INSTITUTIONS AND ETHNIC POLITICS IN AFRICA

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and foremost as a Nyanja-speakers' party, was perceived to have close ties to Tonga-speakers during the brief presidency of Kebby Musokotwane, a Tonga-speaking Southerner, and briefly became identified with Lozi-speakers following the election in 1995 of Lozi Senior Chief Inyambo Yeta as party vice president.

What are the political implications of the tendency for parties to be associated with the ethnic groups of their leaders? From the standpoint of winning support from voters in the leader's home region, the identification of the party with its leader's ethnic group is a great advantage. In fact, as I show in Chapter 8, the home regions of party presidents have been, historically, the parts of the country where Zambian political parties have had their greatest electoral successes.[22] From the standpoint of capturing national power, however, the tendency for Zambians to associate parties with the ethnic groups of their presidents is a problem, since even the largest ethnic group in the country (Bemba-speakers) comprises less than 40 percent of the total population. This means that no ethnic group can constitute a majority coalition in and of itself, and no party without a Bemba-speaker as its leader can win a plurality nationally so long as everyone in the country votes along ethnic lines. To be nationally viable, Zambian political parties must win support across ethnic communities, and this means eschewing public identification with any single ethnic group.

Given such a constraint, parties tend to adopt a strategy of emphasizing non-ethnic issues and condemning tribalism in their public pronouncements and official campaign literature, while quietly playing the ethnic card in the region with whose people they are identified. The goal of this dual strategy is to construct a solid ethnic coalition in the party's home region while still preserving the ability to win pan-ethnic (or non-ethnic) support in the rest of the country. A particularly revealing glimpse of how such a strategy is carried out is provided by the National Party. From the party's inception, as a senior party organizer told me, its founders foresaw that their success would depend on their ability to combat the party's association in voters' minds with Lozi-speakers from Western Province. To avoid this fate, the party adopted an explicitly pan-ethnic name (the "National Party") and chose a unifying symbol (clasped hands).

[22] Once such regional success is documented, it tends to reinforce the association of the party with the region. As a focus group participant explained, "When we see a particular area has more votes for the National Party, we say 'aah, that's the home of the National Party.' Like Eastern Province. They have more votes for UNIP and automatically we feel that it is a . . . UNIP area" (LIV-W).

In addition, whenever they campaigned outside of Western Province party leaders took great care to emphasize the vices of tribalism and the need for national unity and national development. But to make sure that the party would retain its foothold among Lozi-speaking Westerners, party organizers made it a practice, when campaigning in that part of the country, of always referring to the party by its Lozi name as the "Sicaba Party." To non-Lozis, the subtle shift in the party's designation was imperceptible – "Sicaba" was, after all, the direct Lozi translation of "national," and much campaigning in Zambia is ordinarily conducted in local languages. But to the Lozi audiences whose support the National Party leaders coveted, "Sicaba Party" was an obvious reference to the Lozi nationalist party of the same name that had been active in the region in the early 1960s. By alluding to it, the NP campaigners made their party's "true" ethnic orientation clear. But doing so in this manner limited the audience that would understand this message to fellow Lozi-speakers.[23]

The United Progressive Party provides another example of a party that employed national appeals for one audience and ethnic appeals for another.[24] Founded by Simon Kapwepwe, the pre-eminent Bemba politician of the independence era, the UPP drew almost all of its most senior leaders from the Bemba-speaking Northern Province and the Copperbelt.[25] As a consequence of its close association with the Bemba elite, the party was widely assumed to be a party for Bembas only. Thus while the party's leaders did campaign (clandestinely) along ethnic lines in Bemba-speaking areas to shore up their natural base (Bratton 1980: 212–20; Gertzel and Szeftel 1984: 131–35), they recognized that their more important task was to win support among non-Bemba voters. To do this, they "sought to establish [the UPP] as a national political party . . . and avoided expressing its appeal for popular support in regional or factional terms" (Szeftel 1980: 86). The party's manifesto emphasized that one of its goals was "to stamp out all forms of . . . tribalism and sectionalism by establishing real unity

[23] Interview with NP Organizing Secretary Mwitumwa Imbula, Mongu, 15 November 1995.

[24] The *Daily Mail* summarized the party as having "three different faces: one for the people of the urban areas, one for the people of the rural areas, and another for the expatriate community being wooed to support [it]" (15 December 1971).

[25] The UPP's base in these areas is "indicated by the list of those detained by the government for UPP activities and by press reports of defections from UNIP . . . [T]he vast majority of those detained had Bemba names" (Szeftel 1980: 86). Molteno (1972: 7) concurs: "When [Kapwepwe] announced the eight members of his interim central committee, five were Bemba, three were from Eastern Province (but political non-entities) and the other six had no representation at all."

through discussion" (*Daily Mail*, 25 August 1971). In his public campaign speeches, Kapwepwe focused on explicitly non-ethnic issues such as the evils of corruption, the need for economic change, and the importance of national unity. When a dispute broke out over allegations that Bembas were being mistreated by the UNIP government, Kapwepwe went out of his way to state publicly that it was his "hope and prayer that all leaders will avoid the temptation of speaking for particular groups ... We are going to fight as a nation and not as Bembas, Tongas, Ngonis or Lozis" (*Daily Mail*, 27 January 1971). In these ways, the party attempted to preserve its viability as a national, rather than simply a regional, political force.

In addition to trying to help their fortunes by shaping perceptions about their own ethnic orientations, political parties, like individual candidates, also employ the strategy of ascribing ethnic orientations to their rivals. By successfully cultivating the identification of a rival party with a particular ethnic group, a savvy party leader can improve his own party's prospects by undermining the rival party's ability to win support beyond a relatively narrow area. Such a strategy is particularly common for ruling parties, which, having succeeded in capturing power, have an incentive to portray upstart opposition groups in terms that will undermine their ability to compete with them at the national level.

Faced with threats from the ANC and the UP in the 1960s, the UNIP accused both parties of being more interested in helping their narrow ethnic constituencies in Western and Southern Provinces than in fostering the development of the country as a whole.[26] In so doing, the UNIP hoped to – and largely did – undercut these parties' support outside of their regional home bases. The same tactic was employed against the UPP in 1971. "The party was depicted [by UNIP leaders] as a manifestation of Bemba tribalism and its adherents [from other ethnic groups] were dismissed as people of no consequence who were permitting themselves to be used to provide UPP with a national image" (Szeftel 1978: 356). In addition to accusations of this sort, the UNIP government arrested the UPP's two most senior non-Bemba leaders, Henry Msoni and Zipope Mumba, in an effort to disrupt the party's ability to point to these men as evidence of the organization's multi-ethnic roots. Kapwepwe reacted to his colleagues' detention by calling it an attempt by the UNIP to try to "prove their theory that this is a tribal party" (*Times of Zambia*, 25 August 1971). Although part of the reason the UPP found it so difficult to escape its Bemba label was because of Kapwepwe's strong association with the

[26] Interview with William Chipango, Livingstone, 16 December 1995; Molteno (1974).

Bemba cause, the UNIP's steadfast campaign to brand the party as a Bemba instrument also played an important role in shaping peoples' perceptions of the UPP's ethnic orientation.

The MMD also adopted the practice of ethnic finger-pointing as a means of limiting the threats posed by opposition parties. When the upstart National Party was formed in 1993, and then when the UPND was created in 1998, the MMD's principal response was to brand them as vehicles for Lozi and Tonga interests (*The Monitor*, 19–25 November 1999; 25 February–2 March 2000; *Daily Mail*, 13 September 2000). The extraordinary level of resources that the MMD devoted to defeating the NP candidate in the Malole by-election of 1993 – a race viewed around the country as a test of the NP's claim to be a truly national political organization – attests to the importance that the MMD attached to containing the NP in its relatively narrow Lozi- and Tonga-speaking ethnic heartlands. The by-election pitted Emmanuel Kasonde, a former finance minister who had been sacked by President Chiluba following unsubstantiated allegations of financial impropriety (*Weekly Post*, 23–29 April 1993), against an unknown MMD challenger. The significance of the by-election stemmed from the fact that Kasonde was one of the most powerful and visible Bemba politicians in the country and the man widely credited with having delivered Northern Province to the MMD in 1991. To have allowed him to win the seat would have been to give the NP a foothold outside of the South and West and to eliminate the MMD's ability to brand the NP as a regional party.[27] The MMD, like the UNIP before it, was willing to risk reinforcing the opposition party's hegemony in its home region so long as it could be assured of limiting its rival's ability to attract supporters across the country as a whole.

Candidates as Bearers of Both Individual Identities and Party Labels

I have argued that voters use a candidate's ethnicity as a guide to how that person is likely to distribute patronage if elected. I have also argued that voters make their decisions about which political parties to support based on a similar assessment of the match between each party's ethnic orientation and their own. The goal for voters is to support the candidate or party that is perceived to represent the interests of their own ethnic group. The problem, however, is that the candidates among whom the

[27] For a fuller account of this key by-election, see the discussions in Chapters 7 and 8.

voters must choose are competing simultaneously as individuals and as representatives of particular political parties. This means that they can be "coded" ethnically in two different (and sometimes contradictory) ways: one way suggested by the candidate's own cultural background, and another way suggested by the ethnic orientation of the party on whose ticket the candidate is running. Both provide clues about how the politician is likely to behave if elected, but these clues may point in different directions. For example, the candidate may be from one ethnic group but running on the ticket of a party associated with another group. In such a situation, the ethnic community that the candidate is likely to favor once in office is not obvious. Which ethnic cue – the individual one or the party one – should voters focus on in making their decisions? And which ethnic affiliation should the candidates themselves try to emphasize in making thier electoral appeals?

The answer (to the second question, at least) depends on the context. Sometimes, the ethnic loyalties that are imputed to a candidate by virtue of his party affiliation run counter to the candidate's interests, as, for example, when the party on whose ticket he is running is associated in voters' minds with a region or group other than that of the voters themselves. In such a situation, the candidate will either try to stress his party's national orientation or, if he himself is a member of the dominant local group in the constituency, attempt to draw a distinction between his party's perceived ethnic orientation and his own, and encourage voters to focus on the latter. At other times, however, the party's ethnic coattails may be quite beneficial. For example, when a candidate is running for a seat in the region of the country with which her party is popularly identified, the candidate will have a strong incentive to underscore her party affiliation and the ethnic orientation that it conveys. These strategic considerations are at the heart of the explanation for why different dimensions of ethnic identity emerge as salient in one-party and multi-party electoral contests, and I will return to them in the next chapter.

THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ETHNIC MULTI-DIMENSIONALITY

Thus far, as I have discussed the coalition-building strategies of Zambian political actors, I have treated ethnicity as an unambiguous, unidimensional concept. I have described political parties as avoiding overt ethnic appeals in their public campaigns and as carefully playing the ethnic card in regions dominated by people whose interests they are perceived

to represent. I have described candidates as either playing up or seeking to hide from their ethnic group affiliations, depending, first, on whether or not they happen to be located in constituencies dominated by members of their own groups and, second, on whether or not the parties on whose tickets they are running are popularly viewed as representatives of local interests. And I have described how both parties and candidates brand their rivals with ethnic labels, sometimes to restrict the breadth of their rivals' potential support base and sometimes to mobilize members of their own groups against implied outside threats. In each case, the strategic decisions made by the political actors have been cast as a choice between actively drawing upon ethnic identity or actively hiding from it.

Entirely absent from this discussion has been the possibility that political actors, in choosing whether to embrace ethnic labels or ascribe them to their rivals, might also be faced with a decision about which dimension of ethnic identity to embrace or ascribe. Yet ethnic coalition-building in Zambia requires precisely such a decision. Recall that two different dimensions of ethnic identity are available to Zambian political actors: one stemming from tribal affiliation, and the other from language group membership. This means that the calculation surrounding how best to employ ethnicity as a coalition-building tool entails an additional decision about whether to stress tribal connections or language ties. It also implies that the process of ethnic coalition-building is considerably more complex than has been suggested thus far.

Although both tribal and linguistic identities are commonly referred to as "tribal" in everyday social discourse – Zambians, like most Africans, almost never use the terms "ethnic group" or "ethnicity" – each designation refers to membership in a very different-sized social unit. Tribal affiliations identify their bearers as members of one of roughly six dozen highly localized groupings, whereas language group affiliations classify most people as members of one of four much larger coalitions. Since the size of the group with which a person (or political party) is identified is so different depending on whether the group is defined in tribal or linguistic terms, the decision to describe oneself (or one's political opponents) in terms of one dimension of ethnic identity rather than the other has important consequences. To define oneself in linguistic terms is to identify oneself not simply as a member of a particular ethnic group, but as a member of a large and nationally powerful coalition. To define one's rivals in such terms is to identify them with a large, potentially threatening, and perhaps unfairly favored ethnic grouping. Conversely, to define one's own (or one's opponent's) ethnic identity in terms of tribal affiliation

is to emphasize one's own (or one's opponent's) local roots and to assert boundaries between narrower ethnic units that might otherwise be lumped together as part of the same linguistic entity. In each case, the perceived landscape of in-group and out-group members – and thus political allies and political adversaries – is quite different.

The ability of Zambian political actors to alter perceptions of the size of their own or their opponent's ethnic coalition by emphasizing tribal versus linguistic differences constitutes a valuable strategic resource. It allows politicians and political parties to define themselves and their rivals as members of groups on the dimension of ethnicity that will yield them the greatest political leverage given the situation in which they find themselves. As the situation changes, so too can the dimension of identity that they find it most advantageous to embrace. In the context of a struggle over the distribution of national development resources, cabinet positions, civil service jobs, or parastatal posts, for example, a Zambian politician can define himself in linguistic terms to signal the large size and political importance of the coalition whose support he can claim to represent. In the context of a campaign for re-election in his rural constituency, that same politician can play down his linguistic identity in favor of his affiliation with the dominant local tribe in the area to better distinguish himself from rivals (who probably share his language group background) and to underscore his authenticity as a representative of the interests of the local community. More generally, by framing political conflicts in terms of one dimension of ethnic identity rather than another, politicians and political parties can shape perceptions about the fairness of the distribution of government resources to convince voters that they are disadvantaged and that mobilization for change should be a priority. And by defining themselves in terms of the right (in the sense of strategically optimal) dimension of ethnic identity, they can also convince voters that this mobilization should take place behind their banner.

In Zambia, as in many contexts where social identities are multidimensional, the dynamics of such ethnic self-definition and ascription are complicated by the fact that the tribal and linguistic collectivities with which people identify themselves nest inside one another. Tribal and language groups are organized in concentric circles, with all the members of each tribal group located entirely within a single language category and each language category containing several different tribal groups. Thus, every Lozi tribesperson is also a Lozi-speaker, but every Lozi-speaker is not a Lozi tribesperson. The coalition of Lozi-speakers contains a great

many tribal groups – Kwangwa, Kwandi, Mashi, Mbunda, Subiya, to name just a few – who are not Lozis in the tribal sense. The same is true of the coalition of Bemba-speakers (which includes people who are, among other things, Aushi, Bisa, Kabende, Lala, Lunda, Mambwe, Namwanga, and Ng'umbo by tribe), Tonga-speakers (which includes people who are tribally Lenje, Soli, Ila, and Toka-Leya), and Nyanja-speakers (which includes people who are tribally Chewa, Nsenga, Ngoni, Chikunda, and Tumbuka).

Such nesting of tribes within language groups need not cause confusion in and of itself. The confusion stems from the fact that, because of the way in which patterns of language use developed historically, the name of each of the four major language groups in Zambia is the same as the name of the largest tribe in each language coalition. These, of course, are the tribes whose local dialects became the bases for each of the four major regional linguas franca.[28] To refer to someone simply as a "Lozi" (or a "Bemba" or a "Tonga" or a "Nyanja"), as is commonly done in Zambia, is therefore fundamentally ambiguous, since there is no way of knowing whether we are referring to the person's tribal identity or to the person's language group affiliation. This ambiguity has very important political implications, which I will explore in the next section.

Before doing so, however, it is necessary to add an additional wrinkle to our discussion of the Zambian ethnic landscape. To this point, I have described the country's politically relevant social cleavages as being built along either tribal or linguistic lines. As I argued in Chapters 2 and 3, the reason that tribal and linguistic cleavages constitute such important bases for political coalition-building is because the colonial government and the Northern Rhodesian mining companies made access to state and company resources during the pre-independence era contingent on identifying oneself as either a member of a tribe or a speaker of one of the country's four principal languages. When independence and the advent of electoral politics shifted the competition for state resources from the offices of the district governors and the headquarters of Native Authorities to the arena of mass politics, Zambians continued to view this competition in terms of a struggle among coalitions defined in tribal or linguistic terms.

One of the important changes that came with independence was the emergence of provinces as units of development administration. Provinces had first been demarcated in Northern Rhodesia in the early 1930s, and

[28] See Chapter 3.

by the mid-1940s, each of the protectorate's (then) six provinces had its own African-staffed administrative council (Hall 1976: 68; Stone 1979). But it was not until after independence that the scale of the resources allocated for rural development through these units became large enough for provincial administrations to become perceived as sources of patronage. When this happened, provinces became focal points for political competition and Zambians came to view the struggle for state resources partly in terms of a conflict among the country's provinces.[29] In the post-independence era, provincial divisions have thus come to play a similar role to tribal and linguistic divisions as a foundation for political coalition-building.

The reason that the emergence of provincial identities as an alternative to tribe or language has not thoroughly altered the dynamics of Zambian political competition is that, by and large, provincial identities and linguistic identities overlap. Leaving aside the provinces located along the rail line whose migrant populations are so mixed as to have only weak provincial identities, the boundaries of provinces are generally, both in Zambians' imaginations and in fact, the same as the boundaries of the country's main language groups. Southern Province is more or less the Tonga-speaking part of the country, Eastern Province is the country's Nyanja-speaking region, and Western Province is the home of Zambia's Lozi-speakers.[30] In each of these cases, the name of the province and the name of the language group are used interchangeably in popular discourse: Tonga-speakers are referred to as Southerners, Nyanja-speakers as Easterners, and Lozi-speakers as Westerners.

There are, however, two important exceptions to the otherwise close match between provincial and linguistic boundaries. The first is Northwestern Province, which is not associated with any of the country's four major language groups. For reasons explained in Chapter 3, no single regional lingua franca took root in Northwestern Province, as it did in the other rural areas of Northern Rhodesia. Provincial identities thus tend to

[29] At independence, Zambia had eight provinces: Barotse, Central, Eastern, Luapula, Northern, Northwestern, Southern, and Western. In 1969, Western Province was renamed Copperbelt Province and Barotse Province was renamed Western Province. In 1978, a ninth province, Lusaka Province, was carved out of the former Central Province.

[30] The Nkoyas of Western Province, who reject their classification as Lozi-speakers (van Binsbergen 1982), and the Tumbukas of Eastern Province, who at times have been identified, either by themselves or by others, as distinct from the region's Nyanja-speaking population, constitute two minor exceptions.

play an analogous role for people in Northwestern Province to linguistic identities in other parts of the country. Zambians often refer to "Northwesterners" as the fifth major ethnic group alongside the Bemba-speakers, Nyanja-speakers, Tonga-speakers, and Lozi-speakers. People from Northwestern Province also commonly identify themselves in such terms.

The second of the exceptions is the Bemba-speaking region, which spans both Northern and Luapula Provinces (and, in the eyes of many Zambians, also Copperbelt Province and the northeastern portions of Central Province). The fact that the Bemba-speaking coalition does not map onto a single province means that, unlike the coalitions defined by the three other major language groups, Bemba-speakers can be divided not only into tribal sub-groupings but also into provincial sub-units. This, in turn, means that what is meant by "Bemba" is even more ambiguous than what is meant by "Tonga," "Nyanja," or "Lozi." When people are described (or describe themselves) as "Bemba" do they mean that they are members of the Bemba tribe? That they speak the Bemba language? Or that they are from Northern Province (the home of the Bemba tribe and thus the more "Bemba" of the two Bemba-speaking provinces)? In a political context where Bembas are widely perceived to dominate the most important positions in the government and to receive the lion's share of development resources, this ambiguity is a source of tremendous misunderstanding and conflict. The central question of whether or not Bembas are, in fact, over-represented in senior government positions or advantaged in the allocation of development funds depends entirely on which dimension of Bemba identity one uses in the counting. To develop this point, and to illustrate the political implications of Zambia's ethnic multi-dimensionality, I turn now to the question: what is a Bemba?

What Is a Bemba?

For non-Bemba-speakers, almost all people who speak the Bemba language – or, more precisely, all people who are members of tribes or who trace their roots to provinces that are considered Bemba-speaking – are viewed as "Bembas." Epstein (1978: 11) relates a telling anecdote from his field work in the Copperbelt about a young laborer from Mwinilunga (a Kaonde area of Northwestern Province) whom he met one Sunday afternoon when the laborer was on his way home from watching a tribal dancing competition in the Ndola municipal compound. The young man explained that "he had not stayed there very long . . . because his friend had

not appeared and there were only Bemba dancing *Kalela* [a well-known tribal dance] that day." Epstein writes:

> Since I knew that *Kalela* was not danced by Bemba, I asked whether they were not really Bena Ng'umbo [members of a different Bemba-speaking tribe] whom he had seen. He replied (in Bemba): "those of us who come from afar know only the Bemba. It is just the same way they call us from the far west Kalwena . . . even though we are of many different tribes."

"From afar," most Zambians ignore the internal complexity of the Bemba category and lump anyone who comes from a Bemba-speaking area into the same group.[31] "Aushi, Lala, Ng'umbo," a Lusaka focus group participant explained, "these are all Bembas because they speak the same language" (LSK-T1).

Even Bemba-speakers themselves sometimes define their group in undifferentiated terms. "Most of the people in Luapula are not Bemba [by tribe], and yet I have had many experiences where I have met people there who call themselves Bemba" a Catholic missionary from Northern Province recounted:

> [When this happens] I say "but you are not a Bemba, you are a Lunda." And they say "but Father, it is the same thing." Most of the people in Luapula Province who say they are Bemba are not. They say they are Bemba because they speak Bemba. All these tribes – the Bisa, the Lunda, the Aushi – they go to the Copperbelt and present themselves as Bemba because they speak Bemba.[32]

A market seller in Luanshya, herself a Lungu and a lifelong Copperbelt resident, followed precisely this pattern when she characterized people from Northern Province, Luapula Province, and the Copperbelt as "all the same . . . all behaving like one group" (LY-MS-W). A former MP, now retired to the Copperbelt, agreed similarly that people from Luapula and Northern provinces were "just the same people, except that the dialect is a little different. To me, I feel that [people from] Luapula and Northern [provinces] should be one."[33]

Sometimes such characterizations are born from little more than a subconscious effort to simplify an otherwise complex social landscape. Among urban dwellers in particular, this is a common means of coping

[31] As the young laborer noted, the same applies to members of other linguistic categories.

[32] Interview with Fr. Joseph Melvin Doucette, Malole Mission, 8 September 1995.

[33] Interview with Leonard Mpundu, Luanshya, 17 December 1995.

with social complexity (Mitchell 1956, 1969, 1974, 1987). But in some situations, defining the Bemba coalition in linguistic terms is part of a conscious strategy, either by Bemba-speakers or by outsiders, to identify the Bembas as the country's largest ethnic coalition. For non-Bemba-speakers, the purpose of such a characterization is often to expand the universe of officeholders that can be labeled as "Bemba," thereby underscoring the degree to which "Bembas" dominate the most important positions in the government and dramatizing the need to mobilize against "Bemba" hegemony. For members of the Bemba-speaking group, by contrast, defining "Bemba" in linguistic terms is used to justify precisely such dominance. Faced in 1971 with accusations that Bembas held too many of the country's top posts, Justin Chimba, a senior Bemba minister at the time, argued that "this country must realize that Bembas are a majority . . . [We] comprise 58 percent [*sic*] of the Zambian population and should not be taken lightly" (*Daily Mail*, 25 January 1971).[34] In a similar vein, Unia Mwila, another senior government official, concluded a speech to the UNIP National Council meeting of February 1968 by pointing out that, if Bembas were a majority on the Central Committee, "it [was] because Bemba-speaking people number two million!"[35] In both cases, the speakers sought to defend their group's privileged status by defining their coalition in the broadest possible terms and then claiming that the size of their group justified its share of senior positions.

A second rationale for Bemba-speakers to define their ethnic coalition in linguistic terms is to maximize the number of supporters in their coalition. When the emergence of the National Party in 1993 seemed to threaten the MMD's grip on power, President Chiluba attempted to play precisely this strategy. Fearful that Northern Province Bemba-speakers might follow their leader, Emmanuel Kasonde, into the opposition camp, Chiluba called the Northern Province parliamentary delegation to a special State House meeting at which he "quot[ed] historical tribal links between the people of Luapula and Northern Province" and stressed that "family ties [between his province and theirs] should not be broken" (*Weekly Post*, 6–12 August 1993). By invoking the common linguistic ties between Northern Province and Luapula (his own home area), Chiluba hoped to keep intact the Bemba-speaking alliance that comprised the core of his party's supporters.

[34] Chimba's estimate of the size of the Bemba-speaking coalition was significantly inflated. Bemba-speakers in Zambia comprise closer to 40 percent of the population.

[35] Wina (1985: 22). Again, Mwila's figures are highly inflated.

But while Bemba-speakers may find it advantageous to emphasize their linguistic identities in some situations, in other situations they are eager to draw distinctions between themselves and other fellow language group members. Especially when they are faced with allegations that "Bembas" are enjoying more than their fair share of the national cake, many Bemba-speakers are quick to point out that only certain provincially or tribally defined segments of the larger Bemba-speaking coalition are, in fact, benefiting from a preferential access to power and resources. A letter to the editor of *The Times* (29 April 1995) from the chairman of the Bemba Ilamfya Council, the Bemba tribe's leading cultural association, provides an excellent example of such within-coalition boundary drawing:

> It has been said and it is being said that the MMD government is dominated by Bembas. This is not correct. If they mean [that the government is dominated by members of the Bemba] tribe, it is not true . . . The only Bemba minister is Chitalu Sampa. All those you see in the MMD government today just speak Bemba [but] they have their [own] tribes . . . Even President Chiluba is not a Bemba by tribe, he is just a Bemba-speaker. So it is wrong to say that Bembas have dominated the MMD government.

In response to allegations of Bemba over-representation in the government, Bemba Paramount Chief Chitimukulu himself issued a public statement in which he "humbly ask[ed] whoever is the proponent of the anti-Bemba sentiments . . . to stop pointing fingers at the Bembas because Bembas . . . constitute [only one of] the 73 tribes" (*Weekly Standard*, 30 August–5 September 1993). The rationale for both the chief's request and the chairman's letter was made explicit in the latter, which lamented that the tendency of Zambians to conflate Bemba tribespeople with Bemba-speakers more generally had resulted in a situation in which those who were Bemba by tribe were put "at a disadvantage in as far as employment, promotion or appointments to high offices is concerned" (*The Times*, 29 April 1995).

The most vocal protests against the assumption that all Bemba-speakers are part of the same group, however, have come not from Bemba tribal leaders but from politicians identifying themselves in provincial terms. In the late 1960s, politicians from Luapula Province began to speak out against what they perceived to be the insufficient rewards that they were receiving for the contribution they had made to bringing the UNIP to power (Bates 1976: ch. 10; Szeftel 1978: ch. 6). Many of their demands were couched in terms of a comparison between the meager resources allotted to their province and the far more generous allocations enjoyed

by their Bemba-speaking neighbors in Northern Province. In 1969, a group of MPs from Luapula wrote to the President to protest "the lack of development and rewards accorded their region." The authors of the letter

> referred to slights and insults accorded Luapulans by people from Northern Province . . . They noted that in the past they had regarded Northern Province as a "sister province" and had accepted its leadership in the interest of unity. However, these insults . . . had opened their eyes to the costs of their support for Northern Province and they were determined that henceforth they would represent their own interests and seek their fair share of the "benefits of independence" (Szeftel 1978: 334–35)[36]

Later the same year, Luapula politicians asserted the distinction between Northern Province Bembas and Luapula Bembas once again by publicly rejecting the government's nominee for a parliamentary by-election in Kawambwa East constituency in Luapula Province. The nominee, John Mwanakatwe, was a Bemba-speaking Mambwe-Lungu from Isoka district in Northern Province. At the time of his nomination for the Kawambwa East seat, he was the secretary general to the government. Previously he had been a minister of education and a minister of mines. Despite his very senior status in the government, Mwanakatwe was rejected on the grounds that, although he was a Bemba-speaker, he was a Northerner rather than a local Luapulan (*Times of Zambia*, 14 July 1969). To build support for their opposition to Mwanakatwe's nomination, Luapula MPs spearheaded "an outpouring of letters, petitions and telegrams in support of their demand that 'the political interests of the province [be] looked after by its own sons and daughters,' and that 'no outsider be imposed' on the Luapula people" (Bates 1976: 229). In addition, they "devised and disseminated a . . . story [contending] that Mwanakatwe had chastised the Luapula people for aspiring to assert themselves politically and . . . [had] called the Luapula people *batubula*, or 'dumb fishermen' who were 'ordained to be ruled by others'" (ibid.). Although the allegation about Mwanakatwe's *batubula* slur was widely

[36] The MPs wrote: "We are now more convinced that it is because of this attitude against us that our people have not had the benefit of political appointments on the scale enjoyed by those from the Northern Province or other provinces. In this regard we may mention the appointments to Party leadership on the regional level in the [Copperbelt] Province, politically appointed District Secretaries, District Governors, appointments to foreign missions, membership of the statutory bodies and Government Boards, not to mention appointments in the public service" (quoted in Szeftel 1978: 335).

reported in the Zambian press at the time, Bates (1976: 229) claims to have investigated the matter and "found little basis for it." He concludes: "The significance of the story therefore lies not in its veracity. Rather, it lies in the political designs that underlay it. The story was clearly aimed at demonstrating the hauteur and insensitivity of the Northern Province politicians and at severing the bonds of political loyalty between the Luapula constituency and the national-level politicians from the north" (230).

In 1970, five high-ranking Luapula politicians in the Copperbelt sent another letter to President Kaunda demanding that their province be given a greater share of government appointments. To make their point, the authors attached a list of senior government officials "to point out how few of the positions had gone to Luapulans."[37] Bates (1976: 219) cites a 1971 speech given by a Luapula MP at a district-level political meeting that emphasizes the same themes:

> Since independence, the government has done nothing in this province... Before independence we were united together with other provinces, but since then other provinces have wanted [the] lion's share and to eat on their friends' heads... In Northern Province, government has established a railway line... so we want government to establish mines in Luapula.

In all of these examples, politicians from Luapula sought to increase their access to political power and public resources by asserting the difference between themselves and their fellow Bemba-speakers in Northern Province. What outsiders may have perceived, and depicted, as a uniformly privileged "Bemba" block was, in fact, deeply divided by internal factions, each seeking greater access to the coalition's spoils.

In the 1990s, the tables were turned. With the reins of power in the hands of President Chiluba – a Luapulan – it was the Northerners who emphasized the distinction between the two provincial groupings in complaining about inadequate resource allocation. A focus group respondent in Northern Province protested that "whenever they talk of people being favored by the government they talk of Bembas. But... we [Northerners] are not involved... It is the ones from over there [in Luapula] that are benefiting" (KAS-R-M). Echoing this sentiment, a newspaper report in the days leading up to the MMD's 1995 party convention describes

[37] Petition addressed by "The Copperbelt Luapula Delegation to his Excellency the President of the Republic of Zambia, Dr. K. D. Kaunda, on the following points," quoted in Szeftel (1978: 336). The petitioners "demanded that the President 'minimize' the appointment of people from areas 'whose representations have already monopolised the country.'"

Northerners as feeling "abandoned" by their party. "They claim President Chiluba... has sacrificed Northern Province for Southern Province, Luapula Province and Eastern Province" (*The Post*, 18 December 1995). Yet at the very moment that a senior MMD member from Northern Province was complaining to the reporter that "since the late Simon Kapwepwe's vice-presidency, no one from Northern Province has held a senior position in the politics of this country" (ibid.), many, if not most, of the non-Bemba-speaking delegates were convinced that Northerners were controlling both their party and the government. The fact that one of the groups that felt itself to be so ill-treated could be perceived by another group as favored attests to the power of Zambia's complex ethnic landscape to breed grievances and misunderstandings.

Nowhere are the possibilities for conflicting interpretations of the same reality more evident than in the composition of the cabinet. As we have seen, the ethnic breakdown of the cabinet is one of the most visible and closely watched indicators of ethnic group favoritism in Zambia. As we have also seen, the allegation that "Bembas" are dominating the cabinet has been, since independence, a central theme of Zambian politics. Figure 4.1 displays the share of "Bembas" in the cabinet in every odd year between 1965 and 1999 using different bars to indicate the share in each year of Bemba tribespeople, members from Northern Province, and Bemba-speakers.[38] As the figure makes clear, the accuracy of the claim that Bembas are dominating the cabinet depends entirely on how one defines "Bemba."

