systems."<sup>3</sup> British mishandling of the Sinhalese-Muslim riots in 1915 accompanied by overly harsh punishment of the rioters hastened the internal desire for political reform. In response to nationalist pressures, the British allowed the formation of representative institutions and Ceylonese participation in government.

The Ceylon National Congress (CNC), the attempt of some Ceylonese to copy the Indian Congress Party, was the first major nationalist organization that played a role in bringing about British reforms. The movement was entirely middle class and tied together Tamils and Sinhalese with Western outlooks. It was hoped and expected by some "that the struggle for Ceylonese self-government would unify the Sinhalese and Tamils in a common cause."<sup>4</sup> The CNC sought and obtained an enlarged Legislative Council, which provided for nineteen elected members; they also appealed for the abolition of communal electorates, then reflected in the stipulation that eleven of the elected Councillors must represent specific sections of the country. CNC leaders asked for a territory-wide elected majority, with executive responsibility residing in its hands. This request strained Sinhalese-Tamil cooperation, which had appeared at the very onset of the movement.

The Tamil leadership considered the attempt of the CNC to obtain such a system a betrayal of the tacit agreement between the two communities to maintain balanced representation. Consequently, the Tamils withdrew from the congress and, together with other minority groups in the Council, formulated their own communally oriented proposal for reform of the Council.<sup>5</sup>

Woodward observes here that some twenty-seven years before independence "the communal rift between the Tamil and Sinhalese elites ended the operation of the CNC as a comprehensive and inclusive nationalist organization."<sup>6</sup> In reference to this extremely short-lived coalition of two years, Kearney records that

the split was a triumph of primordial identification and loyalty over the new identifications based on class, urbanization and Westerniza-

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3. *Op. Cit.*, p. 26

4. Kearney, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

5. Woodward, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-32.

6. *Ibid.*

tion. The Tamil departure from the Congress marked the beginning of the rivalry between Sinhalese and Tamils which, although seldom bitter and never violent [before independence] became a persistent feature of the transition to independence.<sup>7</sup>

The CNC lost its cooperative character and developed into an exclusively Sinhalese movement. As of 1921, Tamils expressed nationalist sentiments in their own communal organizations.

**Ethnic Conflict.** At the outset, the nationalist movement fostered some Sinhalese-Tamil unity, though short-lived, in opposition to the common colonial enemy. With the breakup of the CNC, the rivalry between the Sinhalese and Tamils steadily increased. These disputes were initially limited to constitutional issues. Ceylon had its constitution replaced with a new one in 1920, 1924, 1931, and 1946, the latter being converted, with some modification, into the constitution of independent Ceylon.

The constitutional debate revolved chiefly around the problem of representation. It was clear that universal suffrage favored the Sinhalese majority. As an alternative the Tamil Congress proposed a "fifty-fifty" scheme in which half the seats in the Ceylon legislature would be reserved for the minority communities. In addition, no more than half of the Cabinet could be appointed from any one community. This scheme, Tamils believed, would preclude any one community from imposing its will on the others.

The Soulbury Commission, which arrived in Ceylon in 1944 to implement constitutional reform, rejected the Tamil "fifty-fifty" scheme on the grounds that it furthered communal representation. The Commission knew that majority rule implied Sinhalese domination, but believed that constitutional safeguards would forestall minority persecution. They expected that D. S. Senanayake would become Ceylon's first Prime Minister and that he would be a man of good will toward the minority communities. With the approval of the constitutional draft by the State Council of Ceylon, the period of postindependence politics began.

The 1947 election, held one year before independence, already foretold the communal character of Ceylon electoral politics. Most successful candidates were of the same ethnic group as the majority of their constituents. Furthermore, no multiethnic party won a seat in the Tamil North. The United National Party (UNP), formed by the leaders of the CNC and the Sinhalese-dominated Council, easily won the election. With the departure of the British the new government turned its attention to internal matters, and "the existing sense of communal identification and loyalty dictated

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7. *Op. cit.*, p. 29.

that communal interests and aspirations be protected and promoted in the political sphere.”<sup>8</sup>

**Language and Nationalist Politics.** Immediately upon independence most Indian Tamils were excluded from Ceylonese citizenship and the franchise. The Citizenship Act, passed in 1948 and liberalized somewhat in 1949, possessed requirements that the majority of Indian estate laborers could not satisfy.<sup>9</sup> By legislative enactment, the Sinhalese had cut Tamil political strength in half: only the Ceylon Tamils qualified for citizenship and the franchise.

*Since independence the language issue has governed Ceylonese politics.* The prime political issue has been whether Sinhalese is to be the sole official language of Ceylon or whether Tamil is also to be recognized.

Under British rule, knowledge of English was a prerequisite for employment in the public service. Consequently, English-language education spread rapidly during the period of British rule. By 1953, the number of English literates made up one-seventh of all literate Ceylonese, and this English trained elite was disproportionately Tamil in composition. This dual system of education separated the English-educated from those who were educated in vernacular languages and gave the former a monopoly over the major positions in the public service, the legal profession, and in education.

Vernacular-speaking Ceylonese began to oppose the influence and power of the English-educated. They started a movement, known as “swabhasha,” demanding the use of the vernacular languages in government. “‘Swabhasha’ [was] a marvelously *ambiguous* slogan for rallying political support.”<sup>10</sup> To the majority Sinhalese community, the term could mean Sinhalese and to the Tamils it could mean Sinhalese and Tamil, the languages of the Ceylonese people. Though the movement was led for the most part by Sinhalese, since the English-educated Tamils had gained admission to the professions and the clerical and administrative grades of the public service disproportionate to their numbers, the ambiguous goals implied in the slogan “swabhasha” attracted some Tamil support.

The swabhasha campaign combined up-country Sinhalese and other vernacular speakers in a joint struggle against the small and exclusive English-educated elite. The demand for swabhasha among the Sinhalese majority was soon transformed, however, into insistence on Sinhalese as the sole official language, and the consequent intensification of communal

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8. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

9. I. D. S. Weerawardana, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

10. Kearney, *op. cit.*, p. 68 (emphasis added).

rivalry.<sup>11</sup> Increased Sinhalese demands for Sinhalese-only grew from resentment of Tamil visibility in the Civil Service. Tamils had secured about thirty percent of the bureaucratic positions although Sinhalese are six times more numerous in the population. Furthermore, the Sinhalese believed themselves to be a numerical minority and hence opposed parity for the Tamil language. Weerawardana notes that there are only five to six million people in the world who speak Sinhalese, all in Ceylon, whereas forty to fifty million speak Tamil, most living in South India across the narrow Palk Strait.<sup>12</sup> The Sinhalese-only advocates insisted that the minority size of the Tamil community could not justify equal treatment for their language.

Politics until 1956 remained calm and free of intense linguistic pressures. In 1952 D. S. Senanayake, one of the early leaders of the United National Party, died and was succeeded by his son, Dudley Senanayake. Although swabhasha was endorsed by all the major parties, it did not dominate the 1952 campaign, and the election produced a solid UNP triumph. Shortly thereafter, Dudley Senanayake stressed to an annual UNP conference the continued commitment of his party to swabhasha but he also emphasized the necessity for gradualism. This emphasis split the UNP: S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, who was identified with a policy of immediate adoption of swabhasha, resigned from the cabinet in 1951 and his party, the Sinhala Maha Sabha (SMS), withdrew from the UNP. The SMS charged the UNP government with procrastination and delay on the language question. Immediately, Bandaranaike disbanded the SMS and founded the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). By 1956 it was able to fight the next election almost entirely upon the language issue, which had shifted from swabhasha to Sinhalese-only. Intense and violent communal politics had finally emerged in Ceylon.

**The 1956 Election: Sinhalese-Only.**<sup>13</sup> In the 1956 election, the issue of Sinhalese-only absolutely overrode all other concerns. Senanayake and the UNP were resoundingly defeated by Bandaranaike, who had built a combined opposition — the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP: Peoples United Front)—around his Sri Lanka Freedom Party. Both major parties emphasized their adherence to a Sinhalese-only viewpoint. The UNP asked the electorate for a two-thirds majority that would allow it to imple-

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11. Again figures 3.8 and 3.9 are instructive. The lottery — in this case swabhasha — can be defeated by a more extreme position ("Sinhalese only"). Extremism is efficacious, and all the more obvious, in light of an overwhelming Sinhalese majority.

12. *Op. cit.*, p. 72.

13. See Weerawardana, *op. cit.*, for a detailed Nuffield-type study of the 1956 election.

ment Sinhalese as the sole official language. The MEP also adopted Sinhalese-only as its major campaign theme; they spent much time and effort trying to convince the electorate that the integrity of the UNP on the language issue was suspect, arguing vigorously that UNP promises were not normally kept.<sup>14</sup> The MEP appealed chiefly to up-country Sinhalese who professed anti-Western, anti-English, anti-Christian sentiments, depicting the UNP as the party of the small exclusive English-speaking middle class. During the campaign Bandaranaike promised to make Sinhalese the official language within forty-eight hours if he were elected, while the UNP stated it would require from two to three years—a policy of gradualism.<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, the UNP did not adopt the platform of Sinhalese-only until after the opposition had already invoked it. Timing was crucial. UNP claims for Sinhalese-only suffered a credibility gap, especially since the UNP Prime Minister had hinted in his campaigning that English would still have its place even though Sinhalese would become the official language. Tamils were also informed by the UNP that they would be permitted to use their language in the northern and eastern portions of the island, as they had done previously.<sup>16</sup>

Bandaranaike's claims that the UNP was less than sincere on the language issue appeared consistent with UNP campaign behavior during by-elections held in the 1952-56 period. The UNP generally tended to associate its opponents with international and revolutionary conspiracies, rather than to debate issues of policy,<sup>17</sup> trying consciously to downgrade language. In addition, Bandaranaike's split with the UNP on the grounds that they were laggard and gradualist in the swabhasha movement confirmed for the Sinhalese electorate that the MEP was the genuine expression of Sinhalese-only sentiments.

The result of the general election even surprised the victors. The MEP garnered an absolute majority of fifty-one seats, the UNP was able to retain only eight, and the remaining thirty-six seats were distributed among independents, leftist parties, and Tamil communal parties. The new MEP government immediately promulgated an Official Language Act that declared Sinhalese the one official language of Ceylon. Tamil representatives naturally opposed the measure. On this point Kearney observes that

the rapid mobilization of Sinhalese-only sentiment in the South, climaxed by the unqualified declaration of Sinhalese as the sole official language of Ceylon, appeared to be the realization of their [the

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14. *Ibid.*, p. 232.

15. Woodward, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

16. Weerawardana, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

17. Woodward, *op. cit.*, p. 97.



Tamils] worst fears regarding the intentions of the Sinhalese majority.<sup>18</sup>

The new cabinet did not contain even a single Tamil. The passage of the Official Language Act was viewed by Tamils as a serious threat to their identity and cultural integrity. When language emerged in 1956 as the dominant issue, Tamils and their chief spokesman, the Federal Party, became alienated from the main stream of Ceylonese politics, and have since been either unwilling or unable to cooperate with any Sinhalese party. Instead, to insure support from their constituents, they have expressed a desire for the establishment of a federal state that would constitutionally enshrine some measure of Tamil autonomy.

The passage of the Official Language Act heightened communal tensions. The victorious MEP coalition, which had planned to provide for some "reasonable use of Tamil," came under pressure from Sinhalese extremists within its own ranks and dropped these provisions from its program. Communal violence at once erupted. A demonstration organized by the Federal Party led to interethnic violence and further intensification of extremist positions on both sides.

The Federal Party then threatened a nonviolent direct action campaign if its demands on language were not met within a year. To forestall violence, Bandaranaike agreed to recognize Tamil as the language of a national minority and permit its use for administrative purposes in the Northern and Eastern provinces. In return, the Federal Party agreed to call off its campaign. But uncompromising Sinhalese immediately denounced the pact, and communal tensions swiftly materialized into outright violence. Tamils in the south were beaten and their homes and shops burned. Reprisals were carried out against Sinhalese in the north. Altogether hundreds died and thousands were evacuated. A state of emergency was declared and the army and police were ordered into action.

Shortly after the riot subsided, a Tamil Language Act was enacted, which defined the "reasonable use of Tamil" to mean use in education, public service entrance examinations, and "prescribed administrative purposes" in the Northern and Eastern provinces. (Extremist pressures held up the legislation of regulations to implement the act, however, for seven more years.) The compromising nature of the Tamil Language Act was probably responsible for Bandaranaike's assassination in September 1959. A convicted conspirator in the murder turned out to be a prominent Sinhalese. Kearney points to this incident as an example of "extremist incendiarism and the opportunistic manipulation of communal passions."<sup>19</sup>

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18. *Op. cit.*, pp. 82-83.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 88.

The Tamil response to Sinhalese-only politics has been even greater internal cohesion. The Federalist Tamil leader, Chelvanayakam, became a determined advocate of Tamil political autonomy as the only way of preserving the identity of the Tamil community.

The Federalists became convinced that the Tamils would never be safe from the threat of domination and assimilation by the Sinhalese majority while the two communities existed together in a unitary state subject to control by the majority.<sup>20</sup>

Since 1956, no Tamil constituency has returned the candidate of any party other than the exclusive Tamil parties.

**Elections Since 1956: The Politics of Demand Generation.** The next election was held in March 1960. A revived UNP, led by Dudley Senanayake, carried 50 seats. The Sri Lanka Freedom Party, suffering the loss of its leader, emerged with only 46 seats. As a consequence, neither party commanded a majority in the newly expanded 151-seat Parliament. This deadlock appeared made to order for Sinhalese-Tamil cooperation. The union of the Tamil Federal Party with either of the Sinhalese parties would set up a majority, coalition government, but none materialized. Neither of the Sinhalese parties could find any common ground of cooperation with the Tamils. The Federal Party demanded a federal constitution providing regional autonomy, parity for the Tamil language, and the use of Tamil as the administrative language in the north and east. Neither the UNP nor the SLFP could accept these demands and retain the support of their less compromising members.

Elections were again scheduled for July. The UNP claimed that only it could form a stable government, and accused the SLFP of Marxist tendencies. Mrs. Bandaranaike, who had been persuaded to take over the party of her late husband, actively appealed for support on the basis of his name and policies. The SLFP pledged in the campaign to complete the transition to Sinhalese as the only language of government. They won seventy-five seats, the UNP won only thirty, and the Federal Party emerged as an even more unified group with fifteen seats.

Although the new government straight away embarked on a rigorous implementation of the Sinhalese-only policy, its majority position gradually diminished as its members became dissatisfied on one or more other policies not related to language. The SLFP coalition government was finally defeated on a confidence motion in 1964. Kearney notes that from June 1964 until the March 1965 general election "*communal questions*

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20. *Ibid.*, p. 96.

were submerged by controversy concerning the coalition's socialist aims, alleged dictatorial actions and designs, and attitude toward Buddhism."<sup>21</sup> Ethnicity did not therefore dominate the 1965 election.

In the 1965 election the three party coalition consisting of the SLFP, the Lanka Sama Samaja Party and the Communist Party captured 55 of 151 elective seats in the House of Representatives. The UNP won 66 seats and was able to form a government with the help of some Federalists, the Tamil Congress, and other Sinhalese. This government marked the first time that a Tamil served as a minister in the cabinet since 1956. In January 1966 the first provisions were announced for the actual use of Tamil since the enactment of the original Tamil Language Act of 1958. The UNP came to power on a campaign which charged Bandaranaike's government with dictatorial practices and economic mismanagement.

The new SLFP opposition harped on communal themes in the hope of splitting the Sinhalese and Tamil supporters of the government or creating a strong Sinhalese reaction against the UNP. Communalism again became the dominant issue of Ceylonese politics.

The attack on the Government by utilizing language and communal issues appeared to be automatic. . . . The possibility of exploiting Sinhalese reaction to the presence of the Federal Party in the Government and the anticipated announcement of a language settlement must have readily suggested itself to the opposition.<sup>22</sup>

Ceylonese politics demonstrates a periodic regularity. Mrs. Bandaranaike succeeded in 1960 by relying on the ethnic issue, but lost in 1965 when language could not be invoked as a genuine issue. The UNP had succeeded in campaigning on economic and personality issues, viz., Mrs. Bandaranaike's personal dictatorial powers and the general disrepair of Ceylon's economy. By 1970, ethnicity again became salient. Of the 1970 election, *Newsweek* (June 8, 1970) reports that "Mrs. Bandaranaike also had played upon the ethnic chauvinism of the Sinhala-speaking Buddhist majority, whom Senanayake had kept from the throats of the mainly Hindu Tamils."<sup>23</sup> Senanayake and the UNP won only 17 of 151 elective seats whereas the SLFP of Mrs. Bandaranaike won 90 seats. Mrs. B's government represents the first two-thirds victory since independence in 1948 and permits her ruling party to amend the constitution without opposition support. The UNP had campaigned on the theme of maintaining steady economic progress; they lost to the politics of ethnic extremism.<sup>24</sup>

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21. *Ibid.*, p. 128 (emphasis added).

22. *Ibid.*, p. 133.

23. P. 41.

24. For details of the 1970 election, see *The New York Times*, May 29, 1970, pp. 1 and 3.

**Politics in Ceylon: Lessons from the Dominant Majority Configuration.**

The conclusions that emerge from a substantive review of Ceylonese electoral politics are consistent with our theoretical expectations.

1. *Little or no interethnic cooperation takes place during the nationalist struggle for independence.* In the dominant majority configuration, a nationalist party of the ethnic majority can secure a majority vote from the entire electorate without support from minorities. British requirements for independence, *viz.*, a responsible party that commands broad support, existed in the United National Party of D. S. Senanayake, which commanded the allegiance of a majority of the Ceylonese population; Tamil participation therefore was not essential in the nationalist struggle. The Tamil-Sinhalese split of 1921 took place only two years after the founding of the multiethnic Ceylon National Congress; nationalism grew primarily as a Sinhalese activity (although the swabhasha campaign had momentarily held Sinhalese together with some non-English-educated Tamils after independence).

2. *Ethnic communities provide the major sources of political support.* Immediately after the Tamils withdrew from the Ceylon National Congress, they formed their own, ethnically distinct, organizations. The constitutional debates over representation between the two world wars reflected intracommunal consensus (A.1) and intercommunal conflict (A.2): Sinhalese preferred a majoritarian scheme in contrast to the Tamil preference for a "fifty-fifty" balanced arrangement. The debates further reflected the joint belief that communal issues would dominate politics in an independent Ceylon. There existed, then, a perceptual consensus (A.3)—the lines of conflict were drawn, hardened, and in full view of everyone.

3. *The politics of moderation gives way to the politics of outbidding.* When ethnicity is salient, as we have seen in several other cases, intense communal electorates invariably favor the extremist position in contrast to a more moderate or ambiguous one. The UNP lost the 1956 election on opposition charges of gradualism and recalcitrance in implementing Sinhalese as the sole official language. Again in July 1960, appeals to unpromising Sinhalese and the memory of the late Prime Minister Bandaranaike forged victory for Mrs. Bandaranaike and the SLFP.

