



Peter Wallensteen

PEACE RESEARCH

Theory and practice

1 Making peace researchable

Making peace researchable

The fundamental idea of peace research was to make peace researchable. This would generate lessons from history and provide benchmarks for courses that could lead to peace and away from war. It would give research a voice in the pursuit of peace policies, but on a basis of accumulated knowledge with the use of modern scholarly methods. "Peace," in other words, would become as researchable as was already the case for "health," "economic growth," or "democracy," all relevant goals to be achieved by society. "Peace" was no different from other problems society faced, many initially deemed to be age-old and "normal" until they had been problematized, were open for systematic thinking, and, thus, could be acted on.

However, it was still no small task to attempt to put "peace" on the national and international research agenda. Such studies could easily be seen as political and normative. There were also interested actors and institutions which regarded this field as their exclusive domain. Other would see peace as part of security, defense, and even industrial activity. The topics to be made researchable were, however, more general and not immediately directed toward particular actors or national policies. The story of how peace research emerged following a series of globally experienced traumas – large-scale, unanticipated human-made calamities – is a longer one. It is sufficient to say that World Wars I and II, the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the dangers of the Cold War, the destructive Vietnam War, the genocides of the 1990s, and September 11, 2001, all pointed to the importance of developing peace strategies. In particular this would have to be action based on historical realities and with an ambition to lead toward more durable conditions of peace (Wallensteen 2011). This was a broader agenda of research than what was pursued in particular institutes or university disciplines at the time.

Still, there was a clear focus. The first and still primary concern for peace research is to find ways to prevent the onset of war and identify ways to solve disputes peacefully. After World War I it was a matter of preventing another world war. After World War II, the chief interest was in preventing a nuclear war. It could come about from direct crises between the two sides of the Cold

War or through the escalation of wars in the Third World. Since the end of the Cold War, the focus has been on the prevention of internal war, sometimes with regional or global repercussions (civil wars, terrorism, regional wars, genocides and other forms of mass killing). Prevention has to be based on an understanding of the causes of conflict and war. Over the years, the agenda has been enlarged with respect to the core theme of causes of war and conflict resolution. There are now a large number of possible causes and impacts of war, ranging from gender to climate change (Wallensteen 2001, 2011; Pim *et al.* 2010).

The peace research agenda has always been large and this affects the question of how to make peace researchable. The idea that has turned out to be highly productive is to develop a milieu in which the issues of peace are central. A shared concern stimulates thinking, generates ideas, and provides quality control. It would also make peace researchers professional and proud of this profession. Research at leading institutions, notably in Britain and the United States, was then – and still is – highly individualistic. The individual researcher runs his or her projects, interacts with colleagues, but has a focus on his/her career. Remarkably, many leading universities did not have milieus specifically devoted to peace studies, or even security issues, in the 1950s and 1960s. Researchers with a peace concern were found in a diverse set of departments, notably in political science, history, sociology, education, and psychology.

Furthermore, when thinking about the possibility of being relevant for this large problem of “peace” and “war” more concerted action is required. Creating a milieu would not be enough. The research problem has to be *more narrowly focused*. Modern research requires more precision. Methodological developments have made it possible to ask more exact questions. Data collection has provided more advanced resources for locating information. However, focusing the research problems more narrowly also means that not all milieus can deal with all issues. There will be some issues that are not attended to or deliberately left out from a particular institution or milieu. This is necessary to progress toward good-quality work. In fact, it means stimulating a *division of labor*. Some milieus will have to deal with some problems, other milieus with others. For instance, there have always been local agendas for peace research (such as a particular conflict, or a particular national security issue), not only general and global issues. This is logical, as research has to respond also to the concerns of the surrounding society. Such concerns also promote a division of work, but without isolating one milieu from the rest. There is a need for *creating and maintaining networks*, exchanges, and an informal way of jointly guiding research so as to cover the peace agenda as completely as possible. However, strict coordination is not acceptable in peace research, or in any other science.

Another way to say this is that the components of peace have to be disaggregated into researchable elements. Optimistically put, at the time of the beginning of peace research it was thought to mean that a minimum of five or six leading scholars would get together and jointly and deliberately create a milieu with a specific focus. It would be some time before this happened, and this chapter tells the story of the milieu that emerged at Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden. It is

not primarily an exercise in history but a way to illustrate possibilities and possibly provide some inspiration. It is not the only one that has emerged, of course. There is also the School of Peace Studies at Bradford University in Britain and the Kroc Institute of International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame in the USA. Others exist under different headings but with a focus that substantially is “peace” (e.g., at Stanford, George Mason, Yale, Columbia, and New York universities). However, these efforts have been parallel to the Scandinavian story to be told in this chapter.

Making peace research milieus

Peace research came to Sweden in the middle of the 1960s. In 1966 a first seminar was set up in Uppsala, run by the university extension service (Kursverksamheten). It engaged younger PhD candidates and undergraduate students as well as teachers and professors. The first theme of inquiry was into nonviolent means, notably sanctions, an issue we will return to in Part IV of this volume. Whether and how to use sanctions was a central issue in the debate on how a small, neutral country could relate to international concerns, particularly those having to do with developing countries. At the same time similar seminars were formed at Göteborg and Lund universities with their own foci. The inspiration for setting up milieus of peace research was the Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO). It was founded in 1959, and a decade later Johan Galtung’s theory weeks – for a number of years run in the cold Nordic month of January – became an attractive “must-attend” event that generated considerable learning and inspiration. A number of young people who later became formative for peace research in the Scandinavian countries were participants as students and junior researchers at these seminars (Nils Petter Gleditsch, Raimo Väyrynen, Håkan Wiberg, Herman Schmid, to name just a few). Many remained in peace research; others took up careers as activists, publicists, or administrators (Wiberg 2010).

The small group from Uppsala returned with ideas of working for something that would be parallel to what it had experienced. PRIO worked as a milieu in line with how peace could be made researchable. The different elements of the institute’s agenda – at least in Galtung’s presentations – appeared to be closely connected in a coherent framework of relevance for peace.

However, the visits to PRIO also gave rise to the observation that peace research milieus in the early 1970s largely resided outside the universities. Institutions such as PRIO, as well as SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) and TAPRI (Tampere Peace Research Institute, in Finland), were foundations or special units. They had limited connections to regular teaching and, for instance, SIPRI did not directly recruit students or PhD candidates. Only a few academic courses were offered. These institutes also had large shares of their funding from government ministries. They were vulnerable to political fluctuations, as was soon witnessed in Denmark, where one peace research institute was closed down, only to reemerge in a new shape, and again suffering the same fate in the early 2000s. The author of this chapter drew the conclusion that peace research has to reside

within the universities in order to be more protected from political pressures but also because it would become stronger qualitatively when building directly on young, aspiring researchers. The challenge from research colleagues as well as from students would help to make peace research a solid discipline that could stand up to the demands of specialization. The arguments for this seemed strong; there was considerable receptivity among students and some researchers for this. Still, reaching the goal turned out to be more difficult than expected.

There was also a need to find a particular focus for a new milieu of peace research. As some institutes already existed, why would there be a need for peace research also within the universities? Like peace research activities elsewhere, the efforts in Sweden had to relate to specific Swedish concerns. The government supported the creation of a peace research institute, based in Stockholm, with international recruitment: SIPRI. It began its operations in 1966 and had a strong focus on roads to decommissioning of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. The first chair of the board was Ms. Alva Myrdal, Cabinet Minister for Disarmament and deeply involved in the international nuclear disarmament negotiations. Disarmament issues received considerable attention in the 1960s and 1970s. Myrdal was supportive of having peace research at universities. In her view it would be a way to reach younger generations about the urgency to stop the ongoing nuclear arms race. However, that argument would not be enough to convince skeptics within academia of the need for more peace research. SIPRI may have illustrated the utility of such a focused research milieu for public policy, even in the field of international affairs, but was there really a field of inquiry based on theory and methods that could be taught to students?

Making peace research academic

The challenge was to develop a peace research field also from an academic point of view. It required a concern for theoretical development and empirical testing. The department in Uppsala originated as an informal seminar drawing together students, PhD candidates, and faculty members who were concerned about the need for peace and the university's role.¹ In 1971, the national government created three assistant professor positions at Swedish universities (Uppsala, Lund, and Göteborg). This gave some stability to the existing seminars. In Uppsala and Göteborg the focus was not only on research, but also on developing an educational program at undergraduate level. The courses quickly filled up and the students became an active pressure group for more research and teaching on global affairs from a peace perspective. There was a demand for academic teaching. Research projects were developed. In Uppsala, issues of causes of war, connections between disarmament and development, and matters of global militarization drew interest. This showed that there were relevant issues that were not taken up by SIPRI, nor were they part of traditional defense and security studies. It demonstrated that there were researchable issues waiting to be studied.

The most significant breakthrough was the creation of a peace research chair

named after Dag Hammarskjöld, the Swedish UN Secretary-General. A bill was passed unanimously in the Parliament in his honor twenty years after his untimely death on a peace mission. That decision, in turn, was based on a national plan for developing peace research at Swedish universities, proposed by the Minister of Education. This proposal stemmed from five different parliamentary motions in 1979, from four different political parties, together having a majority and cutting across political divisions. The fact that active milieus existed and had demonstrated the fertility of the field encouraged the minister and the MPs to move ahead in order to stimulate, as it was phrased, broader research and teaching on security and peace.

At the time, a university chair was normally coupled to a PhD program. Thus, this decision would mean the creation of a new basis for the ambition of developing a peace research milieu. This was the beginning of the development of a professional discipline with a strong standing in the research community and at the same time of practical relevance. The parliament had created something new. The national plan, furthermore, included a second chair, based at Göteborg University. The possibilities seemed many and encouraging.

Making peace research at Uppsala University

A new chair for research and teaching was, of course, always welcome at a university. It meant new resources. However, such opportunities are of interest to many and the peace researchers were a small group. They did not have a department of comparable strength to their support, and, indeed, they were new at the power games that go on within universities. For leading spokespersons of political science, well trained in such business, it would, seemingly, not be difficult to turn the chair into one of political science, rather than allowing a new milieu to emerge. A major battle followed, taking place not only within the university but also in national media, in the parliament, and in government ministries. It was a painful period, but in the end the idea of creating a new research tradition prevailed. The present author was appointed as the first holder of the Dag Hammarskjöld chair in peace and conflict research in January 1985. In a follow-up decision by the Board of the Social Science Faculty, a PhD program in peace and conflict research was to start by January 1986. A vision was beginning to take material form.

This meant having to develop a full department from the bits and pieces that existed. There were negative experiences to learn from at the time. The Department of Social Anthropology was regarded as politically radical, but its critics could not close it on that ground. The ethos of academic freedom would be violated. However, the department did not manage its finances properly. It ran into debt, and decisions by the department's leadership could not salvage the situation. The department's position became vulnerable. There were administrative motives for intervention from higher levels. The existing department was terminated, and new one was created with a different agenda. A similar fate also befell the small department of peace research at Lund University.

From such experiences it was clear that the key to survival and progress for a new unit in the university system were four. They continue to be generally valid:

- 1 *Protect the basic idea!* It is necessary for a milieu to rule itself as much as possible and use its autonomy to develop the idea of being a place where the study of peace is the central concern, not something on the margin of other activities. This means independence vis-à-vis other departments, but also from the outside world. Integrity is important in all directions. Integrity provides the necessary respect for the milieu. It also means to resist all ideas of amalgamation into larger units, however well argued in terms of benefits of scale they may be. Research thrives where the researchers have control, participate in decisions, and are fully informed on the conditions of their works. The rule of thumb seems to be: the larger the unit, the less influence and empowerment of the researchers.
- 2 *Achieve the highest standards of competence!* This is necessary for teaching and research. It is the main route for recruiting talented young people. Particularly important is to have an independent PhD program, and to run it in such a way that its output (in the form of articles, dissertations, and post-doctoral works) is methodologically respected. The best ambassadors of any department are its students, but its future growth rests on its PhD candidates and young PhDs. This means, for a department, promoting and protecting competence, by generating innovative research grants and filling tenured positions after open scrutiny. Furthermore, the highest quality of research is likely to result from a cooperative environment, rather than one marked by rivalry and competition.
- 3 *Keep the department's accounts in order!* Know where the money comes from and where it is going, and make sure it follows established rules. This requires an administrative staff that acts like hawks to avoid debts. It requires a leadership that promotes applications for external funding. It means struggling with higher levels of the university to get the attention and priority a dynamic department is entitled to. Factors 1 and 2 together are likely to attract external funding, but revenue is only one aspect. Expenditures have also to be closely monitored. It is important to make sure that grants are spent in correct ways and are properly reported on, thus providing the safest basis for the long-term development of a milieu.
- 4 *Gain international recognition!* A good measure of whether or not a particular milieu has achieved necessary focus and quality is its international standing. Thus, developing international relations within the field is important. It strengthens a department's position within the university. It also makes it attractive as a place of scholarship and for resources, thus affecting the other factors.

These are administrative principles, and for the new full-fledged Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University they became the cornerstones for what was to follow.²

Making peace research synergetic

The first efforts focused on building the PhD program and recruiting interested young researchers.⁴ However, it was also important to establish a continuous flow of students at undergraduate and master levels.⁴

Thus, a parallel task was to develop a teaching program from the university entrance level to the level from which strong candidates could apply to the PhD program. For a period of time, the department introduced a new course almost every year. In the early 1990s there was a structure in place making it possible for a competent student to begin in peace and conflict studies on the A level (freshman level, in US parlance) and continue to D level (master), from which an application could be made to the PhD program. By the mid-1990s, the bulk of the PhD program consisted of students recruited from within the department. It meant building a strong foundation, while still allowing for students from other fields and with other backgrounds to enter the program. Thus, competence in teaching as well as in the doctoral research became high. Dissertations became of increasingly higher quality, often benefiting from students having the experience of presenting work at international fora such as the International Studies Association.⁵ The Swedish tradition of public dissertation defense made it possible to check the quality by inviting international well-known scholars to be external examiners (opponents) and/or part of the dissertation grading committee (*betygsnämnd*).

This was further manifested by the presence of international scholars in the department, dealing with international conflict issues from a theoretical and empirical perspective. Some were invited to become honorary doctors (Johan Galtung, J. Ann Tickner, Bruce Russett), visiting researchers (Hayward Alker, Ted R. Gurr, Barbara Harff, Daniel Druckman), or participants in particular conferences. As part of making the department known it was possible to organize a series of Executive Seminars during the 1990s, often with high-level external funding and participation of ministers as well as leading scholars. These meetings could also be used to connect PhD candidates to the established international scholars (J. David Singer, I. William Zartman, among many others). This further stimulated research in relevant fields.