Defined in terms of language, Bembas occupied an average of 35 percent of all cabinet positions between 1965 and 1999, with a low of 22 percent and a high of 44 percent. Defined in terms of tribe, however, Bemba cabinet representation during the same period was less than a third of that rate, averaging just 11 percent, and ranging between a low of zero and a high of 25 percent. Defined a third way, in terms of province of origin (as cabinet members from Northern Province), the Bemba share of cabinet

[38] The roster of cabinet members used for each year was as of the first parliamentary sitting of the year, as recorded in the official record of parliamentary debates. The sole exceptions are 1989, for which such records were not published, and 1991, where the list of ministers is as of the beginning of the Third Republic in November. The cabinet was defined as the president, the vice president or prime minister, all full ministers, the attorney general, the secretary general to the government and designated members of the Central Committee in the House. Deputy ministers and ministers of state were not included. Cabinet members holding more than one portfolio were counted only once.



Figure 4.1. Share of Bembas in the Cabinet

seats averaged 21 percent, approximately the midpoint of the linguistic and tribal averages.[39] As these numbers make clear, and as Figure 4.1 graphically illustrates, the conclusion one draws about the dominance of Bembas in the government depends completely on which ethnic lens one employs in counting heads. When Bemba-speakers respond with disbelief and anger to allegations that they hold the lion's share of cabinet posts, it is often because the definition of "Bemba" that they are employing differs from the one being used by their accusers.

But whereas Figure 4.1 may help to explain why people can draw such different conclusions from looking at the same list of cabinet members, it does not provide very strong support for the conclusion that Bembas, irrespective of how they are defined, are actually over-represented in the cabinet. While the average share of Northerners in the cabinet does exceed the proportion of Northerners in the national population by a significant margin, the average proportions of cabinet ministers that are Bemba by tribe

[39] If the "Bemba province" is defined as Luapula rather than Northern Province, the average between 1965 and 1999 drops to 12 percent, with a high of 24 percent in 1997 and 1999.



Figure 4.2. Share of Bembas in Top Six Cabinet Positions

are well below the percentages of Bemba tribespeople in the country as a whole, and the proportion of Bemba-speakers in the cabinet is fairly close to this group's share in the national population.[40] Part of the reason for this is that President Kaunda, whose cabinets comprise twelve of the seventeen in the sample, took great care to balance his cabinet appointments across ethnic groups. Where Kaunda was less evenhanded, however – and where Bemba dominance clearly does manifest itself – is in the composition of the top six cabinet positions. If we focus, as I do in Figure 4.2 (and as most Zambians do in practice) on the key positions of President, Vice President, and Ministers of Defense, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and Finance, the source of the perception that "Bembas are running the country" becomes apparent.[41]

[40] According to 1990 census figures, people who identified themselves as Bemba by tribe constitute approximately 16 percent of the national population, residents of Northern Province make up roughly 12 percent, and Bemba-speakers comprise approximately 38 percent. The figure for Northern Province is misleadingly low, however, because it excludes people who have migrated from Northern Province to urban areas but who still consider themselves (and are considered by others) to be Northerners.

[41] These six positions were the ones to which focus group participants invariably referred when they made claims about Bemba domination. Their symbolic importance

In most years, the percentages of Bembas in the six top positions were significantly greater than in the cabinet as a whole, particularly when "Bemba" is defined in terms of province or language. Whereas an average of 35 percent of all cabinet ministers between 1965 and 1999 were Bemba-speakers, members of this group occupied an average of 55 percent of the top six posts. Similarly, whereas Northerners comprised 21 percent of all cabinet ministers during this thirty-year time frame, they accounted for 33 percent of the people in the six top positions. Interestingly, the decline in the share of Northerners after 1991 was paralleled by a dramatic rise in the share of senior ministers from President Chiluba's own Luapula Province. Over the period from 1991 to 1999, Luapulans occupied, on average, three of the top six cabinet positions. As in Figure 4.1, however, the clearest message conveyed by Figure 4.2 is the disparity in the shares of Bemba tribespeople, Northerners, and Bemba-speakers. Depending on whether one understood "Bemba" in tribal, provincial, or linguistic terms, one would reach quite different assessments of whether (or how much) Bembas were over-represented in the most powerful positions in the government.

An Observation in Need of a Theory

The answer to the question "what is a Bemba?" is that it depends. It depends on who is being asked and what their interests are. Of course, people answer this very question (or one of its cousins: "what is a Lozi?" "what is a Nyanja?" or "what is a Tonga?") dozens of times every day without even knowing that they are doing so: one friend is implicitly thought of as a member of a different group because she speaks a different language; another is perceived as a kinsman because his village of birth is located in the same region of the country; a third is assumed not to be related because she does not share a particular funeral custom or pays allegiance to a different chief. In each of these cases, the person is accepted or rejected as a member of the ethnic group by virtue of a different set of standards for community membership: one linguistic, one regional, one tribal. In none of these cases, in all probability, is the decision to use one yardstick instead of another made strategically or as part of a larger plan to extract rewards or further material interests.

was confirmed by President Kaunda himself, who told me that, next to the presidency and the vice presidency, the portfolios for Defense, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and Finance were the ones to which people paid the most attention (interview with Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, Lusaka, 17 January 1994).

However, in the realm of politics, questions of group membership are much more often answered through calculations of self-interest.[42] This is because ethnic identities are assumed to convey information about the likelihood that a person in a position of power will channel resources to another person – perhaps oneself, perhaps someone else – who does not directly enjoy access to those resources. The fact that people have more than one ethnic affiliation means simply that the information that ethnic identities convey about patronage commitments is ambiguous and sometimes misleading. But this ambiguity, while frustrating for the analyst of political or social affairs, is a valuable tool in the hands of a strategically minded politician or citizen who is trying to build or to secure membership in a winning political coalition. It allows people to present themselves, identify others, and make demands as members of groups of different sizes. And it allows them to tailor their choices in this regard to best serve their needs given the circumstances in which they find themselves. Whether they invoke or embrace tribal or linguistic (or even provincial) identity in their coalition-building or coalition-joining efforts will depend on their situation and the constraints and interests that follow from it.

Such a conclusion, while perhaps correct, is nonetheless not particularly satisfying. To summarize our discussion of the ways in which Zambian political actors take advantage of their country's ethnic multidimensionality by simply saying that they choose whatever identity will best serve their purposes is, frankly, not saying very much – or, at any rate, not saying anything particularly new. The real contribution, for both our understanding of Zambian politics and for the study of ethnic politics more generally, will come from articulating and providing theoretical support for a set of clear, generalizable propositions about the specific conditions under which one form of ethnic identity will be chosen rather than another. Doing precisely this is the objective of the next chapter.

[42] The self-interested use of ethnicity extends to business as well. A telling example is the case of two Scotsmen, both former senior members of the Scottish National Party, who, upon emigrating to Estonia, built and promoted a shopping development that they called "British House" (*The Economist*, 25 September 1999). Evidently they felt that identifying the shopping complex with Britain would generate stronger sales than identifying it with what, in their guises as Scottish National Party leaders, they surely had insisted was their "true" national homeland.

5

Explaining Changing Patterns of Ethnic Politics

A Model of Political Institutions and Ethnic Cleavage Outcomes

In 1984, Cherry Gertzel and her colleagues from the University of Zambia published a book, *The Dynamics of the One-Party State in Zambia*, whose purpose was to describe the origins and workings of the country's new single-party political system. Much of the book's analysis drew on a detailed study of the general election of 1973, the first contest held after the country suspended multi-party competition and moved to one-party rule. In the course of describing the campaign and interpreting the voting patterns that emerged in the 1973 race, the authors observed, almost in passing, that politicians seemed to be emphasizing, and voters seemed to be embracing, different kinds of ethnic identities than they had in 1968, the last election held under the old multi-party system. They noted that, whereas campaigning during the 1968 general election had revolved around the competition among broad, linguistically defined voting blocks, campaigning in 1973 seemed to revolve around the conflicts between local tribal groups. Whereas voters had overwhelmingly supported representatives of their language groups in the multi-party contest, they seemed to ignore language group distinctions and line up behind members of their tribes in the one-party race. It was not that ethnicity was more or less central in either election, for, as the authors made clear, it was highly salient in both. But the specific kinds of ethnic identities that served as bases of electoral competition and as motivations for political support were different.

The observation that the shift from the multi-party system to the one-party system had altered the political salience of linguistic and tribal identities was given little sustained attention by the contributors to the Gertzel et al. volume. Although the authors presented a number of anecdotes to suggest that the shift had taken place, they offered no systematic evidence to support the claim and articulated no clear mechanism to

account for it. Despite this, their observation was a potentially important one. For if the change in institutional rules had led to a shift in the salient axis of ethnic cleavage, then it suggested the possibility of a general proposition about the conditions under which individuals with multiple ethnic identities might choose one identity instead of another. Clearly, something about the incentives generated by the one-party or multi-party nature of the country's political institutions had led to different kinds of ethnic identity choices. But what was the link? Why did Zambian politicians and voters focus on language group differences during multi-party elections and tribal differences during one-party contests? How was the institutional change causing the change in identity choices? This chapter suggests a mechanism. Chapters 7 and 8, which test a number of this mechanism's observable implications, provide additional empirical support for the connection between the party system type and the cleavage outcome.

I develop my account in four stages. First, I introduce a simple model of ethnic identity choice. This general model shows how, given a set of simple (and, in light of the discussion in Chapter 4, empirically justifiable) assumptions, we can predict the identities that individuals will choose and thus the cleavage dimension that will emerge as the axis of competition and conflict in the political system. Then I show how changing the boundaries of the arena in which political competition takes place can change the outcome that emerges. Next, I show how shifting from multi-party to one-party rule brings about a de facto alteration in the boundaries of the political arena and, with it, a change in both the choices individuals will make and, through those choices, the ethnic cleavage that will emerge as salient. I then apply the model to the Zambian case. The chapter concludes by revisiting some of the model's key assumptions to assess its portability to other settings.

A SIMPLE MODEL OF ETHNIC IDENTITY CHOICE

Start with a political arena with a very simple ethnic cleavage structure (A, B), where $A = \{a_1, a_2, a_3, \ldots, a_n\}$ and $B = \{b_1, b_2, b_3, \ldots, b_m\}$ and where $a_1 > a_2 > a_3 > \ldots > a_n$ and $b_1 > b_2 > b_3 > \ldots > b_m$.[1] Recall from the notation introduced in Chapter 1 that A and B are the cleavages (e.g.,

[1] Although I define this as an *ethnic* cleavage structure, the logic extends to non-ethnic cleavages like class. Also, while the example contains only two cleavages, the logic of the model extends to cleavage structures with three or more cleavages.

		B				
		b_1	b_2	b_3	...	b_m
A	a_1					
	a_2					
	a_3					
	⋮					
	a_n					

Figure 5.1. A Simple Ethnic Identity Matrix

race and language, religion and tribe, language and region) and a_1, b_1, a_2, b_2, ..., a_n, b_m are the ethnic groups located on each cleavage dimension (e.g., black, white, English-speaker, Portuguese-speaker, Christian, Muslim). Every individual i has an identity repertoire (a_j, b_k) that contains a single A identity and a single B identity. Each individual can thus be placed in one of the cells in the $n \times m$ ethnic identity matrix depicted in Figure 5.1.[2] If individuals can identify themselves in terms of only one identity at a time – that is, either as a column (an a_j) or as a row (a b_k) but not as both simultaneously – then which one will they choose?

First, assume that individuals will choose the ethnic identity that will maximize their access to resources. Second, assume that resources are made available through a distributive process in which a single power-holder shares resources only with, but equally among, members of his own ethnic group. Assume further that the power-holder is elected under plurality rules. Finally, assume that all individuals have perfect information about the sizes of all groups (i.e., they know the row and column totals of the matrix, though not necessarily the values in each cell).

These assumptions have a number of important implications. They imply that coalitions across group lines (i.e., across rows or across columns) will not be formed, since individuals will be willing to support only those leaders who will share resources with them, and only leaders from their own groups will do so. In addition, the condition that resources will be shared equally among group members means that sub-divisions of the group will not take place after power has been won. For the purposes of the model, ethnic groups are taken to be unitary blocks: uncombinable and internally undifferentiable. Instances where two or more groups might be combined under a single umbrella label – for example, Irish and Italians in New York as "European immigrants," Dinka and Nuer

[2] Note that some of the cells may be empty.



Figure 5.2. Four Categories of Actors

in Sudan as "southerners," Episcopalians and Presbyterians in Ireland as "Protestants" – can be accommodated in the model not by allowing them to form a coalition but by adding another cleavage dimension (European immigrant/non-European immigrant, northerner/southerner, Protestant/Catholic). These assumptions are crucial to generating determinative outcomes; I will return at the end of the chapter to the implications of relaxing them.

Four different categories of actors can be identified, each with a different optimal strategy. I depict them in Figure 5.2 as w, x, y, and z.

Individuals located in the dark-shaded cell, w, are members of both the largest A group (a_1) and the largest B group (b_1). They will therefore be included in the winning coalition irrespective of whether power is held by the a_1s or the b_1s (the set-up of the matrix is such that, given plurality rules, power has to be held by one of them). They are the pivot. Their choice will determine which coalition wins. If they choose to identify themselves and to vote as a_1s, then a_1s will win power; if they choose to identify themselves and to vote as b_1s, then b_1s will hold power.

Individuals located in the unshaded cells, x and y, are the possible co-power-holders with w. They stand to be either part of the winning coalition or not, depending on what w chooses. Individuals located in the light-shaded cell, marked z, are members of neither a_1 nor b_1, so they will never be part of the winning coalition. In many situations they will outnumber w, x, and y combined. But because of their inherent internal divisions – the people in z are a collection of discrete and uncombinable communities grouped together only for analytical purposes – they will never be able to band together to wrest power from the a_1s or b_1s.

Which identity will individuals in each of these categories choose? Individuals in w stand to win either way. But because they seek to maximize the resources they will receive, they will prefer the identity that puts them

in the *smaller* of the two possible winning coalitions, since this will require them to share the spoils of power with fewer other people. Their choice will therefore depend on the relative sizes of x and y. When $x > y$, they will prefer to ally with y by identifying themselves as b_1s. When $y > x$, they will prefer to build a coalition with x by identifying themselves as a_1s. Only when $x > w + y$ or $y > w + x$ (i.e., when x or y are so large that they beat the minimum winning coalition of $w + y$ or $w + x$) will individuals in w not necessarily choose the identity that defines them as members of the smaller winning ethnic group. In such a situation, whether the winning coalition is made up of a_1s or b_1s will be out of w's control. Individuals in w will be members of the winning group either way, but they will be powerless to impose one coalition over the other, so choosing membership in the smaller group is not necessarily advantageous.[3]

Individuals in x and y will always choose the identities a_1 and b_1, respectively, since these are the only identities that give them a possibility of being members of the winning coalition. However, since their ultimate ability to win power will depend on w's choice rather than their own, they will devote most of their political energy to lobbying w. People in y will insist that politics is really about cleavage B and that b_1s need to stick together against the b_2s, b_3s, and so on. People in x, meanwhile, will counter that the more important axis of political division is A and that the ethnic cleavage that really matters is the one that separates a_1s from the other a_js.

Individuals in z are in a lose–lose situation, since neither their A nor B identities will put them in the winning group. Their only viable strategy will be to try to change the game by pushing for the introduction of a new cleavage dimension.[4] Their plea will be that politics is not about either A or B but about some different cleavage, C. In theory, they should try to invoke a cleavage that defines them as members of a new minimum winning coalition. But they cannot choose – and expect people to mobilize in terms of – just any principle of social division. For the strategy to be

[3] Note that the rule that resources will be shared equally among members of the winning group means that members of w can not be penalized by the other members of the winning group for not publicly defining themselves in the same way. Since individuals in w are as much a part of a_1 as x and as much a part of b_1 as y, they will be entitled to their share of the spoils of power irrespective of whether they publicly ally themselves with x (in the situation where $x > w + y$) or y (in the situation where $y > w + x$).

[4] Strictly speaking, this is not their only option: they could also try to join the winning coalition by acquiring the attributes that would allow them to pass as a member of a_1 or b_1. This is often quite difficult, however.



Figure 5.3. How a Sub-Coalition Within z Might Affect w's Choice

effective, the cleavage they propose must be an axis of social difference that others will recognize as at least potentially politically salient. Some bases of social division will fit this bill, but many others will not. This is why identifying the roster of potentially relevant cleavages in society is a prerequisite for employing the ethnic identity matrix.

Only in one special situation can people in z affect w's choice. This is when there exists within z a sub-coalition of a_js or b_ks that is greater than w plus the smaller of x and y – that is, greater than the winning coalition that would otherwise form. This possibility is illustrated in Figure 5.3. Suppose that $x < y$. If this is the case, then the general rule should apply that w will ally with x and choose to identify itself as a_1. But if there exists within z a sub-coalition $b_2 - x_{b_2} > w + x$ (where x_{b_2} is the subset of b_2 that is in x), then w will have no choice but to identify itself as b_1 and ally with y (recall that since, by definition, b_1 is the largest B group, an alliance between w and y will beat any other b_k). Note that the existence of the sub-coalition $b_2 - x_{b_2} > w + x$ will not affect the fate of anyone in z: as soon as w joins with y, everyone in z will still be shut out of power. But the existence of the sub-coalition will have forced w to make an identity choice that it otherwise would not have made. Situations of this sort frequently occur when the A and B cleavages are organized such that groups from one cleavage dimension nest inside groups from another (as, for instance, when the regions of a country each contain distinct sets of region-specific tribes, when a tribe is divided into clans, or when a linguistic community is divided into speakers of multiple dialects). Because ethnic cleavages in Africa are often nested, this special case turns out to be very important for understanding how ethnic coalition formation often works in this region.

The ethnic identity matrix helps to account for the choices of individuals. Yet the outcome this book seeks to explain is not just why individuals make the ethnic choices they do but also why particular ethnic cleavages



Figure 5.4. w Chooses x; Politics Becomes About "A"



Figure 5.5. w Chooses y; Politics Becomes About "B"

emerge as salient in the political system as a whole. How do the individual choices aggregate to determine the cleavage that becomes the axis of competition and conflict in the larger political system? The answer lies in the fact that, once w chooses x or y as its coalition partner (and thus a_1 or b_1 as its identity), the social landscape is transformed. As soon as w makes its choice (or as soon as other players figure out what choice w will make), the distinctions among members of a_1, a_2, and a_3 or among members of b_1, b_2, and b_3 disappear and a new division emerges between those that are in power (the "ins") and those that are not (the "outs"). The particular dimension of cleavage that defines the difference between the "ins" and "outs" then becomes the axis of conflict in the political system. If w chooses x then politics comes to be about cleavage A – that is, about the struggle between a_1s and the other a_js. If w chooses y then it becomes about cleavage B – that is, about the conflict between b_1s and the other b_ks. Note that the "outs" will still not be able to do anything to overturn the situation, since multi-ethnic coalitions are not feasible. But they will come to share the perception that political conflict is about what makes the "ins" different from everybody else. This is how individual-level choices determine which ethnic cleavage becomes politically salient. Figures 5.4 and 5.5 show the two possible outcomes.

race \ language	English-speaking	Spanish-speaking	Korean-speaking	
Latino	10	30	0	40
Asian	15	0	20	35
Black	15	0	0	15
White	10	0	0	10
	50	30	20	

Figure 5.6. An Ethnic Identity Matrix for a Hypothetical Los Angeles Community

An Illustration

To show how this abstract model might be applied to a more concrete example, let us return to the hypothetical Los Angeles community described in Chapter 1. Recall that this community was divided by three different ethnic cleavages: language, race, and religion. The linguistic cleavage divided the community into English-speakers, Spanish-speakers, and Korean-speakers. The racial cleavage divided it into Latinos, Asians, blacks, and whites. And the religious cleavage partitioned it into Protestants and Catholics. Leaving the religious divisions aside to keep things simpler, we can represent the community's ethnic cleavage structure in the matrix depicted in Figure 5.6. As in the general set-up, I have shaded the w and z coalitions and ordered the groups on each cleavage dimension from largest to smallest. To make the incentives facing people clear, I have also provided the share of the population contained in each cell, as well as the totals for each row and column.

English-speaking Latinos are the pivot.[5] They will be in the winning coalition irrespective of whether it is formed on the basis of race or on the basis of language. The question is: which will they choose? Will they choose fellow Latinos as their coalition partners or fellow English-speakers? It is helpful to imagine one politician in the community urging them to mobilize as Latinos and another campaigning equally vigorously for them to mobilize as English-speakers. Indeed, we can imagine politicians standing at the end of each row and at the top of each column urging their fellow row- and column-members to mobilize in terms of the particular identity that they share: as Spanish-speakers, Asians, whites,

[5] Note that they are the pivot even though more English-speakers are black and Asian than are Latino and even though more Latinos are Spanish-speaking than English-speaking. What makes them the pivot is that they are members of both the most numerous racial and the most numerous linguistic communities.

and so on. Which politician will they follow? Which ethnic appeals will resonate, and which will go unheeded?

Traditional accounts of ethnic politics approach such questions by assuming that individuals will select the identity to which they have the deepest emotional commitment. The origin of this commitment is explained in a variety of ways: as a product of the inherently deeper attachment that people have to some kinds of identities than others – an argument frequently made about race (Mendelberg 2001); in terms of the hegemonic status that has been bestowed on a particular identity by history (Laitin 1986); or as an outcome of the work of some political entrepreneur who has succeeded in convincing people that one identity matters more than others (Cohen 1974; Bates 1983; Brass 1991). Irrespective of the explanation provided, all such approaches seek to account for the identity choice by providing a rationale for why one identity is more deeply felt than the other. The identity choice is then explained as a direct outcome of this greater depth of feeling.

This book takes an entirely different approach. Rather than assume that one identity is somehow innately stronger than another, I assume that all of the identities in a person's repertoire are equally important components of who they understand themselves to be. The decision of English-speaking Latinos to identify themselves in racial rather than linguistic terms (or vice versa) thus cannot be attributed to something inherent in racial or linguistic identities themselves. Instead, I argue that the choice is made purely instrumentally – for what the person gets for choosing one identity over the other, not for what it means for them to choose it. I argue that people will make their choice by weighing which identity will secure them access to the greatest share of political and economic resources and that this, in turn, will lead them to choose the identity that puts them in the group that, by virtue of its size vis-à-vis other groups, puts them in a minimum winning political coalition. As I stressed in Chapter 1, what is new in my account is neither the idea that people choose their ethnic identities instrumentally nor the idea that ethnic groups can be thought of as political coalitions mobilized to capture scarce resources. The innovation is to apply this logic to the question of when and why, given identity repertoires that contain multiple identities, individuals will choose to mobilize in terms of one identity rather than another.

If forming a minimum winning coalition is their goal, then English-speaking Latinos should ally with the smaller of the two groups in which they might claim membership. Since non-Latino English-speakers make up 40 percent of the population and non-English-speaking (i.e., Spanish-speaking) Latinos comprise just 30 percent, we should see English-speaking Latinos choosing their racial identity and building a coalition with their fellow Latinos. Asian, black, and white English-speakers will do their utmost to convince them to choose otherwise, but if all the pivot cares about is controlling the greatest share of resources that it can, then the lobbying of fellow English-speakers will go unheeded. And, once English-speaking Latinos have chosen to identify themselves in terms of their race, we should see the politics of the community polarized along racial lines. The elected representative will be a Latino, and whether the representative is English-speaking or Spanish-speaking will be immaterial to non-Latinos. In their eyes, all that will matter is that the representative is a Latino, played the race card to get elected, owes the position to the Latino vote, and can be expected to be beholden to Latino interests. Grievances about how resources are distributed within the community will thus be framed in terms of why Latinos are getting more than their fair share.

The critical point is that race emerges as the central axis of social identification and political division in this example not because racial identities are inherently or historically stronger than linguistic identities and not because politicians playing the race card are somehow more skillful than those attempting to mobilize the population along linguistic lines. Race emerges as politically salient because of the relative sizes of the community's racial and linguistic groups and, in this particular case, because the coalition of Latinos is smaller (and thus more useful from the perspective of the pivot) than the coalition of English-speakers. Group size, not depth of attachment, is what drives the individual-level choice and thus the society-level cleavage outcome.

CHANGING BOUNDARIES, CHANGING OUTCOMES

The ethnic identity matrix helps to clarify why individuals make the identity choices that they do. It also helps make it clear how these choices are sensitive to changes in the boundaries of the political arena. To see why this is so, imagine that Los Angeles is redistricted and that our hypothetical community is divided into two separate electoral districts: "north" and "south." If racial and linguistic groups were evenly distributed across the original community, then this division would have no effect on people's ethnic coalition-building strategies. In both new districts, English-speaking Latinos would again be the pivot, and they would again seek to put themselves in a minimum winning coalition by allying with fellow

race \ language	Spanish-speaking	English-speaking	Korean-speaking	
Latino	54	16	0	70
Black	0	20	0	20
White	0	10	0	10
Asian	0	0	0	0
	54	46	0	

Figure 5.7. An Ethnic Identity Matrix for the "North" District

race \ language	English-speaking	Korean-speaking	Spanish-speaking	
Asian	30	40	0	70
Latino	4	0	6	10
Black	10	0	0	10
White	10	0	0	10
	54	40	6	

Figure 5.8. An Ethnic Identity Matrix for the "South" District

Latinos. But suppose that ethnic groups were not distributed evenly within the original community. Suppose that, due to patterns of residential segregation, the redistricting created a new district that was homogeneously Latino. With no other racial group in the new district (i.e., with $y = 0$), the only cleavage that would matter would be the one that divides English-speakers from Spanish-speakers. Language would thus become the axis of social division, and political coalition-building and conflict would take place along language group lines.

But suppose that the redistricting exercise did not divide the original community quite so neatly. Suppose that most of the Latino population from the original district wound up in the new "north" district and that all of the Asian population wound up in the new "south." The population distributions for each new community might look something like the matrices in Figures 5.7 and 5.8.

As these figures make clear, the partition of the original community leads to changes in the relative sizes of the linguistic and racial groups in each new political arena. Whereas Latinos outnumbered Asians in the pre-redistricting community, the opposite is the case in the post-redistricting "south." And whereas English-speakers were the predominant language

community in the original district, they are outnumbered by Spanish-speakers in the new "north." These changes in the sizes of the groups bring corresponding changes in the coalition-building strategies that both politicians and voters will find it useful to employ. Strategies that made sense in the pre-redistricting setting will, for some groups, no longer be optimal in one or the other of the new contexts.

Take the case of the new "north" district. The shift in status between English-speakers and Spanish-speakers changes the pivot. Whereas English-speaking Latinos were the pivot in the original community, Spanish-speaking Latinos play this role in new one. English-speaking Latinos still do best by identifying themselves in racial terms, but this time whether or not they will share power will be out of their hands. Meanwhile, whereas Spanish-speaking Latinos did best in the pre-redistricting era by identifying themselves in racial terms and lobbying fellow Latinos to join them in a coalition along racial lines, they do best in the post-redistricting context by identifying themselves in linguistic terms and turning their backs on their English-speaking Latino brothers and sisters. Since English-speaking Latinos can be expected to respond to this situation by simply claiming that they speak Spanish too, much of the political action in the district will revolve around policing the border between the English- and Spanish-speaking components of the broader Latino community.

Individuals in the new "south" will experience similar changes in their optimal strategies. English-speaking Asians still do best by identifying themselves in linguistic terms. This time, however, they are the pivot and actually wind up in the winning coalition. Meanwhile English-speaking Latinos, who in the original community were best served by voting with their fellow Latinos, now do best by presenting themselves as English-speakers. For both of these groups, as for both the English- and Spanish-speaking Latinos in the new "north," changing the boundaries of the political arena either changes their incentives for identifying themselves in terms of a particular identity or, because of the altered behavior of others, changes the payoffs they will receive for having done so.[6] Horowitz (1985: 75) writes that "one of the most powerful influences on the scope and shape of 'we' and 'they' has been the scope and shape of political boundaries." This example, and the ethnic identity matrix heuristic on which it is based, shows why.

[6] In addition to altering the choices they make about which identities to emphasize, some people will have powerful incentives to try to change the contents of their identity repertoires. Korean-speaking Asians and Spanish-speaking Latinos, for example, will have incentives to invest in learning English.

Of course, I deliberately designed this illustration to show how changes in the boundaries of the political arena can alter the incentives for people to identify themselves in different ways. Lest readers think this illustration has no real-world parallels, consider the following examples.

Today, Telugu-speaking Andhra Pradesh is one of India's twenty-eight states. Before 1953, however, it was part of Tamil-speaking Madras. During the period when the two states were united, the principal axis of social conflict was linguistic and the central political divide was between Telugu-speakers, who demanded a separate state, and Tamil-speakers, who actively resisted these demands. Yet, after Andhra Pradesh was broken off from Madras in 1953, the language-based conflict was superseded in Andhra by a competition for control of the state between the Kamma and Reddi castes (both Telugu-speaking), and by a regional conflict between people living in the Telangana and Coastal regions of the state (Horowitz, 1985: 613–14). The altered boundaries of the arena of competition led to the emergence of a completely different set of salient cleavages.

The broader partition of India in 1947 offers another example. Before the partition, ethnic politics in the territory that was to become Pakistan revolved around the conflict between Hindus and Muslims. After Pakistan became an independent state, however, the paramount Hindu–Muslim cleavage was replaced by distinctions, varying from community to community, based on language, tribe, or region. Horowitz (1975: 135) writes that "hardly had the Indio-Pakistani subcontinent been partitioned along what were thought to be hard-and-fast Hindu–Muslim lines when, in 1948, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, who had done so much to foster subnational identities in undivided India, ironically found it necessary to warn against the 'curse of provincialism' in undivided Pakistan." The separation of Pakistan from India led to the replacement of one basis of ethnic division by another.

The experience of decolonization provides yet another illustration. In colony after colony, political conflict during the pre-independence era was between colonizers (British, French, Belgian, etc.) and colonized (Sri Lankans, Fijians, Ivoirians, Congolese, etc.), as the latter sought to wrest political control from the former. Since the political arena included both the non-white colony and the white metropole, the relevant axis of political cleavage during this period was race. But as soon as independence was won and the relevant arena of political competition shrank to the new nation itself, the once unified non-white community fractured into

rival camps and the racial cleavage was superseded by cleavages based on language, religion, region, or tribe.

In all of these examples, changes in the boundaries of the political arena generated changes in the dimensions of ethnic identity that were mobilized. Although I do not provide them here, one could easily construct ethnic identity matrices for each case to show how the change in the boundaries of the political arena produced the changes in people's choices.

As in the Los Angeles example, these boundary changes all involved alterations in the physical boundaries of the political system. However, the physical boundaries of political units need not change for the boundaries of the *effective* political arena to be altered and for a shift to occur in individuals' incentives to emphasize one cleavage dimension rather than another. This can happen when a change in political institutions shifts the locus of political competition from one domain to another. Such a change can bring about a shift in the effective arena of political competition (and, with it, a shift in individuals' identity choices) even when the physical boundaries of the political system remain unaltered. The transitions in Zambia from multi-party to one-party rule (and back) did precisely this.

MULTI-PARTY POLITICS, ONE-PARTY POLITICS, AND IDENTITY CHOICE

How are multi-party and one-party political systems different, and how do these differences generate different ethnic choice outcomes? Although multi-party and one-party political systems vary in a great many ways, the central institutional differences between the two can be reduced to two key issues. The first is whether multiple parties are legally permitted to compete for political power. In multi-party systems, where multiple parties are permitted, every parliamentary and presidential candidate runs on the ticket of a different party. In one-party systems, by contrast, political competition takes place under the auspices of a single ruling party and every candidate must run on the ticket of that party. The second key difference lies in whether or not the executive is chosen by the electorate. In one-party states, the norm is for the President to be chosen by the Central Committee of the ruling party and then ratified by voters through a simple up-or-down vote in the general election. In multi-party states, multiple presidential candidates compete for support in the election itself. Thus while presidential elections are held in both systems, only in

multi-party contests do voters have a real choice among distinct alternatives. These seemingly minor differences turn out to have important effects. For our purposes, the most important effect is on the scope of the effective arena in which political competition takes place.

In one-party systems, where the outcome of the presidential election is determined in advance, the only electoral contest of consequence is the one over who will represent each parliamentary constituency. The parliamentary election thus becomes the central locus of competition in the political system. This has the effect of shrinking the effective arena of political conflict from the nation as a whole to the level of individual electoral constituencies. In multi-party elections, by contrast, when control over the executive *is* at issue, electoral competition takes place at two levels simultaneously: at the national level (for the presidency) and at the constituency level (for parliamentary representation). In practice, however, the effective arena of political competition for both the presidential and parliamentary contests is the national arena. This is because party labels transform parliamentary candidates into representatives of national coalitions, and this transforms the constituency-level conflicts in which they are engaged into contests for national power.