The ethnic issue played a lesser role in the 1965 election. For the first time since 1956, moderate politicians could raise national issues (e.g., economic growth), and make them credible, because the policies of Mrs. Bandaranaike's government had resulted in economic stagnation, widespread corruption and increasingly dictatorial rule. The salience of linguistic issues correspondingly declined. A coalition of dissatisfied minorities gradually increased until Mrs. Bandaranaike's government was defeated on a confidence motion in 1964. She had come to power on the ethnic issue

and had now lost her governing majority in spite of it. She was subsequently unable to generate demand for ethnicity in 1965. By 1970, however, she could, as a member of the opposition, charge the UNP government with pro-Tamil policies. Her appeals to the ethnic chauvinism of the Sinhalese majority won for the SLFP the most impressive victory in the history of Ceylonese electoral politics.<sup>25</sup>

4. *Dominant majorities often manipulate the rules of the electoral game to obtain or maintain partisan advantage.* Table 5.1 shows how the disenfranchisement of Indian Tamils has benefitted the Sinhalese, regardless of party. That is, following the 1948 and 1949 Citizenship Acts, which reduced the Tamil electorate by half, the Sinhalese have gained fifteen of the eighteen seats that Indian Tamils might otherwise have won. A gain of five seats immediately accrued to Sinhalese candidates in the 1952 election, the first after the Indian disenfranchisement.

5. *The minority communities, which possess little or no possibility of exercising political power, often resort to extra-legal methods.* The Federal

**Table 5.1**

Distribution of Parliamentary Seats Among Communal Groups, 1947-65

	Sinha- lese	Ceylon Tamils	Ceylon Moors	Indians	Other	Total
Seats due on population basis	66	12	6	10	1	95
Seats won:						
1947	69	13	5	7	1	95
1952	74	13	7	0	1	95
1956	75	12	7	0	1	95
Seats due on population basis	106	17	10	18	0	151
Seats won:						
1960 (March)	123	18	9	0	1	151
1960 (July)	122	18	10	0	1	151
1965	121	18	11	0	1	151

Source: Calvin A. Woodward, *The Growth of a Party System in Ceylon* (Providence: Brown University Press, 1969), p. 258.

25. Despite the fact that Senanayake and the UNP have no real direction to go but up in the 1975 election (unless it is held sooner), we must note that Mrs. Bandaranaike probably will not be able to invoke the linguistic issue, as defecting members of her government will have left on some other basis even though they agree with her pro-Sinhalese outlook, e.g., the 1971 leftist insurrection. The salient issue of the 1975 election should shift to a nonethnic dimension and the moderate stance of Senanayake should be more attractive to voters. Mrs. B's appeal to the World Bank for development funds and her decision not to nationalize foreign banks in Ceylon in December 1970 to stave off economic regression indicate her awareness of Senanayake's likely future campaign theme.

Party threatened a nonviolent direct action campaign in 1957 to obtain minimum demands for the Tamil language. During the next year massive violence rocked Ceylon: Sinhalese officials living in Tamil-majority regions were set upon and beaten and reprisals were carried out in Sinhalese areas. Another massive Tamil campaign was conducted in 1961 and additional rioting took place in Colombo in 1966, also over the language issue. We should also note that a disenchanted Sinhalese extremist assassinated Mr. Bandaranaike over his tolerance towards Tamils.

### **Majority Dominance: Five Additional Cases**

As shown above, Ceylon displays a pattern of ethnic politics that differs, because of its configuration, from the basic model of competitive ethnic politics. Minority Tamils do not and have generally never shared significantly in governmental decision making. Since the separation of the Tamils from the Ceylon National Congress in 1921, just two years after the inception of the modern nationalist movement, there has been little interethnic cooperation. Instead, abrogation or curtailment of democratic practices and institutions, albeit by a different route, are the outcomes, legitimate or not, with which minorities must learn to live.

The cases of Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Mauritius, Rwanda, and Zanzibar also reflect many of the regularities of the dominant majority configuration. They display several variations, however, which pose a minor classification problem. In Northern Ireland, for example, internal politics became singularly important after 1920, when the Government of Ireland Act separated Ulster from the Republic of Ireland and established two separate parliaments. Ethnic controversy is, however, deeply rooted in Irish history and still affects the current Catholic-Protestant dispute. The majority Protestants, who comprise two-thirds of Ulster's population, agitate for continued membership in the United Kingdom on the one hand, while, on the other hand, the minority Catholics, comprising one-third of the population, agitate for union with Ireland. No basis exists for an independence movement as such, but sharp nationalist sentiments often give rise to outbursts of violence. The Protestants in particular fear submergence in an all-Ireland Catholic state, whereas the Catholics claim job, housing and political discrimination under the present regime. Although politics in Ulster is not characteristic of the typical nationalist movement of the colonial plural society, the regularities of machinations, ethnic parties, violence, and the politics of outbidding still obtain.

Cyprus fits more readily into the model of the recently independent plural society. Cypriots received their independence from Britain on August 16, 1960, after several decades of Greek Cypriot agitation. Mauritius, too, is a classic object lesson of the colonial plural society. Inde-

pendence day was celebrated on March 12, 1968, only to be followed by racial violence four days later.

Rwanda and Zanzibar are more difficult to analyze. Rwanda obtained independence on July 1, 1962, after more than fifty years of foreign rule first by the Germans and then, after World War I, by the Belgians. Both colonial powers ruled indirectly through the traditional hierarchical system in which the Tutsi, a small ethnic minority representing one-seventh of the population, had for over four hundred years maintained social, political and economic dominance over the Hutu, who make up about eighty-five percent of the population. Democratization and the franchise, however, radically changed Rwandan politics. As a result of extensive rioting in 1959 and 1960, and an election in 1961, the Hutu majority wrested power from the Tutsi and abolished the traditional monarchy. Independence followed shortly.<sup>26</sup>

Only since 1959 does Rwanda qualify as an element in the dominant majority configuration. Since the 1961 election, the Hutu majority controls the government and thousands of Tutsi have recently fled to neighboring countries. From our perspective of the early 1970s we designate Rwanda as a dominant majority case, even though a minority ruled throughout most of her history.

Zanzibar also escapes easy classification. Between 1800 and 1963 a small Arab oligarchy exercised authority, first under the Omani Sultanate, and then under the status of a British Protectorate. Universal suffrage and parliamentary rule, introduced with postwar constitutional advancement, inaugurated a period of competition between Arabs, indigenous Africans (shirazi), and immigrant mainland Africans. Between 1957 and 1963, these communities contested four general elections with steady African gains. Since the January 1964 revolution and the attendant merger with Tanganyika, Zanzibar is now an example of a dominant majority configuration, although the Arab minority played the major role in government before the revolution.

Since the mid-1960s Rwanda and Zanzibar each exhibit the general features of majority dominance. We therefore choose to subsume these countries under the majority rubric in our analysis of their politics, even though their past histories qualify them for the dominant minority category prior to 1960. Important aspects of the premajority period are noted, though, and can be compared with the observations we record about the minority configuration that appear in the next chapter.

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26. See Philip Mason, *Patterns of Dominance* (London: Oxford University Press for the Institute of Race Relations, 1970), pp. 13-20; Richard F. Nyrop, et al., *Area Handbook for Rwanda* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), especially chapters 1, 2, 4, and 6; and René Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1970).

### Nationalist Politics: The Absence of Interethnic Cooperation

Ethnic groups in dominant majority societies generally tend not to cooperate with each other. This is probably due to the fact that the majority community commands by itself adequate resources to demand and successfully obtain independence. The five illustrations we present below highlight this characteristic of majority configurations.<sup>27</sup>

**Northern Ireland.** Northern Ireland is an established European plural society.<sup>28</sup> That part of its history which is relevant for an understanding of contemporary politics begins in 1603 when English rule became strongly entrenched in the north of Ireland following the defeat of the Irish Earls by Crown forces. Native Irish were ordered off the better lands to make room for Protestant settlers from Scotland and England; some remained on the less desirable lands as laborers and rent-payers. The desire of James II to raise and finance a large army in Ireland, where his Catholic sympathizers still had considerable power, further crystallized the Protestant-Catholic division in the late seventeenth century. He called a Parliament in Dublin that confiscated over two thousand Protestant estates. Many Protestants in the north took refuge in Enniskillen and Londonderry and held out until they were finally liberated by William of Orange when he defeated James at the Battle of the Boyne on July 12, 1690. Protestants still regard this victory as a symbol of their deliverance from the forces of Rome, and celebrate it today as a national holiday. The defeat further subordinated Catholics under Protestant rule.

Modern political developments date from 1920 when the promulgation of the Government of Ireland Act partitioned Ireland into Ulster (six counties in the north) and the Republic of Ireland. Since 1920, political power has remained in the hands of the Unionist Party, which is backed by the militant Protestant Orange order. Voting trends have, since the Act of Partition, strictly reflected the main religious divisions. The two communities in Northern Ireland, divided at the start, have retained their

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27. We remind the reader of our intent to use analytical, not geographical, categories. This may cause some unevenness in presentation at times, but our concern is with cross-national theoretical comparisons. For detailed historical accounts, the reader may refer to the footnote citations.

28. For an excellent summary treatment of the Catholic-Protestant conflict in Northern Ireland see *Orange and Green: A Quaker Study of Community Relations in Northern Ireland* (Yorkshire, England: Northern Friends Peace Board, 1969). An earlier but more detailed treatment is found in Denis P. Barritt and Charles F. Carter, *The Northern Ireland Problem: A Study in Group Relations* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962). More recently Richard Rose has published the results of a study of religious attitudes completed in Ulster in the late 1960s. See *Governing Without Consent: An Irish Perspective* (Boston: Beacon, 1971). Unless otherwise quoted, most of our information is derived from the *Orange and Green* pamphlet.



separateness ever since, and the divisions can be seen in all aspects of religious, political, educational, social, and cultural life.

**Cyprus.** The nationalist struggle in Cyprus closely approximates the Ceylonese pattern.<sup>29</sup> With the arrival of the first British High Commissioner in Cyprus on July 12, 1878, Ottoman rule was terminated. The immigration of Turks during the previous period of Ottoman rule effectively increased the number of Turkish Cypriot Muslims to 190,000, about one-fourth of the population; Greek Cypriot Orthodox Christians form the remaining three-quarters. Nationalism in Cyprus displayed a near exclusive Greek character, taking the form of a movement of *Enosis*, which symbolized union with Greece. Turkish Cypriot Muslims, behaving much like the Tamil minority in Ceylon, displayed their opposition to *Enosis* (and independence for that matter) from the very outset. Legislative Council politics reveals the contradictory preference of the two communities. On the council, nine elected votes belonged to Greeks and three to Turks. British administrators, who controlled six votes, depended regularly on the three Turkish votes to offset a unified Greek vote.

The structure of the Council was such that the government depended on the Turkish minority for the Legislative Council to function. This practice fostered divisiveness between Greeks and Turks. From the very beginning, the Greek members became the permanent opposition to the British-Turkish alliance.<sup>30</sup>

Communalism persisted throughout the independence movement and still pervades politics in independent Cyprus. The Orthodox Church, a strong promoter of *Enosis*, continually refused to cooperate with British constitutional proposals; the Turks, in defensive reaction, put forth their own demand for partition or double *Enosis*. Although a compromise constitution was worked out at Zurich and London, the two communities have been generally unable and unwilling to abide by its provisions, as we show in detail below.

**Mauritius.** Indians, comprising sixty-seven percent of the population, are the overwhelming majority in Mauritius, an island nation in the Indian Ocean. Fifty-one percent of them are Hindus and the remaining sixteen percent Muslims. The balance, consisting basically of Africans,

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29. Unless otherwise indicated, our data is taken from Stanley Kyriakides, *Cyprus: Constitutionalism and Crisis Government* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968). See also T. W. Adams, "The First Republic of Cyprus: A Review of an Unworkable Constitution," *The Western Political Quarterly* 19, no. 3 (September 1966): 475-90.

30. Kyriakides, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

mixed, and some Europeans, totals about thirty percent. Chinese represent an insignificant minority of about three percent.<sup>31</sup>

No community can lay claim to being the indigenous inhabitants of Mauritius. The French, who claimed the island in 1715, established a plantation system and brought in French colonists from the island of Reunion who, in turn, relied chiefly on slave labor. The island passed into British hands in 1810; the new masters abolished the slave trade in Mauritius in 1813 and freed all resident slaves in 1835. Emancipation, as in Guyana, produced a labor shortage and the planters substituted indentured labor from India between 1835 and 1907 when the system was terminated. Altogether more than 450,000 Indians arrived during this period and only 160,000 returned home after their contract of indenture expired. The Indians, moreover, brought their entire families with them and have, therefore, retained a communally oriented culture. White French creoles, Africans, Indians, and Chinese generally live apart from each other as is the case in Furnivall's description of the plural society.

Ethnic considerations are of paramount political importance in Mauritius. The first constitution, introduced in 1886, contained a restricted franchise that placed political control in the hands of the Europeans. Empire-wide changes after World War II led, however, to a new constitution in 1948 with a vastly expanded franchise. During the first major election contested under this new constitution Indians won twenty-nine of forty elective seats, dropped down to twenty-five in 1963, and the Independence Party (Indian in composition) of S. Ramgoolam, the Prime Minister, won thirty-nine of sixty-two seats in the 1967 preindependence general election. The Parti Mauricien, the party of whites and Africans, won only twenty-three seats in 1967, and, not surprisingly, voted unanimously against independence out of fear of Indian domination.<sup>32</sup> The Independence Party, chiefly representative of Indians, commanded sufficient strength by itself to approve the constitutional referendum for independence. Creole and African votes were not crucial and their unanimous opposition did not compel the British to postpone the granting of independence.

**Rwanda.** Rwanda's history, as previously discussed, shows marked ethnic divisions. The Hutu were subordinated to a Tutsi feudal kingdom for nearly 400 years until the advent of the franchise and representative democracy allowed the numerically dominant Hutu to turn the tables on

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31. The major work on Mauritius is that of Burton Benedict, *Mauritius: Problems of a Plural Society* (London: Pall Mall Press for the Institute of Race Relations, 1965). The figures reported above are taken from *Mauritius: Fact Sheets on the Commonwealth* (London: British Information Services, 1966), p. 2.

32. See *The New York Times*, August 9, 1967, p. 4.

their former rulers: many Tutsis have since become refugees in neighboring countries.

**Zanzibar.** Zanzibar's origin as a plural society can be traced to the establishment of the administrative capital of the Sultanate of Oman on the island in the early nineteenth century.<sup>33</sup> The settlement of the Sultanate was followed by the arrival of large numbers of Arab immigrants who brought with them their entire families. The Arab community soon planted cloves as an export crop and, in the process, gradually acquired most of the choice African land. Furthermore, they steadily expanded direct political and judicial powers over Africans with a system of district officers and brought in Indians to work as clerks in the Sultan's administration. Traders from India also arrived. Arabs thus exercised a monopoly of political power and later extended their political control to the island of Pemba (now a constituent part of Zanzibar), whose leaders had requested Arab intervention to relieve the residents of Pemba from their oppressive rulers in Mombasa on the nearby east coast of Africa.

Although the British established a protectorate over Zanzibar in 1890 they did not alter the racial quality of Zanzibar's class structure. Colonial practices were designed to preserve Arab elite status, even in the face of the introduction of the universal franchise after World War II. This decision to preserve the elite status of Arabs is especially intriguing since Africans comprise seventy-six percent of the population, Arabs about seventeen percent, and Asians six percent. And these communities are very tightly knit.

The strength of communal separatism was exemplified in broad and long-standing acceptance of the practice of racial representation in the Legislative Council, in the presence of innumerable racial and communal bodies, and in the fact that even sports, social life, and the local press were organized on communal lines. The election [1957] demonstrated the persistence of these communal loyalties and revealed that they had entered the modern parliamentary arena as the most powerful basis of political affiliation.<sup>34</sup>

The Zanzibar Nationalist Party, dominated by the Arab elite, was in the forefront of the independence movement. They capitalized on the internal divisions between Pemba Africans and Zanzibari Africans; the former historically had requested, and still viewed themselves as living

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33. For an excellent treatment of ethnic politics in Zanzibar, and one upon which we rely extensively, see Michael F. Lofchie, *Zanzibar: Background to Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965.)

34. *Ibid.*, p. 179.

under, benign Arab rule, whereas the latter had been deprived of their land and felt politically oppressed. A coalition party was thus formed consisting of the Arab-based Zanzibar Nationalist Party and the Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party, the latter almost exclusively representing the Pemba shirazis: each of the adherents to this alliance professed common belief in Islam.

African extremists, comprised chiefly of Hadimu (an indigenous tribe) and mainland African immigrants who belong to the Afro-Shirazi Party, had successively increased their share of the vote in the 1957, the two 1961, and the 1963 elections. Due to their disproportionate victories in several heavily African single-member constituencies, they received an absolute majority of the vote in the 1963 election, but only a minority of the seats. Independence was thus granted to a minority Arab government that possessed some Pemba African support. African militant leaders, who believed that peaceful constitutional practices implied permanent Arab rule, revolted in January 1964 — just one month after independence — and immediately placed Afro-Shirazi leaders in control of government. A subsequent merger with Tanganyika rendered the minority Arab position even more tenuous. Thousands of Arabs have perished or become impoverished since the advent of African rule and economic dislocations following the revolution have also significantly diminished Asian fortunes. Since the Africans have come to power, there has been no cooperation with Arabs or Asians.

### **The Ethnic Basis of Political Cohesion**

In those plural societies with dominant majority configurations, ethnicity is customarily the sole grounds for political cohesion, organization and action. For example, the two major parties in Northern Ireland are organized exclusively on religious grounds. Rose finds that very little inclination exists among Ulstermen to cross religious lines in their voting. Ninety-five percent of Unionist supporters are Protestants, and ninety-nine percent of Nationalist supporters are Catholics.<sup>35</sup> The preeminence of the Unionist Party is based upon its identification with the United Kingdom government at Westminster; it is a natural majority party, threatened only by the long-term possibility that higher fertility rates among Catholics might reverse its majority status.

The divisions between Catholics and Protestants, which are hardened and in full view of everyone, eliminate ambiguity in party positions. Rose shows that survey respondents of both religious groups identify the Nation-

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35. Richard Rose, *op. cit.*, chapter 7, p. 235.

alist Party with unification of Ireland and the Unionist Party with unity with Britain. The Unionists have totally dominated electoral politics since 1920. In many elections Unionist candidates have been returned to the Ulster Parliament unopposed, while defiant, though successful, Nationalist M.P.'s have often refused to take their seats in protest against Protestant rule. With few exceptions in the fifty years of Northern Ireland's separate existence, all elections have been fought between the two major parties over the issue of "for" or "against" continued unity with Britain. Such explicitly nonreligious parties as the Northern Ireland Labor Party and the Liberals have been extremely unsuccessful. As confirmation of the futility of a nonreligious appeal, only six of the fifty-two elective seats for the Stormont assembly were won by candidates from minor parties in 1969. As Rose concludes in chapter 8 of his Irish study

the observed voting patterns of Protestants and Catholics show that the two major parties are nearly 100 percent sectarian in their support.<sup>36</sup>

In Cyprus, as in Ulster, political organizations mirror ethnic divisions. Turkish and Greek Cypriots each preserve distinct ethnic identities, express mutual mistrust, and refuse to cooperate with one another. The two ethnic groups are crystallized into opposing political communities, each possessing intense and incompatible preferences. Makarios and the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus expressed Greek sentiments in the drive for *Enosis* with Greece while Turkish feelings led to their demands for partition or union with Turkey. Members of each community adhere almost perfectly to the sentiments of their own communal leaders.