The resulting program of activities, thus, became highly focused, in line with factor 1 above. A large part of the department's activities dealt with causes of conflict, conflict dynamics, and conflict resolution. This guided the educational programs, it stimulated international invitations, and it worked in consonance with a research agenda dealing with conflict and conflict developments. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) emerged in parallel with this development, a story that is told in Chapter 9 in this volume.⁶ The interaction between UCDP and the other elements of the department is an example of synergetic relations. PhD candidates could work with UCDP for a period of time; master students and young MAs were particularly well suited for collecting data on conflict. By 2010, this had developed into a self-reinforcing system, in which many PhDs actually had spent periods of their academic life in UCDP as assistants or project leaders and then returned to it with new projects, thus keeping UCDP alert to new developments in research and methodology.

In 1988 an annual international program was started on conflict resolution, providing the department with international connections in ways not seen before. It was based on funding from Swedish development assistance.⁷ Not only did this allow for inviting promising young scholars from Third World countries, it also gave resources to invite international scholars as teachers in the program. Its focus on conflict resolution, furthermore, helped to sharpen the department's interest in this particular area.

It also attracted international attention to the department as a resource not only in research and teaching but also in practice. One result was the academic diplomacy exemplified in Part V of this book. Another was the development of long-term relations with Swedish diplomats, notably Jan Eliasson, for a period of time also Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, starting with his teaching in the international program. He as well as UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan were awarded honorary doctorates by Uppsala University.

International interest in the department emerged in the late 1980s. A first manifestation was the connection to the Carter Center in Atlanta, which for a series of years published the data from UCDP. This resulted in President Carter's participation in a student panel at Uppsala University in 2002, following his visit to Oslo to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. He was one in a series of high-level visitors to Uppsala, many also occurring in the framework of the annual Dag Hammarskjöld lectures that were initiated in the mid-1990s, bringing international political personalities to Uppsala. This demonstrated the department's significance for the university's image in society at large.⁸

There has also emerged a strong interest from others to cooperate with the department. There is a close relationship with PRIO, the Peace Research Institute in Oslo. Many researchers from the department are involved in the boards of leading scholarly journals, notably *Journal of Peace Research* (JPR).⁹ There is continuous cooperation with SIPRI. In recent years, agreements have been made with Accord in Durban, South Africa, and with the Kroc Institute, University of Notre Dame, USA. Young researchers have been appointed at Otago University, Dunedin, New Zealand, while keeping ties to Uppsala.¹⁰ This all testifies to an international standing that would have been hard to imagine when the idea of such a milieu was first formulated in the 1970s.

Thus, by 2010 the department was making peace research that drew attention. The four factors interacted in a way to make the milieu highly synergetic. There was a clear purpose for the department to which the researchers could connect, there was documented high quality in its output, its economy rested on external funding but was in balance, and it had a strong international standing. Was it also doing something for peace?

Making peace research for peacemaking

The milieu had become a department, the department had a strong reputation, but what could it do for peace? One more basis for relevance was to be concerned with how to engage in affairs outside the university. The Uppsala Code of Ethics

for researchers, reproduced in Chapter 2, was the result of deliberations on such issues within Uppsala University in the early 1980s. It still remains valid. It states that the researchers should be careful in making sure their research does not have a harmful effect on society. This serves as a strong reminder not only on humility but also of dangers. Ethical concerns have to be voiced throughout the research enterprise. If research aims at affecting the world, this is even more important.

The Uppsala experience suggests at least four areas in which its research actually may have a direct impact. They all build on the fact that the research is seen as solid and the milieu exhibits the key factors mentioned above: that it is independent from all interests other than the pursuit of academic interest; has high competence; is run effectively; and is internationally recognized.

On this basis the department became involved in activities that have to do with disarmament issues (particularly in the 1980s, not recently), conflict prevention (as exemplified by the executive seminars mentioned in above, largely an activity of the 1990s), sanctions research (from the early 2000s, elaborated on in Part IV), and academic diplomacy (throughout the period; events since 1990 are described in Part V). The impact can be debated. Certainly, the department has been a meeting place for opposing sides. Its research has helped clarify issues. Direct involvements in political processes are more difficult to evaluate. There is an interest in engaging the researchers, but when and to what extent will vary with developments in politics and society. At certain junctures its research becomes relevant; in many other instances it may be below the political horizon. The public agenda is not set by the researchers. Nor should it be. However, with a strong empirical foundation, peace research is relevant and ready to contribute, when asked to do so.

Notes

- 1 Bo Wirmark put together the first seminar; Professors Ulf Himmelstrand and Stefan Björklund were the senior scholars on the board.
- 2 I was the head of department from the inception of the department as a unit (1972) until 1999, operating on these principles with the support of Anna Norrman.
- 3 The first two PhD candidates in peace and conflict research defended their dissertations in 1992 (Ramses Amer and Kjell-Åke Nordquist).
- 4 There were several directors of studies involved in this, notably Kjell-Åke Nordquist, Erik Noreen, and the pedagogically talented Mats Hammarström.
- 5 Mats Hammarström took over from me, becoming the department's first Director of Doctoral Studies in the late 1990s. He instituted a number of innovations that refreshed the program and gave it the academic strength it now has.
- 6 The starting date is 1979, but the present wide scope of activities emerged in the early 2000s.
- 7 There has been a series of directors since I initiated the program, originally termed PACS (Peace and Conflict Studies, focusing on Conflict Resolution), later TOPS (Top Level Seminar on Peace and Security). Kjell-Åke Nordquist and Thomas Ohlson have been particularly associated with this. Thomas Ohlson has energetically elaborated on this program and involved a new generation of teachers.
- 8 Following an international scientific evaluation, Uppsala University in 2008 specified peace, democracy, and human rights as one of its five profile areas.
- 9 An example is Mats Hammarström, who became Associate Editor of JPR, as has Magnus Öberg.

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- 10 The program with Accord builds on the efforts by Thomas Ohlson, Kristine Höglund, and others; the cooperation with the Kroc Institute partly rests on a grant from the National Science Foundation to Erik Melander; and the Otago connection is pursued by Isak Svensson and Karen Brouncus.

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2 The Uppsala code of ethics for scientists¹

Bengt Gustafsson, Lars Rydén, Gunnar Tibell and Peter Wallensteen

Ethical problems in research

What can we do to stop the armament race and promote peace? In particular, what can we scientists do? The obvious risk of nuclear disaster makes it necessary for any scientist to scrutinize his/her own resources, and to try new unconventional ways to contribute to global disarmament and a reasonable future. One of these resources is the scientist's own personal appreciation of right and wrong, that is, our ethics. In the following we shall describe an attempt to mobilize this resource in order to affect the choice of research field and application of research.

At Uppsala University a small group of scientists has met regularly since 1981 to penetrate ethical problems of research. The variety of disciplines represented (natural sciences, medicine, social sciences, technology, law, theology) has greatly contributed to making the meetings fruitful. From an early stage, the seminar has attempted to formulate a code of ethics for scientists. A first proposal for such a code was circulated in late 1982 and, based on the debate that followed, the seminar published a final version of the code in early 1984 (see Box 2.1).

Box 2.1 Code of ethics for scientists

Scientific research is an indispensable activity of great significance to mankind – for our description and understanding of the world, our material conditions, social life, and welfare. Research can contribute to solving the great problems facing humanity, such as the threat of nuclear war, damage to the environment, and the uneven distribution of the Earth's resources. In addition, scientific research is justified and valuable as a pure quest for knowledge, and it should be pursued in a free exchange of methods and findings. Yet research can also, both directly and indirectly, aggravate the problems of mankind.

This code of ethics for scientists has been formulated as a response to a concern about the applications and consequences of scientific research. In particular it appears that the potential hazards deriving from modern technological warfare are so overwhelming that it is doubtful whether

establish general patterns – correlates – that could be seen as causes of war. Some may be closer to the original intention of testing different realist theories (Vasquez 2000). Others have used the data for studies that included dimensions other than power and weaponry, such as democracy, interrelationships and international organization (Russett and Oneal 2001). Indeed, the finding that democratic states rarely fight each other in war, the ‘democratic peace’, has become one of the most quoted results based on COW data.

The focus has remained on war, although no longer on world wars, major power wars or even inter-state wars, but on civil wars and terrorism. This evolution of research interest closely corresponds to the political agenda, of course. This means that research that today may appear ‘academic’ may again acquire stronger meaning as global conditions change. Still, some discernible constants can be seen in the thinking about wars, whatever their specific type.

The debate on the causes of conflict remains wide-ranging and is often subsumed under very general headings such as ‘liberal’ versus ‘realist’. There are many different ways of making inferences from such labels. In Chapter 4 a contribution is reproduced assembling thinking on the causes of war into four basic categories: *Realpolitik*, *Geopolitik*, *Idealpolitik* and *Kapitalpolitik*. This typology attempts to bring together thoughts about the way major power relations are structured. When organizing thinking in such categories, it is also possible to establish which theories have had the most scholarly attention. For instance, the Correlates of War project was largely concerned with *Realpolitik* thinking (alliances, military expenditures, military capabilities etc.) as a reservoir of hypotheses on war. In that sense, many of the theories that were tested with COW data were close to the political dilemmas in the days of the Cold War: Was NATO useful for the USA and for peace? Should military expenditures be increased, for instance with more nuclear weapons to maintain peace? What were the dangers of arms races?

This means that understandings of geography and territory were mostly on the sidelines, only to forcefully be put on the agenda by Vasquez (1995). He could quickly demonstrate that this perspective was equally valid. Territory may seem invariable, but indeed there were variations in both control and perceptions of its value. Thus there was again room for *Geopolitik* scholarly thinking and perspectives. What came out of the work by Vasquez was probably closer to decision-making discussions in Europe and Asia, which all lived with major powers close to their borders.

However, matters of political systems and ideologies – the matters that belong to the *Idealpolitik* domain – were not originally part of the COW programme. Studies seemed to show that democratic states were as much involved in wars as were non-democratic (Maoz and Abdolali 1989). As we just mentioned, this dimension was energized in the post-Cold War period, captured by the eye-catching phrase of a ‘democratic peace’. Russett could demonstrate that it seemed to matter what type of regimes were in conflict with one another, that is, the dyadic element was important; this meant focusing on the relations between states (e.g. one democratic state versus another), not just on their attributes. It was a statistical demonstration that *Idealpolitik* matters, also seen in Maoz and Abdolali (1989). This was a theme

already in the present author's PhD dissertation in 1973 (partly done with Bruce Russett at Yale University in 1969). The work of Russett (1993) as well as Maoz (Maoz and Russett 1993) formed the discussion on inter-state conflict. Hegre and colleagues (2001) also took up the issue of the democratic peace in internal armed conflict. This in turn has led to a debate on the importance of democratization, for both inter- and intra-state conflict (Russett 2005). Thus, international affairs are no longer analysed simply in terms of *Realpolitik* considerations.

However, the fourth notion, the one of *Kapitalpolitik*, remained under-studied. In the Cold War period it received almost no attention in mainstream work, apart from theories that discussed capabilities and possible connections to power transitions (Gilpin 1981). It was, however, important in the Marxist literature, although seldom operationalized, in ways that could be tested and thus be potentially refutable. It may never have made a strong impact on leading American scholarship, but was influential in the rest of the world, in spite of poor underpinnings with modern methods. The present author's dissertation (Wallenstein 1973) was an attempt to demonstrate the utility of such approaches, but also their limitations. Galtung, by then, had already published his work on structural violence, which also had an empirical application ('A Structural Theory of Imperialism', 1971, which remains one of his most quoted articles). A grandiose attempt to integrate such perspectives into a new way of writing world history is the world system approach, initiated in the 1970s and primarily championed by Immanuel Wallerstein (1974).

However, since the end of the Cold War – and the demise of official Marxism, remarkably *Kapitalpolitik* notions have gained more prominence. As just noted, Russett's work included studies on trade. However, the *Kapitalpolitik* approach by Galtung and Marxists was also concerned with who would benefit from the trade, not just the fact that there was trade. The possibility of trade being exploitative was central. This focused on whether interactions were generating more spin-off effects for one than for the other (who might even suffer negative spin-offs). The new idea of 'Capitalist Peace' (Weede 2005; Gartzke 2007), that capital markets are integrated and make cooperation more feasible, is thus intriguing. It seems to have convincing empirical support, even to the point at which one author argues that this is also what drives democratic peace (Gartzke 2007), in other words basic economics underpins *Idealpolitik*. It is, however, a perspective that emphasizes integration more than exploitation.

The idea of capitalist peace is so far only applied to inter-state relations, but there are parallel investigations which point to the role of economic dependencies in intra-state wars as well (Collier 2007, 2009). It comes closer to the idea of unequal gains, particularly as it connects to matters such as governance, corruption, access to arms and availability of exploitable resources. In scholarly discourse it has often been summed up as 'greed'. This concept makes the issue more a matter of personal desire than necessarily is the case. These theories are more structural in their basic assumptions.

This means that today the four schools are getting attention (although few researchers try to cover all of them at the same time) to arrive at some conclusions of their comparative strengths. The various controls in the quantitative studies of

inter-state democratic peace attempt to cover alternative explanations, but then have to rely on available indicators, which may or may not cover the original intent of the various schools of thought. Chapter 5 in this volume is an early attempt to carry out the task of applying indicators representing all four types of thinking. The results give a stronger role to *Idealpolitik* than has normally been the case and, perhaps, point towards the democratic peace notion. They also show that *Kapitalpolitik* considerations generate considerable disputes and confrontation, but that they rarely escalate into war. However, they find a role for *Geopolitik* as well as *Realpolitik*. These notions continue to be helpful in organizing ideas and findings, primarily for inter-state relations (see Wallensteen 2002, 2007, 2011).

Reducing the plurality of thinking of war to only four schools appears preposterous today. There are at least four other clusters that deserve the label of paradigms: feminist thinking, ecopolitics, ethnographic perspectives and humanism ('psychologism') would make for new ideas of how to understand relations between societies and humans. In particular, notions such as 'equal peace' are more important, bringing attention to the gender effects of war and peace (Tickner 1992; Caprioli 2005; Olsson 2009). Issues of climate-induced conflict have generated a series of investigations, particularly of low-level conflicts (Nordås and Gleditsch 2007; Salehyan 2008). Ethnopolitical cleavages have also been given attention with the use of statistical analysis (Melander 1999; Fearon and Laitin 2003), whereas psychological factors still remain limited in their use for decision-making in war situations (Winter 2004). This opens up our thinking for many other ways to study the causes of war. It remains to demonstrate these additional perspectives more fully.