Party labels do not matter in one-party parliamentary elections because they do not vary across candidates: all candidates must, by law, run on the ticket of the ruling party. But in multi-party parliamentary elections, where each candidate runs on the ticket of a different party, voters will have two different sources of information to consider when they try to predict each candidate's future behavior: the candidate's personal attributes and the candidate's party affiliation. The relative importance that voters attach to these two sources of information will depend on the particular characteristics of the electoral system, including the degree of control that party leaders exercise over access to the party label, whether or not votes are pooled across parties, whether voters cast one vote or many, and the magnitude of electoral districts (Carey and Shugart 1995). It will also depend on whether or not presidential and parliamentary elections are held concurrently (Shugart and Carey 1992; Shugart 1995). In political systems with single-member plurality electoral rules, party endorsements, and concurrent presidential and parliamentary elections (such as in Zambia and most former British colonies), party labels will be much more important to voters than the personal attributes of the candidates (Carey and Shugart 1995). In such situations, voters will make their choices based not on the strengths and weaknesses of the candidates themselves but on the affinity the voters feel for the

political parties the candidates each represent.[7] Voters in such a context will cast their parliamentary election ballots for individual candidates competing at the level of the constituency, but in deciding which candidate to support, they will look beyond the candidates and focus their attention on what their vote means for the battle among the political parties. And since political parties are competing for power at the national level, the effective arena of political competition becomes the nation as a whole.[8]

Thus even if the physical boundaries of a country's political system remain unchanged, altering its political institutions either to prohibit or to allow for competition among multiple political parties will change the boundaries of the effective arena of political competition. A shift from multi-party to one-party competition will shrink that arena from the nation as a whole to the level of the electoral constituency, and a shift from one-party to multi-party competition will expand it from the electoral constituency to the nation as a whole. These changes, in turn, affect the kinds of ethnic cleavages that will emerge as axes of political competition

[7] I provide evidence to substantiate the link between Zambia's electoral rules and voters' focus on candidates' party affiliations in Chapter 8. Perhaps the most famous example of a candidate's individual attributes being trumped by his party affiliation in an SMP system is Franklin D. Roosevelt, who never succeeded in carrying his home area, the traditionally Republican Duchess County, New York. Duchess County was a WASP bastion, and Roosevelt, though a WASP himself, was the Democratic candidate and was thus seen by the county's voters as representing the interests of the non-WASP coalition: Italians, Irish, and Jews (Key 1949: 38).

[8] Bates (1989: 92) provides a slightly different argument that leads to the same result. He argues that national issues, and the national frame, will be salient in multi-party elections because voters will view candidates as potential members of coalitions that might conceivably form the government and shape national policy. In single-party elections, however, voters know that each candidate will have only a negligible impact on national policy since, even if candidates are successful, they will be one of more than 100 Members of Parliament. This calculation, Bates argues, shifts voters' attention from national policy issues to patronage concerns, and from the question of "who has the best policy?" to the question of "which candidate will best deliver patronage to the constituency?" This, in turn, shifts the locus of political competition from "national rivalries between organized teams" to "individual rivalries at the constituency level." Thus, national issues and cleavages will animate multi-party politics and local-level rivalries will structure one-party politics. The problem with this argument is that, at least in the Zambian case (though I suspect in other developing country settings as well), it over-estimates the extent to which voters ever view candidates as shapers of national policy agendas and it under-estimates the role of patronage concerns in competitive party settings. The account that I provide reaches the same conclusion without making any assumptions about either the extent to which voters see candidates as policy-makers or the relative salience of patronage in one-party and multi-party regimes.

and conflict in each context. In one-party settings, political conflict will revolve around constituency-level ethnic cleavages. In multi-party elections, where the arena of political competition is the entire country, broader cleavages that define national-scale groups will become salient. In both settings, politicians will seek to build and voters will cast their votes so as to secure membership in minimum winning coalitions. But because the arenas of competition are different, the social material out of which these coalitions will be crafted will be different as well. In one-party settings, political competition and conflict will revolve around the ethnic groups that divide the constituency; in multi-party settings, it will revolve around the ethnic groups that divide the nation.

This logic, combined with the model of identity choice presented earlier, illustrates how institutional change can cause identity change. It also put us in a position to explain why tribal and linguistic identities each emerged in Zambia as bases for political coalition-building in the periods in which they did.

APPLYING THE MODEL TO THE ZAMBIAN CASE

Recall from Chapters 2 and 3 that Zambians identify themselves ethnically as members either of one of the country's four language groups or of one of the country's roughly seventy tribes. Figure 5.9 provides an ethnic identity matrix for the country. As in the general example, the linguistic and tribal groups are ordered from largest to smallest. In addition, I have indicated the coalitions w, x, y, and z.

Bemba-speaking Bembas are the pivot; non-Bemba-speaking Bembas (an empty set) are x; and non-Bemba Bemba-speakers (e.g., members of the Bisa, Aushi, Kabende, and other Bemba-speaking tribes) are y. Since $y > x$, we would expect w to choose x and to transform national-level



Figure 5.9. An Ethnic Identity Matrix for Zambia



Figure 5.10. An Ethnic Identity Matrix for a Rural Constituency

conflict in Zambia into a struggle among the country's tribes. However, since the coalitions of Nyanja-speakers, Tonga-speakers, and Lozi-speakers are all larger than the coalition of Bemba tribespeople (i.e., for all $n > 1$, $Lang_n - x_{Lang_n} > w + x$), w will be forced into a coalition with y.[9] Bemba-speaking Bembas will thus identify themselves in language group terms and unite with fellow Bemba-speakers to win power, and national-level political conflict in Zambia will revolve around language group differences.

A different outcome emerges when political competition is restricted to the constituency level. The spatial distribution of tribal and linguistic groups in Zambia guarantees that constituency-level ethnic landscapes (and identity matrices) will be quite different from the one depicted for the nation as a whole in Figure 5.9.[10] Rural constituencies, which comprise more than 80 percent of the total, are almost all homogeneous with respect to language and heterogeneous with respect to tribe (though a few are homogeneous with respect to both). Ethnic identity matrices for most rural constituencies thus look like the one provided in Figure 5.10. Urban constituencies, in contrast, contain migrants from multiple tribes, and, while one language group is usually dominant, one or more smaller language groups are usually also present. In terms of their ethnic composition, urban constituencies thus look more like the national political arena. An ethnic identity matrix for a typical urban constituency is provided in Figure 5.11.

In rural constituencies like the one depicted in Figure 5.10, the coalition-building outcome is clear: since $x = 0$, $y > x$ and the pivot will choose to build its coalition along tribal lines. Tribal divisions will thus

[9] Since $y > w + x$, w would have no reason, in any case, to hold fast to its coalition with x.

[10] For a discussion of the origins of these spatial distributions, see Chapters 2 and 3.

	$Lang_{dominant}$	$Lang_2$	$Lang_3$
$Tribe_1$	w	x	
$Tribe_2$	y	z	
$Tribe_3$			
...			
$Tribe_m$			

Figure 5.11. An Ethnic Identity Matrix for an Urban Constituency

emerge as the axis of competition and conflict in rural constituencies. The particular tribal group that will play the role of pivot (and hold power) will vary from constituency to constituency, but political conflict will be played out in terms of the struggle between members of the dominant tribe and members of other tribes.

In urban constituencies, it will almost always be the case either that $y > w + x$ or that $Lang_n - x_{Lang_n} > w + x$. Thus, at the national level, the pivot will choose to identify itself in linguistic terms and to build a winning coalition by allying with fellow members of its language group. The only difference with the national-level outcome will be that the particular $w + y$ coalition will differ from urban location to urban location, depending on which language group happens to predominate in the town in which the constituency is located. The important point, however, is that the pivot will choose its linguistic, rather than its tribal, identity and that the linguistic cleavage will therefore emerge as the salient axis of political division.

The link between institutional change and changes in the kinds of ethnic cleavages that have emerged as politically salient during different periods of Zambia's post-independence history should now be clear. Since the locus of political conflict in multi-party elections is at the national level, and since national-level conflict in Zambia revolves around language group differences, we will observe political competition and coalition-building taking place along language group lines during periods when Zambia is under multi-party rule. We will observe politicians in such settings couching their appeals in language group terms and voters supporting candidates who, by virtue of their party affiliations, are perceived to represent the interests of their language groups. Of course, politicians who stand to lose from such an outcome – for instance, candidates who are running on the tickets of parties perceived to be affiliated with outsider language groups – can be expected to do what they can to

combat the tendency for politics to be reduced to a struggle among language groups. To the extent that they try to break the hegemony of linguistic distinctions by emphasizing tribal differences, some non-linguistic ethnic campaigning may emerge. But every tribal appeal by such a politician will be met by a counter-claim that this person is simply trying to divert peoples' focus from the cleavage that matters: the one that divides the country along language group lines. So long as voters view the political process as a means of gaining control over resources controlled by the center, and so long as they view having a member of their own group in a position of political power at the center as the surest way to serve that end, the conflict between members of the dominant language group and others will emerge as the central axis of political competition. Political conflict in multi-party settings will be language group conflict.

During periods when the country is under one-party rule, a different axis of ethnic political conflict will emerge in most areas. In the one-party context, the locus of political conflict contracts to the electoral constituency and constituency-level cleavages will emerge as the central basis of political coalition-building. In rural areas this means that tribal divisions will emerge as salient, while in urban areas it means that political conflict will be organized (as it is in multi-party settings) along linguistic lines. Note that while the language cleavage will be salient in urban contexts in both one-party and multi-party elections, it will be salient for different reasons. In the multi-party context, language group differences matter because of the centrality of language group divisions in national affairs; in the one-party context, they matter because of the polyglot nature of urban electoral constituencies and because language communities always include members of multiple tribes.

As in the multi-party context, during one-party rule politicians who are disadvantaged by the salience of constituency-level ethnic cleavages – for example, members of non-dominant tribes running in rural constituencies or members of non-dominant language groups running in urban constituencies – can be expected to try to improve their lot by playing the other ethnic card. But this will not prevent either the candidate from the dominant group from winning or the struggle between members of the dominant group and others from emerging as the central axis of political conflict. The predominant outcome in rural areas will thus be politicians making appeals and voters casting their ballots along tribal lines, whereas in urban areas we will find them mobilizing along language group lines. Since the vast majority of electoral constituencies

in Zambia are rural, however, we should find the general tendency in one-party settings to be for tribal campaigning and tribal voting to predominate.

REVISITING THE ASSUMPTIONS OF THE MODEL

The model I have presented offers a simple account of identity and coalition-building choices that can explain why some ethnic cleavages become the axis of political competition rather than others. Yet, while powerful, the explanation rests on a number of important assumptions. How robust is the model to relaxing them? Are the assumptions reasonable for the Zambian case whose patterns of ethnic politics we seek to explain?

Single-Member Plurality Rules

The first key assumption is that the winner of the political contest will be the single candidate who wins the plurality of the votes. Single-member plurality rules (along with the inability of politicians to form multi-ethnic coalitions) are necessary for there to be a unique equilibrium cleavage outcome. If more than one candidate can be selected in the constituency (i.e., if district magnitude is greater than one) then some voters will be able to allocate their support in terms of one dimension of identity to capture one of the available seats and other voters will be able to mobilize along the lines of a different identity dimension to capture one of the others. The identity choices of individual voters, and the cleavage outcome more generally, will cease to be predictable in advance. Note that the requirement that district magnitude be equal to one rules out proportional representation systems, which have multi-member districts.

The restriction to single-member plurality rule is clearly appropriate for Zambia, since these are the electoral rules that have been in operation in that country since independence. But it does limit the strict applicability of the model to some other cases.

Resources Shared Equally Among the Winners

The model assumes that, once an ethnic group has won, resources will be shared equally with all group members. This would seem to be a critical assumption since, without it, it would be possible for a subset of the winning ethnic group (e.g., those who are not just members of the dominant

language group or tribe but who come from the President's province or the MP's village) to keep most of the spoils of power for themselves. If this were the case, the columns and rows in the ethnic identity matrix could no longer be thought of as unified coalitions. Yet the results should still hold even if this were true. Even if a winning coalition member believes that she will receive less than a proportionate share of the benefits of power, this should not dissuade her from choosing as the model assumes she will *so long as she also believes that she will get zero if she is not in the winning row or column.* The likelihood that a fellow group member will give everyone in the winning coalition a fair share is less important than the likelihood that a non-group member would share resources with outsiders. And whereas a voter may believe that some members of her group will benefit more than she will if her group wins, she will almost certainly believe that she will still benefit more than if another group wins. As long as this is the case, it is not, strictly speaking, necessary that she assume that she will receive an equal share of the spoils of victory. It is necessary only that she believe that she will receive a greater amount than she would if the victor came from a group in which she could not claim membership.

Territoriality of the Potentially Salient Cleavages

A third, unstated, assumption that is necessary for the model's predictions to hold is that the ethnic cleavages in question are based on identities that have a strong territorial component. Territoriality insures that the map of ethnic divisions at the national level is different from the map of ethnic cleavages in each individual constituency. To see why this is important, consider what would happen to the logic of the model if, instead of drawing upon territorially linked identities like language group affiliation or tribal loyalty, politicians sought to build coalitions along gender lines. Gender identity creates problems for the model because the groups that it defines are evenly distributed and thus produce identical constituency-level and national-level demographics: men and women each constitute roughly 50 percent of the population in each constituency and 50 percent of the population in the country as a whole. Politicians seeking to invoke gender cleavages would therefore face identical coalition-building incentives at both the national and constituency levels. Since the model's predictions rest on an expectation that political actors competing at the national level will face different coalition-building incentives from political actors competing at the constituency level, the fact that gender identities produce identical incentives in each arena undermines the model's usefulness. To

be sure, gender identities constitute an extreme, even unique, identity type: most social identities are more like regional or tribal affiliation than like gender. But if we imagine a continuum of identity types, with gender at one end and regional identity at the other, the model will work best when the social cleavages that the political actors are choosing from are closer to the regional than to the gender end of the spectrum. The assumption of territoriality certainly holds in Zambia (and, for similar historical reasons, throughout Africa). But making the assumption clear is necessary to understand the contexts to which the model will, and will not, travel.

Perfect Information

The model also assumes that, in choosing which contestant to support, voters have perfect information about the sizes of each tribal and language group in the political arena. If, as I assume is the case, individuals make their identity choices based on the size of the coalition to which their chosen identity gives them entry, knowing the sizes of the respective coalitions that they might choose (as well as the sizes of the coalitions against which they will be competing) is clearly important. But for practical purposes all that is necessary for such choices to be made is that people have a rough idea of the relative sizes of their groups vis-à-vis the other major groups in the political system.

The model also (implicitly) assumes that voters will have perfect information about the tribal background of each candidate and the language group affiliation of each party. It might seem unlikely that voters would be unable to identify contestants' tribal backgrounds – after all, most candidates are residents of the constituency in which they are running, so their family lineage is almost certainly known. However, the frequency of inter-tribal marriages in Zambia means that a significant number of candidates have parents who belong to different tribes, and this can make the candidate's own tribal affiliation ambiguous. In addition, in urban constituencies, where populations tend to be extremely heterogeneous and where the tendency in most social interactions is to identify people in terms of their broader regional or linguistic backgrounds, it is possible that at least some voters will be unable to put candidates into their correct tribal pigeonholes.

In multi-party elections, where the presumed language group orientations of political parties replace candidates' ethnic affiliations as the basis for predicting future patronage flows, even greater opportunities

emerge for the misinterpretation of candidates' ethnic group loyalties. As we saw in Chapter 4, parties' language group affiliations are usually signaled by the language group memberships of their presidents. Sometimes, however, a president's language group affiliation is ambiguous. Take the case of President Kaunda, whose parents came from Nyanja-speaking Malawi but who grew up in Bemba-speaking Northern Province (and who, himself, spoke Bemba far better than Nyanja). Should he be coded as a Bemba-speaker or a Nyanja-speaker? A party's language group orientation may also be made unclear by the party's conscious effort to present itself in pan-ethnic terms.

To the extent that such efforts, or the other factors just described, cause some voters either to misconstrue the tribal backgrounds of candidates or to misinterpret the language group orientations of political parties, the model's expectations about voting behavior will not be borne out precisely. But while voters' uncertainty about candidates' and parties' ethnic affiliations may generate outcomes that deviate from the strict predictions of the model, the imperfect information voters possess about these and other issues paradoxically serves at the same time to strengthen the model's predictions in four ways.

First, it reinforces the importance of ethnic considerations in the voting calculus. In the absence of reliable information about either the policies that the competing candidates will pursue or the ability of each contestant to secure development resources for the constituency from the central government, voters will focus their attention on what little information they do have that will allow them to predict the candidates' future behavior: the candidates' ethnic affiliations. In fact, the less information that voters have about the contestants in the race, the more they will turn to ethnicity as a decision-making shorthand (Ferree 2003). Paraphrasing Downs's observation about the role of ideology (1957: 98), we might say that information about candidates' ethnic affiliations is useful to voters because it removes the necessity of relating the candidates' or parties' stand on every issue to their own. In the absence of other information that might allow them to forecast future behavior, it can be used as a predictor of the candidate's or party's stand on a variety of issues and behavior in a variety of situations.

For Downs, the tendency for voters to focus on ideology is a rational response to the high cost of being fully informed about politics. In developed countries, voters usually have a choice in this matter: should they choose to invest the time and energy to do so, it is possible for them to learn about the agendas, records, and policy positions of the parties and

candidates competing in the race. In developing countries like Zambia, however, communication infrastructures are often so poorly developed and campaign organizations are often so weak that most voters, even if they want to, have little ability to obtain reliable information about what separates one candidate's or party's position on the issues from another's. In the 1973 campaign, for example, "many candidates remained unknown [because] there was an almost total lack of publicity concerning most aspects of the elections" (Chikulo 1979: 210). In the 1983 election, "party-organized election campaign meetings [did not do] much in the way of introducing the candidates, as attendance at most meetings [was] poor, largely because of the short notice given and the bad timing" (*Daily Mail*, 21 October 1983). Even when information about candidates and parties is available to voters, that information is often unbalanced in its coverage (usually focused on one candidate or party at the expense of others) and obtainable only in some parts of the country. In 1968, for example, while the UNIP spent considerable sums on campaign materials and was generally able to get its message out to most voters, the ANC had few funds for transport or publicity, received little coverage from the mass media, and was largely unable to contact voters outside of its Southern Province base (Molteno and Scott 1974: 179). With nine days to go before election day, "not a single [ANC] poster [had] been displayed" (*Times of Zambia*, 10 December 1968). Access to campaign resources and to the media was similarly skewed in favor of the ruling party during the 1996 election (Bratton and Posner 1998). In such a context of incomplete, uneven, or unreliable information about parties' and candidates' platforms and policy positions, voters' emphasis on ethnicity is a rational response.

Yet even if Zambian voters did have perfect information about candidates' and parties' platforms, our discussion in Chapter 4 suggests that such information probably would not have played a particularly central role in shaping many voters' decisions. As we saw, most Zambian voters make their choices based less on candidates' or parties' policy positions than on their perceptions of the likelihood that each candidate or party will deliver patronage to them. This likelihood, in turn, is a function of two factors: the ability of the candidate to secure development resources for the constituency from the central government, and the candidate's willingness to channel those resources to the constituents personally. In weighing these issues, problems of imperfect information also reinforce the salience of ethnic considerations. A schoolteacher in Chipata pointed out that, in weighing a candidate's ability to "deliver the goods,"

> the problem is that people do not know his capability in that position... You find that most of the people are ignorant about this... Sometimes they will not know how capable that person is, so you find most of the people just support [the candidate] for the reason that he comes from that area... There isn't much education or there is not much awareness [and this] makes people land into wrong choices. (CPTA-T)

A former parliamentary candidate agreed that voters "didn't know us. They didn't know what our qualifications were or what we could do for them. All that was abridged."[11]

To the extent that voters are unable to gauge the abilities of the various candidates to bargain successfully on their behalf to win development resources from the central government, they will be forced to make their choice based on other factors. In one-party elections, they will respond to the lack of reliable information about candidates' abilities by focusing on the likelihood that each candidate, if he *is* able to secure resources from the center, will distribute those resources to them personally rather than to other residents of the constituency. This will cause voters to focus their attention on the candidates' respective local tribal identities. In multi-party contests, before thinking about whether each candidate will be likely to channel the resources that he is able to secure from the center to them personally, voters must first focus their attention on the likelihood that the party on whose ticket each of the candidates is standing will allocate development resources to their region of the country rather than to other regions. This will encourage them to emphasize the presumed language group loyalties of the respective political parties. In each case, the inability of voters to ascertain reliably the abilities of the candidates forces them to look to other issues, and this reinforces their tendency to behave in ways that accord with the expectations of the model.

Imperfect information also encourages voters to behave in accordance with the expectations of the model in a third way by reducing the likelihood of strategic voting. If voters are in a position to gauge accurately the degree of support enjoyed by each candidate or party in the race, and if the candidate or party that is affiliated with their tribe or language group clearly has no chance of capturing power, then voters will have strong incentives to shift their support to second-choice alternatives. However, if a lack of information makes voters unable to predict whether or not their preferred candidate or party has a chance to capture power, then they will

[11] Interview with Hosea Soko, 17 October 1995.

be unlikely to vote in such a strategic manner. This effect is particularly important in multi-party elections, where a candidate's ability to deliver patronage depends not only on his getting elected in the constituency but also on his party being able to capture power at the national level. Even if voters are able to assess each candidate's prospects within the relatively narrow arena of their own constituency, they may not have enough information to judge the relative strength in the country as a whole of the parties with which each of the candidates is affiliated.[12] As one focus group respondent pointed out,

> the question of whether MMD or UNIP is strong [throughout the country] may be difficult to answer. This is because some of us are only in Mongu. We don't go to other places. Therefore you can't tell unless you listen on the radio, though sometimes [even then] you [still] can't understand. MMD is the ruling party so it is known to all. But opposition parties may be known in the area where you stay and when you go to other places you find that party is not popular or not there. (MON-MS-M)

In terms of being in a position to secure development resources through their MP from the state, Western Province residents would, in retrospect, have been better off had they not shifted their support from the ruling MMD to the NP, AZ, and UNIP in the by-elections held after 1991 and then again in the 1996 general elections. Eastern Province voters would probably also have been better off had they supported MMD candidates rather than UNIP candidates in 1991. But the lack of information about whether the local enthusiasm felt for these parties was shared by people in the rest of the country (many voters assumed, incorrectly, that it was) prevented Western and Eastern Province voters from strategically backing the winning horse.

A final way in which the lack of reliable information available to Zambian voters reinforces the importance of ethnic identities in the electoral process is by enhancing the ability of politicians to mobilize electoral support by exploiting rumors of ethnic group favoritism. As we saw in Chapter 4, one of the principal mobilizational tools used by non-Bemba-speaking politicians since independence has been the charge that Bembas enjoy more than their fair share of government jobs and development

[12] In one-party elections, where assessing the viability of a candidate from one's own tribe requires only knowing the relative sizes of the various tribes that populate the constituency, most voters will be able to predict whether or not a vote for a candidate from their tribe will be wasted, providing that people vote exclusively for their fellow tribespeople.

resources. But, as we also saw, analyses of the ethnic backgrounds of state officeholders and the regions of the country that have benefited from government spending reveal that such allegations, despite their wide acceptance as fact, are only weakly supported by the evidence. The reason that perceptions of governmental favoritism can be so out of line with reality is not only because non-Bemba politicians have an interest in promoting the misperception. A critical contributing element is the fact that the voters that the politicians hope to sway by making such allegations lack the information with which to corroborate the politicians' claims.

The incomplete information that prevents voters from double-checking claims about governmental favoritism also prevents them from disconfirming inflammatory allegations about slights made by rival group leaders or threats posed by other groups to their livelihood or security.[13] Recall, for example, that one of the key pieces of ammunition used by Luapula Province politicians in the 1969 Kawambwa East by-election campaign (described in Chapter 4) was the charge that outsider candidate John Mwanakatwe had referred to Luapulans as *batubula* (dumb fishermen). Had voters been able to confirm whether Mwanakatwe had ever, in fact, said this – and evidence suggests he probably did not (Bates 1976: 229) – the allegation might have been much less effective in generating ethnic polarization. Similarly, charges made during the 1973 election in Livingstone by Tonga- and Lozi-speaking politicians that members of the rival groups were mobilizing against them became a self-fulfilling prophecy precisely because the charges could not be disconfirmed (Baylies and Szeftel 1984: 37). In similar fashion, the claim by NP campaigners during the run-up to the 1993 Western Province by-elections that they possessed a letter written by President Chiluba to the Lozi Paramount Chief in which the President criticized the Lozi Royal Establishment for stirring up trouble between the Nkoyas and Lozis in Kaoma district would have been far less effective in turning Lozi-speaking voters against the MMD had it been possible to confirm that the letter was, in fact, a fabrication – which it ultimately turned out to be (*Daily Mail*, 10 November 1993). The success of all of these efforts depended on the fact that voters were unable to confirm the veracity of the allegations that were being made. Had reliable information

[13] For precisely this reason, improving the quality and quantity of such information is a key component of confidence-building measures aimed at conflict resolution. For a general discussion of the role of imperfect information in generating ethnic insecurity and ethnic conflict, see Posen (1993).

about the events or patterns of behavior on which these inflammatory allegations were based been available, these charges either would never have been made or would have had far less impact. In this way, as in the others described earlier, the imperfect information available to Zambian voters served to reinforce the model's expectations about ethnic voting.

PART III

Introduction to Part III

Testing the Argument

Chapter 5 presented a simple model of identity choice that helps us to account for why political competition in Zambia has tended to revolve around tribal differences in one-party settings and around language group differences in multi-party settings. The chapters of Part III present a series of analyses that test several of the model's observable implications. Chapter 6 sets the stage for these analyses by addressing and ruling out competing explanations. Chapters 7 and 8 then turn to the implications of the model itself. Chapter 7 focuses on its implications for the behavior of political elites, and Chapter 8 focuses on its implications for mass voting.

It bears underscoring from the outset that the implications being tested are about the relative salience of tribal and linguistic identities in different institutional contexts, not about the salience of ethnicity per se. Some Zambian politicians run for Parliament for no other reason than because they want the attention that being a candidate brings. Others are motivated by a commitment to national service. Some voters make their electoral choices because they are swayed by a politician's credentials or record of performance. Others vote for a particular person or party because they are bribed. In the context of the extreme poverty in which elections are fought in Zambia, a bag of mealie meal, a bolt of cloth, or even a T-shirt (along with the implicit promise that more such gifts are on the way) may be enough to buy a voter's support. In short, many politicians and voters in Zambia are motivated by factors other than ethnicity. Yet this fact, while clearly important for some questions and issues, is not critical for the argument developed in this book. What matters from the standpoint of the argument is not whether every Zambian politician or voter is motivated by ethnicity, but whether those who *are* motivated by ethnicity are motivated by their tribal affiliations or by their language group memberships. Variation in the *kinds* of ethnic identities that

motivate behavior in one-party and multi-party settings is more important than the share of the variance that ethnicity explains in either.

In trying to document these patterns of behavior and test them against the expectations of the model, my strategy is to make use of multiple tests and a diversity of data and methodologies. In doing so, I follow Robert Putnam's maxim that "the prudent social scientist, like the wise investor, must rely on diversification to magnify the strengths, and to offset the weaknesses, of any single instrument" (1993: 12). To document the kinds of appeals that politicians make in different institutional settings, I draw on newspaper accounts, secondary source materials, interviews with politicians, focus group discussions, and original survey data.[1] To test whether citizens voted and politicians chose the constituencies in which they would run in the way that the model would predict, I combine qualitative analyses of secondary sources, newspaper accounts, focus groups, and surveys with quantitative analyses of ethnic demographic data, election results from seven different general elections, and original data on the tribal backgrounds of each of the more than 2,200 parliamentary candidates that ran for election in Zambia between 1968 and 1999.[2] All told, I test more than a dozen different observable implications of the model. Taken individually, the results of each of these tests support the model's expectations. However, none of them alone provides as compelling a confirmation for the model's success as they do when taken together. Moreover, the diversity of the data and of the methods that these different tests employ protects my evaluation of the model's explanatory power from the imperfections of any individual data source or methodology.

[1] Details of the survey and focus group work are provided in Appendix B.
[2] Details of these data sources are provided in Appendices C and D.

6

Competing Explanations

The motivation for the model presented in the last chapter was the observation that changes in regime type in Zambia seem to co-vary with changes in the relative political salience of linguistic and tribal identities in national elections. During multi-party contests, ethnic politics revolves around language group divisions, whereas during one-party elections it revolves around tribal differences. Given this pattern of co-variation, it is natural to assume that it is something about the multi-party or one-party nature of the electoral regime that is driving the salient cleavage outcome. However, it is at least possible that other factors that happen to co-vary with regime type could be responsible for the changes we see in the salience of tribal and linguistic identities. If so, these factors would offer competing explanations for the argument presented in Chapter 5. The first part of the present chapter explores this possibility.

The second part of the chapter takes up another potential problem: endogeneity. Even if we are able to rule out the possibility that something other than regime change has caused Zambian politicians and voters to shift their focus from one ethnic cleavage dimension to the other, we might still have the causal arrows backward. It is possible that changes in the salience of tribal and linguistic identities, driven by factors other than changes in regime type, are what caused the transitions from multi-party to one-party rule and back. This possibility needs to be ruled out for the argument advanced in the book to hold.

Finally, even if it can be established that changes in regime type were responsible for the shift in politically salient ethnic identities, and not the other way around, it is still possible that aspects of regime change other than the factors on which the model focuses could be doing the work in accounting for why one ethnic cleavage becomes politically salient rather than the other. In the model, the shift from multi-party to one-party

rule (and vice versa) is a purely institutional change that involves just two factors: an alteration in the number of parties that are legally permitted to compete and a shift in whether the President is selected by the ruling party's Central Committee or by the voters. However, one-party and multi-party political systems typically differ in more than in just these two respects. The final part of the chapter addresses the possibility that aspects of the one-party and multi-party systems other than those captured in these two formal institutional rules might be responsible for causing the variation we seek to explain.

COMPETING EXPLANATIONS

As I noted in Chapter 1, one of the major strengths of the Zambian case is that its political system shifted not just from multi-party to one-party rule but also from one-party rule back to multi-party politics. This back-and-forth shift in political institutions is advantageous because it makes it possible to double-check the effects of institutional change. If the shift from multi-party to one-party competition in 1973 was really responsible for the displacement of linguistic identities by tribal identities as axes of political conflict, then we should observe a shift back to pre-1973 patterns of ethnic political competition (in which language identities were most salient) after the transition back to multi-party politics in 1991. The fact that we do lends support to the argument that the book advances.

A second advantage of Zambia's back-and-forth pattern of regime change is that it allows us to rule out a large number of potential competing explanations for the outcomes we observe. For example, a key potential alternative explanation for the changes over time in the salience of tribal and linguistic identities is "modernization." The modernization explanation would suggest that tribal identities became more politically salient than linguistic identities in the mid-1970s because the conditions of an increasingly industrialized, urbanized, economically integrated, secular, rational, participatory, and communication-intensive society made that dimension of identity more socially or politically useful than the other. With the growth of communication in a common *lingua franca* (English), people might have found tribal distinctions to be more useful than language group distinctions as a way of categorizing in-group and out-group members, and this might account for the shift in the relative salience of tribal and linguistic identities in the 1970s and 1980s. As plausible as this line of reasoning might seem, however, it would be equally plausible to suppose that, under conditions of increasingly intense

social interaction in a highly heterogeneous community, individuals might have found local tribal identities *less* helpful as labeling devices than more broadly encompassing linguistic affiliations. The work of Mitchell (1969, 1987), Epstein (1958, 1981, 1992) and others lends support to this possibility. Such a mechanism would lead us to expect not the increasing salience of tribal affiliations in the mid-1970s but their disappearance.

Apart from the contradictory outcomes that modernization could be argued to cause, the more important problem with this potential competing explanation is that modernization is a monotonic process that, presumably, generates monotonic effects. If the transition from linguistic identities to tribal identities as bases for political coalition-building in 1973 had not been followed in 1991 by a transition back to linguistic identities as the principal axis of political competition, or if the shift from tribe-based to language group–based coalition-building after 1991 had not been preceded by a shift in the opposite direction in 1973, we might reasonably entertain the possibility that modernization – or one of the group of economic and social transformations that it encompasses – had played a role in accounting for these changes. But the fact that the variation in the political salience of these competing dimensions of ethnic identity was neither uni-directional nor permanent, whereas the increasing modernization of Zambian society presumably was, allows us to rule out this possibility.

Another possibility is that the shift in cleavage salience was caused not by changes in the structure of the Zambian economy, or even by changes in the country's general level of development, but by shorter-term fluctuations in economic performance. The argument might go like this: in times of economic scarcity, people look for scapegoats and coping strategies. In the context of an ethnically divided society, the quest for both leads to a deepening of ethnic divisions (Olzak 1992; Hardin 1995; Woodward 1999; Jega 2000). If this is so, then it is at least conceivable that it might also lead to a heightening of the importance of some group identities over others. Indeed, some scholars make precisely this argument. Azarya and Chazan (1987) argue that economic decline leads to a process of "self-enclosure" in which narrower social ties become more important to individuals and localized cleavages take precedence over broader ones. Chazan (1982) suggests that the deterioration of the economy leads to "a retreat to . . . narrower bases of solidarity" as people turn toward their close kin for aid and social insurance. Empirical evidence seems to support this claim. In Zambia, as the economy declined during the 1980s, Colson (1996: 72) notes that "personal networks acquired new

importance [in a context] where increasing numbers competed in a diminished resource pool." To the extent that these local personal networks were built along tribal lines, it is possible that the heightened salience of local tribal identities in Zambia during the 1970s and 1980s might have been a product of the country's conditions of increasing resource scarcity.