Leaders in Mauritius also organized parties along racial dimensions. The most important of these, the Labor Party, is supported primarily by Hindus and some Muslims. It has been the majority party of government since 1959. (It is now a member of the Independence Party.) Whites and Africans, the two other major communities in Mauritius, underpin the Parti Mauricien.<sup>37</sup> This party is led by a mulatto attorney, Gaetan Duval, who has been depicted as the leader of 213,000 ex-slave descendants and 10,000 whites.<sup>38</sup> Voters cross ethnic lines only on rare occasions, so that nearly all political competition is racially oriented. Even the constitution, which incorporated territorial and ethnic criteria as a basis of constituency delimitation, explicitly recognizes the ethnic and religious diversity of the island. And, elections in 1959 and 1963 show a close correlation between

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36. *Ibid.*, p. 266.

37. See Figure 3.5 and the discussion pertaining to it for a theoretically suggestive interpretation of cooperation between minority communities.

38. *Time*, August 18, 1967, pp. 30-31.

the seats obtained by members of the principal ethnic communities and their corresponding percentages in the overall population.<sup>39</sup> Hindus, who make up just over half the population, obtained twenty-four of forty seats in 1959, and twenty in 1963. Muslims, at sixteen percent, won five seats each time. Creoles and whites, comprising thirty percent, gained eleven and fourteen seats respectively.

Rwanda also reveals a near unbridgeable gap between its Hutu and Tutsi elements. Hierarchical rule in a Tutsi-dominated feudal kingdom lasted over 400 years, until Belgians were charged by the United Nations Trusteeship Council to prepare Rwanda for independence. Changes were initially made in the system of electing members to advisory councils and, with the introduction of the secret ballot, the Hutu achieved marked gains on the lower councils. Shortly after the Hutu success in these elections, nine important Hutu leaders publicized a document which declared Rwanda's principal problem to be Tutsi domination in political, social and economic activities. The publication of this document was followed by the formation of the Party of the Hutu Emancipation Movement (PARMEHUTU) in 1959. Two years later (1961) PARMEHUTU began its domination of electoral politics. Although Tutsi interests were mobilized and expressed in the Rwanda National Party (UNAR), it could only obtain 16.8 percent of the vote in the balloting for the 1961 Legislative Assembly election. PARMEHUTU, on the other hand, received 77.7 percent of the vote. And on the question of continuing the monarchy, the vote was 80 percent negative. These election results correspond closely with the distribution of Hutu and Tutsi in the Rwanda population and thus the ethnic basis of politics in contemporary Rwanda seems established.<sup>40</sup>

Ethnic cleavages in Zanzibar are somewhat more complex, due chiefly to the internal divisions among the Africans. Four distinct groups of Africans reside in Zanzibar: the Hadimu, who are the subjects of the most extensive Arab repression and loss of land; the Tumbatu, a generally uninvolved fishing community; the Pemba, whose relations with Arabs were on the cordial side; and the mainlanders, chiefly urban proletarians who make up the bulk of the African extremists. A small community of Asians also resides in Zanzibar, but they have normally abstained from political activity.

As Lofchie makes clear, these divisions determine the basis of party organization.

Since the election of 1957, party and racial conflict had become practically synonymous, for party membership was based essentially on racial divisions. Indeed, members of all communities viewed their

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39. Benedict, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-67.

40. Nyrop et al., *op. cit.*, chapters 1 and 2.

party affiliation as a projection of the ethnic hostilities between their own community and others in the society.<sup>41</sup>

The political expression of these different communities is found, therefore, in separate political parties. Arabs comprised the Zanzibar Nationalist Party, Pemba Africans the Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party, and Hadimu and mainland Africans the Afro-Shirazi Party.

### **Ambiguity, Moderation, and the Politics of Outbidding**

Only in Zanzibar do we observe a conscious effort at ambiguous politics, and it is confined to the platforms and policies of the minority parties. It is easy to account for this observation. The Arab-based Zanzibar Nationalist Party, as a minority party, required African support to win elections.<sup>42</sup> They tried to obtain this support by stressing the themes of Islamic tradition and national loyalty to the Sultanate in their campaigns.

Arab nationalism, despite its *liberal multi-racial ethos*, was basically a conservative if not altogether reactionary phenomenon. It was an effort to return Zanzibar to a pre-colonial political condition, namely oligarchic rule, by a small landowning minority. While this would have been *disguised in the form of a multi-racial party* operating through formal parliamentary institutions, the political reality of autocratic rule by a small ethnic elite would, for all practical purposes, have been a return to the condition existing in the nineteenth century before the establishment of the Protectorate.<sup>43</sup>

ZNP leaders accentuated nonracial political doctrines and attempted to discredit the racial political thinking of the African extremists in order to undermine the communal appeal of the African-based Afro-Shirazi Party. Arab speakers thus constantly emphasized the Muslim character of the Zanzibar nationalist movement.

The majority Afro-Shirazi Party harped on communal themes alluding that ZNP rule meant continued Arab colonialism. Since the African community constituted a substantial majority, Afro-Shirazi leaders could concentrate squarely on appeals to their potential supporters.

We observe very briefly that two minority parties in Rwanda also appealed for national unity. Both the Rwanda National Union Party and the Rwanda Democratic Rally, supported mainly by the Tutsi minority,

41. *Op. cit.*, p. 204.

42. The existence of a universal franchise in Zanzibar, which is not the case in South Africa, Rhodesia and Burundi (chapter 6), forced the Arab minority to reconcile its electoral strategy with the requirements of majority rule.

43. Lofchie, *op. cit.*, p. 157 (emphasis added).

advocated harmonious relations between Rwanda's constituent groups; each proposed that the constitutional monarchy be maintained (probably to preserve continued Tutsi rule).

**Outbidding: The Politics of Ethnic Extremism.** From time to time, moderates appear in the electoral arena of plural societies but usually fail to retain long-run support from their constituents. Extremist entrepreneurs resort to ethnic demand generation and moderates are often compelled to adopt a less compromising stance to avoid defeat.

Extremist Catholics in Ulster look to the Irish Republican Army, a small revolutionary group of militant Irish nationalists, whose aim is to unite the two Irelands. The Army is banned in both Southern and Northern Ireland, but its slogans appear on street walls in Belfast, especially during periods of violence. In Protestant circles, steady progress towards moderation during the middle 1960s divided the ruling Unionists into hard-liners and liberals. The latter have moved, albeit slowly, in trying to redress housing and job inequities between the two communities while the former, exemplified by the Reverend Ian Paisley, have warned that even the slightest concessions toward Catholics mean rule by Rome.

The effect of such extremists as Paisley is clearly evident in Ulster politics. When Captain O'Neill took over the Premiership from Viscount Brookborough in 1963, it was thought by many to be the beginning of a new liberal era. O'Neill invited the Prime Minister of Ireland to Belfast for a visit in 1965, the first time leaders in the two countries had met in forty-one years. This visit, though, was singularly unpopular with Unionist hard-liners.

Paisley was arrested and imprisoned in the same year and a clandestine militant Protestant group, the "Ulster Volunteer Force," made its appearance; the government immediately declared it illegal under the Special Powers Act. Meanwhile, militant Catholics began to protest O'Neill's slow implementation of "liberal" reforms that, in turn, led to even more extremist demands by the Protestant hard-liners. Paisley's recent election to Parliament in 1970 demonstrates the resurging sentiment of Protestant extremism. "His election has upset more moderate Protestants who had hoped to build ties with the estranged Catholic community."<sup>44</sup>

Earlier in 1970 Paisley had won a by-election to fill a vacant seat in Northern Ireland's Parliament. He had fought that election as a Protestant Unionist and one of his slogans was "Stop the Sellout" — meaning the concessions that had been made to Catholics in the past three or four years of civil rights movements.<sup>45</sup> The successes of Paisley signal the demise

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44. *The New York Times*, June 28, 1970, p. 18.

45. *The New York Times*, April 17, 1970, p. 11.



of moderation. Massive communal rioting erupted in August 1969 and its chronic recurrence throughout 1970 and 1971 suggests that Catholics and Protestants are as sharply separated as ever, and that the majority Protestant community is unwilling to support a policy of moderation and compromise — especially since a greater Catholic birth rate threatens to wipe out their majority status. Protestants must be aware of the fact that one-half of Ulster's primary school children are Catholic.

O'Neill and his associates had tried to incorporate Catholics into the Ulster regime. They stressed economic issues and tried to downgrade the religious question. This strategy seemed viable when, in a snap general election in November 1965, his faction gained two seats. Since that election, however, the rise of Paisley and Protestant extremism spells repudiation of the liberal outlook. Extremism and street violence in 1969, 1970, and 1971 have governed ethnic politics in Northern Ireland.

Moderation, we just saw, quickly disappeared as a viable political strategy in Ulster. In Cyprus moderates were unable to command any degree of Greek or Turkish Cypriot support. Intensely held preferences within the two communities and the value of the stakes for which they were playing mitigated against compromise and moderation.

Among both Greek and Turkish Cypriots there are moderates who do want to try to make the Zurich settlement work. In both communities there are extremists who want it to fail and who are prepared to resort to open violence. The constitution's creaking performance so far has naturally played into the hands of the extremists on both sides.<sup>46</sup>

The history of ethnic politics in Cyprus reveals a steady crystallization and intensification of ethnic hatred; an outbreak of intercommunal conflict in 1963 almost brought Turkey and Greece to the brink of war. A United Nations peacekeeping force intervened in March 1964 to contain the conflict in Cyprus. Kyriakides records that this United Nations force has been instrumental in easing tension and promoting freer movement of the population; all-out war between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus was thus averted.<sup>47</sup> He cautions in his conclusions, however, that undue optimism for a peaceful future of harmonious Greek-Turk relations may be misleading.

Moderation in Mauritius is also notably absent. Indians and Africans are crystallized into two distinct political parties, represented respectively by the Independence Party of the Prime Minister S. Ramgoolam and the Parti Mauricien of Gaetan Duval. Attempts at moderation or compromise

46. *The Economist*, January 4, 1964, p. 10.

47. *Op. cit.*, p. 153.

are likely to cost each leader the support of his constituents. The *New Statesman* plainly points to this constraint.

Both Mr. Duval and Ramgoolam . . . are imprisoned by their parties and forced to adopt racial attitudes. If they come to some real compromise agreement they would both lose the support of influential extremist elements in their parties.<sup>48</sup>

Our final example, Zanzibar, also evinces the demise of moderation in favor of the politics of outbidding. The Pemba African party consciously avoided racial politics since many Pemba shirazi viewed mainland Africans with distrust, out of possible fear of Christianizing influences in Tanganyika. Many believed that mainland immigrants were not loyal to Zanzibar; furthermore, Pemba shirazi owed an historical debt of gratitude to Arabs who had relieved them of oppressive rule from Mombasa.

At the outset, then, Pemba shirazi leaders refused to join in the Afro-Shirazi Party. Pemba politicians appealed almost exclusively to shirazi voters, emphasizing their special needs, and stating their objectives in such terms as constitutional monarchy, rapid evolution towards independence, and nonracial government policies. Spokesmen charged that militant Afro-Shirazi Party leaders would suppress the Muslim faith, convert Zanzibar to Christianity, and hand it over to Tanganyika (the latter fear, in fact, materialized quickly after independence).

The multiracial and Islamic appeals of the Pemba shirazi, in a coalition with the Arab-based ZNP, produced electoral victories in 1957, 1961, and 1963, although with successively diminishing vote totals. Once the African militants were able to make *race* the sole salient issue, the appeals to national loyalty and Islamic devotion proved inefficacious and ethnic identification became decisively important. Thus, the combined ZNP/ZPPP vote totals steadily diminished and finally fell below fifty percent in the final 1963 election.

### **Machinations: The Manipulation of Ethnic Politics**

Dominant majorities often try to insure permanent advantage by manipulating the rules of the political game. These procedures often take the form of gerrymandering, disenfranchisement of minority voters, harassment of opposition leaders, restrictive job and housing policies, etc. Northern Ireland provides an excellent case study of the manipulative practices of a dominant majority.

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48. May 21, 1965, p. 794.

The predominant fear of the Protestant community is that some day Catholics may comprise a majority of the population. Catholic fertility rates outdistance those of the Protestants and nearly half of the primary school age population is Catholic. Until now, extensive Catholic migration to Britain and overseas has kept Catholics in a minority status. Nevertheless, Protestants practice systematic discrimination against Catholics.

A major bone of contention has been the one man—one vote controversy. Elections from Ulster constituencies to Parliament at Westminster are based upon United Kingdom laws; election to the Stormont Parliament and local councils with Northern Ireland are based on special Ulster laws. These laws serve to overrepresent Protestant interests. Complaints of gerrymandering and plural voting are easily justifiable in the realm of local government. The authors of *Orange and Green* note that there are some 240,000 fewer electors on the Local Government register than the Stormont List. This discrepancy follows from two provisions:

1. An elector must be the owner or tenant of a dwelling house of rateable value of ten pounds or over for three months prior to the election, and
2. Limited Companies are entitled to appoint one nominee to vote for every ten pounds of valuation up to a maximum of six votes. This provision was repealed in November 1968, and it is now agreed that the first will not apply in the next Local Government elections.<sup>49</sup>

Although the granting of one man—one vote will disproportionately enfranchise more Catholics than Protestants, because of large families and more doubling up, it will not totally offset the effects of gerrymandering.

Gerrymandering is particularly effective in maintaining Protestant control of municipal councils in Catholic majority communities. The Local Government Act of 1922 empowers the Ministry of Local Government to alter Urban and County Council boundaries. In many cases a large proportion of poorer property is included in one ward, so that fewer votes are needed in wealthier wards. Since the richer property is usually Protestant, a permanent majority is easily created. Unionist Councils tend to allocate houses to Catholics only in Catholic wards to maintain the voting patterns. The towns of Londonderry, Armagh, and Omagh contain respectively sixty-nine, fifty-nine, and sixty-one percent Catholic residents, yet Unionists are a majority in each Town Council. "The allocation of houses appears to be badly biased, and the main purpose appears to be to maintain the established voting balance, and thus prevent any challenge

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49. *Op. cit.*, p. 20.

to the party controlling the Council.”<sup>50</sup> Protestants comprise a majority in the overall Ulster population and can reasonably expect to seat a majority in Stormont. On the other hand, Catholics are a majority in some local areas. Manipulative practices have enabled Protestant minorities to govern even some of these Catholic majority towns.

Machinations have figured in the politics of independent Cyprus especially between 1961 and 1963. Greece and Turkey each played a significant part in determining the provisions of Cyprus's constitution. The Turks were overly successful in obtaining concessions for their minority compatriots in Cyprus; guarantees, e.g., that Turks be given thirty percent of all Public Service positions, were obtained that were disproportionate to the numerical strength of the Turkish Cypriot community. The Greek community refused to implement fully the seventy-thirty ratio in the Public Service and in retaliation, Turkish Cypriots refused to vote for tax legislation—a majority vote of each community is required to pass such legislation. In response to persistent Turkish recalcitrance, Greeks refused to extend the Municipalities law, and so forth.

These administrative deadlocks persuaded the Greeks to propose sweeping constitutional amendments, which, if implemented, would have established a unitary state, majority rule, and have eliminated the special safeguards for Turks. Turkey rejected Makarios's proposals as inimical to her interests. Violence erupted between the two communities in 1963 and since then they remain fundamentally separated as ever in outlook.

Leaders in Rwanda have not yet felt the need for manipulative practices. Since independence, the population balance has shifted even more in favor of the majority Hutu community; many Tutsi have left the country seeking refuge elsewhere. Their proportion in the population has declined from fourteen percent to about eleven percent. Possessing adequate police and military safeguards, Hutu leaders can allow Tutsis to participate in the political process. Tutsis are too few in number to constitute a threat to the Hutu leadership.

Again we find evidence of manipulation in Zanzibar. Lofchie reports that between the 1963 election and the January 1964 revolution, the ZNP/ZPPP regime consciously strived to maximize their control. Their measures included restricting the activities of opposition groups and the press, staffing the bureaucracy with loyal Arabs, and dismissing many Zanzibari police who had been recruited in mainland African countries. Members of opposition parties were not permitted to travel abroad and arbitrary search and seizure became commonplace. The Control of Soci-

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50. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

eties Law had the effect of offsetting the Bill of Rights, which would have ensured the safety of legitimate opposition parties.<sup>51</sup> These machinations, while carefully conceived, failed in the long run to achieve the objectives for which they had been designed.

### Violence: Communities in Conflict

Ethnic frustrations often give rise to violent conflict. Chronic rioting in Ulster in 1969, 1970, and 1971 filled considerable space in the world press.<sup>52</sup> Similarly, massive intercommunal Turkish-Greek hostilities necessitated the presence of a United Nations peacekeeping force. In Mauritius, clashes over proposed independence between Indians and Africans resulted in two deaths in May 1965, and a major outbreak of racial violence in January 1968 left twenty-four dead and over one hundred wounded. British troops were called in to restore order and a state of emergency was declared. Racial violence again broke out in the week following independence day.<sup>53</sup>

Preindependence politics in Rwanda also did not escape interethnic violence. A series of attacks and counterattacks, directed against Hutu and Tutsi groups, broke out in November 1959. In particular, the death of two Tutsi notables touched off a wave of violence in which the Hutu pillaged and burned thousands of Tutsi huts, and Tutsi commando bands attacked and killed several Hutu political leaders. The administration was able to restore order only by declaring a state of emergency and calling in Belgian paratroopers from the Congo. Additional incidents of burnings increased the number of Tutsi refugees; many fled to Burundi, Uganda and the Congo.<sup>54</sup>

Our final case, Zanzibar, also typifies this regularity. The seizure of government by African extremists was followed by their destruction of the Arab oligarchy and the expropriation of its lands. There was rioting during the 1961 election campaign as well, a consequence of a year of intensive campaigning on the racial issue.

The basic features of dominant majority politics bear repeating. The numerical status of the dominant community permits it to seek and obtain independence without the cooperation of the minorities. As a result, ethnic parties are organized and extremists soon come to dominate the electoral

51. Lofchie, *op. cit.*, pp. 265-68.

52. See, for example, Martin Wallace, *Drums and Guns: Revolution in Ulster* (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1970).

53. See *The New York Times*, January 23, 1968, p. 14; January 30, 1968, p. 4; February 29, 1968, p. 3; and *Newsweek*, February 5, 1968, pp. 37-38.

54. Nyrop, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

arena. Once in power they do not hesitate to adjust the rules of the game to secure their political supremacy. During this process violence frequently erupts. Democracy, in these contexts, has little meaning insofar as the protection of minorities is concerned.

## The Dominant Minority

As we have seen, the numerical composition of the ethnic communities profoundly affects politics in plural societies. In the case of the dominant minority situation, one consideration especially stands out: the overriding fear held by the minority, whether rightly or wrongly, that they stand to be overwhelmed by a vastly larger majority. To protect themselves in this situation, the minorities often exclude the majority community from legal participation, deprive them of civil rights and other democratic safeguards, and rely heavily on police rule to maintain order. Equality of opportunity, freedom of expression and other egalitarian values are thus openly discarded in such plural societies as South Africa and Rhodesia. As might be expected, many books and articles about politics in these countries are critical of the minority regimes.<sup>1</sup> South African and Rhodesian politics are not compatible with liberal egalitarian norms. However, a normative evaluation of their standards is not our primary concern in this book. Rather, our chief interest lies in identifying the salient features of ethnic politics in dominant minority configurations and in explaining the how and why of the regularities we discover.