Still the thoughts on different schools and issues as important for understanding peace and war laid the ground for the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) (see more in Chapter 8). In this programme the particular notion of an incompatibility is central. This refers to a fundamental disagreement as basic for why disputes would escalate to war. The author's work in the early 1980s (Chapters 5 and 6) demonstrated empirically that territory and governance were significant variables. The connections to these schools of thought also made clear that there were strong theoretical reasons for this. Thus, as incompatibilities, they became significant in UCDP. Relating back to the study in Chapter 5, two incompatibilities became part of the definition of an armed conflict: conflicts over government and over territory. Later research (see Part III) shows that this was also important for peace agreements; the pattern of agreements and their durability varies with respect to the incompatibility.

War and historical change

The COW data now cover almost two centuries. This is unique and should stimulate research on trends and causes. The data can also be used to write history in a more systematic way, something that has not yet been attempted. Chapter 4 is not only a way of working on the four theoretical frameworks, it also provides for dividing the world into a series of consecutive systems, based primarily on

the number of major powers. Systems thinking was (and is) basic to COW and corresponds also to a practitioner's understanding of why some things are comparable and others are not. The systems emerging from COW definitions as well as published results are identified in Chapter 4 as a Euro-centric system from 1816 to 1895, an interregional system from 1896 to 1944 and a global system since 1945. The basis for the distinction was the number of major powers, as defined by COW. Chapters 5 and 6 apply the distinctions, with some further specifications in Chapter 6, seeing more changes in shorter periods. These chapters were written in the early 1980s, and they require updating. The COW data have been revised since then, for instance, but no such work is done in these chapters for this volume. However, here it can be useful to provide some reflections, building on what has happened in the world as well as within the COW project. This can be related to Chapters 4, 5 and 6.

In the latest iteration, the COW project has introduced two new major powers from 1990 (Sarkees and Wayman 2010: 34–36). These are Germany (reunited in 1990 to again have the full resources and the stature of being a major power, not just a potential major battlefield) and Japan (thanks to its economic growth, but possibly also its increased activity in the United Nations).

There is no doubt a historical turning point at the end of the 1980s. COW's temporal delimitations are built on scholarly consensus. The change may not be captured, however, only by the fact that there were two new major powers. Also, the exact turning point can be discussed and it tells something about the criteria for finding change. It has been convenient to place the change at 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall (as a tangible result of a policy shift taking place earlier). It would, thus, relate the change to events on German soil. It could as well be dated to 1985 (the year when the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev came into power and had a first summit meeting with US President Ronald Reagan), thus pointing to what became a fundamental shift in the Soviet Union and in US–Soviet relations, including a first, radical nuclear disarmament treaty in 1987. It could also be set at the end of 1991 with the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union, thus reducing the status of this nation as a superpower to one in a category of a regional major power. The endpoint will also say something about the starting point: what was the Cold War actually all about? If it was about the handling of Germany, the country's reunification becomes a logical endpoint. If it was about nuclear weapons and the fears they generated, 1987 becomes a significant break-point. If it was about ideology, then the end of the Soviet Union also becomes the final date, as this meant an ideological shift in one of the poles of the Cold War. Economically, it meant the opening of Russia for international investment and a new, vast market for exports.

Such delimitations have an effect, of course, on the way one looks at wars. In concrete terms it would determine whether the US intervention in Panama in December 1989 (too small for COW to include as war, nevertheless an armed conflict by UCDP standards, opposed by the Soviet Union at that) or the Gulf Crisis of August 1990–March 1991 (demonstrating remarkable US–Soviet cooperation) should be seen as part of the 'old order' or the beginning of a new one. It may be

convenient to make the cut-off at 1 January 1990, it being obvious by that time that Germany was likely to be reunited (which it was in October the same year). At that time it was also clear that the Soviet understanding of its role as a global power was changing, notably with agreed withdrawals of its own or allied troops from Angola, Afghanistan and Cambodia.

Thus, the post-Cold War period began, with more major powers than had been the case previously (now seven in all), but at the same time with one pre-eminent beyond all the others (even taken together, US military expenditures would be higher; SIPRI 2009). Possibly one could call this a period of *Pax Americana*. In reality it may have been the closest we are likely to be in the decades to come to a unipolar world. The United States no doubt had a unique position, perhaps comparable only to the stature it had immediately after the Second World War. In the 1990s the American preferred diplomacy was to exert influence with occasional use of air power (Yugoslavia in 1995, Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998, Kosovo in 1999) rather than engaging ground forces (as was done in Somalia in 1993, and thus avoided in Rwanda the following year). The USA was the undisputed leader, the most prominent of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, in the UN referred to as the P5. One could be termed P1 (see Chapter 7 for more on this).¹

In the 2000s, force had again become prominent in America's conduct of international relations against Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as in Somalia, Yemen, Pakistan and other places where semi-clandestine operations could take place against (alleged) terrorist groups. Even if the military force was overwhelming, the sheer fact that it had to be used may be an indication of changing times. The USA was challenged, and not only by non-state organizations. Following 11 September 2001 the relationships changed between the United States and all other actors. The world saw an assertive major power, demanding and taking a pre-eminent role and expecting the others to cooperate (some did, for instance in the war on Iraq in 2003; most others did not).

The Obama administration was elected in 2008 by an electorate that wanted a different approach. It wanted the USA to withdraw from armed conflicts and focus on its own domestic agenda. Again, the USA has to look for allies to do a job it cannot and does not want to do alone. There are many options. The choice remains to be seen, notably China (in a group of two, a so-called G2 configuration), Russia (Euro-Atlantic cooperation), G20 (involving Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, South Korea and others) or other constellations. These questions have to be asked as there were shifts occurring suggesting a gradual move to a more multilateral world for how states could operate. This was not all; there was also a more complex world with non-governmental actors as well as non-state actors dealing with global issues according to their own agendas.² These issues are important to explore and a beginning is made to that in Chapter 7, which, by necessity, is more speculative and forward-looking.

Table 3.1 uses the data from the COW project, dividing the era since 1816 into the four periods we have just seen to be important. It thus complements the arguments from Chapter 5, which builds on the information that was available in

Table 3.1 Historical systems and wars: Correlates of War data, 1816–2007

<i>System</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Length of period (years)</i>	<i>Number of inter-state wars</i>	<i>Number of intra-state wars</i>	<i>Intra-state wars as percentage of all wars</i>
Euro-centric	1816–1895	80	27	103	79.2
Inter-regional	1896–1944	49	30	59	66.3
Global	1945–1989	45	29	111	79.3
Post-Cold War	1990–2007	18	9	61	87.1

Source: Sarkees and Wayman (2010).

Note

The column to the right includes all intra-state wars as a percentage of all intra- and inter-state wars for each period.

the early 1980s. In particular, Table 3.1 shows that intra-state conflict has always been the most common, comprising at least two-thirds of all conflicts throughout the period. Thus, the fact that such conflicts have been so neglected is testimony to the prevalence of strategic and perhaps *Realpolitik* thinking. Inter-state relations have been seen as the ones determining the future of the state. However, for most local residents the much more frequent experience of intra-state conflict is likely to be more of a problem.

There are important variations among these four consecutive inter-state systems. For instance, between 1896 and 1944 intra-state conflicts were at their lowest and in the following historical periods they have become as common as they were in the 1800s. This period, of course, includes the two world wars, and they can legitimately be said to have coloured thinking in peace research as well as world politics in general. Still, this makes it clear that today's prevalence of intra-state conflict is nothing new. The novelty may be that, in a more integrated world, the domestic conditions of countries are as important as their international relationships.

This also suggests that there may be rather different instruments needed to deal with these challenges to humankind. Inter-state relations may more readily be affected by overall major power relations, whereas the same may not be true for intra-state conditions. In Chapter 6 this is approached by defining the quality of major power relationships in terms of particularist and universalist relations. This has turned out to be a reasonable way to understand the onset of inter-state war (Schahezinski 1991; Valeriano with Theo 2009). It is likely to be affected by overall major power relations. In periods of universalist approaches, this means a preference for cooperation and, thus, a will from major powers to contain such conflicts, as they may have a potential to affect international relations in general. In particularist periods, however, the attitude would be different: such conflicts can be exploited for major power purposes and thus be used against the adversary. Further arguments on this are found in Chapter 6.

For the 192 years the COW project identifies 421 inter-state wars and intra-state conflicts. In addition it also documents more than 200 extra-state conflicts

Table 3.2 Universalist and particularist approaches in inter- and intra-state wars:
Correlates of War data, 1816–2007

<i>Period</i>	<i>Inter-state wars per year (and total number)</i>	<i>Intra-state wars per year (and total number)</i>
Particularist	0.59 (53)	1.46 (131)
Universalist	0.41 (42)	2.00 (203)

(largely colonial wars) and non-state wars. Table 3.2 emerges from the first two categories. It demonstrates that, both in absolute number and in relation to the length of the two types of periods, there is a difference between the frequencies of inter-state wars and intra-state wars: universalist times have fewer of the former, but more of the latter. This seems to be in line with a relaxed approach to intra-state conflicts: they are not part of power rivalries and can be allowed to go on. Inter-state conflicts, however, have to be contained. In the particularist periods, the result is the reverse: it is more important to gain advantage over the opposing side, thus inter-state conflicts are not contained. Intra-state conflicts may be fewer, as the focus is on inter-state relations, but military interventions may also be more likely, which could affect the onset of such conflicts.

The relationship between wars and the quality of major power relations, however, should not be exaggerated. It can shift more quickly than structural relationships. The approach taken depends to a large degree on the internal conditions of major powers. Thus, the *détente* of the 1970s ended rather abruptly – intentionally or not on the part of the Soviet leadership – with the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan in 1979. The period, which had included engagement across the Cold War divide since Presidents Nixon and Ford, was initially continued by President Carter, but he had to shift his position. Thus, the approach to international affairs is affected by events in global relations. This is not unusual and can go in both directions. Carter's successor, President Reagan, won the 1980 election on a platform of hostile policy to the adversaries (at that time not only the Soviet Union but also Iran), but in 1985 he embarked on a very constructive policy of universalism. This policy, remarkably, survived the shifts both in the USA and in the Soviet Union, including into the Russian Federation. Only after 11 September 2001 did the United States take a more typical particularist approach. Thus, we can see that international relations are affected by such internal changes of policy, which in turn can be triggered by a domestic interpretation of preceding international events. It is, however, likely that major power approaches to intra-state conditions do not follow the same logic so easily.

With this in mind, it is now time for the reader to confront the following chapters.

Notes

- 1 In retrospect, 1996 may have been the peak year for US global standing. It had successfully helped end the war in Bosnia and was not fighting anywhere else; and its economy

was doing very well, having paid off debts and brought balance to its budget following the Reagan years. Russia was still weak and China, India and Brazil had only begun to lay the groundwork for the remarkable period of growth that was to follow in the early 2000s.

- 2 This was dramatically illustrated in 2010 with the Wikileaks publishing of hundreds of thousands of documents from the US Defense and State Departments on the Internet.

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4 Four models of major power politics

*Geopolitik, Realpolitik, Idealpolitik and Kapitalpolitik*¹

The system of states

Traditionally, the study of conflict between states has had two main foci: the state and the individual. There are good reasons for both, and research may progress most by concentrating on the interaction between the two. Although there are strong arguments for synthesis, there is also a need for the elements to be clear enough to coalesce. The study of the system of states has still not reached the maturity required for a process of amalgamation.

'Conflict' is indeed a loose word, referring to the abstract incompatibility between two parties as well as to actual destructive behaviour. The most pertinent question, then, is: which types of incompatibilities are the most important for giving rise to conflict behaviour between two parties? To this, the following study is devoted, with the states as the actors to be scrutinized. The formulation of the object of study also suggests that conflict, that is, the incompatibility, can best be understood by examining the relationship between parties. Together, such relationships make a system. The system of states, then, is the starting point for the following investigation: which incompatibilities, it is asked, are most likely to give rise to conflict behaviour (i.e. war and military confrontations) between which members of a given system?

The system of states (or the state system; these notions will be used interchangeably in the following) has some unique features as a social system. Other social systems, such as the system of competing business enterprises or the system of rivalling parties, have some elements in common with the system of states. The totality of the state system is, however, unique. This can be seen when analysing the defining characteristics of the state. In political science, the state is defined as the only authority having legitimate use of physical violence.² This means, first, that the state system is composed of *independent* actors. Certainly sovereignty between actors could also be found in other social systems, for instance between parties competing for power or companies competing for profit. Thus, the independence of the actors is not unique in itself. The uniqueness arises from a combination of sovereignty with other properties of this very system. Independence, however, is often seen as *the* mark of the international system even to the point at which scholars would describe this system as 'anarchical'.³ Such a description is hardly

a valid one, since the concept of 'anarchical' carries with it non-analytical connotations of chaos. The system is much more organized than is conveyed by the choice of word. Anarchy would mean that the system is 'without rulers', but it is more precise to say that the system *has too many rulers*. If Greek should be used for describing this system, *polyarchical* would be a more fitting term.¹

The second attribute of the system of states is the one of *territorial control*. Other systems of independent actors have a different way of relating to territory: companies may close down their plants or move their headquarters, parties may gain or lose support in a given area, humans may move from one community to another, or even from one state to another. The state, however, is stuck to the territory it is controlling. Certainly, the territory can be enlarged or reduced, but, if territorial control vanishes, the state vanishes. Exile governments may exist for some time, but only with support of other states. Territoriality, then, is a special characteristic of the state. The inter-state system is organized to the extent borders are clearly defined between different states. This system, in other words, becomes concerned with territorial extension, borders and defence, in a way no other social system does.

The third attribute of the state system is its legitimate control of *physical violence*. This is the focal point of the political science definition of the state, and certainly distinguishes the state from all other actors. It has a profound impact on inter-state relations. This can be appreciated if we make the theoretical experiment of equipping competitors with arms: peaceful competition between companies rapidly becomes transformed into 'wars', and, as a matter of fact, situations with political parties fighting one another with weapons are normally termed 'civil wars'. Supposedly the latter are 'civil' because they are less professional than 'military' wars, and also because they challenge the supreme (military) authority of the state. The state, in other words, is a military actor. Its monopoly control of arms is the 'normal' state of affairs, and refusal to accept this will be resisted. States will oppose other actors becoming armed, that is to say, the fight against terrorism, gangsterism and homicide is crucial. The maintenance of monopoly control of arms internally arises from two different considerations, one being the citizens' demand for 'law and order' (the right of not being robbed), the other the state's own desire to maintain its monopoly.