The salience of linguistic identities in the 1960s and 1990s, meanwhile, could plausibly be attributed to economic plenty. During economic boom times when government coffers are full, political entrepreneurs will do everything they can to extract resources from the government. One way they do this is by threatening to lead their ethnic groups into the opposition unless the government buys their loyalty by channeling resources to them (Bates 1976).[1] Since the leverage that blackmailing politicians can exert will depend on the size of the groups they are claiming to lead, politicians will have incentives to define their groups in the broadest possible terms. In the Zambian context, this means that they will present themselves in linguistic (or sometimes regional/provincial) terms. But blackmail of this sort will only be viable when the government's coffers are full. When the economy declines and the government's ability to buy off potential defectors disappears, so too will the incentives for political entrepreneurs to play this game. We would therefore expect to find language group appeals to be more prominent in periods of economic plenty than in periods of economic weakness.

Taken together, these two arguments would provide a powerful competing explanation for the variation I seek to explain if the health of the Zambian economy co-varied with one-party and multi-party rule. But, as Figure 6.1 makes clear, it does not.

At independence, and throughout the multi-party First Republic, Zambia enjoyed a booming economy bolstered by high world copper prices and relatively efficient mining and industrial management practices. The one-party Second Republic, by contrast, was a period of dramatic economic decline. Although it began in a context of economic plenty, the country's financial situation declined markedly in the mid-1970s when world copper prices plummeted and a combination of shortsighted macroeconomic policy making, a rising wage bill in state-owned enterprises, and an over-staffed and inefficient government bureaucracy sent the economy

[1] As Treisman (1999) shows, this logic extends not just to groups that threaten to defect from the ruling coalition but also to sub-units of the nation that threaten to secede from the state.



Figure 6.1. The Zambian Economy

into a tailspin. By the beginning of the Third Republic, in 1991, the Zambian economy was, on a per capita basis, only 60 percent as large as it had been when the Second Republic had begun in 1973. Despite the implementation of a series of aggressive economic reform programs in the 1990s, the Zambian economy remained weak throughout the first decade of the Third Republic.

The multi-party First and Third Republics thus had identical cleavage outcomes (language identities were most salient in both) but experienced very different conditions of economic health. Zambian political entrepreneurs evidently found it useful to play the language card (and voters responded positively to such appeals) both when state coffers were full and when they were empty. The state of the economy thus cannot account for the salience of linguistic identities in both periods. The one-party Second Republic, meanwhile, had a single cleavage outcome (tribe was the salient axis of political division throughout) but experienced varying economic conditions across its eighteen-year span. Zambians seem to have embraced narrow bases of ethnic solidarity even when the economy was healthy, or at any rate long before the economy had declined to the point where Azarya and Chazan tell us that "self-enclosure" should have begun. Given these patterns, we can rule out the health of the Zambian economy as a competing explanation for the outcome we seek to explain.

AN ENDOGENEITY PROBLEM?

To support the argument that institutional change causes identity change, it is necessary to rule out the possibility of endogeneity. That is, it is

necessary to establish that the shift from multi-party to one-party rule in 1973 and then from one-party back to multi-party rule in 1991 was the cause, rather than the outcome, of the shift in the ethnic cleavages that predominated in each context.

When President Kaunda announced in 1972 that he was going to introduce a new constitution that would ban opposition parties and bring about a one-party state, he was following a path that had already been taken by a number of other African rulers. In Zambia, as elsewhere, a principal official justification for scrapping inter-party competition was that such competition generated inter-ethnic violence. In a National Assembly speech, Vice President Mainza Chona made his case for the adoption of the new one-party system on precisely these grounds. "When we look round the entire country," he argued,

> we find that there has been peace in areas where there has been one party only. For example there was a lot of violence in the Eastern Province where both UNIP and ANC had substantial support [but] . . . this violence . . . completely died down when UNIP remained as the only party . . . On the line of rail, political violence, riots and deaths have occurred mostly in Livingstone and Mufulira [where inter-party competition is strong] . . . In places like the Southern Province and certain parts of Central Province [where inter-party competition is also strong] villagers have suffered a lot by being beaten up by political opponents, having their houses or their food stores burned . . . and a lot of other criminal acts . . . [By contrast,] in the Luapula, Northern and the Northwestern Provinces [where UNIP is dominant and inter-party competition is weak] we have had no violent incidents of a political nature at all except in Mwinilunga – the only district in the Northwestern Province where ANC was . . . active. (*Parliamentary Debates*, 6 December 1972, cols. 54–59)

Chona's argument was clear: multi-party competition generated ethnic conflict, and this was why it had to be suspended in favor of single-party rule. More than two decades later, a former UNIP official agreed with the vice president's justification: "When we had multi-party politics, ANC and UNIP were fighting too much. This is why we decided to go to a one-party system. After that there was no fighting and the whole country was so quiet."[2]

To a large degree, the claim that a one-party state was necessary to end political violence in Zambia was, as it was in other African countries at the time, simply a convenient public rationale for the ruling party to ban its opponents. Yet there was truth to the contention that multi-party competition had exacerbated inter-group conflict. In the five

[2] Interview with Hudson Maimisa, Chipata, 16 October 1995.

years leading up to the elimination of multi-party politics, riots, arson, beatings, and other forms of violence had become regular features of political competition in several areas of the country. In August 1968, five people were killed in riots between UNIP and UP supporters in the Copperbelt town of Chililabombwe. In December 1969, a gun battle between UNIP and ANC supporters led to the hospitalization of members of both parties. In January 1972, UPP leader Simon Kapwepwe was beaten by a group of UNIP members after he left Parliament. Later that day, a UNIP minister was beaten in a retaliatory attack and a bomb was exploded in the UNIP regional office in Chingola. Twelve days later, a UNIP official was attacked and beaten by a crowd of UPP supporters in the Copperbelt. Summarizing the situation during this period, a former MP told me:

> There was a lot of violence. We did not accept one belonging to a different party. Sometimes property was destroyed. People were beaten. If you were a member of this party you had to drink in bars in one area. If you went to bars in another area where the other party was strong you got beaten.[3]

Thus, despite the fact that the UNIP government may have had ulterior motives for banning its opponents, it is not unreasonable to conclude that a desire to minimize violent conflicts may have also contributed to its decision to move from a multi-party to a one-party system. To the extent that this is the case, however, the direction of causality becomes murky: the ethnic outcome (or, more accurately, the anticipation of it) would appear to have caused the institutional change.

This apparent endogeneity problem disappears, however, when we recall that the dependent variable in this study is not the *depth* of ethnic conflict but the *dimension of ethnic identity that actors employ* to define themselves and identify their rivals. The argument that I present would be threatened by an endogeneity problem only if President Kaunda had decided to suspend multi-party political competition in 1973 (or to reinstate it in 1991) because of an expectation that doing so would affect the nature of the ethnic cleavages that would emerge as the basis for political coalition-building in the new institutional setting. There is no evidence that this was the case. The decision to declare the one-party state was based on an expectation that it would hamper UNIP's rivals, and perhaps also dampen the rising tide of ethnic violence in the country, not that it would affect the dimension of ethnic identity that would serve as the

[3] Interview with Leonard Mpundu, Luanshya, 17 December 1995.

central axis of political competition.[4] Nor is there any question that the return to multi-party politics in 1991 was motivated by anything other than a desire to respond to public outrage over the state of the economy and donor pressure to liberalize the political system (Bratton 1994). If institutional change went together with alterations in the political salience of tribal and linguistic identities, it is because the former caused the latter, not the other way around.

CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES IN THE NATURE OF POLITICAL COMPETITION ACROSS ZAMBIA'S THREE REPUBLICS

A final potential objection to the claim that the shift in the salience of tribal and linguistic identities was driven by institutional change is the possibility that aspects of Zambia's one-party and multi-party regimes other than their different formal institutional rules might account for the differences in the ethnic cleavages that became politically salient in each setting. The argument presented in Chapter 5 assumes that the only difference between Zambia's one-party and multi-party systems lies in the number of parties that were competing for power (one vs. many) and the manner in which the President was selected from among the many potential candidates for that job (by the party Central Committee vs. by the voters). Yet one-party and multi-party regimes also tend to differ in other ways. Compared with their one-party counterparts, multi-party regimes typically provide greater freedom for civil society groups and the press, greater opportunities for incumbent legislators to be displaced by challengers, and less governmental control over campaigning practices and electoral appeals. Indeed, it is precisely the presumed association

[4] Interview with Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, Lusaka, 17 January 1994. In April 1971, the government-owned *Daily Mail* published a map of Zambia displaying the locations and population shares of sixty different tribes. The accompanying text explained that "this map has been produced . . . with the one objective of helping to unite the people of Zambia into one powerful Nation. We believe that if the people of Zambia know the truth about themselves they will be more unified against diverse forces such as tribalism . . . [W]e hope the truth we have published will go a long way in proving that no one or two or three or even four tribes have a chance of succeeding in dominating others" (20 April 1971). The idea that an ethnic landscape with a large number of ethnic groups would generate less conflict thus seems to have been understood at the time Kaunda was contemplating the shift to one-party rule. But there is no evidence that Kaunda recognized that banning multiple parties from political competition would affect that landscape.

between these factors and regime type that explains the positive normative label that is usually attached to transitions from one-party to multi-party rule. Before assuming that the only relevant aspects of regime change are captured in the model, it will be important to rule out the independent effects of these other factors in the Zambian case. Doing so will also provide useful background information for the discussion of electoral campaigning that follows.

Political Freedoms

For many countries, the suspension or resumption of multi-party political competition corresponds with a wholesale change in the character of political and social life. The suspension of multi-party rule in Czechoslovakia in 1948 or the move to multi-party competition in Taiwan in 1996, for example, brought dramatic transformations in the degree of political freedom enjoyed by the citizens of these countries. In Zambia, by contrast, the transition from multi-party to one-party politics in 1973 and then from one-party back to multi-party competition in 1991 brought comparatively little change in the nature of the country's political or social affairs.

Generally speaking, Zambians have enjoyed a relatively constant – and middling – level of political freedom throughout the post-independence period. With the exception of the two years immediately following the democratic transition of 1991, when the country was rated as "free," the democracy watchdog organization Freedom House has designated Zambia as "partly free" for every year between 1972, when the organization began ranking countries, and 2001.[5] Zambia's multi-party First and Third Republics were characterized by relatively illiberal forms of democracy, and its lengthy one-party Second Republic was marked by a relatively mild form of authoritarianism. Opposition leaders were detained, independently minded editors and reporters for the government-owned media were fired,[6] and citizens' civil rights were abridged by states

[5] During the one-party Second Republic, Zambia's average "political rights" and "civil liberties" scores were both 5.2, whereas during the multi-party Third Republic they were both 3.8 (lower numbers designate greater freedom on Freedom House's seven-point scale).

[6] In the Third Republic, the government-owned press faced competition for the first time from a group of highly critical independent newspapers. However, the high degree of government intimidation and harassment that these newspapers suffered (Human Rights Watch/Africa 1996) suggests that their presence cannot be

of emergency[7] with almost equal frequency in both one-party and multi-party settings. At the same time, however, authoritarian tendencies such as these were fairly moderate. Detained politicians had recourse in all three periods to a relatively independent judiciary that possessed the autonomy to order and secure their release. The state-owned press, while far from free, nonetheless was more willing to be critical of the government (if perhaps not of the President himself) than in many African countries.[8] And infringements on civil liberties, while slightly more severe toward the end of the Second Republic than in other periods, were never particularly egregious by African standards and did not vary overly much across the three republics. Even during the end of the Second Republic, Lungu (1986: 409) could write that "in terms of basic constitutional rights like freedom of speech, Zambia is closer to a liberal democratic state than to what has now become the 'classic model' of contemporary African dictatorship."

Indeed, when asked what they thought were "the biggest differences between the way things are [in the Third Republic] and the way things were [in the Second Republic]," only 6.7 percent of my survey respondents in 1995 mentioned changes in freedom of speech, assembly, or movement as the most important differences between the one-party and multi-party eras. The most often-mentioned changes, by far, were "pocketbook" issues such as the availability and/or price of consumer goods, the availability of jobs, and the improvement or decline of hospitals, roads, and

taken as evidence of the significantly greater liberalization of the Third Republic regime.

[7] During the First Republic, a state of emergency was declared to combat the threat of armed incursions from Rhodesia. Though justified in its initial period by the threat posed by the white Rhodesian government across Zambia's southern border, the continuation of the state of emergency through the end of the Second Republic – more than a decade after the overthrow of the Rhodesian regime – can be explained only by its usefulness to the government as an opposition-dampening device. As of 2001, two states of emergency had been called during the Third Republic: the first in 1993 following the discovery of a plan by the major opposition party to undermine the government through unlawful means, and the second in 1997 following an aborted coup attempt.

[8] Writing during the Second Republic, Lungu (1986: 406) observed that "with the possible exception of the President, the [Zambian news]papers take issue directly with any leader or any important subject, thereby registering their opinion on public policy... In comparison with the press in some neighboring African countries like Malawi, Zaire and Zimbabwe, and even the so-called capitalist Kenya, Zambian papers have a wider latitude of freedom to express views and report sensational news."

schools. Had the contrast between the degree of political freedom in the two eras been more stark, we would have expected a larger share of respondents to have mentioned such issues first.

Equally important as the relative stability in the level of political freedom across Zambia's three republics is the fact that there is no plausible link between the extent of political liberty enjoyed by citizens and civil society groups and the kinds of ethnic identities that they might choose as bases for political mobilization. While it might be possible to draw a connection between fluctuations in political freedom and the ability of politicians and citizens to build political coalitions, and perhaps even to draw on ethnicity in doing so, there is no obvious theoretical story that links changes in the ability of people to protest or assemble or move freely around the country to changes in the *dimensions of ethnic identity* that they would find it advantageous to mobilize.

Opportunities for the Replacement of Incumbents by Challengers

A second commonly cited difference between one-party and multi-party regimes is the extent to which elections provide meaningful opportunities for replacing parliamentary officeholders. Although this difference across regime types is often overstated, multi-party elections are usually assumed to provide much greater latitude for voters to choose their political representatives than one-party elections, which are usually assumed to be little more than exercises for legitimizing and perpetuating the ruling elite.[9]

While such stereotypical characterizations of one-party and multi-party regime types may apply in other countries, they do not apply in Zambia. If anything, Zambia's four one-party elections were more competitive and resulted in more turnover of incumbents than their multi-party counterparts. Whereas an average of four candidates ran for every seat in the one-party races, an average of just 2.7 candidates ran in the

[9] Multi-party elections are also generally held to provide voters with a greater ability to affect policy making than one-party elections. Since the party that will control the government (and set policy) after the election is definitionally fixed in a one-party state, this is undoubtedly the case. Still, voters in one-party elections have more power to shape the policies that are ultimately adopted by the ruling party than is often assumed. For a discussion of these issues in the African context, see Chazan (1979).

Table 6.1. *Incumbents Defeated in Multi-Party and One-Party Elections*

	Election type	Number of incumbents running for re-election	Number of incumbents defeated	Percentage of incumbents defeated
1968	multi-party	60	11	18.3
1973	one-party	57	15	26.3
1978	one-party	82	31	37.8
1983	one-party	104	42	40.4
1988	one-party	99	36	36.4
1991	multi-party	73	50	68.5
1996	multi-party	74	12	16.2

three multi-party contests analyzed in this study. In addition, as Table 6.1 indicates, incumbents were significantly less likely to be returned to office in the one-party elections of 1973, 1978, 1983, and 1988 than in the multi-party elections of 1968 and 1996. The very high levels of turnover in 1991 are an artifact of that election's transitional nature, which I discuss later.

Another indicator of competitiveness is the number of candidates running unopposed in a given election. By this measure, one-party elections in Zambia again emerge as slightly more competitive than their multi-party counterparts. In the four one-party elections, an average of one constituency in seventeen had an unopposed parliamentary candidate, whereas in the three multi-party contests the average rose to one constituency in twelve.

Zambia's one-party and multi-party elections clearly do not fit the stereotype. But, as with the issue of political freedom, the important question is less whether one-party and multi-party regimes differ than whether the differences that might exist can be linked to a set of expectations about identity choice. If there were a reason to think that the ability or inability of challengers to threaten incumbents in parliamentary elections might account for why political actors choose to construct their political coalitions around linguistic identities rather than tribal identities (or vice versa), then the differences in the competitiveness of Zambia's one-party and multi-party elections might be relevant. But because there is not, the differences in the competitiveness of the two kinds of elections provide no basis for a competing explanation for the cleavage outcome that we observe.

Government Control over Campaigning Practices and Electoral Appeals

A third way in which one-party and multi-party states tend to differ is in the degree of control exercised by the government over campaigning practices and electoral appeals. In multi-party settings, candidates and parties are usually relatively free to frame their electoral appeals as they wish and to campaign when and where they choose. In one-party settings, by contrast, strict boundaries are frequently put on the issues that can be discussed to solicit votes, and candidates are often forbidden from campaigning outside of official, government-sanctioned channels. In terms of the formal rules that governed electoral campaigning during its one-party and multi-party eras, Zambia closely matches this stereotypical characterization: multi-party campaigns were relatively unregulated, whereas one-party campaigns were (formally, at least) tightly controlled. However, in terms of the nature of the campaigning that actually took place, the differences between institutional settings were actually fairly small.

According to regulations in force during all four one-party general elections, candidates were permitted to campaign only during party-sponsored public meetings and, even then, allowed to talk only about issues sanctioned by the party leadership. A single official campaign poster was produced for each constituency with the pictures and symbols of all the candidates in the race, and candidates were forbidden to produce their own campaign materials or to spend any of their own money in conjunction with the campaign. With respect to the content of the appeals that candidates could make, and to ethnic campaigning in particular, UNIP election rules stipulated that

> the election campaign . . . should focus on those issues which concern you and the nation and not on personalities. It must be based on the desire to bring together all our communities instead of dividing them; it must be used to integrate rather than fragment, to build the nation instead of dividing the people.[10]

As several former candidates described the practice, all the candidates in a given constituency would be called to a public meeting by the district governor. Each would be given ten to fifteen minutes to talk about an assigned subject – President Kaunda's philosophy of Humanism, the

[10] UNIP Rules and Regulations, cited in Chikulo (1979: 206). See also the election regulations reprinted in the *Daily Mail*, 7 September 1983.

government's pensions policy, the threat posed by the white regime in Rhodesia, the meaning of the slogan "One Zambia, One Nation," or some other topic. Only in their concluding remarks or in answering questions from the audience could candidates directly address why voters should support them instead of the other contestants. Even then, candidates were strictly forbidden to make negative remarks about their rivals or to engage in expressly ethnic campaigning.

Although the purpose of these regulations was ostensibly to create an even playing field among the candidates, district governors would sometimes go out of their way to make it clear that the ruling party preferred one candidate over the others. Sometimes this preference would be signaled indirectly through the warmth of an introduction. At other times, the district governor would return to the site of the campaign meeting after the candidates had left and actually tell people which candidate they should support.[11] At the central level, the party could also manipulate the election outcome by vetting contestants that it viewed as troublemakers or as threatening to favored candidates.[12] This prerogative was exercised relatively infrequently, however, and never, evidence suggests, for reasons related to the tribal or linguistic background of the prospective candidate. In the elections of 1973, 1978, and 1983, fewer than 9 percent of the candidates that filed nomination papers or made it through the primary stage were disqualified by the party.[13] In 1988, the share of those vetted rose to just over 13 percent.[14]

Once the Central Committee had decided that a particular candidate presented a threat to the party's interests, that candidate could do little to avoid either disqualification from the race or unequal treatment

[11] Interviews with Hosea Soko, Chipata, 17 October 1995; Leonard Luyanga, Limulunga, 17 November 1995; and Felix Kabika, Lusaka, 30 July 1999.

[12] Party regulations gave the Central Committee the power to exclude any candidate deemed to be "inimical to the interests of the state" (Baylies and Szeftel 1984: 30).

[13] In the elections of 1973 and 1978, aspiring candidates first had to run in primary elections. Unless vetted by the Central Committee, the top three vote winners in the primary would then become candidates in the general election. The primary stage was omitted in the contests of 1983 and 1988. In these elections, any candidate who wanted to run, and who was not vetted, appeared on the ballot. Only 26 candidates were vetted by the Central Committee in 1973, compared with 317 that ultimately took part in the elections. In 1978, the comparable figures were 28 vetted and 344 contested. In 1983, the number of vetted candidates jumped to 46, but the number of those that contested rose even more precipitously to 828.

[14] Ninety-four candidates were vetted, compared with 706 that ultimately appeared on the ballot.

by district-level party officials. Where candidates did have considerable control, however, was in their ability to circumvent the highly regulated formal campaign meetings. Candidates in all four of Zambia's one-party elections actively flouted party regulations by quietly – and sometimes not so quietly – campaigning outside of officially sanctioned channels.[15] Candidates distributed illegal election campaign posters and leaflets, canvassed for support in drinking establishments and residential neighborhoods, and conducted "night campaigns based on tribal lines" (*Times of Zambia*, 23 October 1973). Despite the rule that campaigning could take place only in the presence of party officials, a long-time Zambia Information Services (ZIS) officer with responsibility for organizing official campaign meetings confirmed that most of the real campaigning took place outside of the events he organized: "People who had money would have their election agents go from house to house, or in rural areas from village to village on bicycles. It was illegal but it happened a lot."[16] The *Daily Mail* went so far as to describe candidates' behavior in the 1983 election as being characterized by "a blatant disregard of the rules of the game as far as the Party regulations go" (1 November 1983). On the eve of the 1983 poll, as during the periods leading up to the other Second Republic elections, "most urban centers were aflame with election material which seemed to proliferate during the night. Posters were displayed and leaflets were distributed freely as the drive to woo voters picked up" (*Daily Mail*, 1 November 1983).[17] In the run-up to the 1988 election, the UNIP National Council, "noting with regret that illegal campaigns, use of money and other illegal practices have been reported throughout the country," saw fit to reiterate the official policy that "people concerned should be disqualified from contesting the next parliamentary election."[18]

Former candidates told me that they campaigned privately because that was the only way they could make themselves known to voters. While acknowledging that they risked being punished by the party if they were discovered soliciting votes outside of the organized meetings, former MPs told me that "this was very rare, because you did it under cover. And if

[15] Interviews with Mainza Chona, Lusaka, 31 July 1999; Cosmas Masongo, Kasama, 2 September 1995; and Reuben Motolo Phiri, Chiparamba, 21 October 1995.

[16] Interview with Felix Kabika, Lusaka, 30 July 1999.

[17] For similar reports on the 1988 elections, see *Daily Mail*, 8 September and 22 September 1988. Chikulo (1979) and Gertzel et al. (1984) provide discussions of clandestine campaigning in 1973 and 1978.

[18] Resolutions of the Elections and Publicity Committee of the 22nd UNIP National Council Meeting held in Mulungushi Hall from 17 to 21 December 1987.

people wanted you, they would want to listen to you."[19] The long-time ZIS official put it bluntly: "If you followed the regulations you could not win. You had to campaign privately to win."[20] Summarizing the one-party campaigns, Chikulo (1979: 207) writes:

> The circumspection of issues, coupled with poor attendance at [official campaign] meetings, [explains] the importance of informal campaigns by individual [candidates]. It was the informal campaigns which raised the local issues (or grievances) which the electorate wanted to hear... [including] particularistic appeals based on ethnicity, provincial or family ties. It can thus be concluded that the official campaigns did not at all reflect the essence of the election campaigns.

Chikulo concludes by describing the official campaign meetings as "something of a ritual in which participants discussed abstract notions of development and Humanism, while the real (unofficial) campaigns progressed largely unchecked" (ibid.).

Thus, despite formal rules designed to insure the ruling party's control over the conduct of the one-party elections, electoral campaigns in the Second Republic were not as dissimilar to the comparatively unregulated campaigns of the two multi-party eras as might be assumed. Candidates in the Second Republic did face greater obstacles in directly reaching voters than candidates did in either the First Republic or the Third. But the relative ease with which official channels could be skirted during the one-party period suggests that these obstacles may not have affected candidates' strategic behavior to a significant extent.

Moreover, from the standpoint of testing the expectations of the model, the important factor is that candidates in both multi-party and, once they had circumvented party restrictions, one-party institutional settings were equally free to frame their electoral appeals in terms of tribal or linguistic identities. While the rules governing Second Republic elections may have made it more difficult for candidates to make ethnic appeals per se than in the First or Third Republics, these regulations did nothing to bias the content of those appeals in favor of a particular dimension of ethnic identity. For this reason, and for the reasons outlined earlier, we can discount the possibility that aspects of Zambia's one-party or multi-party systems other than those accommodated in the model might be "doing the work" in explaining the variation we observe over time in the political salience of tribal and linguistic identities.

[19] Interview with Reuben Motolo Phiri, Chiparamba, 21 October 1995.
[20] Interview with Felix Kabika, Lusaka, 30 July 1999.

The 1991 Election

A final issue that bears mention involves a discontinuity not across party system types but within the category of multi-party elections. This is the question of whether the 1991 election was so exceptional and atypical as to justify excluding it from the analyses of coalition-building in multi-party elections that I present in the next two chapters.

Called by President Kaunda in response to a groundswell of public anger that had precipitated strikes, food riots, and "the first [rallies] in Africa on the scale of Leipzig and Prague" (Bratton 1994), the 1991 election was less a regular contest between competing parties than a referendum on change. The election, in fact, took the place of a scheduled referendum on whether Zambia should return to multi-party rule. After two decades of economic decline, the election was viewed by Zambians as an opportunity to overturn the status quo and bring about major political and economic reform. The MMD's landslide victory – it won 125 of the 150 parliamentary seats and more than 75 percent of the popular vote – can be attributed to a combination of voters' thirst for change and the party's success in casting itself as the agent of reform.

The referendum nature of the 1991 election is confirmed by the fact that, when asked who they voted for in 1991, Zambians almost never mention by name the particular candidate or party they supported. Rather, they say "I voted for change" or "I voted for the Hour" – a reference to the MMD's slogan "The Hour Has Come!" As a market seller in Luanshya explained, "when we were voting [in 1991], the MMD was campaigning and we were busy shouting 'The Hour!' 'The Hour!' What we wanted was change. We did not care about [the particular candidate] who stood" (LY-MS-W). Many Zambians also told me that ethnic factors were not a consideration in their decisions in 1991. One focus group respondent noted that in 1991 "whoever stood on an MMD ticket [was elected]. It didn't matter where he came from. Whatever area they stood [in], they all went through" (LIV-M).[21] Another explained that "people were not choosing [based on] which tribe this one is coming from. They only wanted change. And Chiluba being popular... nobody looked at his tribe or where he came from" (MON-T). The single-mindedness of voters' motivations was captured well by an MMD politician when he likened

[21] The respondent added that, after the election was over, "it didn't take long before things began to settle down to what people have always been. I don't see a similar thing taking place in the next election."

the campaign to unseat Kaunda to "cutting down a bayobab tree: one with an ax, one with a hoe, one with a pen knife, but all with the goal of cutting it down."[22]

To the extent that Zambians in 1991 were voting for change, the model presented in Chapter 5 will be an inappropriate device for capturing the behavior of Zambian political actors during that election. Voters in 1991 did not decide who to support by weighing the relative advantages of tribal and linguistic identities for securing membership in advantageously sized political coalitions, and candidates did not base their electoral strategies on the expectation that voters would. Both simply decided whether or not they wanted to see a continuation of the status quo and acted accordingly. Although my claim is not that voters are motivated exclusively by ethnic coalition-building concerns in other elections, I do assume that such concerns are at least part of what motivates them to support the candidates that they do. Given that such calculations were clearly trumped by other factors in 1991, it would be inappropriate to treat the 1991 election as a "typical" multi-party contest when I test the predictions of the model. I therefore exclude the 1991 election in the analyses presented in the next two chapters. My practice is to report in a footnote how the results would have differed had I included the data from the 1991 contest. As the results I present make clear, including the 1991 election in the analysis would have made the results even stronger than those I report, not weaker.

[22] Interview with Foxy Hudson Nyundu, Kaoma, 6 August 1993.

7

Ethnic Campaigning

Testing the Observable Implications of the Argument for Elite Behavior

In *Identity in Formation*, David Laitin writes that "ethnic entrepreneurs cannot create ethnic solidarities from nothing. They must, if they are to succeed, be attuned to the micro incentives that real people face" (1998: 248). Having identified the micro-incentives that Zambians face in Chapters 4 and 5, this chapter tests whether or not politicians are attuned to them. It investigates whether political elites behave in the way that the model would predict in each institutional setting.

The chapter is divided into three sections. In the first, I present evidence that politicians make different sorts of ethnic appeals in one-party and multi-party political campaigns: tribal in the former and linguistic in the latter. In the second, I show that the shift from multi-party to one-party rule alters parliamentary candidates' choices about the constituencies in which it will be most advantageous for them to run. Whereas running in a constituency where one is a member of the dominant tribe is of paramount importance in one-party elections, it is much less important in multi-party contests, since electoral success in those races is much more a function of a candidate's party affiliation than of his or her ethnic background. Drawing on information about the ethnic demographics of electoral constituencies and the tribal backgrounds of each of the more than 2,200 candidates that ran for Parliament between 1968 and 1999, I present a series of quantitative analyses that show that the different rules for what it will take to win leads candidates to choose to run in different kinds of constituencies in one-party and multi-party elections. In the third section, I present evidence that the one-party or multi-party nature of the political system also affects politicians' behavior during the periods between elections. Specifically, I show that politicians make investments in different sorts of ethnic civic associations in each institutional context.

THE ELECTORAL APPEALS THAT POLITICIANS MAKE

One of the clearest observable implications of the model developed in Chapter 5 is that politicians will make different sorts of ethnic electoral appeals in one-party and multi-party political campaigns. In multi-party contests, they will make appeals designed to build (or break) political coalitions formed along language group lines. In one-party contests, they will ignore the country's linguistic divisions and instead emphasize constituency-level sources of social cleavage. This will lead them to focus on tribal differences (though in urban constituencies they will continue to emphasize language group distinctions). The demographics of the local political arenas in which politicians are competing for votes do not change, but the altered institutional setting shifts politicians' incentives for emphasizing one of these dimensions of ethnic identity rather than the other. In this section, I present evidence to support this central prediction.

Doing so, however, is complicated by two factors. The first is that it is not always possible to code politicians' ethnic appeals as unambiguously either "tribal" or "linguistic." As I explained in Chapter 4, this difficulty stems from the fact that each of Zambia's four principal language groups carries the same name as the tribe that originally spoke that language. Thus, while appeals for "Tongas" to mobilize to put one of their own in power or for "Lozis" to unite against "Bembas" are clearly ethnic, the fact that the labels "Tonga," "Lozi," and "Bemba" refer to both language groups and tribes makes it difficult to be certain whether the politician making the appeal is seeking to mobilize people along tribal or linguistic lines. I employ several strategies to deal with this problem. One is to look for symbols that the politician invokes that can provide clues about the nature of the coalition he is trying to mobilize. For example, references to Paramount Chief Chitimukulu would suggest that the politician is seeking to build a tribal coalition, since Chitumukulu is the chief of the Bemba tribe but not of the entire Bemba language group – other Bemba-speaking tribes have their own chiefs. But references to the Litunga of Barotseland (the Lozi Paramount Chief) would suggest that the politician is trying to construct a coalition of all Lozi-speakers, since the Litunga is recognized by all Lozi-speaking peoples as their traditional leader.

Another strategy is to make inferences about the implied identity dimension from the nature of the group that the politician identifies as the source of threat. For example, while the call for Lozis to unite against Bembas may be ambiguous with respect to the linguistic or tribal dimension of identity that the politician is trying to invoke, the call for Lozis to unite against the Koma or the Mbunda is clearly a tribal appeal, since the Koma and the Mbunda are unambiguously tribes rather than language groups. Context matters as well. In the Copperbelt town of Ndola, an appeal for Lozis to unite against Bembas would be difficult to code as tribal or linguistic, since Ndola contains both Lozi and Bemba tribespeople and Lozi- and Bemba-speakers who are not members of those tribes. But in Senanga, a homogeneously Lozi-speaking town in Western Province, such an appeal would be easily identifiable as linguistic. The town itself contains no Bembas, so we could safely infer that the politician was trying to mobilize Lozi-speakers by referring to the conflict between Lozi-speakers and Bemba-speakers at the national level.

A second, and more significant, obstacle is that the available evidence on the ethnic appeals that politicians make is scattered and incomplete. Even when not expressly forbidden by party rules, overt ethnic campaigning is frowned upon in Zambian society, and this means that it tends not to be done in public settings. Ethnic campaigning certainly takes place, but politicians prefer to do it away from the scrutiny of researchers or newspaper reporters who might record what they say. Researchers or reporters who do happen to be present at such times are, of course, excellent sources, and I draw on their accounts in what follows. But such accounts are not as plentiful as would be ideal. Thus, while I am able to muster evidence that candidates couch their ethnic appeals in different ways in one-party and multi-party elections, this evidence is not sufficiently complete to provide a comprehensive test of the model's predictions. The discussion that follows is thus meant principally to be illustrative. More systematic tests of the observable implications of the model will come later in the chapter and in Chapter 8.

I begin by providing examples of language group–oriented ethnic campaigning during Zambia's multi-party First and Third Republics. Then I present evidence of tribally oriented ethnic appeals in the one-party Second Republic.