### South Africa

Two different conflicts have conditioned South African political history. On the one hand, Afrikaners and English-speaking Whites have continuously competed with each other for political control in South Africa, while on the other hand, both White communities have often banded together against their commonly perceived African and colored opponents.

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1. See, for example, Pierre L. van den Berghe, *South Africa, A Study in Conflict* (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1965), p. 9.

In both cases, however, ethnicity is the dominant theme of South African politics. As van den Berghe observes:

The power struggle thus takes place at two levels. On the one hand, the two White groups compete within the constitutional framework for the control of Parliament and of the state apparatus, while, on the other hand, Africans and Europeans oppose one another on the extraparliamentary scene. The "Native policy" of the main European political parties has differed in details and in methods, but *the vast majority of Whites, both Afrikaners and English, has always agreed on the perpetuation of White supremacy. Nearly all Africans, on their side, aim at the overthrow of the present system.*<sup>2</sup>

In the discussion that follows, we show a steady intensification of Black-White conflict which, especially since 1948, has dampened and almost eliminated the political relevance of the intra-White Afrikaner-English conflict. Clearly the most important fact of South African political life is the distinction between Blacks and Whites, symbolized by the term "apartheid."

### **South African History from 1652-1910: Afrikaner-English Competition.**

In 1652 the Dutch East India Company established a small colony on the Cape as a half-way station on the route to India. Following the establishment of this colony, a number of Dutch settlers, now called either Boers or Afrikaners, arrived and quickly imposed White rule and a system of slavery. Most of the early slaves, however, were Asians who were shipped from India and the Indonesian Islands, rather than Africans.<sup>3</sup>

The British arrived more than 150 years later in 1806 and subsequently established a permanent governorship over the Cape Province. Prior to the British, the importation of slaves, chiefly from Madagascar, Mozambique, and the East Indies, had already placed the White settlers in the position of a numerical minority. Relations between the newly settled English and the more established Afrikaners were tense from the outset as many Afrikaners feared that their way of life would be submerged under British culture. As a consequence of the British decision to abolish slavery in the Cape Province in 1834, the second phase of South African history known as the "Great Trek" began:

Until this year [1836], there had been one Cape Colony, whether or not it was a divided settlement. There was one government and one official ruler: Britain. The Great Trek was aimed at the establishment,

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2. *Ibid.*, p. 98 (emphasis added).

3. Alex Hepple, *South Africa* (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 9.



in the interior, of Boer Republics, free of British domination and free to practice religion and education in the Dutch language. Here slavery would not be prohibited.<sup>4</sup>

The Boers moved north in large numbers and established what is now known as Transvaal and the Orange Free State. The British, simultaneously, expanded into the northeast and annexed the province of Natal, where they established sugar plantations. For the required cheap plantation labor the planters obtained indentured Indian immigrants, most of whom, following the expiration of their three year contracts of indenture, chose to stay in South Africa and generally engaged in small scale farming or trading. Whether a legitimate concern or not, the steadily expanding size of the Indian community represented a threat to the "purity" of the Afrikaner republics. This threat led directly to the passage of the first discriminatory legislation in South Africa.

From 1885, the laws of the Orange Free State Republic [a Boer state] restricted their residence, withheld all political rights and prohibited their free entry into the republic. In 1891 the Free State enacted that no Indian could own or occupy land within the republic. . . .<sup>5</sup>

Subsequent legislation altogether ended Indian immigration in 1911; by this time, however, the Indian community numbered 150,000 persons.

From the days of the Great Trek in 1836 until the establishment of the Union of South Africa as a self-governing state in 1910, the intra-White British-Boer division was of especial political salience — it even led to several instances of overt warfare. The first instance was sparked by the discovery of diamonds around Kimberly in 1867 that prompted Britain to annex the diamond fields to the Cape Colony. The Boer Orange Free State was then unable to contest this annexation by force. Ten years later, in 1877, the British moved into and occupied the Transvaal, but withdrew after a short fight and defeat in 1881. This incident is known as the first Anglo-Boer War.

Though the English acknowledged Afrikaner supremacy by their withdrawal from the Boer Republics in 1881, the discovery of gold around the future city of Johannesburg in 1886 produced a gold rush and flooded the Transvaal (a Boer Republic) with White English miners and other White non-Boers (foreigners). Non-Boer settlement in large numbers in the boom town of Johannesburg began to threaten the political supremacy of the Boers. Their response, denying the franchise to these foreigners, justified new British intervention and the second Anglo-Boer War erupted that ended with a British victory in 1902.

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4. Harm J. De Blij, *South Africa* (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1962), p. 39.

5. Hepple, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

Shortly after the hostilities subsided the British promulgated the South Africa Act of 1909 which, to all effects, gave political control to the Afrikaners, while allowing English financial magnates to retain control of the economy. Britain sought to insure in the postwar settlement that South Africa would remain a friendly White-settler dominion with security for the dominant English economic interests. Thus the 1909 agreement, which created an independent South Africa in the British Commonwealth of Nations in 1910, restored prewar Boer political supremacy, especially in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Among the important provisions that were incorporated into the constitution, two deserve emphasis. (1) English and Dutch were declared as the two official languages—none of the African languages received any recognition. (2) The franchise was restricted chiefly to Whites. Delegations from the Transvaal and the Orange Free State—the former Boer Republics—were adamantly opposed to any extension of the franchise to non-Whites in their provinces. Any attempt by the British to impose such an extension would have threatened the postwar policy of reconciliation. In the Cape, the voting qualifications were raised to entrench political control even more decisively in White hands; only a small community of 10,000 coloreds, the descendants of intermarriages between natives and the early White settlers, retained the franchise. And finally, in Natal, a British colony with few Afrikaners, the 1909 agreement also denied the franchise to non-Whites.

The end result was a retention of the existing franchise laws in each of the four provinces. The basic agreement on color issues between most Afrikaners and English has been a constant fact of the South African political scene for over a century. . . . the English, as a group, have only shown liberalism (carefully minimized at that) when it suited their interests as opposed to those of the Afrikaners.<sup>6</sup>

**1910-1948: Afrikaner-English Cooperation and the Resurgence of Afrikaner Nationalism.**<sup>7</sup> The South Africa Act of 1909 signaled an end to the violence between the Boers and the British government and the beginning of a cooperative spirit between the two major groups of White settlers. Louis Botha (1910-19) and Jan Smuts (1919-24), the first two Prime Ministers, each maintained the spirit of compromise that was reflected in the South Africa Act of 1909. Both men, ex-Boer generals, resisted extremist Afrikaner elements and chose, instead, to cooperate with the English. By 1924, however, the successful rise of Afrikaner nationalism produced a government with a more explicit Afrikaner orienta-

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6. Van den Berghe, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

7. For this section we draw upon van den Berghe, pp. 101-4, and the other references that are cited below.

tion. This government (1924-33) was headed by J. B. M. Hertzog, who had earlier broken away from Botha and had founded the Afrikaner-based Nationalist Party in 1912. Hertzog had successfully formed a coalition with the English-based Labor Party to oppose the government of Jan Smuts, who had supported English big business interests in 1922 when White mine workers, chiefly Afrikaners, went on strike demanding that restrictions be placed on Black mine workers. Thus a seeming alliance of White working-class elements enabled Hertzog to come to power and carry out several more obvious pro-Afrikaner policies. These included the passage of several pieces of national legislation, e.g., Nationality and Flag Act of 1927, substitution of Afrikaans for Dutch as one of the two official languages of South Africa.

Hertzog's openly anti-English policies came to an end in 1933 when he and Smuts, the former Prime Minister, reached an agreement to establish a new coalition government. Although Hertzog remained in his post as Prime Minister, this rapprochement meant that the new government would likely be more favorable to English capital and less disposed to accept extremist Afrikaner demands. As a result of Hertzog's new moderate stance, the militant wing of the Nationalist Party (now the Purified Nationalist Party) split off and eliminated both Hertzog and the other nonnationalists who had entered into Smut's government. This new nationalist Party, led by Dr. D. F. Malan, officially sought the creation of an Afrikaner Republic and South African withdrawal from the British Commonwealth of Nations.<sup>8</sup>

The union of Hertzog and Smuts was institutionalized in the formation of the United Party, which represented the older line of English-Afrikaner compromise, and of cooperation with Britain and the Commonwealth. This compromise was short-lived, however, and dissolved when the two men split over the issue of South African participation in World War II; Hertzog had favored a neutral position while Smuts advocated active South African participation on the British side. Hertzog was defeated in 1939 by a parliamentary vote of eighty to sixty-seven, which enabled Smuts to form his United Party war cabinet. Hertzog subsequently rejoined the Nationalist party, *but this time Malan, with his extremist Afrikaner policies, was the undisputed leader.*

The 1948 election is the crucial turning point in South Africa's electoral history.<sup>9</sup> On March 29, 1948, Dr. D. F. Malan made a campaign speech

8. For a brief, but excellent, discussion of modern party history in South Africa, see Newell M. Stultz and Jeffrey Butler, "The South African General Election of 1961," *Political Science Quarterly* 78, no. 1 (March 1963): 86-110, especially pp. 90-94.

9. For an excellent discussion of the 1948 election and its consequences for South African politics see Edward A. Tiryakian, "Apartheid and Politics in South Africa," *The Journal of Politics* 22, no. 4 (November 1960): 682-97.

in which, for the first time, he proposed apartheid — separate development of the races — as a policy of race relations. The issue was immediately ridiculed by the English press and the United Party. Throughout the campaign the Nationalists accused the United Party of promoting racial integration. Smuts, campaigning actively as the election drew near, ridiculed the notions of apartheid, separate development, and placing the natives back on their own land reserves as “so much nonsense.”

The election results clearly show that the United Party badly underestimated the appeal of the issues of racial policy and apartheid to the European voter. The United Party of Smuts was shockingly defeated by Malan's Nationalist Party, even though the former polled over 120,000 more votes than the latter. The Nationalist Party emerged with 70 seats, the United Party 65, the Afrikaner Party, led by N. C. Havenga, 9, the Labor Party 3, and minor parties and independents 6. Malan's Afrikaner-oriented party benefitted from the constituency provisions contained within the 1910 South Africa Act, which gave greater representation to the heavily Afrikaner-populated rural areas. With the emergence of race as the sole salient issue in South African politics, moderation gave way to extremism.<sup>10</sup>

After the election, Malan formed a coalition government with Havenga's Afrikaner Party, which had won nine seats, thereby giving the government a narrow parliamentary majority of seventy-nine to seventy-four; the opposition consisted primarily of the United Party and the Labor Party, both of which were chiefly English in composition. The Afrikaner support, though not extensive, which had allowed the United Party to govern between 1939 and 1948, was not forthcoming in the 1948 election. Afrikaner sentiments were reflected almost exclusively by the Nationalist Party. Malan became Prime Minister and appointed an all-Afrikaner cabinet. Three years later the Afrikaner Party joined his Nationalist Party.

By rallying the mass of the Afrikaner electorate, the Nationalist Party eliminated the necessity of compromise with the English, gained control of the entire country, and *opened the way for more extremist policies*.<sup>11</sup>

### **1948-1970: Minority Domination and the Politics of Racial Extremism.**

Since their rise to a position of preeminence in 1948, Afrikaners have totally monopolized the decision processes of government. At the same time, Afrikaner-English political competition has markedly declined in view of the growing political salience of extraconstitutional conflict between Whites and non-Whites. The English have, since the defeat of their

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10. *Ibid.*, p. 691.

11. Van den Berghe, *op. cit.*, p. 103 (emphasis added).

moderate program in 1948, apparently become more or less reconciled to the business of making money, leaving the business of government to the Afrikaner Nationalist Party. Meanwhile, the Afrikaners have moved to consolidate their position through a series of legal enactments. These measures included the following: (1) the elimination of Cape Coloreds from the common electoral roll; (2) the abolition of the "Natives Representatives" system, which eliminated from Parliament the White spokesmen for the African community; (3) a reduction in the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen, which increased the voting strength of the more fertile Afrikaners; and (4) the granting of six seats in Parliament to South-West Africa, whose population overwhelmingly supports the Nationalist Party. As a result, Nationalist majorities increased without interruption in the elections of 1953, 1958, 1961, and 1966; a slight reduction from 126 seats in 1966 to 119 seats in 1970 was suffered, but Nationalists have retained a two-thirds control of Parliament since 1961.

An analysis of these election results is very informative. The first point to note is that Malan's electoral manipulations enabled his party to steadily increase its popular vote. Table 6.1 reveals this gain.

**Table 6.1**

Election Results in South Africa in 1953 and 1958

	1953	1958
Nationalist Party	598,718	642,069
United Party	576,474	503,828
Other	34,730	6,096

Source: Edwin A. Tiryakian, "Apartheid and Politics in South Africa," *Journal of Politics* 22, no. 4 (November 1960): 692.

By 1961, Afrikaner supremacy was openly conceded. Of the 165 seats in the South African Parliament, 70 were unopposed. Of telling importance is the fact that 50 seats, conceded to the Nationalist Party by the opposition, represented either rural provincial constituencies or those in the Afrikaans-speaking towns and working-class sections in Pretoria. The Nationalist Party, in turn, openly conceded 46 constituencies (20 unopposed) to the opposition parties in districts where the English-speakers were predominant. As expected, the major issue in the 1961 campaign was the race policy of the government. The results for the remaining contested seats illustrated the growing strength of appeals to the racial sentiments of the White electorate: the Nationalist Party was successful in 85

percent of these contests (55 seats in all). No Nationalist Party Member of Parliament was unseated; in fact, all of them increased their 1958 majorities. Furthermore, the Progressive Party, which advocated multiracial cooperation, lost 10 of its 11 contests. Many English electors had by now shifted their support to the Nationalist Party and its appeal for White unity.<sup>12</sup>

As the security of the Afrikaner position steadily increased, the policies of the Nationalist government became more extreme. Malan's successor Styrdom and, in turn, his successor Verwoerd adopted even more extremist measures. The latter, in 1958, *eliminated all remaining moderates from his government*. Afrikaner Nationalists gradually secured for themselves the leading positions in the civil service (e.g., the police, railways, education), the diplomatic corps and the judiciary, increased the importance of the Afrikaans language, attacked the autonomy of English-speaking universities, heavily subsidized White Afrikaner farming, and so forth. Their most significant triumph came in 1961 when they declared South Africa a Republic and withdrew from the Commonwealth, policies that Malan's early Nationalist Party had advocated.

Why did the English, who comprise forty percent of the White South African population, stand idly by and permit the Nationalist Party to proceed with these measures, since their economic strength might have permitted them to exert considerable pressure on the government to moderate its policies? In fact, the United Party, as the main official opposition party, has recently *even supported* the government on several pieces of dictatorial legislation.

The real crux of the answer . . . lies in the "Native problem." The English share all the privileges of the other Whites, and they do not want to change the existing system of White oppression. The dictatorial measures of the government do not affect the daily life of the English, as they are intended to suppress the non-white opposition. . . . In order to maintain White supremacy and privileges, the mass of the English is willing to pay the price of increasing dictatorship, of gradual Afrikanerization, and of a measure of economic interference.<sup>13</sup>

The English have thus acquiesced in Afrikaner political supremacy and increasing repression of the non-White majority because of their paramount interest in economic prosperity. Since 1948, measures have been taken to minimize the threat from non-Whites. These measures, discussed

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12. Stultz and Butler, *op. cit.*, passim.

13. Van den Berghe, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

below, reveal just how far minority regimes are prepared to go to preserve their advantaged position.

Upon taking office in 1948, the Nationalists legislated still further separation between the races to enhance White racial supremacy. They passed in 1949 the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act that forbids any marriage between a White and a non-White. In the following year and again in 1957, they amended the Immorality Act of 1927 to make "immoral or indecent acts" between Whites and non-Whites of opposite sexes an offense punishable by up to seven years of imprisonment. And, as we noted before, they completely eliminated Cape Coloreds from the common electoral role in 1956, and abolished token representation of Africans by White members of Parliament in 1960.

Among the more important provisions was the Group Areas Act of 1950, amended in 1952, 1955, and 1957, which established segregated residential areas for each race. These Acts removed the deferential treatment, which had been accorded to Coloreds and Indians, by restricting their physical movement and area of residence; it also placed a significant bar on Indian economic opportunities. Additional labor and educational legislation served to place all non-Whites at a serious disadvantage both in employment and in universities by prohibiting African workers from competing with Whites in many occupations and forbidding non-Whites from attending English-speaking universities. A number of other laws gave the government wide powers of perquisition, confiscation of property, banning of organizations, exile, extradition, arrest, and detention without trial. These repressive measures have culminated in such regulations as the "pass laws" that require all adult African males to carry "reference books," thereby enabling the police to restrict African migration and keep control over the mass of Africans. In terms of punishments for violations of the law, non-Whites receive distinctly harsher treatments in the courts than Whites for comparable offenses.<sup>14</sup>

In an attempt to justify this increasingly harsh repression of Africans, Whites point to the disastrous cattle-killing by the Xhosas in the 1850s, the Zulu Poll-Tax Rebellion of 1906, and the 1960 revolt of the Pondo peasantry, all of which are seen by the European population as expressions of anti-European ethnic nationalism. Repression, disenfranchisement, differential economic opportunity, and other devices are thus readily employed by Europeans to insure continued White supremacy in all aspects of political, economic and social life.

As a consequence of the intensification of apartheid, Coloreds have now been deprived of those remaining privileges that had distinguished them

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14. *Ibid.*, pp. 128-35.

from Blacks, and they are now treated simply as one of South Africa's three non-White groups without the right to participate in the country's government. Indians have also been victims of apartheid policies and their position has been gradually eroded by the acts of several White governments. These enactments include exorbitant taxation, "repatriation" schemes, and even expropriation under the Group Areas Act, under which Indians are required to live within an officially designated segregated area.<sup>15</sup>

Multiracial parties in South Africa are few and far between and have never been successful in moderating the extremist position of the Nationalist Party. Two examples of nonracial political groups are the Communist Party and the Liberal Party, neither of which is represented in Parliament. Most non-White political movements display a Black counter-racialism directed against White domination, and thus it is difficult for well-motivated leaders to bring about genuine interracial cooperation.

What is the likelihood that the Nationalist Party will split and produce a moderate wing that can influence constitutional change attenuating white racial supremacy?

But the whole evolution of Afrikaner Nationalism in the last thirty years has shown *a trend towards reactionary extremism*. As the Nationalist government becomes more firmly entrenched, its policies become more repressive, and today the "extremists" are in a stronger position than ever. The influence of "moderate" Nationalist intellectuals and clergymen has become negligible, and the *Broederbond* [an ultra-secret nationalist organization consisting of prominent Afrikaner elite members of the Dutch Reformed Churches, the professions, business and universities] gradually purged such organizations as the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs of "liberal" dissidents. Within the cabinet and in other leading political posts, the *Broederbond* replaces more and more moderates with extremists, and pressure has been brought upon liberal clergymen to toe the line. . . .<sup>16</sup>

Stultz and Butler also reach a similar conclusion.<sup>17</sup> Since the disagreements between the English and Afrikaners have diminished in importance, it appears unlikely that moderate elements within the White community will emerge to advocate improving the status of non-Whites. The politics of extremism, as the theme of apartheid depicts, seems to preclude the viability of moderation on the racial issue by White politicians who seek electoral victory.