A fourth attribute of the state system is its *economic authority*, the state (or its various subdivisions) being the sole legitimate collector of money from the inhabitants (taxes) and from the goods moving across its borders (tariffs). The economic authority historically is not unrelated to the attributes just mentioned. It is costly to hold an army to guard a given territory. Thus, the state has never been 'outside' economics, as some writing on neoclassical economic theory would like to have it. Its military functions have more frequently been integrated into economic theory as a 'collective good'. Historically, the state has been a very important investor (not only in the military field), controller of monetary flows and regulator of foreign trade.⁵ The relatively low state participation in, for instance, the early economic development of the United States is exceptional rather than typical. Also other actors have economic functions, but political parties rely on voluntary

contributions, and companies rely on their ability to sell. Only the state has the authority to demand money from inhabitants. No doubt, its control of physical means simplifies this task.

Finally, states – being equipped with the authority to arrest, subjugate, tax and even kill people – are in need of *legitimacy*. If the operations of the state were illegitimate, the state would appear to the inhabitants as just another ‘terrorist’. Indeed, even terrorists try to justify their actions with general principles. In order to exert authority and to make people carry out orders (which could be destructive to other human beings) it needs convincing justification. This is not a property unique to the state. All human beings try to give their actions some purpose. The legitimacy of the state, then, becomes exceptional only in combination with the above-mentioned traits.

Together these five attributes make the state unique as an actor and the system of states becomes a system without parallel. This does not mean the system cannot be studied, however. There are, as already indicated, *partial* similarities with other systems, which can provide fertile ground for comparison and evaluation.⁶ Furthermore, the system can be compared over time, as the system continuously changes. The basic, defining characteristics of the system take different values at different time. Such an *historical comparative approach* is the one to be attempted here.

One assumption and four models

Looking more closely at the five attributes, one differs from the others in an important way: the independence of the state. A given piece of territory can be divided between different states, be annexed to another state or constitute a state of its own. States thus emerge through interaction with other states. A large number of the presently existing states are the results of separation, amalgamation, or annexation. Once a given grouping is accepted as a state by other states, it will continuously be moulded by its relations to the others. This process forms its territorial extension and its military and economic strength as well as its legitimacy. The self-preservation of the state, then, appears not only as a requirement to be an actor but also as a goal for the state itself: *to preserve the organization as an organization*. Actors tend to prefer to remain actors.

The overriding concern of the state to remain an actor may contradict other interests favouring, for instance, integration into another state, acceptance of a global economic community or the joining of a military pact. Different and contradictory forces will come into play, shape the state or even lead to its cessation: history, indeed, witnesses the demise of entire civilizations. The feeling that no state is eternal might explain the state’s very obsession with its own survival. The perception of threats and dangers, and its interpretation of the unknown as being of shady colour, are thus part of the milieu of the state. Primitive fear may be driven away by the hope of attaining security, the concept most frequently used to describe the ultimate aim of the state.⁷

In the following, the independence of states will be taken for granted, thus focusing the analysis on the other four characteristics outlined. This means

excluding the highly important problem of dependence. This can be empirically justified only by concentrating on states that are regarded as highly independent from one another: the major powers in the system. It could be debated how independent these states in fact are. Nevertheless, it appears correct to say that they are the most independent actors in the inter-state system. This means that the question of independence has to be kept in mind when dealing with any of the other relations in the inter-state system. Certainly, interaction between big powers and smaller ones will have dependence as a major concern, at least on the part of the smaller ones. Also, relationships between smaller nations are strongly affected by their links to greater powers in the system.⁸

A more precise analysis of the four traits is required. It is appropriate to do this by regarding them as the basis for four different analytical models. These models are labelled and presented in Table 4.1. Two labels suggest themselves: *Geopolitik* and *Realpolitik*. The former concept was introduced by the Swedish scholar Rudolf Kjellén in 1916, and gained adherence particularly in Germany. It explicitly assumed independence as the basis for the state's policy vis-à-vis other states, and it was in particular concerned with geographically natural boundaries. Certainly, such considerations had been made before and had even been formalized, but the label remains with Kjellén.⁹

Realpolitik is also connected with Germany, or, to be more precise, Prussia. It was coined by a German journalist, August Ludwig von Rochau, in a book published in 1848 laying down the foundations of power politics. The concept was introduced in order to separate real politics from philosophical speculation. The strong, according to von Rochau, could not accept to be ruled by the weak. Certainly, this idea was not new, but again the label was.¹⁰

Both the mentioned authors were mixing analysis and normative statements, aiming not merely at telling the 'truth' but at influencing the course of events in certain directions. Both authors, incidentally, were favouring the rise of German power and both scored some success. *Geopolitik* was undoubtedly an element in Hitler's thinking on inter-state relations, and Bismarck became more connected to the term *Realpolitik* than its inventor. Also, one might add, both policies in a long-term perspective ended with disaster, and not only for Germany.¹¹

Geopolitik, then, is the politics of territory, resources and size of the state. Here, *Geopolitik* will be restricted to the concern with territory, borders and neighbours. This may dilute some meaning of the concept, but serves to make the analysis more precise.

Realpolitik particularly devotes itself to the question of military power. Victory and defeat, uses of military might, alliance patterns and arms technology are among its key variables. The state is of primary interest because of its control of military might.

This leaves two models, which, as of now, lack labels. In order to follow the Germanic language already introduced and indeed linking the thinking to a great German scholar, the concern with economic conditions could be termed *Kapitalpolitik*. In this analysis, it will orient our work to the development of industry and international commerce.¹²

Table 4.1 Four models of inter-state relations. Basic assumption: preservation of state (security)

	<i>Geopolitik</i>	<i>Realpolitik</i>	<i>Idealpolitik</i>	<i>Kapitalpolitik</i>
<i>Ordering concept</i>	<i>Territorial extension</i>	<i>Military capability</i>	<i>Legitimizing principle</i>	<i>Economic advancement</i>
<i>Ranking</i>				
1 Concepts	Core-periphery	Major-minor power	Legitimate-non-legitimate	Advanced-backward
2 Criteria for ranking	Size Location	Number of arms Quality of arms	Number of believers Closeness to origin	Amounts Inventiveness
<i>Conflict expected</i>				
1 Locus	Intersection of core areas	Declining majors	Emerging principles (revolution)	Emerging technologies
2 Dyads	Core-core	Major-major	Old-new	Old, advanced-new, advancing
<i>Historical turning points (criteria for)</i>				
1 Redistribution	Territorial change between core states in core areas	Victory/defeat between majors	Old principle gaining over other old principle	Stagnation of advanced
2 Creation	Formation of new sizeable states	Emergence of new armed states	Emergence of new principle over old one	New technologies, rapid advancement
3 Disintegration	Break-up of sizeable core area states	Defeat, disarmament of a major	Competing claims to original closeness	Overdevelopment, crisis, underdevelopment

Furthermore, the concept of *Realpolitik* was, by its very inventor, considered the counterpoint to the concept of morals. Above it was argued that legitimacy is needed for the state to operate smoothly. It might even be more important than *Realpolitik* itself. The principles of legitimacy used for the state, then, are its *Idealpolitik*. The contradictory nature of *Idealpolitik* is not only that it can be used by the state, but also that it affects the state, as holders of power are shaped by the principles of legitimacy themselves. Indeed, *Realpolitik* analysts constantly expose the contradictory phenomenon of power-holders refusing to accept the simple dynamics of *Realpolitik* alone.¹³

It should be repeated that Table 4.1 uses the state as point of departure. There is little difficulty in isolating other models which would involve the state, but departing from other elements in the social system. Thus, we could think of, or

even normatively prefer, models of *Humanpolitik*, seeing the human being as the measure of all, rather than the state, or *Ekopolitik*, departing from a concern of global environment rather than a given state. However, such global perspectives will still have to come to grips with states that refuse to wither away.

Table 4.1 presents systemic aspects of the four models, that is, the approaches they would take to understanding the world, if brought down to their basics. Thus, we assume *Geopolitik* to be concerned purely with territory, *Realpolitik* only with military victory, etc. In this 'pure' form, each model has to find its own criteria for important decisions such as ranking of states in the system, location of incompatibilities and dyads of conflicts as well as ways of finding historical turning-points. As the models all deal with the same inter-state system, ranking, conflict and change have to be accounted for.

In Table 4.1, concepts have been used in order to polarize the models as much as possible. Certainly, some adherents of one given school would object to some concepts used: geopolitical analysts, for instance, using 'big power' as frequently as *Realpolitik* writers. However, this would tend to obscure significant differences. Our object here is instead to clarify the 'world' as seen from the basic ordering concept. Thus, the words used for each model are designed to convey different world perspectives.

Each of the dimensions presented in Table 4.1 can be operationalized. To determine the size of the territory of a given state provides relatively little difficulty (although, at certain occasions, the actual control over claimed areas might be disputed). Size is a quantitative criterion, and such criteria are found for other models as well.

The second criterion for ranking is of a more qualitative nature and, hence, more difficult to grasp. 'Location' refers to the *Geopolitik* theories dividing the world into 'Heartland' and 'Rimland', thus departing from a notion of an 'objective' centre from which the rest of the world can be controlled. Such notions rest on the observation that the world's fragmented geography makes certain spots more important than others, for instance for transportation. *Geopolitik* analysts, then, work from a notion of what is central and what is not. An empirical treatment of the question would, for instance, look at patterns of communication.

Quality in military matters poses the question of military software: military might consists not only of numbers but also of organization, strategy and relative sophistication of weapons. In the nuclear age, vulnerability has become one indicator of 'weakness', but earlier ages may have had similar notions, related to other types of weapons.

To try to rank states with respect to *Idealpolitik* might surprise at the outset, but nevertheless constitutes an important concern for many writers. As each state has to consider its legitimacy, it will also have arguments for its particular legitimacy vis-à-vis states building on the same principle (e.g. monarchical rule resting on lineage, Communist rule on closeness to Marx), as well as states building on contradictory principles (e.g. monarchies given by God versus rule by the people, or Communist rule being superior to other types because it expresses the unfolding development of the modes of production).

Finally, *Kapitalpolitik* provides simple measures for inventiveness, for instance resources channelled into research and development or share of GDP devoted to productive investments.

The four models, however, are not restricted to a procedure of ranking. Our chief concern is their conflict prediction. This leads to the next dimension presented in Table 4.1. The models will all devote themselves to the questions of *where* and *between whom* incompatibilities will exist. The answer to these questions will, furthermore, reveal something of the theoretical underpinnings, the *why?* of the model.

The *Geopolitik* analyst is particularly concerned with intersections, for instance between Heartland and Rimland. In particular, this leads to a concern for core states in core areas. Borders are either solutions or causes of conflict. Conflicts are seen as the results of 'outward pushes' whereby states try to move their border. This 'push' thus becomes a crucial driving force, which, incidentally, is often left unanalysed. It is simply taken for granted, or enhanced by reasoning not necessarily derived from *Geopolitik* considerations. Core states 'pushing' outwards are expected to 'meet' other core states, and friction will be the result. The argument points to the 'risks' for peripheral states of being neighbours to core states, and, in particular, to the 'necessity' for neighbouring core states to be in constant conflict with one another. The more core states based in one and the same region of the world, the more conflict can be expected.¹⁴

The *Realpolitik* model emphasizes military might and primarily expects well-armed states to be concerned with one another: threats to the security of one come from the weapons of the other. To 'lag' behind other majors is, then, highly 'dangerous' for a given actor. Such 'declining' majors could easily become targets for other majors, who might 'rush in' to take their spoils or prevent others from taking too big a share. Major powers, following this line of thought, are in conflict because they are afraid, and, thus, need to react and guard themselves. The driving force is 'fear' leading to expansionism to eliminate the perceived threat. At one point or another, the drive to rid oneself of fear becomes a drive for global dominance. Thus, the major powers would be governed by paranoid tendencies, nervously reacting to the moves of others, and interpreting them in the worst possible light.¹⁵ Basically, the powers fear defeat. Earlier experience of victory and defeat, then, would have a significant impact on major powers and their behaviour.

Idealpolitik reasoning also rests on 'fear', but in this case the principle of legitimacy is the means of alleviation. Ideology gives persuasive arguments to the leaders as well as to the led, justifying why some belong to one category and others do not. The just cause gives strength and makes it possible to endure hardship. The 'fear' underlying *Idealpolitik* analysis is the fear of having one principle replaced by another: revolution (also termed counter-revolution, when history is read in a linear fashion, giving room for only one revolution) is the nightmare. Fundamental revolutions change the patterns of perception, bring new leaders to the forefront, and are seldom restricted to the country where the revolution takes place. The continuous existence of several leading principles contesting and

contradicting each other would thus constitute a major incompatibility, and lead to conflicts in dyads of states supporting contradictory principles.¹⁶

Finally, the conflict expectations in the *Kapitalpolitik* model emphasized technological change; new technologies will replace old ones. This means that new actors emerge, although through a less dramatic process than in *Idealpolitik* revolutions. The most advanced state, the model suggests, will be conscious in keeping its leadership, simultaneously trying to prevent the competitor from overtaking. Thus, incompatibility exists between old corporations and new ones, between old professions and new ones, and, consequently, between states advancing on new technologies over states relying on old. Again the driving force could be fear, but more likely a fear linked to profits or benefits in monetary terms rather than the simple zero-sum game of *Realpolitik*.¹⁷

Taken together, the four models point to *change* as the most important factor in conflict. Rising states are expected to contradict leading ones; advanced ones are expected to exploit the declining ones. Strength comes from different sources, being the vast territory in the case of *Geopolitik* (but, the sceptic could wonder, would not vast territory lead to satisfaction, rather than a 'push outward?'), the fear of becoming vulnerable to defeat for *Realpolitik* (but, the same opponent might ask, the more invulnerable one actor is, the greater the other's fear?), the danger of being replaced by an illegitimate order for *Idealpolitik* (but perhaps all orders are equally legitimate or illegitimate?), and the possible loss of leadership in the case of *Kapitalpolitik* (whatever the cost/benefit calculus of leading is?). Change and dynamics, looking ahead rather than looking back, direct the course of the system.