Ethnic Electoral Appeals in Multi-Party Contexts

The First Republic. In the First Republic, political conflict revolved around the competition for power between two, and at times among three, major political parties. The largest of the three, the United National Independence Party (UNIP), was the party that led the country to independence. Although its leader, President Kenneth Kaunda, was presumed by many Zambians to be predisposed to favor the interests of the

Bemba-speaking North, the party's role as the principal vehicle of the independence struggle meant that its support was, at least initially, national in scope.[1] Its electoral strategy was to stress its own supra-ethnic credentials – its campaign posters urged Zambians to "Vote National, Vote UNIP" (Molteno and Scott 1974: 186) – while emphasizing the narrow regional/ethnic roots of its competitors. As we saw in Chapter 4, this is an intelligent strategy for an incumbent party in a context where, as in Zambia, no ethnic group constitutes a majority and branding a rival party as "ethnic" can undermine that party's ability to win support outside of its home region.

In the period immediately after independence, the only region of the country where the UNIP's support was challenged was in the Tonga-speaking Southern Province, the home area of the First Republic's second major party, the African National Congress (ANC). Originally named the Zambian African National Congress, the ANC was at one time the umbrella organization for all African opponents of colonial rule. However, disenchantment with the moderate approach taken by the ANC's leader, Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, led Kaunda and a number of other more militant leaders to break away from the ANC in 1960 to form the UNIP (Mulford 1967). While most of the country rallied behind Kaunda's more radical organization, Southerners remained loyal to the Tonga-speaking Nkumbula and to his party.[2]

In 1966, a third party, the United Party (UP), was formed. Led by Nalumino Mundia and a group of fellow Lozi-speakers from Western (then Barotse) Province, the UP built a strong following in that region and among Lozi-speaking migrants in the Copperbelt. A particular source of grievance exploited by UP organizers was the government's decision in 1966 to prohibit the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WENELA) from continuing to recruit men from the Lozi-speaking areas to work in the South African mines. WENELA recruitment had been, since 1940, a critical source of income for the people of western Zambia, and Kaunda's decision to close WENELA to demonstrate his government's

[1] Recall from Chapter 4 that, although Kaunda was born of parents from present-day Malawi, he grew up in the North and was initially viewed as a Northerner. It was not until after his perceived betrayal of Simon Kapwepwe (a Northerner) in 1971 that he came to be identified with Nyanja-speaking Eastern Province, the region that borders and is closely identified with Malawi.

[2] Although portions of the population in several rail-line towns, as well as many people in Eastern Province, also remained loyal to the ANC, the party's principal locus of support lay in the South.

opposition to the South African regime resulted in a sharp drop in incomes for many Lozi-speakers. The UP was short-lived, however. When a violent clash between UP and UNIP cadres in the Copperbelt in August 1968 left six people dead, the UNIP responded by banning the UP. UP organizers reacted to their party's prohibition by joining forces with the ANC and running their candidates in Barotse Province under the ANC label in the general election held later that year.[3]

The final, even more short-lived, First Republic party was the United Progressive Party (UPP). The UPP was formed in 1971 when Simon Kapwepwe and a group of prominent Bemba-speaking politicians broke off from the UNIP to protest President Kaunda's sacking of four senior Bemba-speaking ministers. Kapwepwe was perhaps the most important Bemba-speaking politician of his day, and when he defected from the UNIP many Zambians perceived the party's Bemba core to have defected with him. Thus, unlike the ANC and UP, whose support came almost entirely from non-Bemba-speakers, the UPP directly threatened the UNIP's Bemba-speaking base (Tordoff and Scott 1974: 139). This presented the ruling party with a major problem. Its response was to ban the UPP and detain its leaders, ostensibly because the party's activities threatened the peace and security of the country, but really because its existence threatened the UNIP's hegemony (ibid.: 152).

For reasons discussed in Chapter 4, the ANC, UP, and UPP faced common strategic dilemmas. They could each rely on a strong ethnic support base in their leader's home region. But explicitly courting support from these areas in ethnic terms risked confirming the impression among many voters – promoted by the UNIP – that the candidates that ran on these parties' tickets were little more than vehicles for the interests of particular regionally defined ethnic communities. Accordingly, all three parties sought to play a dual strategy. They sought to maximize their electoral support in their leaders' home regions by playing the ethnic card there, while at the same time playing down their parties' ethnic orientations (or simply electing not to run candidates) in other parts of the country.[4]

[3] Gertzel (1984: 214) notes that UP candidates in Barotse Province, though formally part of the ANC, "campaigned to a large degree independently of the ANC national headquarters, so that their [performance in the election] was essentially that of an alternative Lozi leadership, in place of those Lozi in UNIP who were believed to have let their people down."

[4] Often, the decision not to run candidates was based on a lack of resources rather than a calculation of electoral strategy. Writing about the ANC's efforts in the 1968 election, Molteno and Scott (1974: 179) note that "the scale of the ANC campaign

Given their different support bases, each opposition party directed its ethnic appeal to a different audience: the ANC appealed to the Tonga-speaking south, the UP to the Lozi-speaking west, and the UPP to the Bemba-speaking north and to Bemba-speakers in the Copperbelt. What united the three parties was a strategy of couching those appeals in explicitly linguistic, rather than tribal, terms. Again and again, party leaders and candidates employed symbols and rhetoric that were explicitly designed to frame the country's political conflict in voters' eyes in terms of the struggle for power among the country's four broad language communities. In the campaign for the 1968 general election, for example, ANC candidates in Southern Province sought to win support by depicting their UNIP competitors as members of a Bemba-dominated party that threatened the interests of the province's Tonga-speaking majority (Molteno 1972, 1974). To emphasize the linguistic rather than tribal basis of the Tonga community they claimed to be protecting, ANC candidates "conjured up visions of the Bemba (who generally do not keep cattle) as descending upon the hapless Tonga and stealing all their cattle" (Szeftel 1980: 84). By emphasizing cattle keeping as a marker of Tonga group affiliation, the ANC campaigners were not only drawing a clear distinction between Tongas and Bembas but also reinforcing the unity of the various Tonga-speaking tribes, all of whom keep cattle.

The same tactic was used in 1969 during a national referendum, which the ANC opposed, on whether Parliament could amend the constitution without submitting the proposed revisions to a national vote. Chikulo (1983: 178) cites an official Southern Province government report that alleges that ANC activists went around during the campaign telling peasants that if they voted for the referendum proposition "all their cattle, land, and wives would be for the Bembas due to the fact that the President is a Bemba." Again, the choice of the central mobilizing symbol – the threat to cattle – was employed explicitly to forge a coalition that would be useful in the struggle for power in the national political arena.

was minuscule. It was badly organized, almost without funds [and] lacked adequate transport... Operating under these restrictions... the party never really succeeded in contacting large numbers of the electorate outside its areas of strength." When the date for the election was set, the ANC's president, Harry Nkumbula, later recalled, his party "had not even a penny" (183). Nine days before the election, the *Times of Zambia* reported that the ANC "had no funds to print posters and manifestos... Although the party launched its election campaign weeks ago, not a single poster has been displayed" (10 December 1968). The UP and UPP faced similar financial constraints.

The UP also sought to rally support in its home area by playing on fears of Bemba domination. As the ANC candidates had in Southern Province, UP candidates in Western Province "alleged that, if UNIP won, the Bemba would dominate the government and would discriminate against the Lozi, taking away their land and cattle" (Molteno and Scott 1974: 188). They also emphasized the pro-Bemba favoritism of the UNIP government. An article in the UP's newspaper, *The Mirror*, charged that the government and civil service were almost entirely controlled by Bemba-speakers:

> The President, the Vice President, [and] the Chairm[e]n of the Public Service Commission, Teaching Service Commission, Police Service Commission, University Council of Zambia and Judiciary Service Commission belong to one tribe. The Commissioner of Police and the Secretary to the Cabinet belong to one tribe. These are the people governing the country and all the other ministries and departments are merely branches of some form or other of the above. The same tribe has majority of Permanent and Under Secretaries than any other tribe [*sic*]. It has more people in the foreign service than any other tribe. It has more Directors in Charge of Departments and Semi-Government Organizations such as the Zambia Railways, Zambia Broadcasting Services and the Commissioner of Traffic Departments, etc., etc.... It is also estimated that the same tribe has nearly 150 people in the executive and higher positions of office in the Public Service. The Tongas, the Ngonis and the Lozis range between 30 and 50 people each in similar positions. Can anybody explain why?[5]

Although the article refers to government officials as all belonging to "one tribe," this must be interpreted as a colloquialism rather than an indication that UP publicists sought to frame the competition for government jobs in tribal rather than language group terms. Evidence that the article's authors sought to depict this competition as one among language communities is provided by the fact that the officeholders they mention, though lumped together as "Bemba," are from multiple Bemba-speaking tribes. Moreover, at the end of the quoted passage, they juxtapose the favored Bembas with just three other groups: the comparatively unfavored "Tongas... Ngonis [Nyanjas] and... Lozis." Any Zambian who read the article would understand that the conflict was among the country's four language groups, and, by implication, that the coalition that had to be mobilized to change matters was the one with their fellow language-speakers.

[5] "Tribalism in Zambia: Who Are Encouraging It?" *The Mirror* 1 (March 1968), quoted in Dresang (1974: 1610).

This strategy of language-based political mobilization continued in the 1968 election campaign, as UP candidates (running as ANC members) invoked symbols that would unify Lozi-speakers against the government. One tactic was to accuse the UNIP government of not taking adequate medical measures to prevent the death of the Litunga, which had taken place a short time previously (Molteno and Scott 1974: 188). Another was to blame the ruling party for failing to live up to the provisions of the Barotseland Agreement of 1964, a document signed just prior to independence that committed the government to preserving some of the quasi-independent status that Western Province had enjoyed under colonial rule (Sichone and Simutanyi 1996: 181). Like the exploitation of the cattle symbol by ANC campaigners, both the allegation of the mistreatment of the Litunga and the invocation of the Barotseland Agreement constituted conscious efforts to draw upon symbols that UP strategists knew would resonate deeply with – and unify – the Lozi-speaking residents of the region. "We told [the voters] that this is an opportunity for us," the UP's former publicity chief told me. "We told them President Kaunda was a Bemba who came from Northern Province and now the time has come for us to have a Lozi President from Western Province. Now we have [in the UP] a party that is led by a man from this province. Therefore we should unite together to support him so that he will become the President too."[6]

Of course, politics is always about "uniting together" – about building political coalitions that will help their members capture power. But what made politics in the First Republic distinctive was that the coalitions that were constructed were built to capture power at the national rather than local level. And since tribes were too small to be viable units for that purpose, the cultural glue that was used to cement these coalitions together was language.

The Third Republic. Although the UNIP remained a political player during the Third Republic, its resounding defeat in the 1991 election relegated it to a secondary role as an opposition party. In this role, it was closely identified with the Nyanja-speaking Eastern Province, where it won its only concentration of seats. The victor in the election, and the new dominant party, was the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). Because of the near universality of the desire for change among Zambians in 1991, and because of the MMD's vanguard role in the effort

[6] Interview with Morgan Simwinji, Mongu, 16 November 1995.

to bring about that change, the MMD's support was, like the UNIP's after independence, initially national and multi-ethnic in its scope. Like the UNIP's in the First Republic, the MMD's electoral strategy was to emphasize its own national credentials while branding its rivals as regional parties.

The bandwagoning that led to the MMD's overwhelming electoral victory also produced a situation in which too many prominent politicians had participated in the unseating of Kaunda to be rewarded with senior government appointments in the new administration. Accordingly, a number of well-known politicians who felt insufficiently rewarded in the new government resigned from the MMD in 1993 to form the Third Republic's third major political party, the National Party (NP). Although comprised of senior politicians from every language group, most of the NP's top leaders – including its interim president – were from the Lozi-speaking west, and the party was popularly viewed as a Lozi-dominated organization. It bears underscoring that the NP was formed principally as a vehicle for the advancement of its leaders, not as an instrument for ethnic group advancement. But the non-ethnic rationale for the party's origins did not prevent either its leaders from actively playing upon ethnic identities in their efforts to build their new political organization or the MMD from exploiting assumptions about the NP's ethnic orientation to try to undermine the new party's national viability.

The first opportunity for NP and MMD organizers to "play the ethnic card" in the context of an election campaign came in November 1993, when a series of by-elections were held to fill the seats vacated by six of the MPs that had defected from the MMD to the NP.[7] The most important of these by-elections was in Malole constituency in Northern Province. As I noted in Chapter 4, the importance of the Malole by-election lay in its role as a bellwether of the NP's ability to win support outside of its Western and Southern Province home areas. Political analysts agreed that, if the NP's candidate, former finance minister Emmanuel Kasonde, were to win the seat, not only would it give the NP a strong foothold in Northern Province but, potentially, it would cause the whole of the Bemba-speaking coalition to shift from the ruling party to the opposition (*Weekly Post*, 9 November 1993 and 16 November 1993; *Daily Mail*, 18 November 1993).

[7] As per the provisions of the Constitution (Amendment) Act No. 2 of 1966, an MP that crossed the floor to another party lost the seat and was forced to run in a by-election to win the seat back for the MP's new party.

To prevent this from happening, MMD leaders attempted to depict the NP as a Lozi party and to brand Kasonde as a man who had forfeited his claim to Bemba leadership by "selling out" to the enemy. MMD officials taught their supporters a campaign song, whose refrain was "*Kasonde ale shitisha ulubemba ku ba Lozi*," which translates as "Kasonde has sold the Bembas to the Lozi" (*The Post*, 23 July 1999). A senior MMD minister sought to dramatize Kasonde's "conversion" by branding him "Emmanuel Liswaniso" – "Liswaniso" being a characteristically Lozi name (*Times of Zambia*, 13 February 1998). President Chiluba, who personally led the MMD campaign, brought dozens of senior officials to the constituency, including every single Northern Province politician and a number of other high-ranking Bemba-speakers, in an effort to demonstrate that the entire Bemba-speaking block was united against Kasonde.[8] People in Malole even reported that a rumor circulated during the campaign that, if Kasonde won, Lozis would travel from Western Province (some 1,200 kilometers away!) and actually take possession of Bembas' land.[9] Outlandish as it may seem, the claim that outsiders would come and take people's land was actually believed by many rural villagers, and served as a powerful source of mobilization.[10] The implicit claim in all of this was that a candidate's party affiliation said more about the candidate's ethnic orientation than did his tribal background, which in Kasonde's case was unimpeachably Bemba. Kasonde might have been a Bemba when he was still a member of the MMD – he was, in fact, a relative of the Bemba Paramount Chief – but his defection to the NP marked him as an outsider.

Meanwhile, in the by-elections held in the NP's home turf of Western and Southern Provinces, it was the NP candidates that sought to depict the competition in language group terms by emphasizing the dominance of the MMD's leadership by Bemba-speakers. As an article in the *Times of Zambia* reported, "the electorate was told the elections were about

[8] Interview with Brother John Dunbar, Malole Mission, 4 September 1995.

[9] Later investigation confirmed that the source of the rumor was an MMD campaign official (interviews, Malole and Kasama, 2–8 September 1995).

[10] An identical threat was invoked in a by-election that took place on the same day in Lundazi. This time, however, the tactic was used against the MMD. According to the head of the Eastern Province branch of FODEP, an independent election-monitoring group, "UNIP politicians [during the campaign] claimed that if people voted for MMD the MMD government would relocate people from other regions to Eastern Province and they would take our land and rule us . . . Here in Eastern Province, people believe these things fervently" (interview with Joseph Musukwa, Chipata, 11 January 1994).

breaking the Bemba monopoly on the reigns of power" (18 November 1993). A focus group participant described members of the NP in these areas as "referring to Kaunda as coming from the North, Chiluba again from the North [*sic*], so if they come to power they want somebody from Western or Southern [Provinces] to be president" (LY-T). The NP's Western Province organizing secretary confirmed that the party's strategy in Lozi-speaking areas was to point to Akashambatwa Mbikusita Lewanika, one of the NP's founding members and the son of the late Litunga, or to his sister Inonge, the party's interim president, as Zambia's future head of state.[11]

An additional part of the NP's strategy for winning Lozi-speakers' support was to resurrect the issue of the Barotseland Agreement – a topic that had last been invoked as a campaign theme by the UP more than two decades earlier. In the months immediately before the NP was launched in August 1993, traditional leaders in Western Province issued a series of threats to secede from the country if the Barotseland Agreement was not honored. In the November by-elections (and in those that followed in January 1994 and April and November 1995), the Barotseland Agreement featured prominently in NP campaigning. In public rallies, NP candidates and organizers characterized the abrogation of the Barotseland Agreement by the UNIP government and the refusal by President Chiluba to reinstate the agreement's provisions as "a Bemba ploy to oppress Lozi traditions by humiliating the Litunga" and promised that the NP would negotiate for the agreement's restoration if it were voted into power (*Financial Mail*, 16–23 November 1993; *Daily Mail*, 15 November 1995). As in the First Republic, the prominence of the Barotseland Agreement as a political issue can be explained by its usefulness as a tool for uniting Lozi-speakers and mobilizing them against the ruling party. The implicit claim being made when it was invoked was that whereas NP candidates would work for the interests of Lozi-speakers, MMD candidates would not.

In the 1996 general election, opportunities for ethnic appeal making were limited by both an abbreviated campaign period and a series of constitutional manipulations by the MMD government that caused opposition parties to spend more time arguing in Lusaka over the rules under which the elections would be conducted than engaging in grassroots campaigning in the constituencies (Bratton and Posner 1998). To the extent that political actors did engage in grassroots coalition-building, however,

[11] Interview with Mwitumwa Imbula, Mongu, 15 November 1995.

the ethnic electoral appeals they made were couched in explicitly linguistic terms, just as they had been in the multi-party elections and by-elections that had come earlier.

In the run-up to the 1996 race, for example, the MMD government attempted to win the favor of two key language group coalitions by introducing a bill in the National Assembly to rename the national airport and the University of Zambia after two of the country's late leaders, Simon Kapwepwe and Harry Nkumbula, respectively.[12] The choice of Kapwepwe and Nkumbula was far from accidental: each symbolized the glory days of the Bemba- and Tonga-speaking coalitions, and the attempt to rename the two public institutions after them was widely viewed as "an attempt by the President to bring [back] the old UNIP alliance of the Tonga-speakers and the Bemba-speakers for political points" (*The Post*, 15 August 1995). Although the bill was ultimately withdrawn, the clumsiness of the effort could not obscure the highly strategic coalition-building motivations that lay behind it.

The clearest example of the use of language group appeals in the 1996 election campaign itself again involved the attempt of candidates to win support among Lozi-speakers by raising the issue of the Barotseland Agreement. Six months before the election, an editorial in *The Post* observed that

> suddenly the Barotseland Agreement has become a darling of political parties who are now trying to out-do each other... [Political leaders] who once saw no sense in the Barotse demands are now proponents of the principle. Even Kaunda has the guts to say the Barotseland Agreement that he did not honor for the 27 years of his rule is necessary. (*The Post*, 24 April 1996)

Shortly before the *Post* editorial appeared, the UNIP had announced that it had made a mistake when it failed to adhere to the provisions of the Barotseland Agreement. Addressing a public campaign meeting in the Western Province capital of Mongu, Kaunda went "out of his way... [to] promise the people of Western Province that he [would] restore to them the abrogated... Barotseland Agreement of 1964" (*Zambia Today*, 18 April 1996).[13]

[12] The bill also provided for the renaming of the Zambia Air Services Institute after a third, less well-known, political figure.

[13] Chief Malambeka of Ndola Rural dismissed Kaunda's promise as a cheap political tactic: "Dr. Kaunda had vehemently refused to discuss the Barotse issue when he was in power and therefore his promise to reconsider his stand over the matter is merely an excuse to try and muster Lozi support for the forthcoming polls" (*Daily Mail*, 19 April 1996).

The UNIP was not the only party to have a change of heart on the wisdom of ignoring the agreement. Following the completion of an internal MMD report that concluded that the party's mishandling of the Barotseland Agreement issue could undermine its electoral prospects in Western Province during the upcoming election, the MMD followed the UNIP's lead and apologized for "mishandling" the discussions it had initiated on the issue with the Barotse Royal Establishment several years earlier (*Daily Mail*, 16 July 1996). "[D]angling like a carrot on a rope," the *Daily Mail* summarized, the agreement became "the darling for political leaders jockeying for [power] in the coming general elections" (1 August 1996). What the "carrot" represented was the prospect of uniting and securing the electoral support of the Lozi-speaking coalition – a strategically important piece of the national electoral pie.

The formation of the United Party for National Development (UPND) in 1998 brought another important political party onto the scene. As the words "united" and "national" in the party's name implied, the UPND did its utmost to avoid having people conclude that because the party's leader, the prominent businessman Anderson Mazoka, was a Tonga, the party was for Tongas only. Indeed, Mazoka was always quick to point out that his party's top leadership was well-balanced with people from all regions of the country. Yet when campaigning in Mazoka's home region of Southern Province, the party took advantage of the widespread assumption that, because it was "Tonga-led," it would put Tonga-speakers' interests first.[14] To signal the party's connection with the Tonga-speaking community, UPND leaders were careful to conduct their Southern Province campaign meetings not in English, as is customary in Zambian campaigns, but in Tonga (*Times of Zambia*, 6 December 1999).

Individual UPND parliamentary candidates also took advantage of the party's presumed language group orientation. In the by-election held in the Southern Province constituency of Mbabala in February 2000, the UPND candidate, a Tonga named Emmanuel Hachipuka, faced two other Tonga candidates. The fact that all three were Tonga, both by tribe and language, did not stop Hachipuka from implying that he was the only "real" Tonga in the race (*Times of Zambia*, 17 February 2000). "Tonganess," he suggested, derived not from a candidate's own background but from

[14] This was the way most newspaper reports referred to the party: as the "Tonga-led UPND" (*The Monitor*, 24–30 November 2000).

the condidate's party affiliation: since he was the only candidate running on the ticket of a Tonga party, he was the only true Tonga candidate. Hachipuka did to his rivals precisely what the MMD did to Kasonde in Malole. He undermined their claim to be members of the right ethnic group by asserting that what really mattered was the language group affiliation signaled by the party on whose ticket they were running.

Non-Linguistic Appeals in Multi-Party Elections. All of the evidence summarized thus far is in keeping with the expectation that politicians in multi-party elections will emphasize language group differences in their quest for national political power. But while such a strategy may make sense for some parties and candidates, it will not make sense for all of them. Indeed, for some parties and candidates, having the contest revolve around language group differences will be highly disadvantageous. Thus while we would expect to find some politicians in multi-party elections trying to frame the country's political competition in terms of language distinctions, we would also expect to find those politicians who stand to lose from a language-based allocation of support trying to encourage voters to think about political competition in terms of a different dimension of ethnic cleavage. In the language of the model presented in Chapter 5, we can think of such a situation as a case where w chooses its A identity and forms a coalition with y, and politicians who are not in the $w + y$ coalition, or who recognize that voters view another politician as the natural $w + y$ leader, try to convince voters that politics is not really about cleavage A but about cleavage B. Such politicians are not likely to win, but these are nonetheless the appeals we would expect to see them make. Two examples illustrate.

The first involves the UNIP's response to the UPP. When Kapwepwe resigned from the UNIP in 1971, his defection triggered a by-election in which he re-contested his seat on the UPP ticket in the Copperbelt constituency of Mufulira West.[15] The UNIP attached special importance to this contest because it knew that a Kapwepwe victory would lend legitimacy to the UPP's claim that it offered a viable alternative to the ruling party. Even more importantly, a UNIP loss had the potential to trigger a wholesale defection of the Bemba-speaking coalition to the opposition

[15] The Mufulira West seat had actually belonged to Justin Chimba, who resigned from the UNIP with Kapwepwe to form the UPP. When Chimba decided not to re-contest the seat, Kapwepwe decided to run there rather than for his old seat in Kitwe.

camp. In this respect, the UNIP faced a situation analogous to the one the MMD would face twenty-two years later in Malole. Unlike the MMD, however, the UNIP was disadvantaged by being viewed as the less obvious "Bemba party" than its upstart rival.

Recognizing that it was not likely to beat the UPP if the election turned on the question of which party would better represent Bemba-speakers' interests, the UNIP tried to undermine Kapwepwe by dividing the Bemba-speaking coalition and turning part of it – the part that came from Luapula Province – against him. Gertzel et al. (1972: 68) explain that several years earlier "Kapwepwe had antagonized many people from Luapula by his alleged reference to them as *batubula* (dumb fishermen)."[16] UNIP sought to exploit the resentment that this comment had caused by handpicking a candidate to run against Kapwepwe who had been born in Mansa, Luapula's provincial capital, and by sending prominent Luapula politicians to the constituency to campaign with him (ibid.: 69). Although the strategy had only limited success – Kapwepwe won his seat despite being in detention at the time and unable to campaign personally – the UNIP's response to the situation illustrates well how political actors that are disadvantaged by the salience of a particular cleavage dimension will try to frame the conflict in terms of another cleavage that is more beneficial.

A second example comes from the Third Republic and involves the MMD's response to the NP. Throughout most of the country, the MMD's strategy for dealing with the NP was to tell voters that the party constituted little more than an "attempt by the Lozi and their Tonga traditional cousins to distance themselves from the Bembas and to enable them to put up a president during the next general elections" (*Financial Mail*, 16–23 November 1993). Within Western Province, however, the MMD knew that this would be not be a useful strategy. Accordingly, its tactic was to try to divide the monolithic Lozi-speaking coalition, just as the UNIP had attempted to break up the Bemba-speaking coalition in Mufulira West. A veteran politician who worked closely with one of the NP candidates in the province explained to me that the

> MMD was trying to use the old methods that Kaunda used. You see, in Western province there is a mixture of tribes. The MMD were appealing to the Luvale tribespeople, of whom there are quite many in the province, by saying that if they

[16] As with the similar slur alleged to have been made by John Mwanakatwe that I describe in Chapter 4, whether Kapwepwe actually referred to Luapulans as *batubula* was less important than the fact that many people believed that he had.

voted for [the NP] they would be deported to Angola where their forefathers had come from. To a European like yourself, such threats may not seem serious. But to a villager here they are taken literally. Being a Luvale myself I was in a position to refute [these rumors].[17]

Newspaper reports confirm that during the Western Province by-elections "sentiments were being expressed that the Lozis would repatriate the other 24 tribes from the region across the border where they allegedly came from" (*Financial Mail*, 16–23 November 1993).

Note the similarities and differences between this and the Mufulira West example. In both cases, the parties knew that they would lose if voters made their choices based on their language identities, so they sought to encourage them to focus instead on a different dimension of ethnic cleavage. But whereas the UNIP tried to divide the Bemba-speaking vote by "playing province," the MMD tried to divide the Lozi-speaking coalition by "playing tribe." The provincial cleavage was attractive to UNIP campaigners in Mufulira West because the Luapula group was larger than any single tribe and thus would more seriously undermine Kapwepwe's support if it could be turned against him.[18] The UNIP "played province" because the size of the provincial coalition was more useful to it than the size of any of the tribal coalitions that it might have tried to mobilize. MMD strategists, on the other hand, had no choice but to attempt to divide the dominant Lozi-speaking group by mobilizing tribal identities, since tribe was the only other basis of ethnic division that was available to them. Language was shared by all voters in the Province.[19]

These examples illustrate two important aspects of the model: first, that politicians evaluate the ethnic cleavages that are available to them and try to mobilize people in terms of the axis of division that will do the politicians the most good, and second, that their calculations about which cleavage will be most advantageous to them will revolve around the sizes of the groups that each cleavage defines.

[17] Interview with William Chipango, Livingstone, 16 December 1995. MMD campaigners were not the only ones to play this strategy against the NP. UNIP campaigners started a similar rumor during the by-election in Kalabo in November 1995.

[18] Note that the only reason the provincial cleavage was available to UNIP was because the by-election was taking place in the Copperbelt, which contained not just multiple Bemba-speaking tribes but also Bemba-speaking migrants from both Northern and Luapula provinces.

[19] Sub-tribal distinctions along clan lines might have been possible, but these would have been even less useful than tribal distinctions, since they define even smaller groups.

Ethnic Electoral Appeals in One-Party Contexts

In 1973, Zambia became a "one-party participatory democracy." After nearly a decade of multi-party politics, the introduction of one-party rule led, almost overnight, to new patterns of ethnic coalition-building. Whereas politics in the First Republic had revolved around conflicts among broad linguistically defined regional blocs, politics in the Second Republic came very quickly to revolve around competition among local groups, usually defined in tribal terms. The institutions of the one-party state shifted the locus of electoral competition from the national to the local level, and this led to an increase in the salience of more localized ethnic identities. Baylies and Szeftel (1984) explain:

> The sharper focus on local issues and locality tended to parochialize conflict and to intensify lines of cleavage other than those along regional or linguistic lines. In a number of constituencies this resulted in an increased emphasis upon ethnic identity at the local level. (46)

In the new one-party institutional setting, "large regional blocs lost something of their old importance" and "a greater salience [was lent] to far smaller divisions, many hitherto forgotten" (47) during the initial post-independence period.

Summarizing the one-party campaigns of 1973 and 1978, Chikulo echoes these observations about the new salience of localized, "hitherto forgotten" identities. He notes that, with the introduction of intra-party competition, the focus of electoral politics shifted from national-level divisions to those that divide the electoral constituency itself: "cleavage and conflict [become confined] to the local level" (1988: 43). Compared to the patterns of ethnic politics that prevailed during the First Republic, the one-party elections were characterized by a sharp shift in the locus of political conflict "from the national level to disputes based on the organization of smaller, local factions" (Szeftel 1978: 388). This changed the kinds of political coalitions that were formed, as well as the ethnic raw material from which they were constructed. "Within a number of constituencies, individuals who previously might have been members of the same faction now came into conflict as they sought electoral support in competition with each other" (ibid.).

Newspaper reports from 1973 are full of accounts of districts "plagued by tribalism" (*Times of Zambia*, 29 October 1973) and "party leaders engaged in campaigns to insure that people from their tribe get elected to the National Assembly" (*Times of Zambia*, 26 November 1973). When

six UNIP officials were suspended "for conducting election campaigns for people from their own tribes," an editorial in the *Daily Mail* felt the need to stress that it was wrong for people to be elected "for what their tribesmen can get for them" (*Daily Mail*, 15 November 1973). After the election results were announced, further charges emerged, largely (and not surprisingly) from the losers, that "tribalism had contributed to their downfall" or that "the whole election campaign [had been] characterized by tribalism and corruption" (*Daily Mail*, 7 December 1973). A branch-level UNIP official summarized the effects of the new electoral institutions on the character of political competition in the country when he lamented that "the one-party system is destroying the party. We are no longer united and are campaigning tribally against each other" (quoted in Gertzel and Szeftel 1984: 144).

Because of a study of the 1973 election conducted by researchers based at the University of Zambia, the record of ethnic coalition-building for that contest is relatively comprehensive.[20] For example, we know that in Zambezi district of Northwestern Province, politicians in the 1973 election sought to win votes by emphasizing the divisions between members of the Lunda and Luvale tribes (Baylies and Szeftel 1984: 47). In Ndola Rural, the central issue in the campaign was whether candidates were Lamba, the dominant tribe in the area, or urban migrants from other tribes (Gertzel and Szeftel 1984: 143). In Western Province, "the greater emphasis upon locality resulted in the articulation of economic grievances in terms of [the region's] smaller ethnic groups" (Gertzel 1984: 225). In all three cases, the emphasis on tribal differences was a marked contrast to the 1968 election, during which national-scale cleavages had served as the basis of political competition and conflict.

A slightly different form of localism emerged in areas that were not only linguistically but also tribally homogeneous. In Sinazongwe constituency in Southern Province, for example, "three candidates were from the same [tribal] and linguistic groups, but nevertheless managed to polarise the constituency in terms of the three chiefs' areas from which they variously came" (Szeftel 1978: 332). Despite the fact that the dimension of identity that became salient was not strictly speaking tribal, the Sinazongwe case still bears out the model's expectation that political competition will revolve around local-constituency-level cleavages in one-party contests. The fact that Sinazongwe was divided by neither tribe nor language simply

[20] Several of the papers that came out of the study became the basis for the chapters in Gertzel et al. (1984).

meant that candidates had to identify themselves at the sub-tribal level in order to construct minimum winning coalitions. The important point is that the emphasis on chiefs' areas was altogether different from what took place in 1968, when campaigning in Sinazongwe, an ANC stronghold, revolved around mobilizing Tonga-speakers as a unified community against the Bembas who controlled the government. The objective distinctions among chiefs' areas that figured prominently in 1973 were, of course, also there in 1968. But they were invisible to the politicians who sought to mobilize voters in that year's multi-party election.

Unfortunately, no comprehensive election studies were conducted during the 1978, 1983, or 1988 one-party elections, so there is little secondary source coverage that might document the appeals made by politicians in these contests.[21] Newspaper reports at the time of these three elections are full of stories about "clandestine tribal campaigning" and warnings against candidates engaging in "tribalism" (*Daily Mail*, 30 November and 4 December 1978; 28 September 1983; 6 October 1988), just as they were in 1973. But absent documentation of the specific appeals that politicians employed in these contests, it is not possible to make strong claims about whether they emphasized tribal rather than language group differences.