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15. *Ibid.*, p. 152.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 173-74.

17. *Op. cit.*, p. 110.



**Politics in South Africa: The Salience of Race.** 1. *A dominant minority seeks to exclude the majority from legitimate participation in government.* Beginning with the South Africa Act of 1909, the vast majority of non-Whites, excepting about 10,000 Cape Coloreds, were disenfranchised from the common electoral roll. Since Afrikaners began their domination of government in 1948, even these Cape Coloreds have been removed from the electoral lists. Indians, Africans and Coloreds have no basis for legal participation in the electoral process; they cannot vote, cannot run for office, cannot organize legitimate political parties, and generally cannot speak out on political matters. Politics in South Africa is, strictly speaking, the exclusive control over the public sector by a racially defined White minority.

2. *Extremists dominate the political arena.* Since nearly every political movement, whether overt or covert, is predicated upon advancing the interests of some specific racial community, the only attempts at overtly non-racial parties have met with dismal failure. An overriding fear of what the majority Africans are likely to do to the White community if they obtain power encourages extremist Afrikaner Whites, and compels even moderate English Whites, to support official government policy. Politics since 1948 displays a growth of repressive and other extremist measures against the African population, and most Englishmen, it would seem, prefer wealth to social, political, and economic equality for all residents of South Africa.

3. *Interethnic competition strengthens intraethnic cohesion.* Specifically, the English-Afrikaner dispute, marked by thousands of deaths during the two Boer Wars and rooted in a long history dating from 1806, has steadily diminished in importance, especially as Black-White conflict has grown in salience. It appears unlikely that more than a very small number of Whites will diverge from giving support to parties which promote White supremacy. Furthermore, any party leader who advocates moderation is likely to come under attack from more extremist elements within his party. Leaders of the Afrikaner Nationalist Party must have been aware of this pattern as they moved still further in their extremist position in the 1970 campaign to ward off a possible electoral threat from an even more intensely White supremacist group.

4. *The minority relies heavily upon police rule.* Van den Berghe records a steady growth in the size and expenditures of the police force and army and notes that the police are often used as a deliberate instrument of intimidation and harassment of Africans. They often raid African homes under the cover of enforcing the pass regulations; estimates of arrest and conviction show that one adult African male in three is prosecuted for some criminal offense each year. Police raids also often result in the destruction of African property, in the mistreatment and beating of Afri-

cans, and the use of firearms in the maintenance of order. Law and order for Whites represents abuse and oppression for non-Whites.<sup>18</sup>

### Rhodesia

When compared with the White minority which comprises 20 percent of the overall population in South Africa, the tiny White minority in Rhodesia, making up a scant five and one-half percent of its population, appears even more preoccupied with retaining exclusive White political control.<sup>19</sup> Although Africans constitute an overwhelming majority (94.5 percent) of the Rhodesian population, they are only allocated the use of less than half of the country's lands (much of it undesirable), earn on the average one-tenth as much as Europeans, receive a per pupil government expenditure in education approximately one-tenth that accorded to Europeans, and very rarely complete a full course in the secondary schools. In a nutshell, Whites exercise a monopoly on the decision-making structures of government in Rhodesia's plural society; effective African participation in government is negligible and it is unlikely that Whites will relinquish to any degree their position of absolute supremacy. So long as Whites possess adequate police and military forces, Africans are likely to remain, in practice, a disenfranchised, subservient majority.

Ever since Rhodesia unilaterally declared independence from Britain in November 1965, Ian Smith, Rhodesia's Prime Minister, has gradually consolidated White rule. When the Union Jack was hauled down in March 1970, Rhodesia had already adopted a constitution which ensured that the country's overwhelming African majority could never legitimately achieve control of Parliament. *Newsweek* reports that even moderate White voters feel compelled to support the White regime: a typical voter [in the 1970 election] remarked, "We Europeans don't want a dictatorship, but the threat [African rule] to us is very real."<sup>20</sup>

The theoretical paradigm that informs our analysis of ethnic politics in South Africa's dominant minority configuration provides appropriate

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18. *Ibid.*, pp. 136-41.

19. These figures and much of our information about Rhodesia are taken from Theodore Bull, *Rhodesia: Crisis of Color* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967). See especially Appendix I, pp. 159-60. See also James Barber, *Rhodesia: The Road to Rebellion* (London: Oxford University Press for the Institute of Race Relations, 1967); "Rhodesia: The Constitutional Conflict," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 4, no. 4 (December 1966): 457-69; Frank Clements, *Rhodesia: A Study of the Deterioration of a White Society* (New York: Praeger, 1969); and Larry W. Bowman, "Organization, Power, and Decision-Making Within the Rhodesian Front," *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies* 7, no. 2 (July 1969): 145-65.

20. April 20, 1970, p. 64.

categories for making comparisons with White Rhodesian politics. Even though Rhodesian Whites are not internally divided into distinct sub-cultures as in South Africa, ethnic politics under the two White minority regimes is remarkably similar.

**Exclusion of the African Majority from Participation in Government.** Africans in Rhodesia have not been totally disenfranchised; a large number are eligible to vote for candidates who run on a special list called the *B-roll*. Qualifications for *B-roll* voting include citizenship, two years continuous residence in the country, 21 years of age, some knowledge of English, a specified minimum income, and fixed assets of a specified value, or the completion of at least a certain minimum number of years of education. As a consequence of these qualifications, some 11,577 Rhodesians were eligible to vote on the *B-roll* in 1965; the vast majority, 10,689 to be exact, were African. *A-roll* franchise qualifications are more demanding, both in terms of income and education. The 1965 list of qualified *A-roll* voters included 92,405 Europeans out of a total listing of 97,284 persons. Requirements of high income, education and ownership of property, therefore, serve to insure White domination of what may legally appear to be a "color-blind" *A-roll*. Africans correspondingly dominate the *B-roll*. Since the constitution of independent Rhodesia provides for 50 *A-roll* seats and 15 *B-roll* seats, Whites are certain to obtain an overwhelming majority in Parliament. Although Africans may campaign for office and vote (if franchise qualifications are met), representatives elected by *B-roll* voters exert little influence in the allocative decisions of government.

**Extremism and the Failure of Moderation.** As mentioned above, the White community is not subdivided into ethnically separate groupings; rather, most Whites are of British extraction and are culturally quite homogeneous. Most Whites came to Rhodesia to engage in commercial agriculture, especially when it was discovered that mineral wealth claims had been vastly exaggerated. In 1922 these settlers, on the basis of a "color-blind" franchise, voted on the issue of Rhodesia's future political status: approximately sixty percent of the qualified voters indicated their preference for responsible internal government; the remaining forty percent had voted for union with South Africa. Rhodesia was subsequently annexed to Britain in October 1923 with political control firmly in the hands of the resident European population — Africans were in practice excluded from the franchise because of income, property and educational requirements. Most newly arriving European immigrants were easily absorbed into the white Rhodesian way of life, and the White community, therefore, retained its homogeneous character.

The demise of moderation and the rise of extremist politics is found in the 1958 election. Rhodesia had earlier joined in a federation with Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and Nyasaland (now Malawi) by a two-thirds majority vote in 1953, but a crisis with the leader of the governing Federal Party, Garfield Todd, emerged in 1956. Federal Party losses to the newly revitalized Dominion Party in by-elections were blamed on Todd and he was removed from office out of fear that he stood for and might become an activist for widely increased African rights. The Federal Party, under its new leader Sir Edgar Whitehead, was transformed into the United Federal Party, the union of the federal and territorial parties, and won seventeen of thirty elective seats in the 1958 election. Bull reports that this was the most crucial election in Rhodesia's political history. Todd's defeat signified to most African leaders that they no longer possessed any prospects for exercising influence within the framework of the established constitution. "The steady flow of repressive legislation and the repeated banning of African nationalist parties by the Whitehead government only served to emphasize that the races had parted ways."<sup>21</sup>

Whitehead's government was chiefly concerned with obtaining a greater measure of freedom from British control. Following a series of talks and conferences with Britain, a constitution was fashioned in 1961 that provided for fifteen *B*-roll seats, most likely to be controlled by middle-class Africans, and fifty *A*-roll seats, the prerogative of the affluent Whites. In a referendum campaign on the constitution, Whitehead secured a two-thirds approval vote but he misinterpreted the victory as a desire for liberal reform.

At the outset Africans refused to cooperate with White Rhodesians<sup>22</sup> and the British were disappointed because the constitution failed to produce genuine racial cooperation. Extremist tendencies were on the rise as is evident in the 1962 electoral contest between Whitehead's United Federal Party and the Rhodesian Front, the latter having been formed in March 1962 out of the dissident extremist forces that included the old Dominion Party (which was split into Federal and Southern Rhodesian wings), the United Group, and the Southern Rhodesian Association. In

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21. Bull, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

22. Barber believes that the African nationalists miscalculated when they chose to boycott the 1962 election. Although they feared a possible early independence under a White minority government, by not taking their place inside the Assembly they forfeited their capacity to speak out officially for greater reform and more African representation. Furthermore, as an extra-constitutional political group, they left themselves vulnerable to official proscription by the White government. As expected, the two major African nationalist parties were banned and their leaders restricted from political activity in August 1964. See "Rhodesia: the Constitutional Conflict," pp. 462-64.

the campaign Whitehead and the United Federal Party promised to repeal the Land Apportionment Act, abolish racial discrimination, and appoint some African junior ministers. As a counterstrategy, the opposition Rhodesian Front actively fanned the flames of racial fears, painting a picture of rapid African integration in government, the schools, and housing if the electorate chose the United Federal Party. Overconfident after its success in the 1961 referendum, the United Federal Party misjudged the salience of intensely held fears of the White electorate; the Rhodesian Front, using a strategy of demand generation for the racial issue, won thirty-five of fifty *A*-roll seats and formed the new government.

Winston Field became the new Prime Minister but quickly came under suspicion for several reasons. Many party members were upset because he did not take immediate action on the question of Rhodesian independence to insure freedom from British control for Rhodesian Whites. Moreover, he did not appoint a sufficient number of party members to key diplomatic and industrial posts, he ran the government without paying any attention to the party, and he failed to apply suitably strict measures in dealing with African nationalists. Following a near unanimous decision of the entire party, Field was replaced as Prime Minister in April 1964 by Ian Smith. This change signified another victory for the extremist faction in the Rhodesian Front.

The rest of the Rhodesian story is almost common knowledge. Unilateral Declaration of Independence was proclaimed on November 11, 1965, following a referendum held the preceding November: 58,076 (89.1 percent) voted for independence and only 6,101 (10.9 percent) indicated opposition. In the May 1965 election, the Rhodesian Front completely decimated all European opposition to its list of candidates, sweeping all 50 seats on the *A*-roll. An identical success was scored in April 1970. The Rhodesian Front under the leadership of Ian Smith has thus maintained a complete monopoly on political power ever since its extremist appeal first gained victory in the 1962 election, and occupies an impregnable parliamentary (legal) position.

Since Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965, Smith's government has implemented a number of policies that are designed to entrench more deeply the advantaged position Whites now enjoy. Some of these measures involve detention without trial, rigid enforcement of the Land Apportionment Act, a purge of "liberals" from the University College, and the elevation of tribal chiefs — a conservative group of Africans — to more prominent political roles. Rhodesian politics since 1958 thus evinces a steady growth of extremism. White candidates have won elections by stressing the deleterious consequences of integration

with the African majority, whereas those candidates espousing moderate positions have been decisively defeated. The Rhodesian Front does not appear likely to moderate its extremist outlook in the near future.

**Repressive Legislation and Police Rule.** Successive White Rhodesian governments have enacted a number of repressive security measures that in practice entail serious abrogation of African freedoms. Imprisonment without trial, the right to declare unlawful any organization that threatens public safety, wide police powers of entry and search without warrant, and the banning of several African political parties are just a few of the many devices Whites have employed in order to keep the African population under control. The most far-reaching precaution available to Whites is the Emergency Powers Act passed in 1960 that gives the executive branch of government such all-embracing authority as control of business and employees, the right to take possession of any property, complete censorship of all news media, and so forth. Rigid enforcement of repressive legislation thus, for the present, safeguards White supremacy.

We see, therefore, from this brief review that ethnic politics in Rhodesia and South Africa are remarkably alike. Those features which appear in both contexts include:

1. the effective exclusion of the African majorities from legitimate participation in government;
2. the success of extremist strategies and the failure of moderation on the racial issue;
3. the growing cohesiveness of the White communities in view of a perceived fear of the African population; and
4. the frequent recourse to repressive legislation and police rule.

In the final section of this chapter we conclude our examination of ethnic politics in dominant minority configurations with a brief look at the landlocked African country of Burundi.

### **Burundi**

Burundi is the immediate southern neighbor of Rwanda. Although both countries were administered as one unit during the period of rule by successive German and Belgian colonial regimes, each existed as a historically separate kingdom for the four hundred previous years.

The three communities that comprise Rwanda's population are also present in Burundi: the Hutu, who make up about eighty-three percent

of the population; the Tutsi, sixteen percent; and the Twa, less than one percent.<sup>23</sup> As in Furnivall's conception of the plural society, the Hutu and Tutsi are socially and economically differentiated from each other. The Tutsi minority has historically filled most administrative posts and today occupies many major government positions while most Hutu are still farmers and laborers.

Politics in Burundi, however, differs slightly from that in Rwanda insofar as those who held power in Burundi were members of favored Tutsi families, the *ganwa*, rather than simply members of a dominant race. The history of precolonial Burundi is characterized by the struggle for power among various clans, which took the form of succession wars between the descendants of the royal family. Cyclical alliances among different social groupings thus produced some historical measure of social cohesion. Competition between the *ganwa* induced them to seek the support of both Hutu and Tutsi, and the Mwami (ruler of Burundi) did the same to reinforce his position against territorial encroachments from rival feudal *ganwa*. This cyclical competition between the *ganwa* helped to attenuate ethnic tensions.

The initial period of European rule did not seriously alter the social or political structure of Burundi. Belgian administrators favored the ruling *ganwa*, and trained their sons disproportionately to fill administrative and civil service slots. But the advent of independence and the introduction of the franchise to the masses drastically altered the rules of the game leading, in short order, to the politicization of ethnic cleavages. But we are slightly ahead of the story at this point.

The old *ganwa* rivalries, which had remained dormant throughout the period of Belgian rule, emerged in the form of competing political groups in the 1950s. Traditional, monarchic values were expressed in the National Unity and Progress Party (UPRONA), the party of the Bezi family. Modern economic and political values were reflected in the party of the Batare family, the Parti Démocrate Chrétien (PDC). Prince Rwagasore, the son of the Mwami, led UPRONA. Married to a Hutu girl, he was immensely popular with both communities. In the Legislative Assembly election of September 1961, Rwagasore's popularity was translated into fifty-eight of sixty-four seats for his party. He was also very conscious to balance Tutsi and Hutu interests by placing members of both communities in important government positions. Unfortunately for

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23. Gordon C. McDonald, et al., *Area Handbook for Burundi* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 39. For an excellent discussion of modern political history in Burundi and one upon which we rely heavily see René Lemarchand, "Social Change and Political Modernization in Burundi," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 4, no. 4 (December 1966): 401-33.

Rwagasore, he was assassinated by political opponents on October 13, 1961, just two weeks after the first meeting of his Legislative Assembly. With Rwagasore's death, his party (UPRONA) divided into competing ethnic factions. Burundi thus achieved full independence on July 1, 1962, in the midst of a widening rift between the Hutu and Tutsi factions of the ruling UPRONA party.

UPRONA's ethnic partition was also influenced by the contagion of republican ideas from Rwanda—Burundi was still a monarchy. Many of the majority Hutu community became sensitive to the implications of majority rule, which had just come about in neighboring Rwanda. These majoritarian sentiments were further intensified by the fact that Tutsis obtained the bulk of new bureaucratic posts and held two-thirds of the senior civil service slots that native Burundians occupied. Meanwhile, fleeing immigrants from Rwanda further strengthened Tutsi convictions.

The intraparty UPRONA struggle spread to the National Assembly and permeated the country's entire administration machinery by August 1962. Chaos was averted in 1963 when the Royal Court intervened and gave several key appointments to former *ganwa*. The stability which resulted, however, was short-lived due, in part, to the resentment of these appointments by the new Burundi elites.

On October 18, 1965, Hutu officers staged an unsuccessful coup, but in the confusion the Mwami fled the country. A second coup, this time led by Tutsi officers, was successful on July 8, 1966. Led by Captain Michael Micombero, these new military leaders have deposed the monarch and now rule by decree through an appointed Council of Ministers. The regime maintains an authoritarian style and, as needed, provides appropriate displays of coercion.

This review of modern political history in Burundi shows that prior to independence, political competition was restricted to the prominent *ganwa* and their supporters as they organized political parties to fight for positions of influence in a soon-to-be-independent Burundi state. *The passage from trusteeship status to self-government changed the focus of competition and converted the traditional Hutu-Tutsi rivalry into the country's most salient political division.*

During its brief four years as an independent monarchy, from 1962 to 1966, the nation had been torn by political strife that developed from an ethnic conflict between the Hutu majority and the powerful Tutsi minority.<sup>24</sup>

The emergence of ethnic identity as the primary focus of political combat led quickly to the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly and the

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24. McDonald, *op. cit.*, p. 77.



establishment of a military government, which has replaced the elected representatives, most of them Hutu, with appointed administrators, mainly of Tutsi origin.<sup>25</sup> We therefore see that in still another case of a dominant minority situation, democracy and political stability do not blend well together. Dominant minorities do not allow their subject majorities the legal right to secure political power by the universal franchise.

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25. *The New Africans* (London: Paul Hamlyn, 1967), p. 30.

## **Fragmentation**

In this chapter we adopt a change of pace: we compare five countries on a topic-by-topic basis without first presenting a detailed analysis of at least one society. We contend herein that ethnic politics in such diverse fragmented plural societies as Lebanon, a middle-Eastern "confessional" culture, the Congo, Sudan, and Nigeria, all replete with tribal diversity, and Yugoslavia, an Eastern European communist country composed of six ethnically separate Republics, display striking regularities. We turn, first, to a brief recapitulation of the properties that fragmented societies exhibit before beginning our analysis.

### **Properties of Fragmented Societies**

Fragmented societies are characterized by the presence of many culturally distinct communities and the failure of any one of them, at the onset of independent status, to dominate the political process. As in the other ethnic configurations, members of each of the ethnic communities in the fragmented society feel very intensely about the values and practices of their respective cultures. With the departure of the colonial or other ruling power, the rewards of politics become a valuable prize. Political parties, which invariably follow ethnic lines, are then organized and actively compete for these rewards. In the fragmented culture this entails a widespread proliferation of parties, each representing the interests of one specific tribe, religious cult, linguistic group, or other ethnic community. Multiparty coalitions become difficult to form and hold together. The absence of popularly supported, nationwide parties creates a conducive environment in which military or paramilitary organizations, which are the only institutions that possess a nationwide communications network and a capability for effective national rule, can rise to power.