The models, consequently, should be suitable for describing change, and this is what Table 4.1 captures in its third dimension. Change takes primarily three forms for the high-ranked states in the system: redistribution (or reallocations) between them, creation of new high-ranked states and disintegration of older ones. The system, then, is thought to change when the relationships between the high-ranked states change. The four models suggest highly different criteria for observing such change, ranging from territorial redistribution by military victory to revolution or economic crisis. These criteria primarily locate disruption, rather than 'stability' between points in time. Thus, change creates new conditions on which policies have to be formed, but the actual description of a new situation is not readily given by the models. 'Stability', from this perspective, is nothing but non-change. This very 'stability' is what is here termed the structural characteristics of the system. We have also argued that different structural conditions give rise to different policies. In this chapter, however, we concentrate on structure rather than policy.

Three state systems in 160 years

The Correlates of War (COW) project at the University of Michigan provides information on inter-state relations since 1816. As this chapter uses the project's data as its basis, some reflections on the 160 years up to 1976 are necessary. The project has mostly treated the entire period as one temporal unit, or as one global

system of states. It could be argued, however, departing from the four models, that this span of time actually exhibits some dramatic changes not easily accounted for in such an analysis. Concentrating on the leading states in the system, the system would change when these states change in some important respect. But this then presupposes a definition of 'leading state', which in turn can only be determined after we have defined the extent of the system, temporally as well as socially. Thus, all tasks become interrelated.

COW has solved this problem by resorting to scholarly consensus. This results in the listing of nine 'major powers' (COW's terminology) for the entire period.¹⁸ Only three of these are majors for the whole period (England, France and Russia/USSR, although with short breaks for the last two), whereas two appear in 1816 but later drop out (Austria-Hungary, Prussia/Germany), two enter after 1816 but leave well before 1976 (Italy, Japan), and two enter late and remain in 1976 (United States, China). Thus, there is considerable temporal variation of major powers.

The scholarly consensus reported by COW provides a fruitful point of departure in discussing state systems since 1816. Such a discussion can be pursued in the categories provided by the four models of Table 4.1.

First, in order to define a state as a major, it needs to qualify as an actor: that is, have a certain internal stability and international recognition as an actor. This, one could assume, is the reason why the project includes China only from 1949, when the victory of the Communist Party provided unity to the country and, thus, could make it an actor in inter-state relations. Similarly, the unification of Italy in 1861 makes that country an actor. Second, however, there is a need for additional criteria in order to separate 'normal' actors from 'leading' ones. This is where the criteria for ranking become important, and also where fruitful discrepancies emerge between scholarly consensus and empirical indicators. For instance, it is generally agreed that the USA should be included as a major power from 1898. However, by the *Geopolitik* criterion of territory, the USA by 1816 was already larger than many of the majors. Also, by a *Realpolitik* indicator, such as arms expenditure, the USA passes other majors for a good part of the period before 1898. Furthermore, *ideally* the perception of 'freedom' in America had a strong appeal in European countries throughout the nineteenth century, and America was, by many European regimes, regarded as the most revolutionary of all states. Finally, by the *Kapitalpolitik* measure of iron production, the United States out-distanced Austria and Prussia already by 1816, and during the 1800s overtook the other majors one by one, finally even the United Kingdom by 1890.

Does this mean, then, that the scholars have missed such an important phenomenon as the USA? Probably not. Rather, they would argue that USA was of no significance in the whole state system but held a regional role. Thus, the USA could act as a strong state in the Western hemisphere and in the Pacific, but this would not involve it in contradictions with Europe-based leading countries. In some ways, the USA was outside the dominant system.

This is to propose that the entire state system of the 1800s consisted of several *regionally confined systems* only loosely tied together.¹⁹ One is the European region, from a global perspective a small one, highly populated, and divided into a large

number of states. Europe, furthermore, is the centre of a network reaching not only Northern Africa and the Middle East, but Southern Asia as well. A second region is the Americas, less populated, more spacious and with a colonial heritage built on the destruction of all indigenous state organization. Eastern Asia could be seen as a third region, including China, Indochina and adjacent islands (Japan and Taiwan). Finally, at the outset of the period of investigation (1816) most of Africa is a system on its own. As can be seen, these delimitations are not geographical, but account for social links and could be more closely determined by the use of the four models.

The leading region during the nineteenth century is undoubtedly the first one, the only one reaching out of its own geographical confines. The 1800s witness the continuous expansion of the Euro-centric region into the others, notably Africa, but also Eastern Asia. Challenges against Europe do not emerge until the end of the century, when Japan and the United States gradually emerge as rivals in *Real-* as well as *Kapitalpolitik* terms. The historical evaluation points to a change in the system by the 1890s: the United States and Japan both begin to build empires in much the same way as the Europeans, bringing themselves into interaction with these very European nations. The inter-state system thus gradually transforms itself from a *Euro-dominated world to an inter-regional one*, where geographical territory is disputed between countries not necessarily European.

If this holds true, it means that we would expect less discrepancy between the historian's rank order and those of the objective criteria for the period following 1920. The countries with the largest iron and steel production in the 1920s and the 1930s are the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, Italy, and Japan – all appearing on the scholarly list as major powers. These same countries are those spending most on armaments, thus indicating that our reasoning is correct.

New discrepancies emerge, however, following 1945. The scholarly consensus reported by the COW project gives five major powers, but three of these are out-distanced by non-majors on at least one measure: both Japan and West Germany have by 1970 a greater iron and steel production than the United Kingdom, France and China. Further, West Germany has, at times, greater military expenditures than France and the United Kingdom. On most measures of *Geo-*, *Kapital-*, and *Realpolitik* origin, however, the United States and the Soviet Union appear in a category of their own. Thus, these two powers, also leading in *Idealpolitik* for parts of the world, undoubtedly qualify as dominant states. The others, however, are either more regionally significant (for instance, the UK, France and China) or more sectorally significant (for instance, Japan and West Germany, with respect to *Kapitalpolitik*). These five states, in other words, appear on a lower level than the two first mentioned. Taking this together, however, the post-1945 period could best be described as a *global system*: the two leading states could operate globally, their influence not being confined to clear geographical regions or to certain sectors.

This means that, using changes in composition and relative weight among major states as the criteria, the epoch stretching from 1816 to 1976 could be conceived of as *three consecutive state systems*:

- 1 *The Euro-centric system* lasting from 1816 to 1895 with the regions of the world separated, although one region being more important.
- 2 *The inter-regional system*, witnessing increased interaction between the regions, but still with discernible differences between arenas of military action. This period covers the years 1896–1944.
- 3 *The global period*, with two global powers and a set of regionally significant ones: 1945 to present.

As this study encompasses the entire epoch of 1816–1976 we have four time-points which are regarded as major shifts. These are the years 1816, 1895/1896, 1944/1945 and 1976. The first as well as the last of these appear less important than the other two, and they are justified on other grounds than our four models. 1976 is a date of convenience. In retrospect, it might turn out as a date of significance, although not reshaping the entire system, at least marking a change in relations between global powers. The year of 1816 could perhaps be replaced by an earlier date, for instance 1789 or even 1648, if the study were to encompass the entire history of the system of states. However, the relative stability achieved in 1816 included traits of the four models, thus making that year a significant enough turning-point, and leaving a time-span sufficiently long for an analysis of the Euro-centric state system.

The turning-point 1895/1896 is arrived at through the following considerations: *geopolitically*, it meant the introduction of new arenas of contention among the majors (e.g. East Asia), *realpolitically*, the emergence of two new major powers and, *ideallypolitically*, the rise of anti-European nationalism (Japan). Finally, around 1895 there were significant *kapitalpolitik* changes, notably the USA overtaking the United Kingdom as the most important producer of iron and steel, and the high degree of industrialization achieved among most of the majors.²⁰

The years 1944/1945 mark a turning-point for reasons parallel to those of 1895/1896. *Geopolitically*, the outcome of the Second World War meant the end of Europe as an independent region, *realpolitically*, the emergence of two major contenders with new formidable weapons, *ideallypolitically*, the rise of a combined universalist–nationalist contradiction, and, *kapitalpolitically*, industrialization reaching new heights, at least among the already industrialized major powers.

The purpose of dividing the epoch 1816–1976 into three distinct periods is to achieve comparability. The way the distinctions have been made suggests that patterns of conflict, confrontation and war would be different between the three periods. This is what is then discussed in Chapter 5 of this book.

Notes

- 1 Sections of this chapter were presented at the First World Peace Science Congress, Harvard, June 1980; at the Nordic Theory Week, Oslo, August 1980; and at seminars at the Mental Health Research Institute, Ann Arbor, and the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala. Important comments from these presentations have been incorporated. I am also grateful to Klaus Jürgen Gantzel, Bjørn Hettne, Miroslav Nincic and J. David Singer for valuable suggestions. The original article is divided in

- two, one part constituting this Chapter 4, immediately followed by the second part, here reproduced as Chapter 5.
- 2 The exact formulations may vary and so do the emphases of different authors, but the heart of the matter is similar enough to state that there is a political science consensus on the definition. See, for instance, Lasswell, H.D. and A. Kaplan, *Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1950, pp. 181–185.
- 3 See, for instance, Waltz, Kenneth N., *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1959, ch. VI.
- 4 Wallensteen, P., 'Anarki, konflikt och krig', *Tiden*, 1979, 8.
- 5 Many political science definitions seem to miss the economic importance of the state. In an evolutionary perspective this becomes an important aspect. See, for instance, Tilly, C. (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975.
- 6 For instance, it is possible to compare the various subsystems of a given system by isolating subsystems on grounds of geographic proximity (regions, or military capability (small states). The question of independence, however, enters strongly into this type of comparisons.
- 7 On the concept of structure, see Wallensteen, Peter, *Structure and War: On International Relations, 1920–1968*, Stockholm: Rabén & Sjögren, 1973, p. 32.
- 8 The question of dependence and war constituted the central theme in Wallensteen, *op. cit.*
- 9 Kjellén, R., *Staten som livsform*, Stockholm: Hugo Gebers förlag, 1916, p. 13. See also Whittlescy, D., *German Strategy of World Conquest*, New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1942, ch. 5 in general, and p. 71 in particular, and Cohen, S. B., *Geography and Politics in a World Divided*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 44.
- 10 von Rochau, A. L., *Grundsätze der Realpolitik*, 1857 (2nd edn), cited in Pflanze, O., *Bismarck and the Development of Germany*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963, p. 48.
- 11 Hitler's links to *Geopolitik* served to discredit the entire field of political geography, something Whittlescy sought to undo, *op. cit.*
- 12 *Das Kapital* contained little on inter-state relations, but, of course, underlined the significance of industrialization for inter-class relations.
- 13 This prompts a leading *Realpolitik* scholar such as Hans J. Morgenthau to ask for a 'pathology' of international politics in order to understand the American policy in Vietnam, without seeing that this undermines the whole idea of power politics as rooted in objective laws of human nature; see *Politics among nations*, New York: Knopf, 1973 (5th edn), p. 7. Following a similar line of argument, John C. Stoessinger deplores the *Idealpolitik* of a series of American presidents: 'unfortunately the moralist mentality is embedded very deeply in America and seems to come in cycles', *Crusaders and Pragmatists*, New York: Norton, 1979, p. 289.
- 14 Often, *Geopolitik* writers refer to lofty drives of a sort similar to many other writers, but representing different models. Cohen talks about 'man's need for large space', *op. cit.*, p. 40, and Morgenthau states that the 'drives to live, to propagate and to dominate are common to all men', *op. cit.*, p. 34, pointing out that zoologists have found the drive to dominate 'even in animals', *loc. cit.*, note 5.
- 15 The obsession with 'threat' certainly differentiates the military world from the civilian one. Also, the more power possessed by a given actor, the more threats there appear to be. Thus, both the USA and the Soviet Union eagerly watch the moves of the other party, constantly fearing the worst. Thus, the most powerful are the fearful. Such *Realpolitik* paranoia can be reinforced by *Idealpolitik* considerations: Stalin, being the most powerful man in the Soviet Union, appears to have lived in constant fear of intrigues stimulated by his own interpretation of Marxism as well as his power position.

- 16 Interesting contradictions can emerge between a universalist ideology and an actor having less than universal influence: either ideologies have to adapt to the actors to which they apply (notably, the formulation of 'Socialism in One State' when no further Revolutions occurred after 1917) or the contradiction can be 'solved' by expansionism, aiming at making the message universally applicable. The latter certainly was in the minds of personalities as diverse as Mohammed and Napoleon.
- 17 It could, of course, be debated whether well-paid top executives in corporations or ministries actually strive to maximize their monetary returns. Perhaps they should be regarded as 'barons' rather than 'robbers' as E. J. Hobsbawm suggests when describing early American capitalists: they were maximizing power and building empires. The discussion would apply equally well to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, where, nominally, the 'robbers' have been abolished. See Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital*, New York: New American Library, 1979, p. 157.
- 18 Singer, J. D. and M. Small, *The Wages of War: A Statistical Handbook*, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1972, p. 23.
- 19 The conception of 'world systems' which do not cover the entire geographical 'world' was introduced by Wallerstein, I., *The Modern World-System*, New York: Academic Press, 1974, and the view of 'regions' as not confined to continents by Russett, B. M., *International Regions and the International System*, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967.
- 20 Also historians have emphasized this change, notably Barraclough, G., *An Introduction to Contemporary History*, Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1979, who, however, sees no significant shift around 1945.

16 Academics in peacemaking

Applied peace research

An ambition in early peace research was to also contribute directly to actions for peace. Knowledge that is generated through research also has to be brought to the public and have an impact on policy. This is, in some sense, what the taxpayers or donors are expecting from their funding, although what the impact could be cannot be predicted. This means that this volume now has come full circle. In Chapters 1 and 2 we discussed how to prevent research from being misused for purposes not consonant with the individual researcher's own convictions, for instance research results being used for war or repression. The Uppsala Code of Ethics was designed to provide guidance for this. However, in this part we need to discuss if and how a more positive approach can be developed. Research is not just for the academic community; it is also there to be applied. However, applied peace research is a topic on which very little has been written and there is a lack of empirical insights. In Chapters 17 and 18 two cases are presented by a researcher in the situation of armed conflict. Obviously, research can be applied in many other ways. Let us consider some roles that the researcher can take up, and point to their advantages and disadvantages.

Applying research to actual conditions is not a simple matter. We have already encountered this in Chapter 3, in which the popularity in political circles of "democratic peace" was noted. To many researchers this resulted in a simplification of the notions implied. There are several concepts stemming from peace research concerns that have traveled into the arena of politics. Karl W. Deutsch developed the notion of a "security community," which also has acquired popularity. In Part IV of this volume the notion of "smart sanctions" was mentioned. The term was used by US Secretary of State Colin Powell in 2002, when presenting new sanctions measures against Iraq. It made the term controversial in the Arab world. "Preventive diplomacy," "conflict prevention," "track II diplomacy," "peace process," and "peacebuilding" are terms that also move between academia and politics. Findings and terms have their own life and it is hard to make them keep the qualities the researcher may want. Let us, however, also consider a situation in which it is not only the intellectual properties that are transiting from academia to actual decision making but also the researcher. Adding such assignments to the role of a researcher creates additional dilemmas.