Some evidence of the cleavage-shaping effects of the shift from multi-party to one-party rule can nonetheless be gleaned from the appeals that politicians did *not* make. Take the case of the Barotseland Agreement, which, as we have seen, was a key campaign issue in both the First and Third Republics because it helped to mobilize a coalition that was useful for national-scale political competition. Because a coalition that unites all Lozi-speakers is too large for constituency-level political competition – nearly all the rural constituencies that contain Lozi-speakers are homogeneously Lozi-speaking – we would expect politicians to have had little interest in invoking the Barotseland Agreement as a coalition-building device during the Second Republic. Of course, interest groups that would benefit from the restoration of the agreement – such as the Lozi Royal Establishment, which stood to win substantial powers of local government and taxation if the terms of the agreement were ever put into force – should have had strong incentives to put the issue on the agenda irrespective of the institutional setting. Indeed, one of the senior advisors to the Litunga told me that the Lozi Royal Establishment did try to make an issue of the

[21] Chikulo (1988), Baylies (1984), and Gertzel (1984) all deal with the 1978 election but make little mention of the campaign appeals made by candidates.

Barotseland Agreement during the Second Republic.[22] But in the sphere of electoral competition, the agreement's usefulness as a coalition-building tool would be far greater in a multi-party than a one-party setting.

The expectation is borne out. A participant in one of my focus groups in 1995 commented that "in the Second Republic [the issue of the Barotseland Agreement] wasn't there. But immediately [when] multi-partism comes in, they started that issue and it was a burning issue recently" (CPTA-T). An editorial in *The Post* commenting on the resurfacing of the Barotseland Agreement as a political issue after the MMD came to power in 1991 notes that "everyone was silent about the issue under Kaunda's Second Republic" (7 July 1995). A former MP and longtime Western Province politician agreed that the agreement "simply was not an issue until 1991."[23] The agreement seems to have been an issue only when the coalition that it mobilized would be politically useful, and, as the model predicts, this was during multi-party, but not during one-party, elections.

The foregoing examples illustrate how patterns of ethnic coalition-building differed across one-party and multi-party settings. Although they lend plausibility to the arguments developed in Chapter 5, they do not constitute a systematic test of the model's expectations about elite behavior. In the next section, I turn to a series of quantitative tests that do. These tests assess whether candidates run in the kinds of electoral constituencies that the model predicts they will in each institutional setting.

THE CONSTITUENCIES IN WHICH CANDIDATES RUN

Writing about elections in Kenya, Joel Barkan observes that "because possession of the right ethnic credential is often a prerequisite for being a serious candidate, most serious candidates meet this test" (1984: 92). Given a choice about where to run, Barkan implies, serious candidates will choose (or their parties will choose for them) constituencies where they are a member of the "right" ethnic group. But what if, as in Zambia (and, as I will emphasize in Chapter 9, also Kenya), candidates possess ethnic credentials that allow them to claim membership in more than one ethnic group? Which one will they (or their party strategists) focus on when they try to match their ethnic background with that of the voters?

The argument developed in Chapter 5 suggests that the answer will depend on the institutional context in which the candidate is running.

[22] Interview with Induna Mukulwakushiko, Lealui, 18 November 1995.
[23] Interview with Leonard Luyanga, Limulunga, 17 November 1995.

It suggests that, in Zambia, candidates in one-party elections will seek to place themselves in constituencies where their own tribal background matches that of the voters whose support they are seeking. In multi-party contests, the match between candidates' and voters' tribal identities will be less important than the match between the language group orientations of the parties with which the candidates are affiliated and the predominant language group in the constituency in which they are running. We would still expect to find many candidates in multi-party elections placing themselves (or being placed by their political parties) in constituencies where their tribal backgrounds match those of the voters. After all, being a member of one of the local tribes, while not essential, is not in any way disadvantageous in a multi-party context. But we would expect to find this less often than in one-party settings. In the discussion that follows, I test this expectation in a variety of ways.

Where Candidates Run

The most straightforward test of the expectation that the institutional context will affect the kinds of constituencies in which candidates choose to run is simply to count the percentage of candidates that run in constituencies outside of their home tribal areas in multi-party and in one-party elections. If the model is right, we would expect to find only candidates that are members of the dominant tribe in a given constituency running in one-party races, whereas we should find non-dominant tribe members running in multi-party contests.[24]

Of course, a test of this sort makes sense only if candidates actually have the ability to choose the constituencies in which they run. In multi-party races, where the decision about where a candidate will run is generally made by the party rather than the candidate, we can assume that parties will assign candidates to the constituencies where they will have the greatest chance of winning, and we can make inferences about parties' strategies to achieve this goal from the candidates' locations.[25] But in one-party elections, where by definition a candidate from the ruling party wins, party leaders will have little reason to go out of their way

[24] As we shall see, this formulation is a bit too simple, since the prediction will depend on the number of candidates in the race. I return to this issue in a moment.
[25] On the allocation of candidates to constituencies in the First Republic, see Molteno and Scott (1974: 171–74) and *Times of Zambia*, 24 October 1968. For the Third Republic, see *Weekly Post*, 20–26 September 1991; *Sunday Mail*, 28 July 1996; *Zambia Today*, 12 September 1996; and *Times of Zambia*, 16 September 1996.

Table 7.1. *Where Candidates Run*

	Number of candidates running for election		Share of candidates running for election that are members of the dominant tribe in the constituency in which they are running (in %)
	That are members of the dominant tribe in the constituency in which they are running	That are *not* members of the dominant tribe in the constituency in which they are running	
1968	34	22	61
1973	37	7	84
1978	15	3	83
1983	28	4	88
1988	11	1	92
1996	15	5	75
one-party total	72	12	86
multi-party total	49	27	64

to match candidates with the "right" (in the sense of ethnically advantageous) constituencies. Of course, candidates themselves will have strong incentives to make sure they are running in the "right" place, but we need to satisfy ourselves that party officials do not prevent candidates from running where they would prefer. The evidence suggests that they do not. Applications to run in a particular constituency were open to all UNIP members in good standing, and it was up to the prospective candidate to decide where he or she would apply (Baylies and Szeftel 1984: 30–31). The former Zambian Vice President and UNIP secretary general, Mainza Chona, confirmed that "there was no restriction at all on people standing where they wanted" during the Second Republic.[26] Chona told me that he could not think of a single example of a person who applied to run in a particular constituency and was told by the party to run somewhere else instead.[27]

Table 7.1 compares the number and share of candidates that ran in constituencies where they were members of the dominant tribe in every competitive election between 1968 and 1996. The analysis includes only rural constituencies, since it is only in rural areas that the model would lead us to predict a difference in candidates' behavior across one-party

[26] Interview with Mainza Chona, Lusaka, 31 July 1999.

[27] Ibid. Although candidates were subject to vetting by the party's Central Committee, this had a much greater effect on whether candidates would be permitted to contest than on *where* they would do so.

and multi-party settings. It also includes only cases where we can be sure that prospective candidates would have no difficulty identifying the dominant tribe, which I define as constituencies where the dominant tribe's population share is at least 20 percentage points greater than that of the next largest tribe. In addition, the analysis excludes candidates that received less than 5 percent of the vote on the grounds that such candidates were not serious and thus cannot be assumed to have made their decisions about where to run based on a careful assessment of what it would take to win.

The analysis also makes one final restriction: it includes only constituencies in which just two candidates were competing. Limiting the analysis in this way is crucial because the incentives for being a member of the dominant tribe will vary depending on the number of candidates in the race. Given plurality rules, the more candidates there are, the greater the likelihood that a non-dominant tribe candidate might win, and thus the greater the incentive for such a candidate to enter. Take the example of Chipangali constituency in Chipata district, which is approximately 60 percent Chewa and 30 percent Ngoni. The constituency's tribal demographics provide a distinct advantage for Chewa candidates, so we would expect Chewa politicians to be the first to enter the race. If only one or two Chewa candidates enter, a Ngoni candidate will have little incentive to join the contest. But as the number of candidates in the race rises (in this case, above two), the possibility of the Chewa candidates dividing the vote among themselves will increase, and the viability of a Ngoni candidacy improves. The number of candidates beyond which entry by a non-dominant tribe member makes sense will vary from constituency to constituency depending on the local tribal demographics. But, generally, the larger the number of candidates in the race, the more viable a non-dominant tribe candidate will be and the more likely it will be for such a candidate to enter. Beyond a certain point, the disincentives for non-dominant tribe candidates to enter are transformed into incentives for entry.[28]

[28] There is, of course, a problem with my Chipangali example. I describe the Ngoni candidate's entry decision as if he is making it as part of a staged process in which he knows who has already entered the race. This may not be an accurate representation of the context in which prospective candidates actually make their choices. The number of candidates that competed in a given race is something I can identify *ex post*, but it is not something that prospective candidates know *ex ante* – at least not reliably. Prospective candidates may have some idea of who has already declared at the time they are considering entering the race. But they may not. And they would have no way of knowing who might enter after they did. This said, controlling for the number of candidates in the race is far better than not doing so.

If the number of candidates running in each constituency were, on average, equal across one-party and multi-party elections, then this "number of candidates effect" would not be a problem. But the average number of candidates in Zambia's elections does vary considerably.[29] This variation makes meaningful comparisons across contests impossible without controlling for the number of candidates. To be absolutely sure that I am getting a "clean" test, I limit the analysis to cases where just two candidates compete.

The trend in Table 7.1 is clear. In the four one-party elections of 1973, 1978, 1983, and 1988, the share of candidates running in constituencies where their own tribal affiliation matches that of the dominant tribe is significantly higher than in the two multi-party contests of 1968 and 1996. Whereas the share for the four one-party races taken together is 86 percent, the share for the multi-party elections is just 64 percent.[30] Note that the multi-party average probably somewhat over-reports the share that the model would predict. Recall that what frees candidates in a multi-party election from the need to run in a constituency in which they are members of the dominant tribe is that the language group label that voters ascribe to them by virtue of their party affiliation trumps their own tribal background. However, this should apply only to candidates that are running on tickets of parties associated with the dominant language group in the constituency. Candidates affiliated with parties that are not viewed this way would actually do best by deliberately trying to locate themselves in constituencies where they *are* members of the dominant group and can at least appeal to voters on tribal grounds.

Furthermore, changes in the direction that the model predicts are evident in these shares on either side of the 1973 and 1991 regime transitions. In the final multi-party election of the First Republic in 1968, only 61 percent of candidates ran in constituencies where they were members of the dominant tribe. Five years later, in the first one-party election of the Second Republic in 1973, fully 84 percent of candidates did so. A similarly

[29] Whereas no constituency in the elections of 1968, 1973, or 1978 had more than three candidates, fully 83 percent of the candidates running in 1983 were running in constituencies with more than four competitors. In 1988 and 1996, the shares were 68 and 43 percent, respectively. In 1973 and 1978, candidates competing in the general election were selected via a primary system in which the top three vote winners advanced to the next stage. The primary stage was eliminated for the 1983 and 1988 elections, and the average number of candidates in each constituency rose precipitously.

[30] A difference-of-means test reveals the differences across one-party and multi-party elections to be significant at greater than the 95 percent confidence interval.

dramatic change took place in the opposite direction between the final Second Republic election of 1988 and the Third Republic multi-party contest of 1996.[31] In the former, 92 percent of candidates ran in constituencies in which they were members of the dominant tribe, whereas in the latter this figure dropped to 75 percent.

Although the results of the test clearly bear out the expectations of the model, it is reasonable to ask why we find *any* candidates in the one-party elections running in constituencies where their tribal affiliation is different from that of the majority of voters – particularly after we have excluded non-serious candidates, constituencies where the dominant tribe is not easily identifiable, and races containing more than two contestants (where entry by non-dominant tribespeople might be a rational strategy). The fact that large numbers of candidates in multi-party elections continue to run in constituencies where they are members of the dominant tribe is not a problem, since nothing in the model suggests that candidates are disadvantaged in multi-party races by matching their tribal background with that of the voters. But the fact that roughly 15 percent of candidates running in one-party contests are from non-dominant tribes raises a legitimate question. The simple answer is that the model does not explain everything. As I have emphasized, the goal of this study is not to demonstrate that ethnic considerations motivate one hundred percent of actors' behavior. Rather, it is to show that the institutional context in which actors are operating will determine the kinds of ethnic identities that matter for politics. In this regard, the relevant finding is the consistent (and statistically significant) difference between the patterns in the one-party and the multi-party races.

The difference between the 1968 and 1996 results also bears mention. If the institutional setting is driving the results, why do we find such significant variation in outcomes within the category of multi-party elections? Two explanations are plausible. First, the 1968 elections took place only four years after independence and in a context where UNIP leaders felt it important to build national unity. Also, the UNIP at the time was sufficiently secure in its hold on power to risk running well-known politicians in constituencies outside of their home areas. As Mainza Chona explains:

> In the First Republic, we tried to put people in areas where they came from, where they were known. But in order to enhance nationalism we also put people in areas

[31] For reasons explained earlier, the results of the 1991 election (in which, employing the same controls, 84 percent of candidates stood in constituencies where their own tribal affiliation matched that of the dominant tribe) are omitted from the analysis. For the purposes of testing the model, the 1996 election is treated as the first multi-party contest of the Third Republic.

that were not their own but where we thought they would be accepted because they had a national outlook. For example, we put Grey Zulu [a well-known minister and a Chewa] in Kasama [a Bemba constituency]. And, myself [a Tonga], I was put in Western Province [in a constituency dominated by Nkoyas and Lozis]. But we did this sparingly because we knew that there would be a revolt.[32]

The 1968 election probably featured a larger number of candidates running outside of their home tribal areas than would have been the case had the UNIP's leaders been less confident that voters would support well-known freedom fighters irrespective of their ethnic backgrounds. The proximity of the 1968 election to the independence struggle thus probably accounts for part of the difference in the shares of non-dominant tribe candidates in that year and in 1996.

A second factor is learning. The 1996 election took place just five years after the transition from one-party rule, and it is likely that parties and candidates were still used to the idea learned during the long one-party era that candidates should run in constituencies where their tribal background matches that of the majority of the voters. The fact that such a strategy, while not essential in a multi-party setting, was nonetheless not disadvantageous may explain why so many candidates in 1996 were members of the dominant tribes in the constituencies in which they ran. Thus the location of the 1968 election at the beginning of the post-independence era probably biased the share of dominant tribe candidates downward and the location of the 1996 contest shortly after the end of nearly two decades of one-party rule probably biased it upward. The result is greater variation across the two elections than there would have been had they been held closer together. The important point, however, is that, even with learning, the share of candidates that were members of dominant tribes was still significantly lower in 1996 than it had been in any of the one-party elections that preceded it.

In Table 7.1, I restricted the analysis to constituencies where only two candidates competed in the race, so as to provide the cleanest possible test of the model's predictions about candidates' strategic behavior. In Table 7.2, I revisit the analysis, but this time I focus explicitly on how the results change with different numbers of candidates (for space reasons I report only aggregate findings for each party system type). What we find is interesting: as the number of candidates increases, the gap between the

[32] Interview with Mainza Chona, Lusaka, 31 July 1999. Although President Kaunda at one point threatened to bar parliamentary candidates from running in their home regions, the proposal was never implemented (*Times of Zambia*, 15 July 1969).

Table 7.2. *Where Candidates Run, with Different Numbers of Candidates*

	Number of candidates	Number of candidates running for election: That are members of the dominant tribe in the constituency in which they are running	Number of candidates running for election: That are *not* members of the dominant tribe in the constituency in which they are running	Share of candidates running for election that are members of the dominant tribe in the constituency in which they are running (in %)
one-party	2	72	12	86
multi-party	2	49	27	64
one-party	3	274	54	84
multi-party	3	43	16	73
one-party	4	70	14	83
multi-party	4	79	17	82
one-party	≥5	330	109	75
multi-party	≥5	88	23	79

one-party and multi-party outcomes shrinks.[33] This is in keeping with the theoretical expectation that, as the number of candidates rises, the disincentives for non-dominant tribe candidates to enter the race will decrease and, after a point, become incentives for entry. Indeed, when four candidates are in the race, the one-party and multi-party outcome is almost the same. With five or more candidates, we actually find (statistically significantly) more cases of non-dominant tribe candidates entering the race in one-party than in multi-party elections.

Candidate Movement

A second test involves counting, among candidates that ran for Parliament once before and are running again, the share that are running in different constituencies from the last time and, among these candidates, the share whose movement involves a shift either to or from a constituency where they are a member of the dominant tribe. If the nature of the party system shapes politicians' and party strategists' incentives in the way that the model suggests, then the transition from the multi-party to the one-party system in 1973 should have sent a stream of politicians that had previously run in constituencies dominated by tribes other than their own toward constituencies dominated by members of their own tribe. Similarly, the shift from one-party back to multi-party politics in 1991 should have relaxed the necessity for politicians to match their tribal affiliations with that of their constituents and triggered a (more modest) movement of politicians from constituencies where they were members of the dominant tribe toward constituencies where they were not.

Table 7.3 presents the results of the analysis. In each election, I identify every candidate that had previously run for Parliament, even if not in the immediately prior election, and assess whether the candidate is running in the same constituency as the last time.[34] If candidates are running in a

[33] Beyond two candidates, the differences in the one-party and multi-party means cease to be significant at the 95 percent confidence interval.

[34] The re-delimitation of constituencies at the start of the Second and Third Republics makes assessing whether or not candidates have moved more difficult. In the case of the 1991 re-delimitation, the task is made somewhat easier because the re-delimitation involved the division of existing constituencies rather than the wholesale re-drawing of boundaries. In instances where a single constituency was divided into two new ones, I considered the candidate that ran again to be running in a different constituency if the tribal demographics of the two new constituencies were sufficiently different so as to force the candidate to make a choice about which one would be more advantageous.

Table 7.3. *Candidate Movement*

	Total number of candidates competing	Number (share) that had run previously	Among candidates that had run previously, number (share) running in different constituency	Among candidates that had run previously and were running in a different constituency			Ratio of movement *to* to movement *from*
				Percentage that moved *to* a "home constituency"	Percentage that moved *from* a "home constituency"	Percentage that moved to an *equally* "home constituency"	
1973	245	46 (19%)	23 (50%)	83	4	13	19 : 1
1978	274	122 (45%)	12 (10%)	50	8	42	6 : 1
1983	574	204 (36%)	30 (15%)	63	20	17	3.2 : 1
1988	472	245 (52%)	21 (9%)	52	14	33	3.7 : 1
1991	259	111 (43%)	32 (29%)	31	28	41	1.1 : 1
1996	466	110 (24%)	27 (25%)	44	26	30	1.7 : 1

new constituency, I evaluate whether that constituency provides a better match than their old one between their tribal background and that of the dominant tribal group. If it does, I code the case as an instance of movement *to* a "home constituency," where a "home constituency" is simply one where the candidate is a member of the dominant tribe. If it does not, I code it as an instance of movement *from* a "home constituency." If the candidate's new constituency provides an equally good match as the old one between the candidate's tribe and the dominant tribe, I code it as an instance of movement to an *equally* "home constituency." As in the previous analysis, I include only rural constituencies, though this time I do include candidates that won less than 5 percent of the vote (I assume that candidates that go to the trouble to switch their constituencies can be safely assumed to be serious about winning) and constituencies where the dominant tribe's population share is less than 20 percentage points greater than the next largest tribe (I assume that they have made it their business to find out what the tribal demographics of the constituency are before they move to it).

The first thing to note about the results in Table 7.3 is the high percentage of candidates who switched their constituencies following the regime changes of 1973 and 1991. Only 19 percent of the candidates running in 1973 had run in 1968, but, of these, fully 50 percent ran in new constituencies. The 1991 election also brought a significant rise from the previous election in the share of former candidates that were running in new places (from 9 percent in 1988 to 29 percent in 1991). Part of the reason for this trend was undoubtedly the re-delimitation of constituency boundaries, which did away with the constituencies in which many candidates had previously run and forced them to choose new ones. But an equally large part of the explanation was almost certainly the changed institutional environment, which created incentives for many candidates to shift to constituencies that would be more advantageous for them in the new political context. Evidence that this was the case comes from the kinds of constituencies to which candidates were moving.

In 1973, fully 83 percent of the candidates that moved to new constituencies moved from ones where they were not members of the dominant tribe to ones where they would be. In that election, the ratio of candidates moving *to* constituencies where they would be members of the dominant tribe to candidates moving *from* such constituencies was nineteen to one. The trend was so marked as to cause the audience attending a municipal meeting in Kitwe to "demand to know why so many people,

particularly Ministers, were rushing to their home areas to stand." One speaker at the meeting volunteered an answer when he suggested that "this clearly shows that the people involved are practicing tribalism and they will be elected on a tribal basis" (*Daily Mail*, 18 October 1973). This is exactly the direction of movement that the argument developed in Chapter 5 would lead us to expect. This trend persisted through the next three Second Republic elections, as candidates continued to relocate themselves to places where their tribal backgrounds would match those of the voters whose support they needed. Across the elections of 1978, 1983, and 1988 taken together, the ratio of movement *to* to movement *from* "home constituencies" was 3.6 to 1. With the return to multi-party politics in 1991, this trend of movement to home areas slowed to a trickle. Many candidates were moving in 1991, but now the share of candidates moving *to* and *from* "home constituencies" was almost equal. The ratio rose slightly in 1996 but still fell well short of even the lowest ratio in the one-party era. These results – particularly the contrast between the directions of movement in the transitional contests of 1973 and 1991 – provide powerful evidence that the one-party or multi-party nature of the political system shaped the ethnic calculations of Zambian political elites.

Unopposed Candidates

A third test of the model's implications for candidates' behavior comes from comparing the kinds of candidates that are able to run unopposed in different kinds of elections. If the model is right, we would expect no unopposed candidate that is not a member of the dominant tribe in the constituency to be able to remain unopposed in a one-party contest. In situations where it looked like a tribal outsider might contest a seat without opposition in a one-party race, it would always make sense for an ambitious tribal insider to challenge the unopposed candidate and turn the election into a referendum on the need for representation by a member of one's own tribal group. In multi-party elections, on the other hand, unopposed tribal outsiders would attract challengers only if both the party for which they were running was not associated with the language group in the region and if an alternative party that *was* associated with the regional language group was in a position to put up a candidate of its own. We would therefore expect unopposed candidates from non-dominant tribes to be extremely rare in one-party elections

Table 7.4. *Unopposed Candidates*

	Unopposed candidate is a member of	
	Dominant tribe	Non-dominant tribe
1968	10	20
1973	12	2
1978	6	0
1983	0	0
1988	10	0
1996	3	0
3rd Republic by-elections	1	2
one-party total	28	2
multi-party total	14	22

but common in multi-party elections. Table 7.4 confirms that this is the case.[35]

In Zambia's four one-party elections, thirty candidates ran unopposed. Only two of these were not members of the dominant tribe in the constituency in which they were running.[36] In the multi-party elections of 1968 and 1996, and in the Third Republic by-elections that took place through the end of 1999, fully twenty-two of the thirty-six candidates that ran unopposed – slightly less than two-thirds of the total – were members

[35] The reported differences across one-party and multi-party elections are statistically significant at greater than 95 percent. As in the previous analyses, I include only rural constituencies. I include the Third Republic by-elections in this analysis because, unlike the two previous analyses, it does not matter here that by-elections do not provide candidates with a full spectrum of constituencies from which to choose.

[36] One of these unopposed "outsiders," William Harrington, had a white father and Lozi mother and was running in a Lozi-dominated constituency. I code him as not being a member of the dominant tribe only because a "full" Lozi (i.e., a candidate with two Lozi parents) could have claimed to be a more authentic representative of Lozi interests. This said, Harrington's father was well known and long established in the area, so it is likely that Harrington himself was viewed as a local son. The other non-dominant tribe candidate able to run unopposed was Unia Mwila, a Bemba standing in a constituency where Bembas were the second most numerous tribe, though only 6 percent behind the dominant Mukulus. Mwila was a very well-known figure in Zambia at the time, having served as a minister of state in the Ministries of Finance and Education, and as secretary of state for trade, industry, and mines. At the time of the 1973 election in which he ran unopposed, he was serving as Zambia's ambassador to the United States. So, while these candidates were, strictly speaking, tribal outsiders, they were far from ordinary ones.

Table 7.5. *Unchallenged Constituencies*

	Total number of constituencies	Number of constituencies without a candidate from the dominant tribe in the race	Percentage of constituencies without a candidate from the dominant tribe in the race
1968	86	32	37
1973	100	10	10
1978	100	9	9
1983	100	3	3
1988	100	5	5
1996	122	15	12
3rd Republic by-elections	46	1	2
one-party total	400	27	7
multi-party total	254	48	19

of tribes other than the dominant tribe.[37] The contrast is striking. It is also exactly in keeping with the model's expectations.

Unchallenged Constituencies

A final test is very similar to the last one. For the same reason that non-dominant tribe candidates that are running unopposed in one-party elections will be likely to be challenged, constituencies in which no dominant tribe candidate has yet entered the race (irrespective of the number of non-dominant tribe candidates that already have) will be very unlikely to remain that way. If it looked like a constituency might wind up with nobody running from the dominant tribe, it would always make sense for a dominant tribe candidate to enter. In a multi-party election, by contrast, there would be no such incentive. On balance, then, we would expect to find a significantly larger number of constituencies with no dominant tribe candidates in multi-party than in one-party elections. As Table 7.5 shows, this is what we find. The share of unchallenged constituencies in one-party races (7 percent) is far lower than in multi-party contests (19 percent).[38]

[37] There were no unopposed candidates in the multi-party elections of 1991.

[38] The differences across one-party and multi-party contests are statistically significant at greater than the 95 percent level. Again, I include only rural constituencies in the analysis.

Taken together, these four quantitative tests provide strong evidence that the shift from one-party to multi-party rule altered the strategic behavior of Zambian politicians in the way the model would predict. Not only do candidates couch their electoral appeals in terms of different dimensions of ethnic identity in each setting, but they attach different importance to matching their own tribal backgrounds with that of the voters when it comes to deciding where, or whether, to run for office. In one-party contests, where a candidate's tribal identity matters, we find that candidates are careful to run in constituencies where they are members of the dominant tribe. In multi-party elections, where the requirement that a candidate be a member of the dominant tribe is secondary to the need to be running on the ticket of a party that is identified with the regional language group, we find that candidates are significantly more willing to run in constituencies outside their tribal home areas.

INVESTMENTS BY POLITICIANS IN ETHNIC CIVIC ASSOCIATIONS

Thus far, I have focused on the political strategies employed by Zambian politicians either during parliamentary elections or in the period immediately leading up to them. Given that the key variation I seek to explain is the kinds of ethnic identities that become salient for coalition-building in the context of mass-level electoral campaigns, this focus is understandable. But political elites also expend considerable energy during the periods between formal campaigns laying the foundations for the coalitions that they will mobilize at election time. Investments by politicians in traditional ceremonies and ethnic civic associations constitute one of the most important forms of such activity.

Tribal chiefs (who, as we saw in Chapter 2, were created or bolstered during the colonial era for their usefulness as tax collectors) remain influential local actors in many parts of Zambia, and they are recognized by candidates and political parties as useful allies. One of the principal ways in which politicians cultivate chiefs' support is by attending, and sometimes helping to organize and raise money for, their annual traditional ceremonies. These ceremonies are valued by chiefs because they serve as occasions for reinforcing their authority and prestige in the local community. They are valued by politicians because they provide opportunities for them to introduce themselves to the local population and, through their attendance and contributions, demonstrate their commitment to the community's welfare. This mutuality of interest often leads to

an unspoken quid pro quo whereby politicians attend and help to underwrite the traditional ceremonies and chiefs, who are by law and custom officially apolitical, reciprocate by quietly indicating their support for the politicians. This is not to say that every politician that attends or contributes to a traditional ceremony will be warmly endorsed by the chief. But, given the potential payoff of a chief's endorsement, politicians have incentives to invest in trying. Sipula Kabanje, the chairman of a Zambian non-governmental organization, puts it well:

> These ceremonies have political flavours . . . They are launching pads for someone who wants a rural seat . . . You can't afford to miss them if you want to get to political office . . . Prospective MPs from the towns will do well to remember that a good impression of generosity to the chief and his *indunas* [advisors] may prove to be a worthwhile investment when election time draws near. (quoted in *Sunday Mail*, 18 October 1998)

It is not surprising, then, that these annual rituals have become important parts of the campaign before the campaign.

Because participation in annual tribal ceremonies provides such a useful means of winning the support of local leaders, politicians tend to participate in them with equal frequency in one-party and multi-party settings. In multi-party contexts, however, we also find politicians trying to build ethnic associations that unite multiple tribes, often along provincial or linguistic lines. The impetus for these more broadly encompassing associations was made explicit in a 1996 letter to the editor of *The Post*. In the letter, the author "challenge[d] and urge[d] the people of Eastern Province to come together and form a strong cultural association that will keep us Easterners together."

> It is my belief that if we the Easterners came together we could do something. Therefore I urge all the Easterners to come together and form a strong association which could deal with the political, cultural and economic development [of our people]. It is my sincere hope that we unite so that we develop our province. (18 July 1996)

Localized tribal associations may be useful in one-party contexts as vehicles for political elites competing at the level of the individual electoral constituency. But, as the author of the letter suggests, associations that bring together and can claim to represent the interests of multiple tribes or even whole language groups or provinces provide their leaders with far greater ability to exert political leverage in a multi-party setting.

An association called Twishibane Mbabanibani, formed in Mkushi district in 2000 by the local constituency chairman of the UPND, provides

an illustration. Not only was the organization spearheaded by the representative of a political party, but its purpose was transparently political. Mkushi is an area that, while generally considered Bemba-speaking, is made up primarily of members of the Lala and Swaka tribes that are not core members of the Bemba-language group. People in Mkushi came to be Bemba-speaking largely through the effects of migration from the Bemba-speaking epicenter to the Copperbelt and the rail line, which passed directly through Mkushi, rather than because the area's tribes originally spoke Bemba (see Chapter 3). UPND leaders knew that if they could convince Lalas and Swakas that people from Mkushi were not really Bemba, then they might be able to convince the area's residents to shift their allegiance from the MMD to the UPND. This was precisely the suspicion of Mkushi's MMD district chairman, who charged that the motivation for the establishment of Twishibane Mbabanibani was to "bring together the Swaka/Lalas so that they resigned en masse from their parties to join the UPND and later defeat politically those regarded as the non-indigenous ones" (*Times of Zambia*, 21 February 2000).

An even clearer example of a cultural association constructed explicitly along language group lines and explicitly for political purposes is the Bantu Botatwe Ngoma Yamaanu. Taking its name (which means literally "three peoples") from a linguistic designation referring to the cluster of related language groups in present-day Southern and Central Provinces, the Bantu Botatwe was formed in 1991 for the express purpose of joining members of the Tonga, Ila, Lenje, and associated tribes into a formidable language-based political coalition (Colson 1996). Although the association's constitution defines its purpose in purely cultural terms, its chairman – himself a politician and one of the founders, first of the MMD and later of the NP – admitted that the group's real goals were political from the start. "The Southern and Central Province people desperately needed cohesion because we were so disunited," he explained. "From our common basis of culture we could draw economic and political strength."[39] Two key association organizers in Livingstone – again, both politicians: one was the mayor of, and later MP for, Livingstone, the other a town councilor – echoed their chairman's view when they told me that the Bantu Botatwe was set up "to unify Tongas in the province . . . as

[39] Interview with Aaron Muyovwe, Lusaka, 18 August 1993. Muyovwe is quoted in *The Post* providing the same rationale for the formation of the Bantu Botatwe: "While other provinces were organized and voted people of their tribe to responsible positions, Tongas were ever divided and quarreling among themselves" (9 January 1996).

a response to the perceived domination of the Bembas at the national level."[40] Another Livingstone resident described the group's origins this way: "If all these tribes that fall under the Tonga umbrella can come together, then they can have a President. That was the rationale behind the Bantu Botatwe."[41]

Despite public claims that the association does not engage in open political activities, the group's organizers admitted that the association does support political candidates behind the scenes by advising members on which politicians and parties merit their votes. They explained that "it is just like a church where the pastor tells the people which candidate should be supported."[42] In 1996, the head of the Southern Province Tonga Traditional Association, a related organization, took an explicitly political stand when he urged all Tonga-speakers to participate in the upcoming general elections to make sure that only Tongas were voted into power. He told his supporters:

> The Association has taken inventory of how Tongas have fared in politics and traditional leadership since 1964 and I am afraid to say we have lamentably failed to provide quality leadership . . . We have been too accommodating and this has resulted in authority or top positions slipping through our fingers. *Koona akumane, kuziima kwatujaya. Kubbadama mbulwazi* [We should wake up and start fighting to assume positions in the top]! (*Times of Zambia*, 22 August 1996)

A Bantu Botatwe meeting earlier in the year had resolved that a new party should be formed "that would take care of Tonga interests" (*Zambia Today*, 18 February 1996). Mindful of the group's power as a national political coalition, its leader reminded the government that "our Association covers a very big area from Southern province up to Kapiri with a population of about four million. We will tell our people not to vote for [the MMD]" (*The Post*, 23 September 1996).[43]

Confirmation that it was the multi-party political system that created the impetus for the creation of the Bantu Botatwe Ngoma Yamaanu comes not only from the timing of the group's founding (which was immediately

[40] Interview with Munang'angu Hatembo and S. C. M. Muzyamba, Livingstone, 1 December 1995.

[41] Interview with James Muzumi, Livingstone, 6 December 1995.

[42] Interview with Munang'angu Hatembo and S. C. M. Muzyamba, Livingstone, 1 December 1995.

[43] The chairman's inflated estimate of the size of the Tonga-speaking coalition recalls the similarly exaggerated estimates of Zambia's Bemba-speaking population made by Justin Chimba and Unia Mwila to justify the dominance of Bemba-speakers in the country's top government positions in the First Republic (see Chapter 4).