Effective party politics, therefore, does not usually emerge in the fragmented setting; no party is large enough to rule and the multiplicity of culture groups frustrates any attempts to form long-run multiethnic coalitions. In settings such as these, democracy frequently gives way to forms of authoritarian rule.

In summary, the cardinal features of fragmentation are (1) a multiplicity of ethnic groups, (2) the absence of effective brokerage institutions, e.g., national political parties and (3) the tendency for authoritarian rule by military or paramilitary organizations. We examine, now, politics in five fragmented settings, Lebanon, the Congo, Sudan, Nigeria, and Yugoslavia, in order to illustrate these conditions.

### **Fragmentation: The Proliferation of Ethnic Groups**

The first characteristic of the fragmented society is contained in the meaning of the classificatory term itself, *viz.*, the existence of a large number of discrete cultural communities. Furnivall's definition of the plural society is thus slightly modified. Instead of several groups living side by side, but separately, within the same political unit, we find *many* groups living a culturally segregated life.

In Lebanon, for example, most persons are immediately identifiable as Christians or Muslims, but for political purposes membership in a particular sect is much more important. As Edward Shils points out,

People may know they are Lebanese, but this is not as significant a fact for most of them as being Maronite, Orthodox Christian, Sunni, Shi'ite Muslims, or whatever else.<sup>1</sup>

The full list of confessional communities appears in Table 7.1. Although all of the groups (Jewish excepted) in Table 7.1 are loosely defined as either Christian or Muslim, significant denominational divisions exist within each of the two broader groups.

The radical and clear-cut cleavage between two different groups which prevails among Frenchmen and Arabs in Algeria, Greeks and Turks in Cyprus, Europeans and Africans in South Africa, does not exist in Lebanon. Only those who like to convey, internally or externally, the impression of a Christian-Muslim either/or, try to distort the varied, rich and complex nature of the Lebanese social picture.<sup>2</sup>

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1. "The Prospects for Lebanese Civility," in Leonard Binder, ed., *Politics in Lebanon* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), pp. 1-11 (quotation at pp. 3-4).

2. Hassan Saab, "The Rationalist School in Lebanese Politics," in Binder, *op. cit.*, pp. 271-82 (quotation at p. 272).

**Table 7.1**  
Lebanese Population by Sect, 1956

Sect	Estimated Population
Maronite	424,000
Sunnite	286,000
Shi'ite	250,000
Greek Orthodox	149,000
Greek Catholic	91,000
Druze	88,000
Armenian Orthodox	64,000
Armenian Catholic	15,000
Protestant	14,000
Jewish	7,000
Syrian Catholic	6,000
Syrian Orthodox	5,000
Latins (Roman Catholic)	4,000
Nestorean Chaldeans	1,000
Others	7,000
Total	1,411,000

Source: Michael C. Hudson, *The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon* (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 22.

J. C. Hurewitz agrees with this description, noting that the two major communities are fractured rather than monolithic.<sup>3</sup> An assessment of ethnic groups in Lebanon shows, therefore, that the sects within the major religions are far more significant for political, economic and social purposes than the broader divisions themselves, and that Lebanon is a fragmented rather than competitive configuration.

It is also the case that each major religious sect is heavily concentrated in a particular region of the country.<sup>4</sup> Sectarian differences are thus reinforced by regional rivalries. Such regional concentration strengthens the alternative claims for statehood that minority communities are prone to assert. The Sunnis in northern coastal towns, for example, have on numerous occasions threatened to withdraw from Lebanon and join Syria.

The classification of the Congo as a fragmented political culture is less problematical. René Lemarchand observes that an amazing variety of cultures and political systems are encountered in the Congo, and the very classification of its people is a difficult task.<sup>5</sup> Six major ethnic groups are

3. "Lebanese Democracy in Its International Setting," in *ibid.*, pp. 213-38 (citation at p. 214).

4. Michael W. Suleiman, *Political Parties in Lebanon: The Challenge of a Fragmented Political Culture* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967), pp. 26-27.

5. *Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964), p. 7. Our assertions of tribalism in the Congo are based on the discussion which appears in chapter 1 of Lemarchand's study. See also Crawford Young, *Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and Independence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), chapter 11, "The Politics of Ethnicity," pp. 232-72.

distinguishable: Bakongo, Baluba, Mongo, Kuba, Mangbetu-Azande, and Waregu. In addition to these major "culture clusters," a host of minor tribal groupings can be identified. Altogether in a total population of over 14 million, some 180 culturally distinct tribes exist. The approxi-



### Ethnographic Map of the Republic of Congo


mately 2 million Mongo are the largest community, but even so constitute only a small minority of the overall population. As in Lebanon, the proliferation of tribal groups is further exacerbated by regional concentration (see map).

To be sure, the difficulties of creating an integrated national community from a multitude of ethnic "selves" are not unique to the Congo, as shown by the continuing efforts of African leaders to overcome the actual or potential threat of ethnic separatism. But in no other African territory have these difficulties assumed such magnitude, for in no other territory has the virulence of ethnic and regional particularism been so pronounced.<sup>6</sup>

6. Lemarchand, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

Lemarchand further remarks that "some Congolese politicians . . . conceptualize nationhood in terms of linguistic and cultural affinities, . . ."<sup>7</sup> Tribalism in the Congo thus poses severe problems for national unity.

Nigeria shares tribal diversity with the Congo. Eighteen different tribal groupings exist, each with its own language, organization and body of customs.<sup>8</sup> Three of these make up over half of the population: the Hausa-Fulani in the North, the Yorubas in the West, and the now famous Ibos in the East (see map). The Hausa-Fulani, the largest group, is chiefly Muslim



**Nigeria**

and possesses a traditional Islamic system of authority. Ibos, on the other hand, are noted for their ready acceptance of Christianity and interest in Western education and technology. During the era of British colonial rule that began in the nineteenth century, many Ibos migrated to other parts of Nigeria and filled clerkships in the colonial administration. Yorubas also possess their own distinct cultural traits and tend to be known for their business ability.

The rivalries between these communities are intense and bitter. In addition, rivalries also exist within each region between the dominant group and one or more minority tribes. The interests of the Tiv, the Kanuri and


7. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

8. L. Franklin Blitz, *The Politics and Administration of Nigerian Government* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 18.

the Nupe are often in opposition to those of the dominant Hausa-Fulani in the North; the Ibibio, Ijaw and Efik occupy a similar minority position in the East, and the same condition applies to non-Yoruba peoples in the West. Altogether, some 400 linguistic groups, large and small, comprise Nigeria's more than 45 million people. Tribalism, thus, aggravates the difficulties most new societies face in their efforts at nation building.

"Tribalism" continues to bedevil the politics of a nation in which the people still think of themselves as Ibo, Yoruba, Hausa or even Ijebu, Aro or other tribal sub-group, rather than Nigerian.<sup>9</sup>

The Sudan, too, shows a complex ethnic mosaic — the 1956 census recorded some 10,263,000 persons and classified them into 572 tribes and subtribes which range in size from the one million Dinkas down to groups of a few dozen individuals.<sup>10</sup> Even when these tribes and subtribes are aggregated into more inclusive categories, no single community emerges as a majority. Using these broader divisions we find that 39 percent of the population is Arab, 30 percent Southern, 13 percent Western, 12 percent Beja and Nuba, 3 percent Nubian, and 3 percent foreigners



**The Sudan**

9. Walter Schwartz, *Nigeria* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), pp. 60-61.

10. Mohamed Omer Beshir, *The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 5.

and miscellaneous. Out of the total population, 52 percent are Arabic-speaking and 48 percent speak a variety of other languages.<sup>11</sup>

Within the Arabic-speaking community, one division has assumed special political importance. We refer to the differences between the Ansar sect, the followers of the late Mahdi who attempted an unsuccessful revolt against Egyptian rule in 1881, and the Khatmiya sect, led by the Mirghani family, which opposed the Mahdi's revolt. Each of these sects have, at various times in modern Sudanese history, dominated one party. Their historical rivalries have often obstructed the formation and/or development of stable, intra-Arabic coalition governments.<sup>12</sup>

The Southern Sudan is considerably more varied than the Arabic North in its ethnic composition. Three main groups of people are ordinarily distinguished: (1) the Nilotics, comprising the Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk and Anuak, who live chiefly in Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile Provinces; (2) the Nilo-Hamitics, comprising the Murle, the Didinga, Boya, Toposa and Latuka, who live mostly in Equatoria; and (3) the Sudanese tribes, such as the Azande, which live in the west and southwestern parts of the South (see map).<sup>13</sup> The ethnic differences between tribes are reflected in linguistic, political and religious institutions. Twelve major languages are spoken in the South and none of these has become a *lingua-franca* among all Southerners. In addition, religion does not unify the South since ninety percent of these tribal peoples are pagan.

Yugoslavia is our final example of a fragmented polity. "Yugoslavia, created in 1918 as a new state, was composed of areas which had never enjoyed a common government and which for centuries had been under the domination of different foreign powers."<sup>14</sup> When the Communist Party came to power after World War II, five distinct Slav nationalities were given official recognition: Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, and Montenegrins.<sup>15</sup>

The Serbs, taken together, number approximately seven million and live mainly in the Republic of Serbia. Second in numerical size are the four million Croats who reside chiefly in Croatia but also represent significant minorities in the other Yugoslav republics. The third largest community is the Slovene, a compact national group of one and one-half

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11. George W. Shepherd, Jr., "National Integration and the Southern Sudan," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 4, no. 2 (July 1966): 193-212 (citation at p. 196).


12. Thomas E. Nyquist, "The Sudan: Prelude to Elections," *Middle East Journal* 19, no. 3 (Summer 1965): 263-72 (see page 265).

13. Beshir, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-6.

14. Jack C. Fisher, *Yugoslavia—A Multinational State* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1966), p. 27.

15. This discussion of ethnic diversity in Yugoslavia follows Paul Shoup, *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 3-12.





### Yugoslavia

million who live in Slovenia. Irredentist movements among Slovenes in Carinthia still strain current Yugoslav-Austrian relations. Slovenes are followed in size by Macedonians, numbering on the order of one million, whose territory (Macedonia) has been claimed at various times by Yugoslavs, Bulgarians, and Greeks. Finally, the smallest of the major Slav communities is the Montenegrin, consisting of 500,000 persons. This latter people is famous for their proud and warlike ethnic character and has often disputed its border with neighboring Albania.

Some 700,000 Moslem Slavs, who live mainly in Bosnia and Hercegovina, possess an ambiguous status. Although they have gained recognition as a nationality in the postwar period, they do not yet enjoy the privileges (such as a Republic of their own) possessed by the other Slavic communities. Other minorities make up the remaining ten percent of the Yugoslav population. These include Albanians, Hungarians, Turks, Slovaks, Rumanians, Italians, and Czechs.

These diverse (and regionally concentrated) ethnic communities in Yugoslavia are separated both by religious and cultural practices. The

Serbs, Montenegrins and Macedonians comprise a large Orthodox bloc, whereas Croats and Slovenes are mainly Catholic. Cultural differences reinforce religious divisions. Different historical experiences have also contributed to national rivalries among the Slavs. During the period of nationalist movements in Central Europe in the nineteenth century, most of the South Slav communities developed their own independent national movements — many of them related to real or imagined glories of past medieval kingdoms.

The achievements of independence and international recognition were not equally shared by all Slavs. On the one hand, for example, Serbia was declared a fully sovereign state by the Great Powers at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, whereas Croatia and Slovenia, on the other hand, failed to win autonomy within the Austro-Hungarian Empire prior to World War I. Although some cooperation developed among the Slavic groups, especially when they were confronted with common enemies, the old issues of national exploitation and intimidation nevertheless hampered the development of harmonious relations among the Slavic groups.

Yugoslavia was finally created as a modern state in 1918, but the union of Slavic peoples did not eliminate the older, more established national loyalties. Genuine Yugoslav patriotism, as might be expected, failed to replace local ethnic feelings: between the two wars, Serbs and Croats moved still further apart as the Croats expressed anxiety over being submerged under a Serbian-dominated government. Other Yugoslav minorities also felt estranged from the government in Belgrade. On top of these fears, atrocities committed during World War II further enlarged the almost irreconcilable gaps among the respective Slav nationality groups: Croatian fascists assaulted Serbs, Serbian Chetniks attacked Moslems, and Bulgarians, Hungarians and Albanians massacred a large number of Serbs.

When national strife was indeed curbed at the end of the war, it was not as the result of a reconciliation of national differences but because the Communists, by seizing power and carrying out revolutionary changes in Yugoslav society drastically limited the scope given to expressions of national discontent.<sup>16</sup>

Ethnic conflict is thus deeply rooted in Yugoslav history — attempts at reconciliation must, if they are to be successful, overcome long-established barriers of hate and mistrust, as well as vivid recollections of violence and killing. Yugoslavia's constituent cultural groups are held together now by Tito's Communist Party; even under communist rule, however, traditional ethnic aspirations have remained fundamentally unchanged. Shoup concludes in his study of communism and Yugoslav ethnic groups that,

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16. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

the Yugoslav Communists, after a decade and a half of experimentation with a liberal form of Communism, seem to be succumbing to the sterile pattern of national conflict which so weakened the inter-war regime.<sup>17</sup>

The problem that presently confronts the communist rulers is found in the incompatible, intense ethnic feelings held by the members of the respective communal groups, and their sensitivity to local interests. These sentiments are further polarized because of the unevenly developed character of the economy; the lower developmental level of the South has strengthened ethnic group ties in that region and its citizens demand increased public expenditure in their area.<sup>18</sup> Regional grievances are thus intensified because of real or imagined discrimination by the central government in the allocation of financial assistance and investment funds. Standards of productivity and efficiency must be relaxed, if necessary, to prevent an upsurge in regional/ethnic animosities or jealousies. Investment funds are often distributed for political reasons, even though the maximum marginal productivity gains can only be obtained by concentrated investment in the already industrially advanced North. These investment funds are not viewed by members of each nationality group as public goods, but rather as private regional goods. Expansion of Yugoslavia's port capacity, for example, highlights the ethnic competition for public funds. The Republic of Slovenia is now constructing a major port facility at Koper, due to Slovenian desire to have a port of its own, regardless of the actual utility of the port's development.<sup>19</sup> Duplication in other industries is widespread and wasteful of public funds. Thus the rationale for government, the provision of collective goods, is challenged by communities that suspect they are not receiving their deserved portion of public funds. Under these conditions, unity is tenuous and perhaps unwarranted.

**Summary.** We thus see that the fragmented polity is characterized by a multiplicity of culture groups and the absence of a dominant community capable of providing stability and orderly government (especially democratic government). This condition holds even though the bases of cultural pluralism vary from religion in Lebanon, to tribalism in the Congo, Sudan, and Nigeria,<sup>20</sup> to ethnic regionalism in Yugoslavia. We show in the next

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17. *Ibid.*, p. 261.

18. Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 59-60.

20. For further discussion on the problem of tribalism and political integration in Africa see James S. Coleman, "The Problem of Political Integration in Emergent Africa," *Western Political Quarterly* 8, no. 1 (March 1955): 44-57; Immanuel Wallerstein, "Ethnicity and National Integration in West Africa," *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines* 2, no. 3 (October 1960): 129-39; and Aristide R. Zolberg, "Mass Parties and National Integration: The Case of the Ivory Coast," *Journal of Politics* 25, no. 1 (February 1963): 36-48.

two sections that such political organizations as parties often follow tribal, religious or linguistic lines, and usually command little support outside their own communities. The absence of such brokerage institutions as national political parties encourages military or paramilitary organizations to seize power — they alone command the resources to provide stable and orderly government.

### **Political Parties: The Absence of Brokerage Institutions**

In competitive, dominant majority, and dominant minority configurations, political parties invariably follow ethnic lines. Racial, religious, linguistic, and tribal communities all represent ready-made sources of political support that political entrepreneurs repeatedly try to tap and mobilize. Leaders in fragmented plural societies are no different. Ethnic communities again constitute the most readily available collection of supporters, especially when these fragmented societies have a history of intercommunal conflict. In the fragmented culture, however, the successful mobilization of even the largest ethnic group, whether it be a tribal, religious or linguistic community, does not provide a basis for majority rule. The formation and maintenance of coalition governments is a formidable task and, as we see shortly, such attempts often meet with failure. Bitter enemies are not easily persuaded to put aside their differences in order to cooperate in government, especially since extremists within each community watch from the sidelines and often seize the first opportunity to discredit men of moderate persuasion with having sold out the interests of their own community. We intend to show in this section that the proliferation of ethnic groups, which defines the fragmented society, encourages a commensurate proliferation of political parties; the plethora of parties, in turn, inhibits cooperative ethnic behavior. The resulting product is instability, or at best a most tenuous stability.

**Lebanon.** Politics in Lebanon, since its independence from the French Mandate in 1943, is invidious.

As for national consensus, in one sense it is nonexistent while in another it imposes stiflingly narrow limits: national consensus exists only in the negative form of mutual rivalry and suspicion and an awareness by each group that satisfaction of its own wants must mean the negation of another group's sense of security.<sup>21</sup>

Religious divisions in Lebanese society exert a profound impact upon political behavior and attitudes. These divisions make it difficult for Lebanon to evolve a system of effective party government: no party or

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21. Malcolm H. Kerr, "Political Decision Making in a Confessional Democracy," in Binder, *op. cit.*, pp. 187-212 (quotation at p. 188).

combination of parties has ever been able to capture a majority in the Lebanese Parliament. Even in the hard-fought campaigns of 1960 and 1964, some eight to ten parties were able, taken together, to win only thirty-four and twenty-eight seats (out of ninety-nine), respectively. Feudal leaders, landlords, and financiers, organized into well-defined blocs, obtained the majority of seats.<sup>22</sup>

Although party government does not work in Lebanon, it remains true nevertheless that parties are of a religious character. "Almost in every case some ethnic or religious group constitutes the predominant element in the party."<sup>23</sup> In his study of parties in Lebanon, Suleiman identifies some nineteen distinct parties and classifies them into four categories: (1) transnational parties with non-pan-Arab organizations: the Lebanese Communist Party and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party; (2) transnational parties that represent the Arab nationalist movement: the Arab Resurrection Socialist Party and the Arab Nationalists' Movement; (3) expressly religious and ethnic organizations: the Dashnak Party, the Hunchak Party, and the Ramgavar Azadagan Party; and (4) exclusively Lebanese parties: An-Najjada Party, the Progressive Socialist Party, the National Appeal and National Organization Parties (all chiefly Moslem); Phalanges Libanaises, the Constitutional Union and National Bloc Parties, and the National Liberals' Party (mainly Christian). What does this proliferation of parties imply for Lebanese democracy?

Parties in Lebanon do not meaningfully represent the interests of the population, a function which parties in a democratic system are supposed to perform. Because they are sectional-confessional in their strength and composition, *they are not capable of aggregating interests on a national level*. They are generally too doctrinaire and *the population is too fragmented to allow for adjustment and balancing of divergent views*.<sup>24</sup>

What forces, then, act as a surrogate for parties and provide some semblance of orderly government? According to Michael Hudson, Lebanon's domestic tranquility is based upon a perpetual stand-off among the various religious sects.<sup>25</sup> This stand-off is underpinned by an unwritten agreement called the "National Pact," which was concluded when Muslims

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22. Suleiman, *op. cit.*, p. xv. For an analysis of the occupational composition of Lebanese Parliamentary Deputies, and the results of the 1960 election see Jacob M. Landau, "Elections in Lebanon," *Western Political Quarterly* 14, no. 1 (March 1961): 120-47. Landau concludes from his study of Lebanese politics that as of 1960 parties have been unable to diminish the influence of the feudal lords or circumscribe their effects.