Obviously, there are many possible ways for researchers to have a role in policy-making for peace. One is to be an *advisor* to decision-makers with the same ambition, for instance as part of their office, such as the UN Secretary-General. This could also be the mandate, for instance, of a mediation- or disarmament-oriented Minister for Foreign Affairs. It puts the peace researcher close to the political action and may give an opportunity to have direct impact on policies. The advantage is the access to decisions and having action taken. Perhaps it is also comforting that responsibility for action rests elsewhere. It is likely that a number of peace researchers have found themselves in such advisory roles, as part of a political or expert appointment. Normally, such arrangements last for a specific period of time. The impact is dependent on the impact the political leader can have. It may also, however, tarnish the reputation of the researcher. He/she may find himself/herself involved in decisions where the peace perspective may be diluted or even contradicted. There are very few accounts of such experiences. It is a story that needs to be written. There are even fewer cases of a peace researcher actually entirely moving into the political field and becoming a decision-maker. It is more common to find the researcher's students in such a role.

A position in government or an international organization may be the most common role of a peace researcher, but, with the strength of civil society, a corresponding role may also be found in organizations such as advocacy movements, for instance. The value to the movements is the researchers' general insights, but also their methodological competence, which can be applied to a number of issues and fields. As in the previous case, the integrity of the researcher is central, and it has to be protected for the sake of the researcher as well as for the organization.

An alternative is to be involved in peacemaking through *independent projects*. An example is the one mentioned in Chapter 13, the Stockholm Process on the Implementation of Targeted Sanctions (SPITS). It was designed to provide input to the UN reform process on sanctions. The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs financed the process. It was carried out at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University. The integrity of the researcher was never questioned or challenged. On the contrary, it was an advantage to the Ministry that the task was done independently, thus making it possible for the Ministry, if necessary, to put some distance between itself and the conclusions of the researchers. The integrity of both sides was preserved. The process clearly had an impact on improving targeting of sanctions. It was a short-term commitment that generated many important lessons, some of which have been conveyed in Chapters 13–15. There are likely to be many more experiences of this nature.

This points to a slightly different role that peace researchers can take, notably through writing of the *report of a top-level commission* that will, it is hoped, impact on international policies and which can be largely based on ongoing research. In this case there is a commission that takes the responsibility for the report to be done, but the actual work is done by academics. It is, for instance, noteworthy that researchers were greatly involved in the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes that the UN Secretary-General appointed in 2003. For instance, its

executive director was Professor Stephen J. Stedman, a well-known and respected researcher in the field of peace and security. This panel presented a host of suggestions for UN reforms. Many of them were part of the UN General Assembly agenda in 2005/06 and several were implemented, notably on peacebuilding, human rights, terrorism, and other concerns.

Another role – which builds on the competence of peace researchers as researchers – is the more traditional one: *commentary* in, for instance, the media, lecturing, or giving seminars to government and nongovernment organizations (NGOs). It is a matter of communicating research to the general public. These are efforts that are normally seen as university outreach. A quick glance suggests that, among scholars involved in the media, peace researchers take a larger role than their small number would suggest. In these cases, however, the distinction between research and advocacy is clear. The researcher normally builds his/her participation on published reports or accumulated knowledge, and the division of roles is quite clear.

A more complicated relationship emerges when researchers start their own *advocacy* NGOs and in effect become advocates of particular positions in a public debate. It may originate in research but the dynamics of NGO action and general politics may soon make the researcher appear like any other movement representative. In such cases, the researcher has to give due consideration to how to structure a balance between engagement in particular issues and the role of a neutral teacher and researcher.

A particular situation is to become involved as a researcher in an exercise that builds on research insights but posits the researcher in the role of *a third party*. This is what is here referred to as academic diplomacy: the use of academics in diplomacy for peace. Chapters 17 and 18 reproduce two such experiences of this author. The basis for involvement is the integrity of the researcher as a researcher. The researcher brings along insights, but also an approach that the warring parties may appreciate. The researcher is not siding with any of the parties and acts in a way that is parallel to both of them (and in some way reflects the teacher's impartiality in evaluating students). Let us consider this particular role somewhat further.

The peace researcher as a third party

Early on in peace research there were ambitions to have an impact on conflicts. The first approach seems to have been the one of creating seminars with the conflict parties present. These became known as *problem-solving workshops* (Mitchell and Banks 1996). The meetings organized by the diplomat and conflict researcher John Burton are often described as the first ones (Fisher 1997). This may be true if one takes a narrow definition of what such a seminar does. The Pugwash conferences, which began in 1957, did the same, but their concern was with nuclear disarmament and East–West relations. The first conference was convened in a small place in Nova Scotia in Canada – which gave its name to the whole movement – as there was a need for an inconspicuous venue in one of the few countries

where nuclear scientists from the Soviet Union, UK, and USA could meet (Rotblat 1972). The importance of the Pugwash movement clearly surpasses many other attempts at focused exchanges and dialogue. It was the origin, for instance, of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in 1966, but Pugwash participants also had important roles as advisors to significant decision-makers in the three nuclear powers at the time. Their scientific expertise gave them remarkable influence on arms control and disarmament treaties. The movement received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1995 in recognition of its achievements.

This is to say that researchers can contribute through workshops to connect different parties. This should also apply to conflict situations that involve ongoing or recently stalemated conflicts. Such workshops have been documented for some conflicts such as Cyprus, Lebanon, and Palestine. Fisher (1997: 187–212) estimated that at least seventy-six such workshops were conducted in the period 1969–1995, led by respected researchers, notably John Burton, Hal Saunders, and Herbert Kelman. Adding to the history of such meetings, arranged under the auspices of an academic institution and with the use of academic practices, the present author recounts the academic seminar convened outside Uppsala, Sweden, in June 1990 (Chapter 18).

However, what happened in June 1990 built on what had gone on before, which is presented in Chapter 17: *the researcher as an academic mediator*. Here is an area with even fewer accounts. Some are known for this, notably Professors John Paul Lederach and John Darby of the Kroc Institute, University of Notre Dame (see, for instance, Lederach and Wehr 1996). For confidentiality reasons many are unwilling to tell of their experiences. A predecessor was Adam Curle, a professor of education at Harvard. Curle and a colleague were involved in secret diplomacy in the Nigeria–Biafra war in the period 1967–1969 (Princen 1992: 186–214; Wallensteen 2011a). There are academic institutions that have been involved in such work, in addition to their regular tasks. The list includes not only the Department at Uppsala University or the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), but also the University of Notre Dame's Kroc Institute, George Mason University's Institute of Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR), and activities based at Johns Hopkins University. In other words, there is more material on this than presently known and the topic is worth further study.

The particular contribution of such an academic mediator can be discussed. Academic skills can be useful in mediation situations. Such skills include an ability to listen and to distill points, as well as giving persuasive presentations, bringing attention to other relevant experiences, and drawing conclusions from theoretical insights. However, these are also qualities that others can exhibit. Svensson and Wallensteen (2010) studied the same mediator in six different situations over a thirty-year period to get closer to the craft of mediation. They found that the style of a mediator has an effect on process and outcome. The academic style may be closer to the seasoned diplomat of trying to persuade rather than forcing actors to agree, for instance. The problem-solving workshops seem also have had that as an ambition, stimulating communication among the participants. This is probably an important new challenge to mediation research (Lindgren *et al.* 2010). In political

life, however, the use of force may be more common, and many agreements may in fact be the result of persuasion techniques far from the academic intellectual exercise.

Research on the researcher in peacemaking

Thus, we have pointed to two roles in peacemaking for academics: the use of the seminar to bring parties together and the use of the academics as mediators. There is some writing on the former, as has been indicated. There is much less on the latter. Whether this reflects the paucity of such involvements (which would be a sad state of affairs) or an unwillingness to give accounts (which in some instances clearly is the case, and is plausible) remains to be considered. However, as peace research comes of age, such experiences are probably also accumulating, and thus should now be increasingly possible to account for. The two situations described in Chapters 17 and 18 are now twenty years old and, thus, much of what happened can be explained without jeopardizing confidentiality, or creating peril for particular actors. It is only to be hoped that there will be more such accounts forthcoming.

What, then, is the impact that could be expected? Can the academic diplomat contribute something another could not? Certainly that is an overarching question and difficult to respond to. For a start it will require a typology over possible ways for an outside actor or third party to have an impact on a conflict (Wallensteen 2011a).

First, the third party can take a quiet or assertive approach, in consonance with “quiet diplomacy” (such as has been the approach of Curle and Lederach, as far as we know) or be more pushing for particular solutions the third party believes the parties can agree to (see the account in Chapter 17). This corresponds to a style of mediation that emphasizes a fostering or forcing approach (Svensson and Wallensteen 2010).

Then there are three elements in a conflict that need to be addressed: the parties, incompatibility, and the actions (Wallensteen 2011b). This element can be combined with the style dimension. This gives six possibilities:

- 1 *An assertive approach to the parties.* This involves the intricate question of which parties should be invited to the negotiations. A dilemma is how this can be done in such a way that one invitation does not mean another party will not attend. The academic mediator could take the initiative and invite parties to a particular event, trying to get them to connect, possibly outside formal negotiations, but as a complementary approach, and without making this a secret channel. The academic form can be convincing and make parties attend. An additional typical approach is for the third party to suggest an agenda for meetings and thus bring the parties to discuss the central issues in an academic setting.
- 2 *An assertive approach to the incompatibility.* This is a situation in which the third party specifies for the warring actors what an outcome could look like. The

example in Chapter 17 is the autonomy solution. Presenting this to the parties involves a risk. They may come to identify a particular mediator with a particular solution. It may also be the matter that moves the negotiations forward. The independence of the academic third party may here be an asset: he/she is not necessarily tied to the situation, but can take the risk of being excluded in later phases. Diplomatic negotiators may be more constrained by national considerations.

- 3 *An assertive approach to building confidence.* This would be when the mediator pushes for restrictions on the use of weapons, for instance, or a fully fledged cease-fire agreement, even helping the parties to work out the issues of monitoring.
- 4 *A quiet approach to the parties.* This means that the mediator is offering himself/herself as an indirect channel of communication between significant parties, letting the parties control the flow of interactions, only making sure there is a flow. This is the facilitative approach that is often mentioned in the literature on mediation.
- 5 *A quiet approach to the incompatibility.* The academic mediator takes the role of a teacher or trainer, organizing seminars on particular solutions to the basic disagreement, thus hoping to enrich the parties on the possible options. Such workshops could be conducted in university settings away from the scene of conflict in order to give the participants a necessary detachment to explore particular options. It could be connected to a form of problem-solving workshop.
- 6 *A quiet approach to the actions.* This involves making the parties exchange information whereby they can explain their particular actions. The primary purpose may be to reassure the other side that specific measures are not meant to escalate a conflict. An example is to find ways in which the parties can reduce hostile propaganda.

Obviously each of these approaches involves decisions by the mediator. Where should a particular mediator put most of his/her efforts? It will depend on an assessment of the parties' willingness to engage. In the study of the six cases of mediation, it could be seen that one of the first tasks for a go-between when going in to mediation is to make just such an assessment. The mediator needs to ask himself/herself questions such as "What can I reasonably achieve during the time I am involved?" and "Do I know at the outset if there are areas of possible agreement among the parties?" The approach a mediator takes will be significant for the continuation of the efforts (Svensson and Wallensteen 2010). There is a need for more investigation in this field as well as in many of the others that we have dealt with in this volume.

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17 The strengths and limits of academic diplomacy

The case of Bougainville

The phone call in mid-January 1990 from the Bougainville branch of the University of Papua New Guinea (PNG) is short and crisp:

Is this Professor Wallensteen? It is Graeme Kemelfield calling

Yes, that is me.

We have read your article!

Yes. . .

We find it relevant!

Oh!

Can you come?

This unexpected call became the starting point of an intense involvement in a conflict in the South Pacific. It also sparked an interest in the use of peace research for practical diplomacy, with the advantage of a base in the academic community. It was an exercise in academic diplomacy for peace and security. The story that unfolded also illustrated a series of key concerns in mediation theory: the entry of the third party (who is inviting whom at what moment in time for what particular function), the process of third-party actions (what to do, when, how, and with what results), and the exit of the third party (when to end, how, and what happens then).

All these questions are challenging, and systematic information to answer them is only slowly being gathered. In 1990 the literature was highly limited (e.g. Touval and Zartman 1985; Azar and Burton 1986). There are now an increasing number of case studies, particularly on the Palestine conflict (e.g. Corbin 1994; Makovsky 1996; Kelman 1997; Bercovitch 1997; Zartman 1997; Aggestam 1999) and Sri Lanka (e.g. Höglund and Svensson 2002), and reports from participants in various peace processes (Bildt 1998; Savir 1998; Holbrooke 1999; Mitchell 1999; Egeland 2008). There are several volumes with comparative case studies (e.g., Zartman and Richardson 1997; Stern and Druckman 2000) and some systematic collections of data with analysis (Bercovitch 1996; Greig 2001; Harbom *et al.* 2006; Nilsson 2006, 2008; Svensson 2006, 2007).

Still, an eyewitness/participant account of a phase of academic diplomacy in Bougainville may have its particular value. The peacemaking in this conflict has

attracted increasing attention, particularly following the peace agreement in 2001 (Rolfé 2001; Regan 2002; Boege 2006; among many others). The events of 1990, however, have not gained the same attention (Carl and Garasu 2002; Wallensteen 2005 has a little on this). Now, for the first time, I am providing a detailed account as such an invited third party, close to twenty years later, when some of the tensions may have subsided. It will draw some conclusions for mediation theory and ask whether such academic diplomacy does have a role to play: what are its strengths and weaknesses?

Entering the conflict

Through the work of the conflict data project in the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, I was aware of the land conflict in Bougainville. From a distance it seemed peculiar: the landowners were rebelling! Our thinking was normally geared to tenants and small farmers reacting against major landowners. In Bougainville it was landowners who took up arms against a major international corporation, Bougainville Copper Limited, a subsidiary of an Australian company, and against the government defending its mining operation. Bougainville was not only a beautiful island in the western waters of the South Pacific. It was also built on a geological formation rich in high-quality copper ore. Its beauty, I soon witnessed, was tarnished by tailings from the open pit mining that had gone on for fifteen years. It was one of the most lucrative mining operations in the world. Indeed, the mine was said to have earned back its initial investment in the very first year of production. However, there was a price: rivers and waters outside the river mouth were polluted, the fish had disappeared, and the mine was literally eating up the ground that had provided the income for the landowners.