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after the return to multi-party politics in 1991) but also from the fact that Tonga politicians – including some of the same figures that later became active in the Bantu Botatwe – were actively engaged under the one-party state in building cultural associations that were explicitly *tribal* in their scope. Colson (1996: 75) relates that, in the 1970s, Tonga members of the Southern Province branch of the Historical Association of Zambia attempted to create a new annual Tonga traditional ceremony that would "put it on a par" with other major tribes in the country that had, or were then in the process of reinventing, such ceremonies. Although the effort ultimately failed, Colson argues that the attempt demonstrates "that by the 1970s some Tonga intellectuals had decided that they needed to be able to field a range of collective symbols comparable to those that celebrate the unique histories of other peoples in Zambia" (ibid.). She speculates that, in contrast to the founders of the Bantu Botatwe, the organizers of the Tonga traditional ceremony were "not . . . trying to forge a larger ethnic coalition for political purposes since the 1970s and 1980s were the years [of] the one-party state [when] . . . political manoeuvering and strategies used for the advancement of personal interests relied on patronage networks described in terms of kinship and home-ties rather than in ethnic terms" (ibid.: 75–76). Although Colson uses a slightly different vocabulary, her juxtaposition of the local ties that serve as the basis "for the advancement of personal interests" in the one-party state and the broader cultural ties that play this role in the multi-party context is exactly what we would expect to find if the one-party or multi-party nature of the political regime affects elites' calculations in the way the model predicts.

As the evidence presented in this chapter makes clear, the shift from multi-party to one-party and then back to multi-party rule altered the behavior of Zambia's political elites. In Chapter 8, I turn to the effects of these institutional changes on the behavior of Zambian voters.

8

Ethnic Voting

Testing the Observable Implications of the Argument for Mass Behavior

In this chapter, I turn to the model's expectations for the behavior of non-elites. The central expectation to be tested is that people will vote for candidates from their own tribes in one-party elections and for parties whose leaders belong to their language groups in multi-party elections. As in Chapter 7, I identify and test a range of observable implications of the model using a variety of data sources and analytical techniques.

The chapter is divided into three sections. In the first, I estimate and compare rates of tribal voting in one-party and multi-party elections. These analyses demonstrate that, while tribal identities are not the only motivation for voters' choices in either type of contest, Zambian voters nonetheless vote along tribal lines at measurably higher rates in one-party elections than in multi-party ones. In the second section, I focus exclusively on voting patterns in multi-party elections. First I present evidence to support the central assumption in the model that voters put more emphasis on candidates' party affiliations than on their individual backgrounds. Then I show that this emphasis on candidates' party affiliations leads voters to allocate their support on language group lines.

In the third section, I test the model's implications in a more fine-grained way through a pair of controlled experiments. The first compares the performance across elections of candidates that ran in the same constituencies in back-to-back contests. If changes in regime type affect the way voters allocate their support, then we should find greater changes in candidates' vote shares when one of the elections is a multi-party contest and the other is a one-party contest than when both elections are of the same type. This is, in fact, what I find. I also find that patterns of support vary in ways that the model would predict. When candidates in multi-party contests are running on the tickets of parties associated with the dominant language group in the constituency, they outperform their one-party results. When

they are running on the tickets of parties associated with other language groups, they do less well than in the one-party races.

The second controlled experiment compares the performance of two types of candidates whose respective levels of support most clearly capture the model's expectations for voting outcomes in multi-party settings. The first are candidates that are members of the dominant tribe in their constituency but running on the tickets of parties affiliated with language groups from other parts of the country (i.e., candidates who belong to the "right" tribe but the "wrong" party). The second are candidates that are members of non-dominant tribes but affiliated with parties that *are* identified with the local language community (i.e., "right" party, "wrong" tribe). The model would lead us to expect candidates of the latter type to outperform candidates of the former type, and the evidence confirms that they do.

TRIBAL VOTING IN ONE-PARTY AND MULTI-PARTY ELECTIONS

I begin by examining every electoral constituency in every election held in Zambia between 1968 and 1999 and comparing the share of the dominant tribe in the constituency with the share of the vote won by candidates belonging to that tribe.[1] Notwithstanding a number of caveats to be discussed later, the model predicts that in one-party elections, where voters support members of their own tribal groups, the share of dominant tribe voters in the constituency will mirror the share of votes won by dominant tribe candidates.[2] Of course, focusing only on the behavior of dominant tribe voters addresses only one implication of the model: we would also expect members of the second most numerous tribe to vote for candidates from their group, members of the third most numerous tribe to vote for candidates from their group, and so on. But restricting the analysis to the behavior of members of the dominant tribe in each constituency greatly simplifies the analysis.

In multi-party elections, where voters look past candidates' tribal backgrounds and support people running on the tickets of parties associated with their language groups, the share of dominant tribe voters in the constituency should be a much less good predictor of the share of votes

[1] Some constituencies are excluded, for reasons explained later. For a discussion of how information about the tribal backgrounds of parliamentary candidates and the tribal demographics of constituencies was collected, see Appendices C and D.

[2] This expectation depends on turnout rates being equivalent across groups. I assume that they are.

won by dominant tribe candidates. The expectation is *not* that we will find no evidence of tribal voting in multi-party elections. In multi-party elections, candidates that are supported because of their party affiliations but who happen to be members of the dominant tribe will look, in the data, like they were supported because of their tribal background. But, because candidates affiliated with parties that are identified with the local language group will not always be members of the dominant tribe, we would expect the match between the share of the dominant tribe in the constituency and the share of the vote won by candidates from that tribe to be less good in multi-party contests than in one-party contests. The bias will be toward over-estimating the degree of tribal voting in multi-party elections. Since this will make it more difficult to find a difference between the amount of tribal voting in one-party and multi-party settings, any difference I do find can be interpreted as fairly strong support for the predictions of the model.

Figure 8.1 illustrates the relationship between the share of votes won by dominant tribe candidates and the share of dominant tribe voters in each constituency in multi-party and one-party elections. The former include the general election of 1996 and all by-elections held between 1992 and 1999; the latter include the one-party elections of 1973, 1978, 1983, and 1988. As in Chapter 7, I exclude urban constituencies from the analysis, since it is only in rural areas that tribal voting patterns should differ across one-party and multi-party settings. I also exclude cases in which either all or none of the candidates in the race are from the dominant tribe in the constituency, since such contests provide no opportunity for dominant tribe voters to choose whether or not to vote for a candidate from their tribe, and thus offer no test of the predictions of the model. As in Chapter 7, I exclude the 1991 election from the analysis. I also exclude the 1968 multi-party contest, since the tribal demographic data that I possess for that year are not sufficiently precise to allow me to accurately determine the size of the dominant tribe. I draw the $y = x$ line in the scatterplots for reference.

If the model is right, we would expect the points to be scattered closely about the $y = x$ line in the one-party elections and to be scattered more broadly in the multi-party elections. Yet, the first thing one notices about the two panels in Figure 8.1 is that the points in neither scatterplot lie right along the $y = x$ line. This suggests that factors other than the candidates' tribal backgrounds motivate voters' choices. For our purposes, however, the "tightness of fit" of the scatter around the $y = x$ reference line is less important than the difference in that fit across the two panels. Eyeballing



Figure 8.1. Tribal Voting in One-Party and Multi-Party Elections

the data, the fit does seem to be better in the one-party elections than in the multi-party ones.

One way of measuring this difference more systematically is to compare the correlation between the x and y values in each. This correlation is 0.52 for the one-party cases and 0.37 for the multi-party cases.[3] If the outlier case in the lower-right corner of the one-party panel is excluded, the correlation coefficient in the one-party cases rises to 0.55. This outlier case is the 1973 election in Bweengwa constituency, where the independence-era hero and former ANC president, Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, an Ila by tribe, won overwhelming support against a Tonga opponent in an almost entirely Tonga constituency. This was clearly a special case: Nkumbula, though strictly speaking a tribal outsider, was the symbol of Tonga-speakers' aspirations for national power during the First Republic and was thus still considered an important enough figure to warrant support.

The correlation between the size of the dominant tribe and the share of votes won by its candidates is still far from perfect in the one-party panel, but it is measurably stronger than in the multi-party cases. An even more intuitive way of comparing the degree of tribal voting in each setting is to compare the average distance of each point from the $y = x$ line. If voters were voting purely along tribal lines, the distance would be zero, so values closer to zero reflect greater tribal voting.[4] The average distance in the one-party cases is 17.1 percentage points (16.7 percentage points without the Bweengwa constituency outlier); in the multi-party cases, it is 22.8 percentage points.[5] As with the correlation measure, the results suggest less tribal voting in the one-party elections than the theory would predict, but, nonetheless, measurably more in those elections than in the multi-party ones.

[3] Both correlations are statistically significant at the 0.01 level in a two-tailed test. If the 1991 elections are included, the correlation coefficient in the multi-party sample drops to 0.20.

[4] Note that the comparison across the one-party and multi-party samples is valid only because the distribution of dominant tribe population shares is nearly identical in both settings. Having an identical distribution of dominant tribe population shares is necessary because the maximum deviation from the $y = x$ line depends on the share of the dominant tribe in the constituency (it increases as that share approaches zero or 100 percent). If either the one-party or multi-party samples had a greater share of very homogeneous or very heterogeneous constituencies, it would make the comparison of average distances from the $y = x$ line problematic.

[5] If the 1991 election is included in the multi-party sample, the average distance from the $y = x$ line rises to 25.8 percentage points.



Figure 8.2. Voters Without Candidates from Their Tribes in the Race

While suggestive, this analysis has several important limitations. The first is that for voters to be able to cast their votes for a candidate who comes from their own tribe there must be a candidate from their tribe in the race. This is not always the case. When it is not, voters are left without a decision rule for how to allocate their support. The hypothetical constituency depicted in Figure 8.2 illustrates the problem. The constituency contains six different tribes (Tribes A–F), but only voters from Tribes A, B, and C have candidates from their own tribes in the race. If voters allocate their support strictly along tribal lines, we would expect voters from these three tribes to cast their ballots in the manner suggested by the dark-shaded cells: voters from Tribe A will support candidates from Tribe A, voters from Tribe B will support candidates from Tribe B, and so on. The problem is that the theory generates no predictions about which candidates voters from Tribes D, E, or F will support. When the share of a constituency's population made up of such "free agent" voters is large, it will undermine our ability to make inferences about tribal voting patterns from aggregate data.

Of course, it is possible that, because they do not have a candidate from their own tribe in the race, voters from Tribes D, E, and F will simply abstain from voting. It is also possible that they will divide their support

evenly among the candidates from Tribes A, B, and C, or will support them in proportion to these groups' shares of the total population. Any of these responses would make our job much easier, but we cannot assume that voters from Tribes D, E, and F will do any of these things. We are thus left with a problem: the inference we want to make is based on the total vote share won by the candidates from the dominant tribe, but that vote share will necessarily be affected – perhaps quite significantly – by the theoretically unpredictable electoral choices of the "free agent" voters from Tribes D, E, and F.

My solution is to redo the analysis, this time limiting the cases I include to constituencies where at least 85 percent of the population are from tribes that have a candidate in the race. This significantly reduces my sample size, but it also raises my confidence in the results.[6] In the new analysis, the correlation between the share of dominant tribe voters and the share of votes won by dominant tribe candidates is 0.54 in the one-party cases and 0.40 in the multi-party cases.[7] If the Bweengwa outlier case is excluded, the correlation in the one-party cases rises to 0.63. The average distance from the $y = x$ line in the one-party sample is now 17.3 percentage points (16 points without Bweengwa), versus 22.0 percentage points in the multi-party sample.[8] As in the analyses that included all cases, the results suggest that while tribal voting is not the whole story in one-party elections, it is a bigger part of the story in such settings than in multi-party contests. The fact that the correlations and distances from the $y = x$ line are similar in the full and truncated samples does not necessarily imply that excluding cases where most voters did not have a candidate from their tribe in the race was a waste of time (or data). It simply confirms that voters who did not have a candidate from their tribe in the race did, in fact, vote for dominant tribe candidates in rough proportion to the dominant tribe's population share.

There is, however, a second limitation to the analysis: what is known as the "ecological fallacy" (Robinson 1950; Achen and Shivley 1995; King 1997). This problem arises any time a researcher uses aggregate election results to make inferences about individual voting behavior. To

[6] Sample sizes are now 53 for the one-party cases and 26 for the multi-party cases.

[7] The one-party correlation is significant at the 0.01 level; the multi-party correlation is significant at the 0.05 level, both in a two-tailed test. If the 1991 election is included in the multi-party sample, the correlation coefficient falls to 0.01 and ceases to be significant at any level.

[8] If the 1991 election is included in the multi-party sample, the average distance for the $y = x$ line rises to 27.3 percentage points.

understand the dilemma it entails, consider a constituency in which the largest tribal group, Tribe X, constitutes 40 percent of the population and 40 percent of all voters cast their ballots for candidates from Tribe X. Given that the percentage of votes received by candidates from that tribe exactly matches the percentage of the population that belongs to it, we might be tempted to conclude that voters had cast their ballots along tribal lines. But however intuitive this inference may seem, it would be equally consistent with the aggregate data for *none* of the voters belonging to Tribe X (and two-thirds of the voters belonging to the other tribes in the constituency) to have supported the Tribe X candidates. Although such a counter-intuitive outcome may not be likely – indeed, we are probably studying this constituency because we have theoretical reasons to expect people there to have voted along tribal lines – it is impossible to rule it out on the basis of ecological (i.e., aggregate) demographic and voting tallies alone.

To deal with this problem, I employ a method developed by King (1997). In its general form, the ecological inference problem that King's method allows us to solve is presented in Figure 8.3. The unknown quantities that we need to estimate for each constituency are the share of voters from the dominant tribe in the constituency that voted for candidates from the dominant tribe (β^d) and the share of voters from other tribes that "crossed over" and voted for candidates from the dominant tribe (β^n). Once we have estimated these values we will also know the values for the other two cells, which we can compute by subtracting β^d and β^n from one. King's method allows us to estimate these quantities at both the national and constituency levels from aggregate information that we know for each constituency: the percentage of dominant and non-dominant tribe voters (X and $1 - X$), the percentage of votes won by candidates from the



Figure 8.3. The Ecological Inference Problem

dominant and non-dominant tribes (T and $1 - T$), and the total number of voters that cast ballots (N).

If the model's "pure" expectations about tribal voting in one-party elections are correct, then voters in such contests will support only candidates that are members of their tribes. Thus β^d (which captures the frequency of tribal voting among dominant tribe voters) should equal one, and β^n (which captures the frequency of cross-tribal voting by non-dominant tribe voters) should equal zero. To the extent that voters weigh factors other than candidates' tribal affiliations in deciding who to support – as the results presented earlier suggest they do – these expectations will not be borne out exactly. But we would still expect β^d to be far higher than β^n in one-party elections. In multi-party elections, where the model predicts that voters will ignore candidates' tribal backgrounds and support candidates whose party affiliations mark them as representatives of the interests of the voters' own language groups, we would expect to find less evidence of tribal voting (i.e., lower β^ds) and more evidence of cross-over voting (i.e., higher β^ns).

Some caution, however, is necessary in interpreting the estimates of β^d and β^n in the multi-party races. Even if every voter behaved precisely as the model predicts – that is, even if every voter paid no attention to the tribal backgrounds of the candidates in the race – such behavior could easily be hidden in our estimates of β^d and β^n. Consider a voter who is a member of the dominant tribe in her constituency and who casts her vote for a candidate running on the ticket of a party affiliated with her language group, just as the model predicts she will in a multi-party election. If the candidate for whom she has voted also happens to be a member of the dominant tribe, then her vote for that candidate will increase the estimated value of β^d in the analysis and it will look, in the results, like she is voting tribally. If the candidate happens to be a member of another tribe, then her vote for the candidate will decrease the estimated value of β^d and it will look, in the results, like she is ignoring tribe in making her choice, as, in fact, she is. The problem is that although her behavior is consistent with the model's expectations in both situations, it will have a different effect on our estimate of our quantity of interest depending on the tribal background of the candidate.[9] Given this, I do not use the results of the analysis as a direct test of the model's expectations about voting behavior in multi-party elections. The estimates of β^d and β^n in multi-party

[9] If the voter is a member of one of the constituency's non-dominant tribes, an analogous scenario can be outlined for the effect of her behavior on β^n.

Table 8.1. *Estimates of Tribal Voting in One-Party and Multi-Party Elections, Using King's Ecological Inference Method*

	Estimated percentage of voters from dominant tribes voting for candidates from dominant tribes (β^d)	Estimated percentage of voters from non-dominant tribes voting for candidates from dominant tribes (β^n)
All one-party elections	0.72	0.38
	(0.023)	(0.026)
All multi-party elections	0.68	0.52
	(0.023)	(0.031)
One-party elections where > 85% of voters have a candidate from their tribe in the race	0.69	0.43
	(0.029)	(0.074)
Multi-party elections where > 85% of voters have a candidate from their tribe in the race	0.63	0.52
	(0.025)	(0.091)

Ns = 185, 75, 53, 26. Estimates are weighted averages of the results for all constituencies in the specified elections. Standard errors are in parentheses.

elections can, however, be used as a point of comparison with the estimates of these parameters in one-party contests. Although tribal voting may occur in multi-party elections – or may appear in the data – it should occur with less frequency than in one-party elections. We would therefore expect the estimated values for β^d to be lower and the estimated values of β^n to be higher in multi-party elections than in one-party elections.

Estimates of β^d and β^n are reported in Table 8.1. I report results both for one-party and multi-party elections generally, and for the smaller set of one-party and multi-party contests in which at least 85 percent of the voters have a candidate from their tribe in the race. As in the analyses presented earlier, I include only rural constituencies in which at least one of the candidates is a member of the dominant tribe and at least one is not. I also exclude the 1991 election from the multi-party estimates.[10]

As the model leads us to expect, β^d is significantly higher than β^n in the one-party elections and less different from β^n in the multi-party

[10] If the 1991 election is included in the multi-party analyses, the estimates for β^d and β^n are 0.60 (.014) and 0.53 (.020), respectively, for the full multi-party sample and 0.56 (.018) and 0.56 (.070), respectively, for the limited multi-party sample.

contests. In the one-party cases, dominant tribe voters cast their ballots overwhelmingly (roughly 70 percent of the time in both the full and restricted samples) for candidates from their own tribes, and non-dominant tribe voters "cross over" and support candidates from the dominant tribe fairly infrequently (about 40 percent of the time). In multi-party contests, by contrast, dominant tribe voters are only slightly more likely to support dominant tribe candidates than are non-dominant tribe voters. The former do so approximately 65 percent of the time, while the latter do so 52 percent of the time. Recall, however, that while the estimates of β^d and β^n in the one-party elections provide a relatively reliable test of the model's implications for voting behavior in that setting, they offer a somewhat weaker test of its implications for voting behavior in the multi-party context. Still, the fact that the pattern of tribal voting (as reflected in the estimated values for β^d and β^n) is more pronounced in the one-party elections than in the multi-party elections confirms that tribal considerations are a more important concern for voters in the former than in the latter.

Thus far, I have focused exclusively on rural constituencies, since it is only in rural areas that the model generates different predictions about voting patterns in each kind of election. But the model does generate a prediction about what we should expect to see in urban constituencies: rates of tribal voting should be quite low, and there should be little difference in the degree of tribal voting in one-party and multi-party contests. Again, the evidence bears out this expectation. If I limit the analysis to urban constituencies (of which, adhering to the same selection rules as in the earlier analyses, there are 56 one-party cases and 28 multi-party cases), I find that the correlation between the share of dominant tribe voters and the share of votes won by dominant tribe candidates is extremely low: 0.16 in the one-party contests and 0.08 in the multi-party contests. This finding is reinforced when I repeat the ecological inference analysis in urban constituencies only. In urban contests, my estimates suggest that the tendency of dominant tribe voters to support members of their own tribes (β^d) is nearly identical in one-party and multi-party elections: 34 percent in the former, 38 percent in the latter. Meanwhile, the tendency of non-dominant tribe voters to cross over and support candidates from the dominant tribe (β^n) is also indistinguishable in one-party and multi-party contexts. I estimate that 37 percent of non-dominant tribe voters cross over to support dominant tribe candidates in one-party contests, and 38 percent do so in multi-party contests. These analyses suggest that very little tribal voting takes place in urban constituencies in either one-party or multi-party elections, just as the model predicts.

LANGUAGE GROUP VOTING IN MULTI-PARTY ELECTIONS

In one-party elections, all the contestants in the race are members of the same party, so party labels offer voters no means of distinguishing one candidate from another. Voters in such a situation have no choice but to focus on the candidates' personal attributes: their experience, their reputation, and, quite centrally, their ethnic backgrounds. But in multi-party contests, where candidates are each running on the ticket of a different political party, voters are forced to choose which cues to weight more heavily: that suggested by the ethnic background of the candidate, or that suggested by the presumed ethnic orientation of the party on whose ticket the candidate is running. A key claim of my argument is that in multi-party elections Zambian voters focus their attention on the latter: on the language group affiliation of the candidate's political party. I therefore begin by presenting evidence to document this assertion. Then I show how the emphasis on party labels generates voting along language group lines.

Party Affiliations versus Candidate Backgrounds as a Focus of Voters' Attention in Multi-Party Elections

In Carey and Shugart's (1995) typology of electoral systems and incentives to cultivate a personal vote, single-member plurality systems with party endorsements, such as is found in Zambia, rank as the most party-oriented system type on the list. Evidence from surveys, interviews, and secondary source accounts bears this out. Summarizing voters' attitudes during the multi-party First Republic, Molteno and Scott (1974: 192) write that Zambians "seem to adhere more strongly to parties than to individuals . . . [I]ndividual candidates are a relatively minor factor influencing voter behaviour." In a speech to the National Assembly in 1972, Vice President Mainza Chona argued that "under a multi-party system people do not vote according to the merit of the candidate. They are only interested in their party winning the seat" (*Parliamentary Debates*, 6 December 1972, cols. 54–59). Commenting on the strength of party orientations in the Third Republic, a survey respondent observed that in a multi-party system "people will in no way support someone who is not a member of their party" (SR 7). A focus group participant explained that, in weighing candidates' backgrounds, "it was the party they were voting for, not the candidate" (KAS-T). Another focus group participant was explicit in linking the centrality of party labels to the multi-party nature of the political system: "In the [one-party] Second Republic we were voting

for people, but now [in the multi-party Third Republic] we are voting for a party not a person" (CPTA-R-M).

Candidates themselves also recognized the importance that voters attach to party labels in multi-party contests. Recalling the 1968 election campaign, in which he had contested (and won) the Nalikwanda constituency seat on the ANC ticket, one former politician told me that his own qualities as an individual simply had not mattered in that election:

> What mattered most was the party: what the party has done for the people, not what [I had done] for the people. This is because it was a multi-party system and in a multi-party system the popularity of the party matters more than the popularity of any individual candidate. If UNIP was more popular, then the candidate for ANC lost and UNIP won. It didn't matter who you were.[11]

This was the situation in 1968. But in 1973, when the same politician ran for re-election under the new one-party rules, things had changed. Now, "it was the popularity of the candidate that mattered . . . In the one party state, people had to vote for the man who they thought could do something for them."[12] Horowitz summarizes the phenomenon when he emphasizes that, in a multi-party context, it is not "advantageous to cross party lines to vote for a *candidate* of the same ethnic background as that of the voter if this requires voting for a *party* identified with the opposing ethnic group. Ethnic voting means simply voting for the party identified with the voter's own ethnic group, no matter who the individual candidates happen to be" (1985: 319–20).

Behavioral evidence for the weight that voters attach to candidates' party affiliations can be gleaned from examining the outcomes of parliamentary by-elections. Under Zambian law, parliamentary seats belong to the party rather than to the MP. Thus, when a sitting MP resigns from his or her party to join another political organization, a by-election is automatically triggered in which the defecting MP must re-contest the seat on the ticket of the new party.[13] Such contests provide an ideal opportunity for testing the relative weight that voters attach to a candidate's personal attributes and party affiliation. If voters care more about candidates' personal attributes, then we would expect them to continue supporting the defecting MP in his or her new party. But if voters care more about candidates' party affiliations, then we would expect their support to be conditional on the characteristics of the party to which the MP has defected.

[11] Interview with Morgan Simwinji, Mongu, 16 November 1995.
[12] Ibid.
[13] The relevant provision is the Constitution (Amendment) Act No. 2 of 1966.

If the party to which the MP has defected offers a better match with the voter's language group than the old party, then the voter will follow the candidate to the new party. If it offers a less good match, then the voter will withdraw his or her support from the candidate and remain faithful to the party on whose ticket the candidate originally ran.

The series of by-elections triggered in 1993 by the formation of the NP and the defection to that party of eleven MMD MPs offers an excellent opportunity for testing the importance that voters attach to party labels.[14] All of the defecting MPs were senior politicians who had won their seats in 1991 by wide margins. In that year, Zambians were voting for political and economic reform, and being on the MMD ticket identified a candidate as being an agent of change. By 1993, however, party affiliations had come to take on ethnic overtones, and the MMD had come to be viewed in many parts of the country as a vehicle for the interests of Bemba-speakers from the Northern, Luapula, and Copperbelt Provinces. The NP, meanwhile, drew its top leadership from the Western, Southern, and Northwestern Provinces and was popularly identified with the interests of the non-Bemba-speaking people from these regions. If voters were casting their votes based on party labels, we would expect the defecting MPs from Western, Southern, and Northwestern Province constituencies to fare well when they re-contested their seats on the NP ticket – perhaps not quite as well as they did in the watershed 1991 elections when the sentiment for change was unanimous, but certainly well enough to win their seats by wide margins. In the Bemba-speaking Northern Province, on the other hand, we would expect voters to remain loyal to the (presumed-to-be-Bemba-oriented) MMD and to withdraw their support from the defecting MPs who had, in their eyes, crossed over to a party whose presumed patronage commitments lay with a different language community. As Table 8.2 illustrates, this is exactly what voters in both areas did.

In the Western Province constituencies of Kalabo, Mongu, and Senanga, the Northwestern Province constituency of Solwezi Central, and the Southern Province constituency of Bweengwa, voters followed their defecting MPs en masse from the MMD to the NP. Whereas the defecting MPs from these five constituencies had won an average of 85 percent of the vote when running as MMD candidates in 1991, they won an average

[14] Six of the eleven by-elections were held on 11 November 1993, one on 27 January 1994, and the remaining four on 7 April 1994. In three instances, the defecting MP, having left the MMD, chose not to run for re-election on the NP ticket. I exclude these three cases from the analysis, leaving eight cases.

Table 8.2. *Changes in Candidates' Vote Shares in the 1993–94 By-Elections in Constituencies Where the Incumbent Ran Again on the NP Ticket*

Province	Constituency (by-election date)	Candidate's vote share in 1991	Candidate's vote share in by-election	Percentage change in candidate's support
Western	Kalabo (11 Nov. 93)	79.7	56.3	−29.3
Western	Mongu (27 Jan. 94)	88.2	81.7	−7.4
Western	Senanga (11 Nov. 93)	88.5	72.0	−18.6
Northwestern	Solwezi Central (11 Nov. 93)	82.8	69.7	−15.8
Southern	Bweengwa (11 Nov. 93)	83.9	75.0	−10.6
Southern	Pemba (11 Nov. 93)	85.6	27.4	−68.0
Northern	Chinsali (7 Apr. 94)	82.6	9.5	−88.5
Northern	Malole (11 Nov. 93)	91.4	24.1	−73.6

of 71 percent of the vote when they re-contested their seats in the by-elections on the NP ticket. The percentage change in their support across the two contests ranged from −7 to −29 percent. Given the unnaturally high vote shares they won in the 1991 race and the fact that they all faced two opponents in the by-election but only one in the 1991 contest, these results suggest that the shift in their party affiliations was embraced by their constituents. Only in the Southern Province constituency of Pemba did voters maintain their loyalty to the MMD and fail to follow the defecting MP to his new party. Although the MMD did suffer a 38 percent decline in its vote share in that constituency, the defecting MP saw his own vote share decline by 68 percent.

In Northern Province, voters completely deserted the two MPs that re-contested their seats on the NP ticket. One of these MPs saw her vote share tumble by nearly 89 percent; the other suffered a 74 percent decline. This second candidate was former finance minister Emmanuel Kasonde, the powerful Bemba leader whose critical by-election was discussed in Chapter 7. A writer in the *Daily Mail* explained Kasonde's loss as "a rejection of NP by the Bemba-speaking voters [in] reaction to charges that NP was a Lozi-Tonga party trying to use Mr. Kasonde [to establish] a

foothold in the area" (18 November 1993). A columnist for another paper argued similarly that it was "not because Kasonde was hated but because he was considered a 'sell-out' to a political party supposedly not associated with the Bembas" that he suffered such a dramatic change in fortune. The writer went on to speculate that if Kasonde and his MMD opponent, the unknown Dismus Kalingeme, had switched parties, "Kalingeme [would] have faced a similar fate" (*Financial Mail*, 16–23 November 1993). The fact that Kalingeme was able to unseat such a powerful and popular rival by a nearly three-to-one margin – Kalingeme won 64 percent of the vote to Kasonde's 24 percent – dramatically illustrates the irrelevance of candidates' personal attributes and the centrality of party affiliations in multi-party settings in Zambia.

Another striking illustration of the power of party labels to affect voters' choices comes from the Copperbelt constituency of Chingola, where political heavyweights Ludwig Sondashi and Enoch Kavindele ran against each other in the 1991 general election and then, again, in a by-election held in April 1995. In the first contest, Sondashi, running on the MMD ticket, easily beat Kavindele, who was then running as a UNIP candidate. By the time of their second meeting in 1995, however, Sondashi had left the MMD for the NP and Kavindele had left the UNIP for the MMD. This time, Kavindele handily defeated Sondashi. While the outcome was reversed for the candidates, it remained the same for the MMD as a political party: the candidate running on the MMD ticket – Sondashi in 1991, Kavindele in 1995 – won almost exactly the same share of vote in both elections. In 1991, Sondashi won 84.3 percent of the vote in a two-way race. In the 1995 by-election, Kavindele won 86.3 percent of the vote in a four-way race (Sondashi managed just 6.3 percent). The candidates may have changed their party affiliations, but both the overwhelmingly Bemba-speaking composition of the constituency and the Bemba orientation of the MMD remained the same. And it was the combination of language group demographics and perceived party orientation rather than the attributes of the candidates that shaped the voting outcome.

Evidence of Language Group Voting in Multi-Party Elections

If voters in multi-party elections focus on candidates' party affiliations, and if parties' ethnic orientations are understood in language group terms, then ethnic voting in multi-party elections should follow language group lines. The examples sketched earlier provide initial suggestive evidence

that this is the case. In this section, I present additional empirical support for the link between multi-party politics and language group voting.

To the extent that voters allocate support along language group lines, we would expect the share of votes won in a given constituency by a party identified with a particular language group to be equal to the share of voters in the constituency that are members of that language group. Since most constituencies – and, in fact, most whole regions – are linguistically homogeneous, we would expect entire constituencies (and regions) to focus their support on the party or parties that are identified with that constituency's (or region's) language group.

Initial evidence for the relationship between language group membership and party support is provided in Figures 8.4–8.6, which juxtapose maps of support for each major political party in the 1968, 1991, and 1996 general elections with maps of the distributions of the language groups with which each party was associated. In keeping with the evidence presented in Chapter 4 regarding how Zambians view the ethnic orientations of political parties, each party's language group orientation is determined by the language group affiliation of its president. The shaded areas on the maps of party support (at the top) indicate the districts in which the party in question won more than 60 percent of the vote (except in the maps of the 1996 election, where the threshold for shading districts supporting the NP and the AZ is 20 percent). The shaded areas on the language maps (at the bottom) indicate districts in which more than 80 percent of the population speaks the indicated language as a first or second language of communication (as calculated from 1990 census data). In all three elections, the linguistic basis of party support is evident, particularly for regions that had parties associated with their language group in the race. In regions that did not have parties associated with their language group in the race, voters tended to support the ruling party (or, in 1991, the party viewed as the vanguard of change). This explains the extension of the UNIP's support in 1968 and the MMD's support in 1991 and 1996 beyond their Bemba-speaking "home areas."

More systematic evidence for the relationship between language group membership and patterns of party support during these three general elections is presented in Table 8.3, which records, for each major party in each election, the language group with which the party was identified, the number of constituencies in the country in which that language group was dominant, and a comparison of the average of the party's vote share in constituencies where the party's associated language group was dominant



Figure 8.4. Voting in 1968

(which I label "home area" constituencies) and in the rest of the country. Table 8.3 confirms the pattern depicted graphically in Figures 8.4–8.6: in every case (save one), parties received significantly – and, in the case of non-ruling parties, overwhelmingly – more support in "home area" constituencies than elsewhere.