23. Suleiman, *op. cit.*, p. 267. See also Landau, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

24. Suleiman, *op. cit.*, p. 286 (emphasis added).

25. *The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon* (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 6.

and Christians united against French rule and restored to high office those officials who had been arrested by French authorities. This "National Pact," an Islamic-Christian accord of which no written text exists, presumably consecrates the voluntary and equal association of Muslims and Christians in the Nation and in the State; Maronites invariably hold the office of President of the Republic, and Sunnis the office of President of the Council.<sup>26</sup> In addition to this sectarian allocation of Lebanon's highest offices, so correspondingly are most other elective posts allocated according to each sect's share of the total population. The 1932 census reported that Christians exceeded non-Christians by a ratio of six to five; seats in the Lebanese Parliament are thereby awarded to the several religious sects on a proportional basis. Cabinet portfolios and other important administrative posts are also reserved on a sect by sect basis.

In the ninety-nine-member Parliaments of 1960 and 1964 the Maronites were allocated twenty seats, the Greek Orthodox eleven, the Greek Catholics six, the Armenian Orthodox four, the Armenian Catholics, Protestants, and Christian minorities one apiece for a Christian total of fifty-four. The forty-five non-Christian seats were distributed as follows: Sunnites twenty, Shiites nineteen, and Druzes six. These proportions have been maintained in all the Parliaments of the Independent Republic.<sup>27</sup>

A brief review of the Lebanese plural society has shown that a multitude of distinct religious sects has spawned an even larger number of political parties, each with its own sectarian basis. As a consequence, party government is neither responsible nor workable as we know it in other Western democracies. Instead, a small landed gentry has combined with leading businessmen to rule in Lebanon's Chamber of Deputies. Domination of the Lebanese Parliament by these traditional, often nonparty, groups has given Parliament a reputation for being unable to deal with fundamental problems. As a result, Parliament has not been a terribly important institution in Lebanese politics, and sectarian problems have often been contested in the streets. This condition imparts to Lebanon's democracy an extreme sensitivity to destabilizing events and on occasion leads to military rule as a necessary alternative to feudal, factional, regional, and religious party rule in times of crisis.

**The Congo.** Tribal divisions in the Congo have similarly fostered the origin and growth of an incredibly large number of parties: the 180 or more distinct tribal groups can almost be juxtaposed against the 113 different

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26. Pierre Rondot, "The Political Institutions of Lebanese Democracy," in Binder, *op. cit.*, pp. 127-41 (citation at pp. 136-37).

27. Hudson, *op. cit.*, p. 23. See also Ralph E. Crow, "Religious Sectarianism in the Lebanese Political System," *Journal of Politics* 24, no. 3 (August 1961): 489-520.

parties that existed just prior to independence; many of these small parties have since dissolved or merged with larger parties.<sup>28</sup> One can, without doing an injustice to an impartial interpretation of Congolese politics, reduce this list to about 19 important parties. In order to stress the point of tribalism and its relationship with multipartyism, we present the full list and indicate in parentheses the provinces in which they are based.<sup>29</sup>

Abako	Alliance des Ba-Kongo (Léopoldville Prov.)
Abazi	Alliance des Ba-Yanzi (Léopoldville Prov.)
A.R.P.	Alliance Rurale Progressiste (Kivu Prov.)
Atcar	Association des Tshokwe du Congo de l'Angola et de la Rhodésie (Katanga Prov.)
Balubakat	Ba-Luba du Katanga (Katanga Prov.)
Cerea	Centre de Regroupement Africain (Kivu Prov.)
Coaka	Coalition Kasaienne (Kasai Prov.)
Conakat	Confédération des Associations du Katanga (Katanga Prov.)
Luka	No particular meaning (Léopoldville Prov.)
M.N.C.	Mouvement National Congolais: (a) the Lumumba faction (throughout the Congo); (b) the Kalonji faction (Kasai Prov.); (c) M.N.C.-Nendaka
Mederco	Mouvement de l'Évolution et de Développement Économique Rural du Congo (Equatorial Prov.)
M.U.B.	Mouvement de l'Unité Basonge (Kasai Prov.)
P.N.P.	Parti National du Progrès (throughout the Congo)
P.S.A.	Parti Solidaire Africain (Léopoldville Prov.)
Puna	Parti de l'Unité Nationale (Equatorial Prov.)
R.D.L.K.	Rassemblement Démocratique du Lac-Kwango-Kwilu (Léopoldville Prov.)
Reko	Ressortissants de l'Est de Kongo (Kivu Prov.)
Unimo	Union Mongo (Equatorial Prov.)
U.N.C.	Union Nationale Congolaise (Kasai Prov.)

As is evident from the list, party names often reveal the local basis of organization and tribal support. Even those parties that display a national name are basically tribal in membership.

Most Congolese parties were founded only a few years before independence as a response to the announcement that territorial and communal elections would be held in December 1959; shortly thereafter elections were scheduled for May 1960 for the House of Representatives and the Provincial Assemblies. Tribal support quickly materialized for most of these newly formed Congolese parties.

28. Daniel J. Crowley, "Politics and Tribalism in Katanga," *Western Political Quarterly* 16, no. 1 (March 1963): 68-78.

29. Daniel Biebuyck and Mary Douglas, *Congo: Tribes & Parties* (London: Royal Anthropological Institute, 1961), pp. 29-30.

The sudden proliferation of Congolese political groups provides the example of a developmental pattern which finds virtually no counterpart in other African territories. Whereas in November, 1956, the Abako was the only significant party in existence on the Congolese scene, by November, 1959, as many as fifty-three different political groups were officially registered. In the few months preceding independence the number had grown to 120. *This plethoric growth of parties reflects the extent to which they tended to rely on the support of tribal groupings as a means of entry into the political arena.*<sup>30</sup>

Those politicians advocating intertribal cooperation made little headway against tribally based elites. Lemarchand observes, and it is a most crucial observation, that "moderate" groups, either on a uniraical or multiracial basis, were structurally weak and failed to attract widespread national support.<sup>31</sup> For most Congolese, "affiliation to a political party was viewed as secondary to, and derivative from, affiliation with the tribe."<sup>32</sup> The political salience of tribal identification is heavily reinforced since many Congolese can recall a vivid history of intertribal violence.

The first elections, the communal and territorial elections of December 1959, were of little significance because they were boycotted by the three major parties. The Parliamentary and Provincial Assembly elections held the following year, however, are a signpost in recent Congolese history. Throughout the campaign, local interests and tribal rivalries were emphasized.<sup>33</sup> The balloting for seats in the House of Representatives displayed below failed to produce a majority government.<sup>34</sup>

M.N.C. — Lumumba with cartels, Coaka and U.N.C.	41
P.S.A.	13
Abako	12
M.N.C. — Kalonji	8
P.N.P. — A.R.P., Luka, Mederco, Front Commun	15
Reco	4
Puna	7
Cartel Balubakat	7
Conakat	8
Cerea	10
Independents, local interests, Abazi, R.D.L.K., Unimo	12
Total	137

30. Lemarchand, *op. cit.*, p. 191 (emphasis added).

31. *Ibid.*, pp. 210-12.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 187.

33. For details about the 1960 election see Lemarchand, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-32 and Young, *op. cit.*, pp. 302-6.

34. Biebuyck, *op. cit.*, p. 9.



The Congress that was formed almost immediately broke down with the secession of Katanga Province. Although the secession movement ended in 1964, after a period of confusion and conflict that witnessed the intervention of United Nations' forces, popular elections have not yet been restored.

Belgian colonial rule can probably be credited with stimulating rather than reducing tribalism and its political consequences: industrialization produced uneven levels of development that benefitted select tribes and threatened surrounding, less advanced groups; in addition, the tribe became the major focus of personal identification as rural villagers moved into urban areas. Furthermore, Belgian educational policy maintained tribal differences since education was dispensed in the vernacular and few Congolese received higher education. Finally, Belgian administrators tried to adapt district boundaries to tribal divisions, thus "favoring the emergence of separate regional consciousness among Africans."<sup>35</sup>

Even if Belgium had fostered the growth of a national consciousness among Congolese, it is still most unlikely that independence and national elections would have produced a popularly supported majority government. Tribal rioting on behalf of demands placed by various communities for their own autonomous districts, and the subsequent demarcation of twenty-one tribally distinct districts, confirms the salience of tribe in Congolese politics.

**Nigeria.** Nigerian nationalists never displayed the spirit of cooperative behavior that often appears in competitive, and, on occasion, in dominant majority configurations. As we might expect, political parties in Nigeria originated and grew principally as expressions of tribal/regional interests: Azikiwe, an Ibo, formed the Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, later renamed the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC); Yoruba nationalism first appeared in the Egbe Omo Oduduwas, a cultural organization founded in 1948, which subsequently became active in politics as the Action Group (AG); and, finally, Hausa interests were expressed by both the colonial authorities and the traditional rulers until the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC) was formed to contest the 1951 elections. *Thus by 1950, the alignments that were to characterize Nigerian politics after independence had already solidified: the North against the South, East against West, and the minority groups in each region against their respective dominant communities.*<sup>36</sup> These splits have shaped the history of modern Nigeria.

35. Lemarchand, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

36. For an informative account of the position of the minority tribes in the three major Nigerian regions see Richard L. Sklar, "Nigerian Politics in Perspective," *Government and Opposition* 2, no. 4 (July-October 1967): 524-39.

Constitutional development in Nigeria unfolded in the form of a federal government. Major powers of finance, defense and external affairs are allocated to the federal government, and the Eastern, Western and Northern regional governments possess powers in the fields of health, agriculture, and education. Certain powers are shared: trade, labor, industrial development, roads, prisons and public works.<sup>37</sup> During periods of emergency, the federal government also has the right to dissolve the regional legislatures, arrest or detain persons at will, search premises without a warrant, and expropriate any property.

The drawback in the Federal Constitution, at least insofar as Southerners were affected, was the likelihood that Northerners, comprising just over half of all Nigerians, would seek to gain advantages because of their dominant position at the federal level: the Northern region was allocated more seats in the Nigerian House of Representatives than the other two (and later three) regions combined.<sup>38</sup>

**Parties and Elections in Nigeria.** As mentioned before, parties in Nigeria are tribally based. For example, as of 1958, 59 percent of the major NCNC leaders were of Eastern origin, of whom 49 percent were Ibo. Yorubas in turn comprised 68 percent of the Action Group leadership and 84 percent of the NPC leadership were indigenous Northerners.<sup>39</sup> The regional elections held in 1951 provided the first competitive opportunity for these tribally based parties. As expected, each major party was successful in its own region, and in subsequent regional elections sought to consolidate their power still further. By 1957, the Action Group held 49 of 80 seats in the Western regional assembly, the NCNC controlled 64 of 84 Eastern seats, and in the North the NPC occupied 106 of 131 seats.<sup>40</sup> Minority groups in each region generally allied themselves with major parties outside their own regions in order to strengthen their positions.

The first federal election was scheduled for December 12, 1959. Violence erupted periodically throughout the campaign and "opposition" party members were stoned in all three regions. Each party stressed the unity of its own tribal community and warned its members, who lived as

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37. Henry L. Bretton, *Power and Stability in Nigeria* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 20.

38. The applicability of a federal constitution for Nigeria is explored in S. D. Tansey and D. G. Kermode, "The Westminster Model in Nigeria," *Parliamentary Affairs* 21, no. 1 (Winter 1967/68): 19-37. They conclude that a federal constitution is not likely to work when one member state is more populous than all the rest put together. It was implemented, they suggest, because British sympathies were with the North in any case.

39. Adebayo Adedeji, *Nigerian Administration and Its Political Setting* (London: Hutchinson Education, Ltd., 1968), p. 174.

40. James S. Coleman, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958), pp. 389-95.

minorities in other regions of Nigeria, of likely domination by that region's majority. They, in the language of our theory, adopted an extremist position, resorting to communal demand generation or ethnic chauvinism.

The Action Group's electoral effort in all three regions during the 1959 pre-independence campaign was based partly on the theme of Yoruba unification and partly on the exploitation of non-Yoruba minority fears in the North and the East. The results indicate that the appeal was successful mainly in the Western Region itself: outside the Region, it succeeded wherever non-Yorubas required outside support against the Hausa-Fulani, the Ibo or other groups of actual or imagined hostile intent. Nearly every argument in favor of these non-Western groups was applied by the NPC and the NCNC against the Yoruba in the Western Region and in support of ethnic argument there.<sup>41</sup>

The final ballot count revealed that each party won a majority of the seats allocated to its region and also received some minority support from areas outside of its region: the NPC controlled 134 seats, the NCNC and its affiliate, the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) 89 seats, the Action Group 73, and other groups the remaining 16. No one party commanded a majority in the 312-seat House of Representatives.<sup>42</sup>

The 1961 regional elections showed clearly that the different communities were moving further apart from each other instead of becoming reconciled. In the North the NPC overwhelmed its opposition and captured 160 of 170 regional legislative assembly seats. Meanwhile, the Action Group was beset with internal difficulties and several of its dissident members, led by Akintola who was the Premier of the Western Region, split off and formed the United Peoples' Party (UPP). Disturbances erupted in the Western Region's legislative assembly when Akintola was asked to resign his position. The federal government declared a state of emergency and dissolved the Western regional government. Federal intervention infuriated the Yorubas who perceived the emergency as a plot on the part of the NPC and NCNC to intervene in their affairs.<sup>43</sup>

While the Western Region was in a state of chaos, a new region was created in the center of Nigeria: the Mid-Western Region. In keeping with the prevailing pattern of Nigerian politics, a new party was therein formed called the Mid-West Democratic Front, which propagated an anti-Ibo platform and sought to ally itself with the Northern NPC. This alliance

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41. Bretton, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

42. K. W. J. Post, *The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 356-68.

43. A detailed account of the crisis in the Western Region is given in John P. Mackintosh, "Politics in Nigeria: The Action Group Crisis of 1962," *Political Studies* 10, no. 3 (October 1962): 223-47.

was short-lived as bitter memories of slave raiding led to the flaring of anti-Northern sentiments among the Edo-speaking groups in the Mid-West state.

Relations between the NPC and NCNC, which had earlier set up a coalition government, had badly deteriorated by the time of the 1964 Federal Election. A host of new coalitions were speedily created. The National Progressive Front (NPF), which contained the NCNC and the AG, joined with the NEPU and the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) to form the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). This combination was arrayed against the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA), which consisted of the NPC, the UPP now renamed the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) and the MDF.<sup>44</sup> Irregularities hampered and prevented the smooth execution of the election: Awolowo, leader of the AG, was imprisoned for his alleged misuse of party funds as revealed in the prior state of crisis in the Western Region; members of the Federal Election Commission became suspect when they decided to accept the list of unopposed nominations provided by the NNA (which seemed to insure the NNA's victory); furthermore, widespread evidence suggests that the NNA used coercion to prevent UPGA candidates from contesting seats in the North. The NNA won a clear victory securing 202 of the 257 elective federal seats.

The results of the 1964 elections are less important than the consequences that followed. The alliance between the NCNC and the AG immediately broke down due to the AG's resentment of its poor showing in the West. In the following year, an election was held for seats in the Western regional assembly. At best it was farcical: AG candidates were not allowed to contest many of the elective seats; government party members received their ballots before polling day; and the counting of votes was haphazard. Calls for a new election went unheeded and violence flared up within the Western Region. Shortly thereafter, in January 1966, the army seized power.

It appears that a number of army officers, of the rank of major and under, had become inflamed by what they thought to be the incompetence and corruption of the Regional and Federal Ministers, the self-seeking and avarice of the political parties and they thought that the Army would be given the "dirty" work of cleaning up the troubles they strongly believed, and with some truth, had been due to the politicians and to no one else: these factors proved too much for them and they determined to overthrow the civilian administration.<sup>45</sup>

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44. The reader is asked not to throw his arms into the air in wild confusion. This proliferation of parties and abbreviations terminates shortly in authoritarian military rule; for the moment, please try to struggle with the authors through this welter of parties and coalitions.

45. Rex Niven, *Nigeria* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 113.

The Constitution was thrown out and a unitary, military government was established. In the last section of this chapter we discuss the still further deterioration of tribal relations which led to the all too well known civil war.

**The Sudan.** Electoral politics in the Sudan adheres to the same pattern we have witnessed in the recent histories of Lebanon, the Congo, and Nigeria. A multiplicity of culture groups has spawned a large number of active political groups, each representing the interests of one specific ethnic community. The Umma Party, or Umma for short, was founded by the Mahdi's son and is the spokesman for the Arabic Ansar sect. Its Khatmiya counterpart is the National Union Party, which speaks for the followers of Sayed Ali El Mirghani. (These two Islamic, Arabic communities are distinguished by differences in organization and ritual, and not in matters of faith and doctrine.) These two parties have played an important role in Sudanese electoral history.

Sudan's experience with democracy began in 1943 with the introduction of elections for members on the Provincial Councils. This was followed by elections to the Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan in 1944, for tribal leaders and town councils in 1948, and to a partly elected Legislative Assembly in 1948. These developments prompted the holding of nationwide elections for the Legislative Assembly in 1953.<sup>46</sup>

During these pre-independence days, the ideal of a common struggle against foreign rule helped the rival Islamic factions to forget their narrow affiliations. Sayyid Ismail El Azhari was able to organize the National Unionist Party and, having secured a majority of fifty-one seats in the ninety-seven-member Assembly, was able to lead the country to independence in 1956 as its first Prime Minister. But, as we see below, once the foreign enemy had been removed political life resumed its historical tradition of dissension; all attempts at alignment of the different factions within the democratic framework failed.<sup>47</sup>

The Republic of Sudan began its existence as an independent country on January 1, 1956. Azhari and the Khatmiya, however, were unable to sustain their harmonious relations. On February 26, 1956, Azhari formed a national government without the support of the Khatmiya, who had broken away from the NUP and formed the People's Democratic Party (PDP). As a result of this split Azhari's government was short-lived. It was defeated in a vote of censure, and replaced by a coalition of Umma and the PDP on July 7, 1956. This coalition was sustained by the 1958

46. Leo Silberman, "Democracy in the Sudan," *Parliamentary Affairs* 12, nos. 3 and 4 (Summer and Autumn 1959): 349-76 (citation at p. 352).