The landowners had been paid by the early representatives of the company, but it was mostly men who had signed the deals, taken the money, and wasted it in the nearest bar. They did not mind, as they knew it was their wives, not they, who were the true owners. Bougainville has a strong matriarchal tradition and land was passed down from mother to daughter, while the boys, as one mother told me, “were married away in the next village.” Thus, according to custom, the agreement had no value. However, PNG was applying Western laws and the PNG government – in distant Port Moresby on the main island – received its share of the copper income. Many in Bougainville felt cheated. The association of landowners had made specific but expensive demands, which went unheeded. This led some members to encourage the taking up of arms. An armed movement developed its own explosives by using some of the remnants from the major battle that went on between the Americans and Japanese in Bougainville, almost fifty years earlier, during World War II.

By January 1990 the conflict had escalated. There had been an attempt at indirect negotiations, but to no avail. The PNG government under Prime Minister Rabbie Namaliu was a coalition of several parties with different agendas. The balance had shifted toward a military solution and the government initiated a new offensive to crush the rebels once and for all. The rebels, now organized as the

Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA), were led by the mysterious and reclusive Francis Ona, who seldom participated in public functions, and his commander, Samuel Kauona, who was trained in Australia and had the bomb-making skills that BRA needed.

Thus, by January 1990, the conditions on the island had deteriorated considerably. The copper mine had ceased to function in May 1989. Many of the workers and others attracted by the strong economy of the island began to leave. To some extent they were pushed out by the Bougainvilleans, a form of "ethnic cleansing" clearly taking place, although the term had not yet gained currency. The government's campaign, however, misfired: the locals, whether supportive or not of BRA, felt harassed and abused by the PNG forces, who largely came from other parts of the ethnically diverse state. BRA gained new recruits, but was also pushed into the forests of the island. BRA began to argue for secession, developing plans to make the island an independent republic. This, in turn, made the national government even more determined to end the rebellion, fearing other parts of the culturally diverse state could follow suit.

In this situation, the local administration of the province, the North Solomons, found itself squeezed between the national government and the rebels. To find a way out, it formed a "think-tank" led by a university teacher, Graeme Kemelfield, originally from Australia, but married to a Bougainvillean. The think-tank had come across an article I had written on the conditions of conflict resolution. It got it from a former participant in a Sida (Swedish International Development Agency)-sponsored program at Uppsala University. They contacted International Alert, a nongovernmental organization (NGO) in London led by Martin Ennals, formerly Secretary-General of Amnesty International, who in turn gave them my telephone number.

Of course, it was a challenge to become a third-party actor in a difficult conflict. The think-tank had no money, but the Director General of Sida, Carl Tham, was willing to give me SEK 50,000 (about US\$7,000) to go. I canceled my lectures in Uppsala and flew to the capital of PNG, where I arrived on February 10. It resulted in three weeks of very intensive diplomacy. The fact that an academic professor in peace from the other side of the planet unexpectedly had a key role drew attention, not least as some results were achieved. It gave me some insights into the strengths and limits of academic diplomacy.

The parties

The way I entered the conflict, as a complete outsider, with no experience in the area, from a neutral country that also had no record or particular interest in the region, and from a university which was respected and seen as a civil, nongovernmental institution, constituted three significant assets. Professors earned respect for impartiality but also for creativity and knowledge. A lack of national or business interest added to my credibility. A first question skeptics asked me was: Who is paying you? To be able to answer truthfully—that this was Sida—improved my standing, not the least since development aid carried high regard at this time, to

some even implying the promise of future support. Thus, there was no suspicion among the parties in PNG against either me or my role, as far as I could determine.

The same day I landed in Port Moresby I was taken to the prime minister's office in one of the tallest buildings in the city. In fact, from the office, one could only see one taller building in the neighborhood. "That is the Australian High Commission," I was told, with an undertone of bitterness.

Prime Minister Namaliu outlined his and the cabinet's views of the Bougainville conflict. In condensed form this is what he told me:

We want to end this conflict peacefully. We do not like seeing our own citizens killed. We do not like the bad publicity our country is receiving in the international media. We are a peaceful and diverse country. We want to open the copper mine again. The incomes are needed for Bougainville and for the country. Please, explain this to the rebels when you meet them. Everything can be discussed. But we cannot accept secession. That has to be clear. I inherited Papua New Guinea as a country of many peoples united as one state. That is the way I am going to hand over this state to my successor one day. I am not going to see a dismantling of the state.

In short, Prime Minister Namaliu outlined the principle of territorial integrity. It was not possible for him and his government to operate differently, he made clear. PNG, I was informed, consists of peoples with more than 700 different languages. If one area were to secede, others might want to do the same, particularly those with resources, leaving all the others in poverty. He could illustrate the point with recent riots in some gold-mining areas. To my direct question of whether some form of autonomy were possible, he did not rule that out. In fact, the constitution allowed for self-rule for different provinces. Bougainville, being the main part of the North Solomons province, already had considerable autonomy. "It even has its own Premier," he said. Certainly this was true; the decentralization that had been offered had been particularly well received in Bougainville. This, in turn, was the result of a short-lived declaration of independence that island representatives had made in 1975, when PNG became independent. A delegation had actually gone to the UN to demand recognition. A leader of that movement was now a representative of the province and had a seat in the government.

The issues were clearly stated by the government: end to the violence, a discussion on the opening of the mine, but also a discussion on the status of the island within PNG.

With this in the back of my mind, I flew to Bougainville, which was under a state of emergency. Nobody was allowed to visit without special permission of the government. This was all arranged. The think-tank, indeed, had prepared for this mission properly. It became very significant for what was to follow. The idea was originally that we were to be three, but the two others withdrew for various reasons. That left me as the lone outsider.

On arrival at the airport I was met by Graeme Kemelfield. When we set out for the university branch, we were stopped at a PNG roadblock. I began to understand the harassment to which ordinary people were exposed. The soldiers were

arrogant, nervous, and not willing to accept the papers I had from their own government. Grim-looking, armed soldiers climbed into our car and we were driven off to the military headquarters. My luggage was searched and some papers on the Bougainville conflict were confiscated. It was not a promising start to a peace mission!

However, the security officer in charge was better informed. He apologized and listened to Kemelfield's explanation of our mission. Finally, he assured us that the Toyota Land Cruiser with the University of PNG emblem on its doors was allowed to pass through the lines, as far as the government side was concerned. However, some of the papers were not returned.

Thus, we arrived safely at the meeting of the think-tank, which consisted of some four additional persons with vast contacts across the island. Through informal channels they had already arranged a visit with BRA leader Samuel Kauona.

A day later, February 15, we set out to visit BRA-held territory. The PNG soldiers around the airport now made no difficulties; the university car could pass. We entered abandoned territory, passing an empty schoolhouse, and continued on the main road, where there was no other traffic but our vehicle.

Suddenly, we were stopped by a group of men with odd-looking weapons, including some old rifles. Most of them had no shoes, and they were wearing shorts and T-shirts (I recall one with the inscription "I love New York"). This was the BRA roadblock. The BRA soldiers were indeed a different crowd from the PNG forces. They were distinctly less well equipped, even demonstrating the sling-shot as their "best" weapon. They were more black (it turned out they subscribed to the notion of "Black is Beautiful" and in fact called the PNG forces, which were drawn from other islands, "Redskins"). They were in a happier mood and welcomed us to their area. They climbed onto the car and gave directions to the drivers. We veered off onto smaller and smaller roads, until the road turned into a path. The car was hidden under the thick coverage of trees and brushes. "We are worried about the government's attack helicopters," they explained. From there on, we progressed by foot. My think-tank colleagues did not look worried, but I reflected on whether I would ever return to Uppsala.

The walk was not too long and we arrived at a camp, where the meeting was to take place. The military leader of the BRA, Samuel Kauona, appeared, smiling happily, offered a drink of coconut milk as a welcome, and we sat down for a conversation. It lasted for about four hours. He outlined his view of the conflict. In summary form, the following was his perspective:

We do not want to fight this war. But we have no choice. The copper mine had destroyed our land, our waters, and our fish. The environment was deteriorating. By stopping the production, we have also stopped pollution. The fish are now recovering. We have ruled ourselves for 40,000 years. We have survived on our lands; we can continue to live by ourselves. We do not need the mining; we do not need the PNG government. The government only wants to destroy us.

He turned to me and asked a pointed question: "We hear on the BBC that Lithuania has declared itself independent. We understand that. Tell me, Professor, why do we have to be with this country [he meant PNG] which we have never asked to be with? Is that democracy?"

The position was very clear. He and the BRA did not want violence, they did not want the mine, and they did not want to be ruled by the PNG government.

Except for the desire to stop the violence, there was nothing on which he and the government agreed. The parties were in a situation where they had positions that entirely contradicted each other. The elements of conflict were obvious: there was fear on each side of what the other wanted to do, there were actions that underscored this, and the key issues seemed to be incompatible. Indeed, there was a need for a third party to look at the situation.

A third-party perspective

After his initial explanation of the BRA position, the conversation with Sam Kauona turned into a serious discussion on self-rule and independence. I told him of the Åland Islands, located between Sweden and Finland. It made him interested, not only because these were also islands, albeit distant. What interested him were the demilitarization and the autonomy of the islands. "We do not want armies in our land," he explained, although he had a military background himself in the PNG Defence Forces. Formally, he had actually deserted the national force to join the rebel movement: "We want to rule ourselves, but we are not interested in embassies in other countries or in the UN." I understood this to mean that, to him at least, island self-rule was the most important, not necessarily statehood as an independent republic. Much of what one could have as an independent state would actually be acquired with a sufficiently strong autonomy.

However, he was not interested in opening the mine again. Others around him were less resolute on this issue. Some actually indicated to me that they could accept mining production from the present mine (but no new mines) if it were under "responsible management." To them that meant it could not be under an Australian company. Other companies could be possible, one person confided to me, even hinting at the possibility of a Swedish one.

From my conversations with Kauona, it emerged that he could imagine a discussion on the key issues with the government. He even said "the sooner, the better." In his view, however, a third party had to be present. He would not trust the government. That had to do with the fighting: "There can be no talks as long as the government wants to wipe us out. The government has proclaimed a 'total war' against us. That has to stop!" In other words, a credible cease-fire was a first step.

Much peace research literature discusses the significance of cease-fires. There are too many examples of failed cease-fires. Either they are extremely short-lived (violations can occur easily, conditions can be unclear, and fears can linger) or they are very long-lasting (thus, in effect freezing a situation along military lines, as seen

in the cases of the divided Korea and divided Cyprus). A cease-fire arrangement, in other words, has to be strongly coupled to a peace process, not a measure on its own.

However, Kauona was more concerned with the modalities of a cease-fire. It would have to include the withdrawal of the PNG Defence Forces from the island. He had no problem with the simultaneous disarming of the BRA forces. However, the cease-fire had to be supervised by the UN. The government, he made clear, could not be trusted. The idea of involving the UN, thus, was not to have international recognition of the BRA, but to have someone observing the government. For me, it was not difficult to anticipate the government's objections to a UN presence: the conflict was a domestic matter, and the government was opposed to any internationalization of the issue. This was the common view in 1990, and few countries had yet accepted international involvement in domestic affairs. However, I explained to Kauona that the UN does not have its own forces, but has to call on countries to supply them. Which countries that would be acceptable then became an issue. In the end, the reply from the BRA side was "no countries in the region and only countries with a good record of human rights, such as Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Canada." For some reasons BRA also wanted to include an African country; in the end, that became Ghana. Indeed, New Guinea was actually given the name by a European explorer who also had been in the Bay of Guinea in West Africa and saw a similarity between the inhabitants. However, in this context, Ghana was a symbol as it was the first black African country to gain independence from colonial rule.

The think-tank was pleased with the discussions and we set out to work on a cease-fire within a broader framework. I flew back to Port Moresby and explained what Kauona had told me. Prime Minister Namaliu was satisfied: autonomy could be discussed, as well as the mining operations. The cease-fire conditions, however, were more difficult: it would require making an agreement with "rebels" who actually had been breaking PNG law by taking up arms. The prime minister was willing to accept this, to improve the chances of peace, but other coalition partners were not. The government would have to have a special cabinet meeting. It was definitely not an easy decision.

A particular stumbling block was, not unexpectedly, the international observers. The government did not want that, and during the discussions I could point to the situation in Nicaragua as an interesting "model." Certainly, the peace process in Nicaragua was not high on the minds of the PNG politicians, but the conflict was still well known. The Sandinista government had agreed to international observer missions of its national elections in early 1990, as part of a process of ending the civil war with the US-sponsored rebels, the so-called Contras. The formula was that the government invited the outsiders to observe the elections. Thus, I suggested, if the PNG government invites some countries to observe the cease-fire, this means the government using its sovereignty to do what it chooses to do. It is not an arrangement imposed from the outside. This formula was accepted, but the fact that there was a precedent was particularly convincing. The PNG foreign ministry was assigned the task of formulating the invitations to the

governments that were agreed between the government and the BRA. Thus, two Swedish diplomats ended up in Bougainville in March 1990, in a mission led by a diplomat from Ghana.

From this experience I concluded that academic insights were useful and, in particular, could help to strengthen the role of a third party. By following different conflicts, ideas could be identified and their use in particular settings could be reviewed. Ideas are not tied to contexts. They are transferable, even globally. Ideas from the Aland Islands and Nicaragua were applicable in the South Pacific. Thus, academics not only served as impartial listeners, but could also inject proposals into a process. In this case, a central element was the autonomy idea. As the conflict continued, this element became controversial in its own right. I became identified with the autonomy proposal. As this was closer to some parts of BRA, BRA wanted me to continue as a third party. I had been useful also for Prime Minister Namaliu, who may have seen it the same way. To others, however, this became too active a role. They preferred, in later rounds of negotiations, to have third parties who were only observing, not suggesting. That, in my view, meant that the parties could not benefit from the value-added of a third party.

Secondary parties

Australia was the closest major country to Papua New Guinea. It had held control over the entire territory since World War I, when it took over the parts that had belonged to Germany (which included Bougainville, by the way). It was, however, not a regular part of Australia, but a mandate under the League of Nations (later a trust territory under the UN). That is why it was natural that a group went from Bougainville to the UN at the independence of PNG in 1975. It was the UN that "supervised" the trusteeship. Thus, it was to the UN that one could turn in times of crisis. However, the UN did not pay attention to the Bougainville situation until the mid-1990s. Australia may have had something to do with that. In 1990 UN action was still a farfetched idea.