In 1968, for example, ANC candidates won fully 76.2 percent of the vote in constituencies dominated by Tonga-speakers but were able



Figure 8.5. Voting in 1991

to capture only 15.9 percent of the vote in constituencies dominated by members of other language groups. Were it not for the fact that Lozi-speakers in 1968 also voted overwhelmingly for ANC candidates (who, in Western Province, were simply former UP candidates running under the ANC banner), the share of ANC votes outside of Tonga-speaking areas would have been lower still. Indeed, if constituencies dominated by Lozi-speaking voters are excluded, the ANC vote

share in "the rest of the country" drops to just 10.1 percent (in Tonga- and Lozi-speaking constituencies taken together, it was 67.9 percent).[15] As

[15] Support for the ANC by Lozi-speakers, taken separately from Tonga-speakers, was also high. In the eleven constituencies dominated by Lozi-speakers in 1968, 56.7 percent of the vote went to UP candidates running on the ANC ticket, compared with 22.2 percent in the rest of the country (or 10.1 percent if Tonga-speaking areas are also excluded).



Figure 8.6. Voting in 1996

Table 8.3. *Party Vote Shares in "Home" Language Group Areas and Elsewhere*

Party (year)	Language group with which party is identified	No. of constituencies in which party's language group is dominant (of total in which party ran candidates)	Party's average vote share in "home area" constituencies	Party's average vote share in the rest of the country	Ratio of vote share in "home area" to rest of country
ANC (1968)	Tonga	16 (of 76)	76.2	15.9	4.8: 1
UNIP (1968)	Bemba	48 (of 76)	94.1	57.1	1.6: 1
MMD (1991)	Bemba	63 (of 150)	86.6	65.0	1.3: 1
UNIP (1991)	Nyanja	21 (of 150)	73.1	17.3	4.2: 1
MMD (1996)	Bemba	63 (of 147)	66.0	55.2	1.2: 1
ZDC (1996)	Bemba	63 (of 142)	10.6	17.5	0.6: 1
NP (1996)	"Northwestern"	10 (of 98)	39.6	6.9	5.7: 1
AZ (1996)	Lozi	7 (of 11)	33.9	6.6	5.1: 1

Note: Uncontested seats are omitted from the analysis. Constituencies in which a particular language group is dominant are defined as those in which a majority of the population, as determined from 1990 census data, belongs to the specified language group. "Tonga" constituencies in 1968 are Mumbwa West, Mumbwa East, and all 14 Southern Province constituencies. "Bemba" constituencies in 1968 are Kabwe, Mkushi North, Mkushi South, Chitambo, Serenje, all 18 Copperbelt Province constituencies, all 10 Luapula Province constituencies, and all 16 Northern Province constituencies except Isoka East. "Bemba" constituencies in 1991 and 1996 are Bwacha, Kabwe, Mkushi North, Mkushi South, Chitambo, Muchinga, Serenje, all 22 Copperbelt Province constituencies, all 14 Luapula Province constituencies, and all 21 Northern Province constituencies except Isoka East. "Nyanja" constituencies in 1991 are all 19 Eastern Province constituencies plus Feira and Isoka East. "Northwestern" constituencies in 1996 are all 12 Northwestern Province constituencies. "Lozi" constituencies in 1996 are Kalabo, Liuwa, Sikongo, Kaoma, Luena, Mongu, Nalikwanda, Nalolo, Senanga, Sinjembela, Mulobezi, Mwandi, and Sesheke.

the final column of the table indicates, the ratio of support for ANC candidates in Tonga-speaking areas and elsewhere was nearly five to one. If Lozi-dominated constituencies are added to the ANC's "home areas" and excluded from its "non-home areas," the ratio rises to nearly seven to one.

Because the UNIP's support in 1968 was strong in several areas that lay outside of its Bemba-speaking base, the pattern of language group voting for the UNIP in that year is somewhat less striking than that reported for the ANC. Still, it is clear that the UNIP's vote share was significantly higher in the 48 constituencies it contested that were dominated by Bemba-speakers than in the 28 constituencies that were not.[16] In the former, fully 94.1 percent of voters supported UNIP candidates, while in the latter UNIP candidates' vote share dropped to 57.1 percent. Although UNIP candidates won more than seven votes out of ten overall in the 1968 election, they were approximately 65 percent more likely to win the votes of people living in constituencies dominated by Bemba-speakers than they were to win the votes of people living in constituencies dominated by members of other language groups.

Similar patterns of in-group linguistic voting were evident in the elections of 1991 and 1996. In 1991, the MMD won 86.6 percent of the vote in Bemba-speaking constituencies and 65 percent of the vote in non-Bemba-speaking constituencies – a relatively modest difference attributable to the referendum nature of the 1991 election. But the UNIP, which by 1991 had come to be identified as a Nyanja-speakers' party, captured fully 73.1 percent of the vote in the 21 Nyanja-speaking constituencies but only 17.3 percent of the vote in the rest of the country. Its ratio of support in Nyanja-speaking and non-Nyanja-speaking constituencies was more than four to one.

In 1996, the MMD again won not only most of the vote in the Bemba-speaking parts of the country but also widespread support among voters in non-Bemba-speaking areas that did not have parties representing their own language groups in the race. Unlike its experience in 1991 (or the

[16] The large number of uncontested seats that were omitted from the analysis bias the results somewhat. However, since the majority of the omitted seats were located in Bemba-speaking areas where we would have expected the UNIP's support to have been strong (the UNIP's presumed strength was almost certainly part of the reason the seats were uncontested), the exclusion of these seats almost certainly results in an under- rather than over-estimation of the extent of language group support.

UNIP's in 1968), however, the MMD was challenged in 1996 by another major party, the ZDC, whose president was also a Bemba-speaker. The 66 percent vote share won by MMD candidates in Bemba-speaking areas in 1996, while greater than the 55.2 percent share won by MMD candidates in non-Bemba-speaking areas, was almost certainly lower than it might have been had the ZDC not been in the race. Similar reasons help to explain why the ZDC's vote share in Bemba-speaking constituencies (10.6 percent) was actually lower than its vote share in non-Bemba-speaking constituencies (17.5 percent).[17]

The two other major parties that competed in the 1996 election, the NP and the AZ, both won a significantly larger share of votes in constituencies located in their presidents' linguistic "home areas" than in other parts of the country.[18] NP candidates won 39.6 percent of the vote in the ten Northwestern Province constituencies that they contested but only managed a 6.9 percent share in the rest of the country.[19] The AZ, which ran candidates in only eleven constituencies (seven of which were in its Lozi-speaking "home" region), captured 33.9 percent of the vote in Lozi-speaking constituencies but only 6.6 percent of the vote outside of

[17] Competition with the MMD for Bemba-speakers' votes probably tells only part of the story, however. When the ZDC was formed, its founders went to great lengths to balance the party's leadership with members of all four major language groups. Thus, in addition to its Bemba-speaking president and secretary general, the party had three vice presidents: one a Lozi-speaker, one a Tonga-speaker, and the third a Nyanja-speaker. In part because of such efforts at language group balancing, and in part because the MMD's status as the ruling party made it the more obvious choice for Bemba-speaking voters seeking to secure patronage resources from the state, the ZDC was only weakly identified as a Bemba party. This helps to account for the low ZDC vote share in its "home area" constituencies. Its balanced leadership also bolstered the ZDC's appeal in areas outside of its alleged linguistic "home," which also helps to account for its higher than expected vote share in the rest of the country.

[18] In addition to the MMD, the ZDC, the NP, and the AZ, a fifth political organization, the National Lima Party (NLP), contested the 1996 election on an agrarian platform and won just over six percent of the total vote. But because its appeal was explicitly to farmers (and also because one of its two leaders was a white Zambian), the NLP had no language group association in voters' minds and is excluded from this analysis. An additional five small parties, none of which managed to capture more than 0.17 percent of the vote, also contested the election. The UNIP boycotted the poll.

[19] Despite the NP's earlier perceived orientation as a Lozi- or Tonga-speakers' party, it had come to be seen as a Northwestern Province–oriented organization in 1995 when Humphrey Mulemba, a Kaonde from Northwestern Province, was selected as its new president.

Table 8.4. *Correlations Between Dominant Language Groups and Party Voting in Multi-party Elections of 1968, 1996, and Third Republic By-elections*

Dominant language group in constituency	Winning party associated with which language group?				
	Bemba	Tonga	Nyanja	Lozi	"Northwestern"
Bemba	.786*	−.446*	−.306*	−.381*	−.235*
Tonga	−.436*	.843*	−.094	−.117	−.072
Nyanja	−.360*	−.084	.951*	−.071	−.044
Lozi	−.375*	−.116	−.079	.854*	−.061
"Northwestern"	−.120	−.091	−.063	−.078	.667*

$N = 193$; * correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test). Dominant language groups are identified from constituency-level 1990 census figures. Mambwe- and Namwanga-speakers are included in the Bemba-speaking group; Tumbuka-speakers are included in the Nyanja-speaking group. The ANC in Southern Province in 1968, the NP in 1994–95, and the UPND are coded as "Tonga" parties. The UNIP in the First Republic and the MMD are coded as "Bemba" parties. The ANC in Western Province in 1968, the NP in 1993, and the AZ are coded as "Lozi" parties. The UNIP in the Third Republic is coded as a "Nyanja" party. The NP in 1995–99 is coded as a "Northwestern" party.

them. Language group voting would thus appear to account for a major part of the variation in these two parties' success rates: NP and AZ candidates that were running in constituencies dominated by members of their presidents' language groups were more than five times as likely to win voters' support than were their fellow party members running in other regions of the country.

A final source of evidence for language group voting in multi-party elections in Zambia is provided in Table 8.4, which reports the correlation between the dominant language group and the language group affiliation of the winning political party in each constituency for the multi-party general elections of 1968 and 1996 and for all Third Republic by-elections held between 1992 and the end of 1999. For the purposes of the analysis, I omit cases where there is not a clearly dominant language group (and thus no clear prediction about which party should win), where the dominant language group does not have a party affiliated with it in the race, and where the election was won by an independent candidate. As in the analyses of tribal voting presented earlier in the chapter, I omit the 1991 election (though the results are almost identical when it is included).

If the language group affiliations of parties matter to Zambian voters, then we would expect to find strong positive correlations between

each dominant language group and parties affiliated with that group, and weak or negative correlations for all other combinations of language groups and parties.[20] This is exactly what we find. All the correlations along the diagonal (measuring the tendency for parties identified with particular language groups to win seats in constituencies dominated by a voters from that group) are positive and highly significant, while the correlations located off the diagonal (which capture the tendency for voters with the opportunity to elect candidates running on the tickets of parties affiliated with their own language groups to instead elect candidates running on tickets of parties affiliated with different ones) are all negative. The fact that the correlations along the diagonal are not all equal to one confirms – as the analyses presented earlier also make clear – that language group affiliations are not a perfect predictor of electoral behavior in multi-party elections. But the general pattern in the data is still overwhelmingly in keeping with the proposition that linguistic identities drive voting decisions in a multi-party context.[21]

CONTROLLED EXPERIMENTS

The results presented thus far confirm that tribal voting is more prevalent in one-party than in multi-party elections and that voters in multi-party contests overwhelmingly support candidates running on the tickets of political parties whose language group orientations match their own. These findings are robust across multiple analyses employing different techniques and drawing on varying data sources. In this section, I present the results of a pair of controlled experiments that permit a more finely calibrated test of the model's implications regarding the effects of regime change on tribal and linguistic voting. The first holds the candidates constant and tests, first, whether they fare differently in elections held under different institutional rules and, then, whether the differences in their

[20] Note that the ecological inference problem is not an issue in the language–voting analysis, since the rural constituencies it includes are all almost completely homogeneous with respect to language group membership.

[21] Apart from the general support it provides for the language group voting thesis, an interesting finding that jumps out of the table is the highly significant negative correlations between ethnic dominance by non-Bemba-speakers and support for Bemba parties (the UNIP in 1968; the MMD in the Third Republic). This pattern, which reflects the tendency for non-Bemba-speakers to support parties other than those led by Bemba-speakers, offers empirical confirmation for the claim made in Chapter 4 about the resentment that non-Bemba-speakers feel toward the ruling party.

performance can be accounted for by the match between their party affiliation and the dominant language group in the area in which they are competing. The second experiment looks at how voters behave when they are given an explicit choice between supporting a candidate from their tribe and supporting a candidate whose party affiliation suggests that he or she represents the interests of their language group.

Support for Candidates in Back-to-Back Elections

The intuition behind the first experiment is simple: if the institutional setting is what drives voters' choices, then we should find relative stability within one-party and multi-party contexts in voters' support for candidates running in the same constituencies in different elections, and changes in voters' support levels across elections held under different institutional rules. To test this intuition, I first identified all candidates that had run in back-to-back elections in the same constituency in the elections of 1973, 1978, 1983, 1988, 1991, and 1996. This yielded a total of 780 cases. Then, to insure the comparability of each candidate's performance across election pairs, I excluded all cases in which different numbers of opponents ran against the candidate in each election.[22] This turned out to be a hard standard to meet, and it reduced the total number of cases in the analysis to just 145. Having identified these key test cases, I divided them into two categories: those that constituted pairs of elections *within* an institutional setting (either multi-party or one-party) and those that constituted pairs of elections *across* institutional settings. There were 123 cases in the first category and 22 in the second.

I then calculated the correlation between the candidates' vote shares in the first and second elections for each category, on the logic that higher correlations would indicate less change across elections in candidates' performance. The correlation in the within-regime-type cases was 0.57 (significant at the .01 level in a two-tailed test); the correlation in the across-regime-type cases was 0.30 (below accepted thresholds of statistical significance). I also calculated the average difference in candidate vote shares in each kind of election pair. With this measure, smaller differences imply greater stability. In within-regime-type pairs, candidates' vote shares varied by an average of 14 percentage points; in the across-regime-type pairs, their vote shares varied by an average of 30 percentage points. Both results confirm that regime change matters: support for candidates was

[22] I also excluded all cases where the candidate ran unopposed in either election.

much more stable when the elections were either both one-party or both multi-party than when each election was of a different type.

The more important testable implication of the theory, however, is that a candidate running in a pair of elections across regime types will not only fare differently but fare *predictably better or worse* in the second election depending on whether the party on whose ticket the candidate is running in the multi-party race is affiliated with the dominant language group in the constituency. For example, we would expect that a candidate who ran on the ANC ticket for a Southern Province seat in 1968 (i.e., a candidate that ran on the ticket of the "right" party – the ANC being closely identified with Southern Province Tonga-speakers) and then again as a UNIP candidate (which, under the one-party rules, the candidate would have to be) in 1973, would perform not just differently but far *worse* in the second election, since the candidate would lose the advantage provided in the 1968 contest by the match between the ANC party label and the Tonga-speaking voters that the candidate was courting. Similarly, we would expect a candidate that ran in Northern Province in both 1988 and 1991, but as an MMD candidate in the second of these elections, to win a larger share of the vote in the 1991 contest than in the 1988 race, since, again, the candidate was running on the ticket of the "right" party in the multi-party election – the MMD being closely associated in voters' minds with Northern Province Bemba-speakers. Had the same candidate been running on the ticket of the same party in the same years for a seat in Nyanja-speaking Eastern Province, we would expect the MMD party label to have hurt and to have reduced the candidate's vote share in 1991 relative to what it had been in 1988.

To test this expectation, I first identified, for all candidates that ran in pairs of across-regime-type elections and that met the selection criteria noted earlier, whether or not the party on whose ticket each was running in the multi-party contest was affiliated with the dominant language group in the constituency. I then compared the candidate's performance in that race and in the one-party contest. In *twenty of the twenty-one* cases, the direction of change in the candidate's performance across the two elections could be predicted by whether or not the candidate was running on the ticket of a party associated with the dominant language group in the region.[23] If candidates were, then they won a larger share of the

[23] Twenty-two cases meet the general criteria used, but the candidate in one of the cases ran as an independent in the multi-party contest and had to be dropped from the analysis.

vote in the multi-party contest than in the one-party contest; if they were not, then they received more support in the one-party race. Because this analysis allows us to control for so many of the factors that might have affected the outcome – including a candidate's personal attributes and ethnic background, the ethnic composition of the electorate, and even the number of other candidates in the race – it offers particularly strong support for the expectations of the model. The findings confirm that the one-party or multi-party nature of the election not only affects patterns of electoral support, but does so in exactly the way that the model developed in Chapter 5 would predict.

Support for Candidates of Different Types

One of the weaknesses of the analyses presented earlier in the chapter is that they are unable to distinguish between tribal and language group voting in situations where a candidate is both a member of the dominant tribal group and running on the ticket of a party that is associated with the dominant language community. The problem with such cases is that we cannot be sure whether the candidate's support is coming from her party affiliation or her tribal background. Testing the model's implications more carefully requires that we focus on candidates that are either members of the dominant tribe or running on the ticket of a party associated with the dominant language group, but not both. Figure 8.7 distinguishes among these different types of candidates.

Type A candidates are both members of the dominant tribe in the constituency and running on the ticket of a party that is affiliated with the constituency's dominant language group. We would expect such candidates to perform very well, and they do: of the 82 Type A candidates that ran in the multi-party elections of 1968, 1996, and the Third Republic by-elections

Is the Party on Whose Ticket the Candidate Is Running Affiliated with the Dominant Language Group in the Constituency?	Is the Candidate from the Dominant Tribe in the Constituency? Yes	No
Yes	A	B
No	C	D

Figure 8.7. Four Types of Candidates

that were held through the end of 1999, 70 (85 percent) won the seat they were contesting.[24] Type D candidates, by contrast are neither members of the dominant tribe nor running on the ticket of a party that is associated with the dominant language group. To the extent that voters allocate their support along ethnic lines – that is, in terms of *either* their tribal or their linguistic identities – we would expect Type D candidates to fare poorly. Again, the data bear out this expectation: of the 87 such candidates in the analysis, just 32 (37 percent) won the race they were contesting.

One implication of these findings is that ethnicity matters but is not determinative of electoral outcomes. The fact that 85 percent of those candidates whose ethnic backgrounds (both tribally and, through their party affiliations, linguistically) matched those of the plurality of the voters were able to win their election suggests that ethnicity does matter for Zambian voters. But the fact that 37 percent of those candidates whose ethnic background *did not* match that of the dominant group of voters were also able to win the seats they were contesting suggests that factors other than ethnicity also motivate voters' decision making.[25]

From the standpoint of confirming the salience of ethnicity in Zambian voting, comparing the success rates of Type A and D candidates may be illuminating. But from the standpoint of testing the relative salience of tribal and linguistic identities in multi-party elections, the success rates of such candidates are of little use since we have no way of knowing whether their victory or loss was because of their individual tribal affiliation or because of the language group identity ascribed to them by virtue of their party affiliation. The key candidate types to look at for this purpose are B and C.

Type B candidates are running on the ticket of a party that is affiliated with the constituency's dominant language group but do not belong to the

[24] The analysis includes only rural constituencies and constituencies in which the dominant language group is clearly identifiable. It excludes independent candidates, unopposed candidates, and candidates running on the tickets of parties whose language group affiliations are not clear (including all very small parties). The language group affiliations of parties are coded as indicated in the notes to Table 8.4.

[25] It is possible, of course, that these results occur in cases where dominant tribe and language group voters split their support between two or more candidates, thereby making it possible for another candidate, not of the dominant tribe or language group, to emerge victorious. Such an outcome would "look," in the data, like a Type D winner, but would, in fact, be an instance of strict ethnic voting. This possibility does not, however, undermine our ability to test the relative salience of tribal and language group voting, since Type D candidates are members of neither the dominant tribe nor the dominant language community and so provide no leverage on this question.

Is the Party on Whose Ticket the Candidate Is Running Affiliated with the Dominant Language Group in the Constituency?	Is the Candidate from the Dominant Tribe in the Constituency? Yes	No
Yes	85%	75%
No	35%	37%

Figure 8.8. Winning Rates for Each Type of Candidate in Multi-Party Elections

dominant tribe. Type C candidates belong to the dominant tribe but are running on the ticket of a party that is not affiliated with the constituency's dominant language group. If voters in multi-party contests were behaving exactly as they did in one-party elections (i.e., if they paid no attention to party affiliations and allocated their support based on the match between their own tribal affiliations and those of the candidates in the race), then we would expect Type C candidates to outperform Type B candidates, and success rates among Type A and C candidates (and among Type B and D candidates) to be roughly the same. In other words, we would expect candidates' column values to be better predictors of their success than their row values. If, on the other hand, as the argument I have advanced in this book suggests, voters in multi-party elections ignore candidates' tribal affiliations and instead cast their votes based on the language group affiliation communicated by the candidates' party labels, then row values will be more important than column values as predictors of candidates' success. We would expect Type B candidates to outperform Type C candidates, and Type A and B (and Type C and D) candidates to perform roughly equally. As Figure 8.8 shows, the latter is exactly what we find. Type B candidates win 75 percent of the time, whereas Type C candidates win just 35 percent of the time. All of the action is in the rows, not the columns.

These results provide strong support for the proposition that voters in multi-party elections put more emphasis on language group ties, as conveyed by the candidates' party affiliations, than on tribal connections.[26] Even more compelling evidence comes from comparing the performance of Type B and C candidates when they are competing directly against one another in head-to-head contests. In the results presented in Figure 8.8,

[26] If the 1991 election is included, the results are even stronger: the shares of winning Type A, B, C, and D candidates become 90, 81, 34, and 37 percent, respectively.

Type B and C candidates are competing against rivals of all types. A superior test is one in which they compete directly against one another with no other candidates in the race. In such a context, voters are given an explicit choice between supporting a member of their tribe who is not running on the ticket of a party affiliated with their language group and supporting a candidate who is affiliated with a party associated with their language group but is not a member of their tribe.

The parliamentary by-election that took place in Mazabuka Central constituency on 30 November 1999 provided voters with just such a choice. Mazabuka is located in the heart of Tongaland and, apart from a Lozi-speaking minority of around 18 percent and a handful of migrants from other parts of the country who work in the nearby sugar estates, the constituency is almost entirely populated by Tonga-speakers who are also Tonga by tribe. Although five candidates contested the 30 November 1999 by-election, the race quickly reduced itself to a contest between the MMD candidate, Gary Nkombo, and the UPND candidate, Griffiths Nang'omba.[27] Nang'omba had the advantage of running on the ticket of the UPND, a party that had a Tonga president and was widely assumed to represent the interests of Tonga-speakers. Nang'omba's own tribal background was a disadvantage, however: he was Lozi running in a constituency that was overwhelmingly Tonga by tribe. Nkombo, on the other hand, was Tonga by tribe but running on the ticket of the MMD – a party identified with Bemba-speakers. The situation offered a perfect test of the predictions of the model. Nkombo was a Type C candidate, and Nang'omba was a Type B candidate. If voters put the candidates' tribal backgrounds before their party affiliations, then Nkombo should have been the winner, since his tribal background matched that of the vast majority of the constituency's population. But if voters put the candidates' party affiliations first, then the seat should have gone to Nang'omba, since he was the one running on the ticket of the party that everyone viewed as the "Tonga party."

In the intense campaign leading up to the by-election, each party did its best to convince voters to focus on the dimension of ethnic identity that would play to its advantage. MMD campaigners "used carefully selected Tonga phrases to tell voters that the Mazabuka Central constituency needed a Tonga MP, and his name was Nkombo" (*The Monitor*, 19–25 November 1999). They "openly campaign[ed] on tribal lines urging voters not to vote for . . . Nang'omba because he is Lozi and not Tonga"

[27] Together, the two candidates ultimately won 94 percent of the vote.

(*The Monitor*, 26 November–2 December 1999). The article goes on to say that "never in the history of this country has a ruling party, or any other party for that matter, so overtly campaigned on a tribal platform to the extent that the MMD has in Mazabuka" (ibid.).

UPND campaigners, meanwhile, emphasized that a vote for Nkombo was a vote for President Chiluba and his Bemba language group, whereas a vote for Nang'omba was a vote for UPND president Anderson Mazoka and the broader Tonga community. Irrespective of Nang'omba's own tribal background, they stressed, a vote for him was a vote for a party committed to advancing the interests of Tonga-speakers. In the end, voters were more persuaded by the UPND's appeals than by the MMD's. Nang'omba won the race with 52 percent of the vote to Nkombo's 42 percent. Although Nang'omba failed to capture *all* the votes, his victory nonetheless provides strong support for the model's expectations – particularly since his opponent was a member of the ruling party and therefore had vastly more resources to draw upon in the campaign.

The Mazabuka Central by-election was not the only head-to-head contests between a Type B and a Type C candidate. Thirteen others took place in the elections of 1968, 1996, and the Third Republic by-elections. In the fourteen such cases, the Type B candidate won ten times.[28]

Another implication of the model is that Type B candidates not only will outperform Type C candidates but also will win a larger share of the vote than their tribe's share of the population would lead us to expect. Even given problems of ecological inference, a finding that a candidate won a larger share of votes than the candidate's own tribe's share of the voting population can be counted as definitive evidence of cross-tribal voting. Analogously, the model also implies that Type C candidates should win smaller shares of the vote than their tribe's population share would lead us to expect.

I was able to test this expectation in the nine head-to-head contests that were held during the Third Republic, where it was possible to draw on census data to identify the exact share of the population that belonged to each candidate's tribe.[29] Eleven Type B and thirteen Type C candidates ran in these nine contests.[30] Of the eleven Type B candidates, nine (or

[28] The total sample rises to nineteen cases, including Mazabuka Central, if the 1991 election is included. The Type B candidate won fifteen times in this larger sample.

[29] Data on the ethnic demographics of electoral constituencies in 1968 was sufficiently good to allow me to identify the dominant tribe in most constituencies, but not precise enough for me to identify that tribe's exact population share.

[30] Two of the races featured one Type B and two Type C candidates.

82 percent) won more votes than their tribe's share of the population would have led us to expect; of the thirteen Type C candidates, eight (or 62 percent) won fewer votes than their tribal share would have led us to expect. Again, the findings are in keeping with the theoretical expectations of the model: tribal voting seems not to take place in multi-party elections in the way that it does in the one-party contests. Ethnicity matters in both contexts, but different dimensions of ethnicity.

PART IV

Introduction to Part IV

Beyond Zambia

Why, and when, do some social cleavages emerge as politically salient rather than others? In the preceding pages, I have sought to shed light on this question by exploring the case of Zambia – a country that, for the complexity of its ethnic landscape, the richness of its empirical record, and the advantageous pattern of its institutional variation, offers a particularly good laboratory for studying the determinants of identity choice and cleavage change. The specific outcome that I have sought to explain in the Zambian case is why tribal identities served as the basis of electoral mobilization and voting during one-party elections and language group identities played this role during multi-party elections. I began by showing why tribe and language, but not other possible bases of social mobilization, are available to Zambian political actors as potential foundations for political coalitions. Then, to account for why political actors find it advantageous to identify themselves in terms of one of these ethnic identities rather than the other, I developed a simple model to account for why people embrace the ethnic identities they do. Finally, I showed how the incentives that the model illuminates are affected by changes in the rules that specify whether one party or many may legally compete in the political arena.

In its general form, the central argument of the book can be summarized as follows: given a widespread expectation that elected officials will favor members of their own ethnic groups in the distribution of patronage benefits, voters will seek to better their lot by electing members of their own ethnic groups to positions of political power. Politicians, knowing this, will seek to improve their electoral prospects by couching their electoral appeals in ethnic terms. But the simple rule that voters should "support their own" or that politicians should "play the ethnic card" is complicated by the fact that voters and politicians are almost always

members of more than one ethnic group. Both sorts of actors possess identity repertoires that provide them with membership in – "admission tickets" to – more than one ethnic community: one defined by their race, another by their religion, a third by their language, a fourth by their tribe, and so forth. This provides voters with access to more than one stream of patronage benefits and politicians with more than one set of potential supporters. The question thus arises as to which group they should claim as their own. When politicians "play the ethnic card," which ethnic card should they play? When voters "support their own," which principle of group membership should they employ to determine which candidates are, and are not, members of their group?

If politicians and voters are interested in political power and the resources it brings, and if political power is allocated via a system in which the plurality group wins, then they should both choose the group membership that puts them in a minimum winning coalition. Being part of a winning coalition is a prerequisite for there to be any resources to distribute, and having that coalition be minimum maximizes the resources that each coalition member will receive. To the extent that this model of political behavior is correct, ethnic identities will not be chosen because of the psychological attachment that actors have toward them or because of the success of some crafty political entrepreneur in convincing voters that a particular identity is more important than others. They will be chosen because the identity gains them entry into a more usefully sized political coalition than the other identities that they might draw upon. The ethnic identity is simply a means to an end.

This simple outcome is complicated by yet another wrinkle. Whether or not a particular group membership will put a person in a minimum winning coalition will depend not just on the size of the group that the identity defines but also on the boundaries of the political arena in which political competition is taking place. A group that might be minimum winning in one setting – say, in a state-level gubernatorial election – might be too small to be winning or too large to be minimum in another setting – say, in the context of a town-level mayoral race or within the nation as a whole. Changes in the boundaries of the relevant arena of political competition will bring about changes in the incentives for actors to choose one identity instead of another. Political institutions are one of the variables that determine these boundaries. Thus when political institutions change, so too can actors' identity choices and, with them, the cleavage outcomes to which these choices give rise.

Applied to Zambia, I show that this argument can account for why tribal identities have served as the basis of political competition and coalition-building during one-party elections and language group identities have played this role during multi-party elections. My claim is not that the shift between multi-party and one-party electoral rules has had any effect on the salience in political life of ethnicity per se. Zambian voters "vote their ethnic groups" and politicians "play the ethnic card" with equal frequency in both institutional settings. What the one-party or multi-party nature of the political system does is determine which ethnic community – their tribe or their language group – Zambian political actors will focus on when they try to mobilize their fellow group members.

Tribal divisions emerge as salient in one-party elections because political competition in such contexts takes place at the level of the electoral constituency and electoral constituencies in Zambia tend to be linguistically homogeneous but tribally heterogeneous.[1] While linguistic identities might generate winning coalitions in such a setting (after all, everyone is a member of the dominant language group), only tribal identities can produce coalitions that are *minimum* winning. This explains why voters in one-party contests focus their attention on the candidates' tribal identities and why political competition and conflict in one-party elections revolves around tribal differences.

In multi-party contests, candidates each run on the ticket of a different party and voters expect candidates, if they are elected, to distribute patronage in ways dictated by their party's leader. In such a context, voters ignore the candidates' own ethnic identities and focus their attention on the presumed ethnic group orientations of the parties with which the candidates are affiliated. Because political parties are competing on the national stage, voters' attention to party labels shifts the effective arena of competition from the local to the national level. National-scale cleavages in Zambia are language cleavages, since tribes are too small to serve as the basis of coalitions that, at that level, are both minimum and winning. This explains why electoral mobilization and counter-mobilization in multi-party settings revolve around language group differences.

[1] As I explain in Chapter 5, ethnic competition in urban constituencies, which are both tribally and linguistically heterogeneous, follows a different logic. But since urban constituencies make up only 20 percent of the total, it is reasonable to make generalizations about the ethnic basis of electoral support in one-party elections based on the outcome in rural constituencies alone.

This simple argument generates a number of observable implications about how the behavior of politicians and citizens will differ across multi-party and one-party elections. In Chapters 7 and 8, I presented a series of analyses that test these implications. In Chapter 7, I showed that Zambian politicians make the kinds of ethnic appeals, invest in the sorts of ethnic association, and choose to run in the kinds of constituencies that the argument would predict. In Chapter 8, I turned to the behavior of non-elites and showed that Zambian voters also behave in accordance with the argument's expectations: they vote for members of their tribes in one-party elections and for parties affiliated with their language groups in multi-party elections. Some of these analyses constitute true tests of the argument's implications, in that they draw on large amounts of randomly selected data (or the entire set of instances in which the phenomenon of interest took place) and employ well-accepted methods of scientific inference. Others are simply anecdotal illustrations of the argument's predictions that do not formally test the theory so much as document its empirical foundations through examples of events, outcomes, or the behavior of key actors. Together, however, the number and variety of these analyses – *all* of which provide support for the theory's expectations – give us great confidence in the argument that the book advances.

Quite apart from these findings, our confidence in the argument's success is reinforced by the fact that two of the key premises on which it is built – that voters expect political leaders to favor members of their own groups when they distribute patronage resources and that, in striving to put members of their own groups in positions of power, voters in multi-party elections pay attention to the ethnic affiliations conveyed by candidates' party affiliations rather than the candidates' own ethnic backgrounds – were substantiated with survey and focus group evidence. By providing empirical evidence to support these two building blocks of the argument (the former in Chapter 4, the latter in Chapter 8) we can have greater confidence that the match between the outcome that the argument predicts and the outcomes that I document in Zambia's one-party and multi-party eras is a product of the causal process that the book describes.

The argument that I advance in the book may account for the variation we observe in ethnic cleavage outcomes in Zambia, but is it portable? Have other African countries that have shifted back and forth between single-party and multi-party rule experienced similar changes in the relative salience of tribal and linguistic (or, more broadly, localized and national-scale) cleavages in their political competition? If so, can the argument be pushed further still? Leaving aside the impact of regime change

and moving beyond the specific context of Africa, can ethnic identity matrices such as the ones introduced in Chapter 5 offer more general insights into why particular ethnic cleavages emerge as axes of political competition and coalition-building? The book began with this general question. Does it provide any more general answers? The next two chapters take up these questions. Chapter 9 addresses whether the specific argument developed for Zambia can explain patterns of variation in ethnic cleavage salience across single-party and multi-party elections in other African countries. Chapter 10 applies the argument and the ethnic identity matrix heuristic to still other countries and political arenas to demonstrate the insights the approach offers for thinking about identity choice and ethnic cleavage salience.