47. See B. S. Sharma, "Failure of 'Local-Government-Democracy' in the Sudan," *Political Studies* 15, no. 1 (February 1967): 62-71, especially p. 69.

election, but proved unnatural and difficult to maintain. Although Umma, the PDP and some Southern delegates gave the government a comfortable majority of 103 out of 173 seats, the historical conflict between the Mahdists (Umma) and the Mirghanists (PDP) strained the coalition. The resignation of several government ministers in mid-November of 1958 was followed by a military coup on November 17, 1958.<sup>48</sup>

Since independence on January 1, 1956, the Sudan had struggled under the burden of weak coalition governments. The multiplicity of parties, the constant shifting of party alliances, the lack of discipline over individual members in Parliament all contributed to the inability of parliamentary government to deal decisively with problems facing the new nation.<sup>49</sup>

During the regime of Abdullah Khalil, the Prime Minister between 1956 and 1958, Southern representation in Parliament increased from twenty-two to forty-six members. These Southern delegates presented a demand for a federal solution to the Southern problem, the desire of the South for greater regional autonomy from the Arabic North, but later walked out of Parliament in protest of government's failure to comply. Military rule, which began in 1958, did not improve the Southern situation. The military regime carried out repressive policies in the South: political activity was severely punished, Christian missionaries were expelled from the South, and thousands of Southern Sudanese fled to neighboring countries. By 1963 the Anya-Nya guerrillas began open terrorist activity against the military government stationed in Khartoum. Thus the generally tense relations between Southerners and other Sudanese were even further strained during the first period of military rule.

The military regime was liquidated in October 1964 when it failed to cope with a massive popular uprising led by staff and students of the University of Khartoum.<sup>50</sup> A new caretaker government was formed on February 24, 1965, which included former members of the NUP, Umma, the PDP, the Islamic Charter Front, the Southern delegation, a Communist, and an independent. Although conflicts erupted within the government over the scheduling of elections especially because of turmoil in the South, arrangements were finally made to hold the election on April 21, 1965. They were suspended altogether in the South where twenty-two nominated candidates were unopposed.

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48. Yusuf Fadl Hasan, "The Sudanese Revolution of October 1964," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 5, no. 4 (December 1967): 491-509, see especially pp. 491-93.

49. Nyquist, *op. cit.*, pp. 263-64.

50. A detailed account of the 1964 popular uprising is found in K. D. D. Henderson, "The Sudan Today," *African Affairs* 64, no. 256 (July 1965): 170-81.

An analysis<sup>51</sup> of the election and its results reveals that tribal, regional and personal loyalties are important determinants of voting behavior. No one party secured enough seats to form the government. An alliance between Umma, which won seventy-five seats, and the NUP, which won fifty-two, was ultimately arranged, though it too had a very limited duration.

The most significant factor in the election, however, was the rise of two racial groupings for the first time: the Beja Congress and the Nuba "Independents." Each party is regionally concentrated. The Beja Congress won ten of fourteen constituencies of the Red Sea Hills in Kassala Province, while the Nubas simultaneously gained eight of thirteen in their region. These candidates appealed to their constituents for support voicing the theme of regional autonomy.

Following the establishment of the new government, a series of negotiations were held between Arabs and Africans that resulted in the Round Table Conference on the Southern Problem at Khartoum in March 1965.<sup>52</sup> Northern extremists were generally opposed to separation for the Southern provinces. In spite of this element of opposition, several reforms in the areas of increased Southern representation in the administration, greater educational opportunities, and more funds for Southern economic development were agreed upon; a twelve-man committee formed after the Conference to implement these reforms, however, soon broke down. Successive prime ministers, Mohammed Mahgoub, Saddik el Mahdi, and Mahgoub again were unable to resolve peacefully the Southern problem.

In May 1969 a new military regime, led by General Gafaar al-Nimeiry, assumed office. Meanwhile, a Nile Provisional Government was formed in the Southern Sudan on March 19, 1969, by representatives of the three Southern provinces.<sup>53</sup> The new nation was christened the "Nile State" and the goal of freedom for the Southern people was announced. Although the General was confronted with overt civil war in the South, he has been unable to maintain unity and cohesion in the North: five attempted coups d'état had been put down by the new government in just the first year of military rule alone.<sup>54</sup> Moreover, most of these attempts have been led by dissident Moslems, rather than Southern Africans. For example, one assas-

51. See B. S. Sharma, "The 1965 Elections in the Sudan," *The Political Quarterly* 37, no. 4 (October-December 1966): 441-52.

52. Shepherd, *op. cit.*, pp. 204-6.

53. The Nile Provisional Government publishes a newsletter called "The Voice of the Nile Republic." In it, they attempt to document claims of Arab repression and genocide. While some of these reported statistics may be exaggerated, these documents do provide an opportunity to study official Southern Sudanese aims and policies.

54. *The New York Times*, January 14, 1970, p. 20.

sination attempt on General al-Nimeiry's life was ultimately traced to an Arab Sudanese of the Ansar sect.<sup>55</sup>

Although the Sudan does not display the impressively large number of parties we find in Nigeria, the Congo, and Lebanon, nevertheless democratic stability does not exist. Repeated terms of military rule highlight the tenuous nature of democratic practices and institutions in the Sudan—the major stumbling block has been and still remains the fundamental differences both within the Islamic Arab North and between it and the African South. The appearance of new political racial groupings in the 1965 election suggests that workable coalitions might be even more difficult to form should elections be reinstated sometime in the future.

**Yugoslavia.** Electoral history in modern Yugoslavia is divisible into two distinct periods: (1) multiparty competition in 1920 shortly after the establishment of an independent Yugoslavia in 1918, and (2) post-World War II elections which have been dominated almost exclusively by Tito's Communist Party. The first period follows closely the general pattern seen throughout this chapter. An assortment of parties, many of them expressions of particular ethnic communities, contested elections on November 28, 1920, for seats in the Constituent Assembly (Yugoslavia's parliament).<sup>56</sup> A full list of participating parties, which we enumerate below, reveals that political representation of ethnic sentiments in Yugoslavia's fragmented society engendered a panoply of competing groups:

1. the Democratic Party, of which Serbs formed the majority — advocates of a centralized state inspired by Serbia;
2. the Radicals—enthusiasts of Serbia stressing her past glories and the Serbian claim to national leadership;
3. the Communist Party, the only party possessing genuine nationwide backing;
4. the Croatian Republican Peasants Party;
5. the Agrarian Party (a Serbo-Slovene Coalition);
6. the Yugoslav Club;
7. the Yugoslav Moslem Organization;
8. the Social Democrats;
9. the National Club (Croatia);
10. the Džemijet (Turkish Party);
11. the Croat Union;

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55. *Ibid.*, March 31, 1970, p. 3.

56. Data about this election are drawn from Frits W. Hondius, *The Yugoslav Community of Nations* (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), pp. 94-95.



12. the Republican Party;
13. the Croatian Law Party;
14. the National Socialists; and
15. the Trumbić-Drinković group.

None of these parties emerged with a majority in the Constituent Assembly. The Democratic Party came out first with 92 seats followed by the Radicals who obtained 91 seats; these two Serbian-based parties, even when taken together, failed to constitute a majority. Other parties polled anywhere from a high of 58 seats (the Communists) to a low of one (the Trumbić-Drinković group) out of a total of 418 seats.

The proliferation of minority parties in the 1920 Yugoslav Constituent Assembly does not appear, in retrospect, to provide a sound basis for stable democratic government. As we might have predicted, disagreements immediately surfaced at the very opening of the Constituent Assembly on December 12, 1920. For example, three delegations (Communists, Yugoslav Club and National Club) refused to take the oath when demands for a two-thirds majority vote acceptance of the constitution were turned down in favor of an absolute majority. Other disagreements centered on such questions as the name of the country, the procedural rules for discussion and adoption of a draft constitution, the number of provinces, and the degree of centralization and decentralization of the new government. The new constitution was finally adopted on June 28, 1921, by a slender majority vote, although the Croatian Peasants, Communists, National Club, and Yugoslav Club members were absent from the vote.

The parliamentary system began to disintegrate in short order. Communist attempts on the life of the Regent and other high officials led the National Assembly to nullify the right of Communist Party delegates to be seated—the party immediately went underground until it reappeared as the leading political force in Yugoslav politics in World War II. The Radical-Democrat coalition broke down in 1922 over an internal Serbian historical problem; meanwhile, the Croatian Peasant Party refused to participate in parliamentary life—the party was outlawed and its leader, Stjepan Radić, was jailed in January 1925. Realignments, new coalitions and other unexpected moves inhibited stable, orderly government; governments succeeded each other in rapid succession.

On 20th June 1928 the parliamentary system broke down. After a sharp discussion in the National Assembly between the Montenegrin Radical delegate Puniša Račić and the opposition, Račić drew his revolver and fired at the Radić group. He instantly killed two

Croatian delegates and wounded three other, including Stjepan Radic, who died in Zagreb on 8th August.<sup>57</sup>

The King subsequently named an extra-parliamentary government under General Petar Živkovic: the Constitution was declared no longer in force and the National Assembly dismissed. Royal rule continued until Germany defeated the Yugoslav army in 1941. In that interim period, attempts by the King to reconcile ethnic tensions by including in his governments men from different parts of the country failed miserably. Most notable was the refusal of any important Croats to cooperate with the Belgrade government.

The second period of electoral politics dates from the reestablishment of an independent Yugoslavia immediately following the collapse of Germany in World War II. In the election for a new Constituent Assembly, the ballot papers were dominated with candidates nominated by the People's Front, and contained only a sprinkling of candidates from other parties—the People's Front gained over ninety percent of the vote. The Constituent Assembly met on November 29, 1945, and on December 1 Marshall Tito was appointed head of the Government.

Tito and the Communist Party have ruled Yugoslavia since 1945. Competitive party politics that existed early in the interwar period did not reappear in the postwar era. Nevertheless ethnic tensions have often materialized within the Communist Party and official government policies have been designed to grant recognition to the importance of the different nationality groups.

The lack of complaints about the system [Yugoslavia's unitary state] could not be taken to mean that it met with universal approval, *since all opposition to the regime was silenced*.<sup>58</sup>

Shoup goes on to note that a genuine effort was made to establish the importance of the "nationalities" in Yugoslav life despite the monolithic character of communist rule set up after the war. The Party generally staffed government and political posts in the republics with indigenous personnel representative of the ethnic composition of the region in question.

Although economic and political decentralization was begun in 1949, following an economic disaster induced by rigid application of Stalinist measures, the Communist Party, and Tito in particular, continue to hold

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57. *Ibid.*, p. 104.

58. Shoup, *op. cit.*, p. 119 (emphasis added).

ultimate power. For example, in the Yugoslav election of 1953, an unexpected show of opposition to the regime materialized in Macedonia. The response of the party was stern.

In the campaign that followed, the contestants began to appeal, among other things, to national feelings, *necessitating the removal of the nonofficial candidates from the ballot*.<sup>59</sup>

Ethnicity is still a political problem for Yugoslav leaders and threatens to become even more severe after Tito steps down from power.

### Authoritarian Rule: The Fragility of Democracy

In the final section of this chapter we examine the consequences of a proliferation of parties and other ethnic organizations. The major consequence of this proliferation under the condition of ethnic fragmentation is the tenuous nature of democratic practices and the tendency for military or paramilitary organizations to surface and rule.

**Lebanon.** Of the five fragmented cultures we have investigated, only Lebanon continues to display democratic features. Even so, civil war, temporary military caretaker governments, and an incredibly rapid turnover of cabinets highlight the fragile character of Lebanese democracy. Edward Shils makes note of these incidents: (1) one of the political parties tried to seize power through a coup d'état in 1949; (2) a breakdown in the constitutional process of succession occurred in 1952 when the then incumbent President tried to change the constitution to permit an extension of his term of office; and (3) a civil war erupted in 1958 over another crisis of succession.<sup>60</sup> Cabinet instability has remained a recurrent disap-

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59. *Ibid.*, p. 175 (emphasis added). We might also glance briefly at the condition of ethnic minorities in the Soviet Union. Erich Goldhagen asserts that "the Soviet dictatorship surrounded the nationalities with an iron hedge, ruthlessly suppressing all endeavor for independence, but within these confines the national identity was given considerable freedom of scope." See his "Introduction," in Erich Goldhagen, ed., *Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), pp. vii-xiv (quotation at p. ix.). Mary Kilbourne Matossian further notes that in the case of the Soviet Union, unity with diversity is not always precarious politically, especially if one ethnic group [the Russians] constitutes a clear majority. See "Communist Rule and the Changing Armenian Cultural Pattern," in Erich Goldhagen, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 185-95 (citation at p. 195). In other words, *strict totalitarian rule* in the Soviet Union prevents "nationality" sentiments from becoming salient in the political process; otherwise, cultural diversity in such forms as language, dance, etc., are permitted relatively full expression.

60. *Op. cit.*, pp. 1-2.

pointment in Lebanon; Lebanese endured some forty-six Cabinets between 1926 and 1964, or an average of less than eight months per cabinet.<sup>61</sup> Since the Lebanese declaration of independence from the French Mandate in 1943, some thirty-six separate governments have risen and fallen.<sup>62</sup> Stable, orderly government is hard to maintain under conditions of rapid Cabinet turnover.

External events also pose severe strains for the maintenance of democracy. Lebanon has tried to maintain friendly relations with Egypt, on the one hand, and with the United States and France, on the other. The Israeli-Arab disputes perhaps best illustrate the ease with which such national institutions as the army are able to provide an alternative source of rule.

The Arab-Israeli war of 1967 produced an acute domestic crisis in Lebanon. The army's commander General Emile Bustani, a Maronite Christian, refused to obey the orders of Prime Minister Rashid Karami, a Sunni Moslem, who insisted that the army fight against Israel. As a result of this confrontation, the military temporarily seized power.<sup>63</sup> Twice before, Chehab, a General in the Lebanese army, had been prevailed upon to become President: in 1952 he served as acting head of state after President Khoury felt compelled to resign over fears of impending violence (due to the succession crisis which he himself had created), and again in 1958 he became head of state after the landing of American troops helped end a civil war in which 2,000 to 4,000 casualties were suffered.<sup>64</sup> Palestinian guerrilla raids against Israel from bases in Lebanon continue to pose severe strains on Lebanese democracy.

A brief look at the August 1970 election for President concludes our treatment of Lebanon's plural society. Former Economic Minister Suleiman Franjeh was elected by the slim edge of one vote; the speaker, however, announced that the fifty votes received by Franjeh did not constitute the required simple majority. Tempers soon flared and guns were drawn, but a crisis was averted when the speaker reversed himself and declared Franjeh President.<sup>65</sup> *Newsweek* further reports that Franjeh must cope with two major problems: reform of the archaic political system, specifically the reservation of the Presidency and Prime Ministership for the Maronite Christians and Sunni Moslems, respectively, and controlling the Palestinian commandos who use Lebanon as a base for operations against Israel. *Newsweek's* reporter is not sanguine about Franjeh's prospects.

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61. Kerr, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

62. Hudson, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

63. *Ibid.*, p. 99.

64. *Ibid.*, pp. 105-10.

65. *Newsweek*, August 31, 1970, p. 37.

But given the new President's precarious hold on power, there is no assurance that he will prove able to deal effectively with the guerrillas — or with any of Lebanon's other problems.<sup>66</sup>

**The Congo.** Military government in the Congo is more the rule than the exception.<sup>67</sup> On September 14, 1960, not long after Congolese independence, Colonel Joseph Mobutu, commander of the Congo army, seized political power in a military coup which was sanctioned by President Kasavubu. The military regime was terminated on February 9, 1961, and Joseph Ileo was appointed as Premier of the provisional government composed of members of the former Parliament. The Katanga secession, which had begun in June 1960, ended on January 15, 1963. Later that year Kasavubu dissolved the central Parliament because of its failure to prepare a draft of a new constitution. New elections were held in May 1965 and Premier Tshombe's Congolese Convention Party obtained an overall majority winning 86 of 125 seats. Parliament met for the first time in two years in September 1965, but two months later General Mobutu again seized control of the government in a new military coup, ousting President Kasavubu. A five year regime of military rule was declared by Mobutu and his new government was almost unanimously approved by Parliament on November 28, 1965. General, now President, Mobutu has ruled continuously since the military coup in 1965.<sup>68</sup>

**Nigeria.** As we indicated before, a military coup took place in Nigeria in mid-January 1966. At that time, Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and two regional Premiers were killed. A provisional military government headed by an Ibo, Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, took over the duties of both the federal and regional governments. Ibos felt they had much to gain from their increased mobility and were consequently in favor of the new regime. Northerners reacted with antipathy and a series of riots developed in the North with attacks aimed principally at resident Ibos. On July 29, 1966, a new military coup led by Northern elements in the Nigerian army overthrew the military regime of Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi and replaced him with Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon, who as head of government was later promoted to the rank of Major General. Within a few months the Eastern Region had seceded and declared itself

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66. *Ibid.*

67. This discussion is based on data taken from "Deadline Data on World Affairs."

68. We should credit Daniel J. Crowley with having made an astute prediction for the Congo. He speculated, in 1963, that the army or *gendarmérie* would become the elite that the Congo so badly needed. His prediction was borne out by events in 1965 and thereafter (*op. cit.*, p. 77).

the independent state of Biafra. Nearly three years of civil war followed until Biafra surrendered on January 12, 1970. Thus in Nigeria the military has ruled for a considerable portion of the country's postindependence period. Military rule appears to have come about because the animosities shared among Nigeria's tribal communities drained the oil, so to speak, from the country's democratic machinery.<sup>69</sup>

**The Sudan.** We have already noted that the Sudan has not escaped periods of military rule. General Ibrahim Abboud had seized power earlier on November 17, 1958; he dissolved Parliament, suspended the constitution, and banned all political parties. Six years later the General resigned and a new civilian government was installed. This government, among other things, was unable to resolve peacefully the Southern problem. Consequently, civilian rule was again terminated on May 29, 1969, when Major General Gafaar al-Nimeiry staged a bloodless coup. He immediately nullified the provisional constitution, dissolved all constitutional and legislative bodies, and set up a ten-man Revolutionary Council, consisting of nine officers and one civilian with himself as head of state. Thus, military rule has emerged each time the civilian government has shown itself unable to resolve or cope with major ethnic differences. This result neatly fits the experience of not only the Sudan, but also Nigeria, the Congo, and to a lesser extent, Lebanon.

**Yugoslavia.** So long as the Communist Party has been willing and able to command nation-wide obedience and compliance with its programs, ethnic demands and grievances have been kept within manageable bounds. Democratic politics in the interwar period soon developed into royal rule because the rival ethnic communities were unable to compromise their differences. A similar pattern now appears to be developing in Yugoslavia: Tito's program of economic and political decentralization, fashioned in response to the economic disasters of the late 1940s, has contributed to a revivification of the old regional rivalries. The Yugoslav constitution grants an exception to Tito for the number of terms the head of state can serve and, as long as he remains competent to rule, the Communist Party appears able to hold together the diverse regions of the country. Still, the Communist Party is more a collection of the Republic Parties of Serbia, Croatia, and Macedonia, and the Regional Parties of Vojvodina and Kossovo-Metohija than it is a genuine, national party. Upon Tito's death

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69. For an account of these successive army coups, see Paul Anber, "Modernization and Political Disintegration: Nigeria and the Ibos," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 5, no. 2 (September 1967): 163-79, especially pp. 163-64.

or the passing of his leadership, the future is likely to hold in store a renewed upsurge in the expression of "nationality" sentiments (especially since the previous common enemy, the Soviet Union, no longer provides an external enemy for all the Yugoslav peoples).

### **Conclusion**

This chapter completes our tour of ethnic politics in each of the four different configurations. The prospects for stable democracy appear dim as the historical record has indicated. Does this imply, though, that the problems which plural societies face are insoluble? That democracy and stability in the plural society are incompatible?

We examine these questions in the concluding chapter, paying particular attention to an assessment of the policy implications of our theory as proposed solutions. Let us turn, then, to this task.