Australia was the central secondary party to the conflict. It was the main provider of assistance to the PNG government. It was an Australian company and Australian management that ran the copper mine in Bougainville. It was Australia that had provided helicopters for the PNG Defence Forces (ostensibly not for aggressive purposes, but it was not difficult to use them to track down people on the ground). Thus, BRA saw Australia as a hostile actor. Also, the PNG government wanted to demonstrate its distance from the Australians. However, the reality was that Australia could not be ignored. It had to be on board. Thus, I went to Canberra to inform the Swedish embassy and it, in turn, told the Australians.

The ones most concerned about my mission and my doings in PNG, even baffled, were no doubt members of the Australian foreign service. One of them later said, in the blunt style that is typical: "We were really laughing when we heard the idea of a peace professor from Sweden coming to Bougainville. Now we have stopped laughing." I take that as praise. There was, however, no intention of having Australia directly involved in my and the think-tank's approach to the

mediation. The idea that emerged was a different one that turned out to be fruitful: the Commonwealth.

The British Commonwealth had transformed itself into an international organization, the Commonwealth of Nations. PNG was a member, as well as some fifty other countries, many of which were smaller than PNG in terms of population. A Commonwealth member-state, Grenada, had been invaded by US forces in 1983. This had upset the leading member of the organization, the UK, and by 1985 a report on security assistance to small states had been worked out. It was accepted by the Commonwealth meeting in Nassau the same year. It meant that PNG could ask for assistance from the Commonwealth Secretariat for the crisis in Bougainville. This is what now happened, apparently one of the first times this mechanism was put into practice. The idea was that the Commonwealth would participate in the observation of the cease-fire. This, it was hoped, would make the Australians more comfortable with the development.

Thus, the contours of an ad hoc peace mission were gradually taking shape. It was to consist of a set of countries, as agreed by the primary parties, and the Commonwealth. It would be recruited primarily from the diplomatic corps in Canberra, as most relevant countries did not have a representative stationed in PNG itself. The mission was to go to the island to watch the withdrawal of the PNG forces and the disarming of the BRA.

Thus, the way the talks evolved in the Bougainville conflict made international participation inevitable. The BRA – like most other rebel groups around the world – could not trust the government. Indeed, that was the basic reason why they had taken up arms. The government, on its side, would not trust the rebels, as they were breaking the laws of the country. Thus, it seems quite obvious that an international participation in any agreement is the logical answer to the dilemma. The ad hoc arrangement for Bougainville nevertheless was one of the first of its kind. Both sides were nervous about the outcome and international presence helped to reassure them about what the opponent would be able to do. Thus, having secondary parties supporting the peace efforts was crucial for ending violence in March 1990.

The agreement

On my return to Port Moresby, I noticed that the communications between the government and BRA were about to break down. The think-tank members were traveling across the roadblocks with a tape recorder. Sam Kauona recorded his message; the officer responsible for the PNG forces on the island, Colonel Leo Nuia, responded. The idea was that the two would meet and sort out the many details of making a cease-fire. That turned out to be impossible. Neither side would be secure or could guarantee that their side could be prevented from attacking the other. My suggestion that they use new things called mobile phones (I even indicated the name of a leading Swedish producer that might be happy to supply the equipment) was turned down: "I can be tracked," Kauona claimed. Thus, the tape recordings were an appropriate solution. However, the two military leaders

began gradually to shout at each other. The situation seemed critical. If there were no agreement on the cease-fire, there would be no continuation of the peace process. It now seemed crucial to find a way to connect the two sides directly. The prime minister wanted me to talk to Kauona. I suggested that he should also send a leading envoy. He agreed. The idea was transmitted to Kauona, who responded quickly and positively. On February 24, the think-tank members, the prime minister's special envoy, and I met with Kauona on the island.

The rain was pouring down and we were crammed into a small traditional house. The atmosphere was very tense. The BRA leaders were suspicious of having the "enemy" among them; the envoy was worried but brave. He said he had a message from the prime minister and he pulled out the tape. It was inserted into the recorder, but the machine refused to start. The batteries were dead. It was blamed on the rain. Frantic actions ensued. Soldiers and assistants were sent out in all directions to find batteries. The tension in the small house was almost palpable. Not having a functioning recorder was a failure for BRA. After some time, batteries started to come in. In the end we had a bag full of batteries. The tape recorder began to function and was switched on: only classical music! The BRA leaders stared at the special envoy: was this a joke? He tried to calm them: the message is hidden in the tape. Clearly, the government was worried about the tape falling into the wrong hands and wanted to conceal the message. The "fast forward" button brought us further into the tape. Suddenly, there was the message from the prime minister! The rain continued; all other movements ceased completely. The prime minister explained the role of the special envoy and of me. He went on to say that he had not proclaimed a "total war" on the rebels. They were all citizens of the same country. There had been a tradition of living in peace among the inhabitants on Bougainville and on PNG. He wanted to restore that. He was willing to discuss any grievances the listeners might have, and he wanted to conclude a cease-fire as a first step. To this end, his special envoy was authorized to cooperate with Professor Wallenstein and the think-tank to conclude an agreement. The prime minister also mentioned the need for a special peace ceremony to seal the deal. His voice disappeared and the music began again. There was a moment of complete silence. How were the guerrillas going to respond? In an instant, everything changed. They began to cheer and applaud. There were big smiles on all faces. Kauona ordered food to celebrate! The envoy looked relieved. Certainly I was. I had watched the men in the house as they listened attentively. They showed no reactions while the prime minister spoke. Now, the meeting turned into a major feast. Traditional foods were combined with more Western dishes. Drinks, yes, but no alcohol. The discussions continued. Darkness fell. But an agreement was worked out on when to start the cease-fire and how it was to be understood. The basics of a text were there, to be refined over the following days with the help of the think-tank and its computer. The cease-fire was to start at 6 a.m. on Friday, March 2, 1990. The PNG forces were to be withdrawn by March 16. BRA weapons were to be assembled in three places. Neutral international observers were to supervise the process. Following implementation of the cease-fire, negotiations were to start on the issues of the status of Bougainville and on

the mining operations. The agreement was to be signed by the two military commanders, Colonel Nuia for the PNG and Samuel Kauona for the BRA.

Thus, we could leave the meeting in a good mood. We drew back toward the government lines. It was late. Actually, it was well past the start of the curfew. Thus, the fact that a car was approaching from the rebel side toward the government outpost drew considerable attention from the PNG soldiers. Our car was surrounded by a rowdy crowd of soldiers who spent the evening drinking and shooting their guns into the darkness. The prime minister's envoy introduced himself and explained to the commanding officer who he was. The officer just stared back and laughed: "Yes, sure, and I am Colonel Nuia!" The others around laughed and one soldier began to pull one of the think-tank members from the car. We held him back. The soldiers grabbed his glasses and took them. This was about to get out of hand. It was quite a contrast to the happy meeting with the BRA that had finished less than an hour before! Could the government really control its own forces? After further discussions a more senior officer appeared, noted our names and let us through. The special envoy was steaming, and I would later hear him report to the prime minister. He was shouting so that nobody around could miss a word.

There were probably more phone calls that evening, as we received an apology the next morning and even the glasses were brought back. But it was not a good sign. For me, however, it had been an unforgettable experience. It was also my twenty-second wedding anniversary!

The agreement was turned into an official document. The first version covered two pages, but that was too long. One of the parties insisted that it should be on one page: "If one page is covered by another, there might also be other hidden pages." The computer provided the technological ability to adjust the margins and font size, but some lengthy sections still had to be deleted. The government wanted the emblem of PNG to be on the document. I worried what the BRA would say, but the response was: "That is fine, it means the government has to implement it if it is on PNG letterhead." The agreement was completed, the commanders signed and Kauona spent some time walking around to his troops to explain what was now expected of them.

The impact of the cease-fire was immediate. Even before it was in place, the soldiers in the roadblocks began to relax. One told me that he now wished to go home as soon as possible: "We have no business here, they are very different from us, why should we be here?" The market opened up. Youngsters began to play football on the beautiful beaches that previously had stood empty. War and the fear of war have tremendous psychological impacts on all concerned. It is not a natural state of affairs for human life.

Exit of a third party

A day after the cease-fire I went back to Sweden. The government and the BRA expected me to return when negotiations on the real issues were to start. However, on the eve of my departure, an envoy from New Zealand came up to me in the bar of the hotel in Port Moresby. He said that the PNG security services were looking for me and that there were grumblings among the military about the cease-fire. It

was probably wise for me to leave the scene, he indicated. He certainly was well informed. Also, he was to play a crucial role some seven years later. I was not too worried, however, as I had the support of the prime minister.

But soon some unexpected events happened. The PNG forces suddenly withdrew from Bougainville, before the international observers had arrived. Some remaining issues, notably on the stationing of PNG police on the island, had not yet been worked out. Deliberately, the head of the PNG military forces created a new situation. By mid-March the troops were assembled outside Port Moresby. There was considerable irritation among them about the withdrawal. After some drinking an unorganized military group set out toward the residence of the prime minister. They wanted to "talk" to him or, possibly, arrest him. Was it a military coup? It is hard to know. The responsible officer resigned the following day but, as is often the case in PNG politics, returned to power a year later, openly proclaiming his opposition to the 1990 cease-fire agreement.

The international inspectors noted that the Bougainville cease-fire had been implemented by the parties, although its report also remarked on the premature departure of the PNG forces. A strange situation now prevailed on the island. Instead of tension as a result of armed action, there rapidly developed a void of any authority at all. This was not what the peacemaking had been all about. Furthermore, the government was unclear how it should proceed. The problems with its own military were one part of it. Presumably there were also issues within the coalition and with parliamentarians. I was constantly adjusting my reservation for a return flight. But I was only asked to wait for the right moment. It never came.

BRA also felt that the situation was unclear. Why was the government stalling the start of the talks? Was it planning some drastic move? Increasingly concerned, but also realizing that the withdrawal of the PNG forces had provided it with an unprecedented opportunity, it moved. On May 17, 1990, it proclaimed the independence of Bougainville, formed a coalition "government" of its own and broke into the sealed storages to retrieve its weapons. The conflict took an entirely new turn. The government responded by cutting off all transportation, trade, and interactions with the island, in fact imposing its own sanctions and isolating Bougainville. No country ever recognized the new state. Smugglers appeared, coming to the islands, for instance from the nearby Solomon Islands. The isolation created hardships on the islands. Particularly devastating was the lack of medical supplies. Gradually the conflict returned to armed action, with the government landing troops and supporting splinter groups. There were repeated attempts to restart negotiations, but really significant efforts were only those that New Zealand organized in 1997 and led to the peace agreement in 2001. A basic trait of the agreement was a referendum on regional autonomy, within a ten- to fifteen-year timespan.

Lessons for mediation

In retrospect, one might say that the opportunity for negotiations was "ripe" in January and February 1990. The government had tried a military solution without

success; the rebels had lost and were pushed back, but they were not defeated. It dawned on the opponents that the armed confrontation could go on for a long time. So there was an interest in negotiations. However, there were many similar situations in the following years that did *not* lead to negotiations. Furthermore, the think-tank that took the initiative started its work because the situation was deteriorating and it wanted to do something about it. It saw how the society around it was beginning to fall apart. It established the necessary relations, but without regard to the "ripeness" of the situation. The prime minister's perspective was probably similar. Thus, the offer of a third-party action provided an opportunity to pursue a different course of action, for a time.

For the members of the think-tank it was close to an existential issue to stop the war; for the government it was one of its options. The failure of this first peace effort also had a price. Many of the members of the think-tank had to leave the island. Graeme Kemelfield took his family to Australia, where he died some years later. He had tried to avert the danger, but the conflict unleashed a dynamic he could not withstand. It was symbolic that the only car that could pass the battle lines was torched and burned. The prime minister also had to leave office, but short tenures were the rule in PNG politics.

Thus, from this experience it is hard to say that a particular "hurting stalemate" either produces peace initiatives or is a necessary precondition for them (see the works of Zartman). It is more typical that peace initiatives always are needed, and that it is difficult to determine if the time is "ripe." It is to the credit of the think-tank that it was persistent and took the initiative. Indeed, the opportunity might not have arisen had Sida not been willing to support the endeavor.

Furthermore, in conflicts many issues are obscure and many actions difficult to understand, no less to control. As a third party I had some insight into the interactions between the two sides, but it was hard to know what was going on within each. For the different sides, their internal dynamics were probably highly significant. The prime minister had to keep his cabinet intact and survive challenges in the parliament. He also had to deal with a host of other pressing government matters. The relations between Sam Kauona and Francis Ona were elusive, not to say mysterious. The prime minister had a diverse coalition to manage, but the BRA also had many and undefined tensions: some wanted independence, others not; some wanted the mine to start, others not; some may have been in the war for family honor, others for loot and personal gain. Leaders on both sides feared being undermined by opposition from within. These are dynamics into which the outside third party enters: peace proposals, actions, and statements are evaluated by different factions in their particular light. However, the third party is not likely to have access to these deliberations. Both sides prefer to present a unified position to the outsider and to the opponent. The reality may never be entirely clear to any of those involved. What matters are the decisions that can be derived from the messiness of the situation. On March 1, 1990, there was agreement on some measures with clear real-world implications. In 1997 another truce was concluded. It still took another four years to advance from that shared decision to a peace agreement.

In the February 1990 discussions the idea was to couple the cease-fire to a sustained peace process. There was agreement on this. However, that could not be written into the cease-fire document. It dealt strictly with the conditions for ending hostilities. This fact may have indicated that there was opposition to a continuation of peacemaking within either or both sides. It was defended, however, with the argument that this was not a "political" document, only a military one, and thus to be signed by the military commanders, not the political leaders. It was presented as a technical document, which, of course, it was not. It meant that the two sides at least identified whom they were fighting and that they thought it would be possible to discuss issues with the other.

It was a most public process. To me, it is obvious that the agreement carried the support of the population at large on Bougainville. There was joy about the end of fighting. However, there were no spokespersons who pushed for continuation of the process. The think-tank and the North Solomons provincial government did, but there was a lack of popular manifestations. In Port Moresby, there was even less public support. The conflict seemed to concern only those displaced by the conflict and they were, understandably, hostile to the BRA. The government was more troubled by the fiscal implications of the conflict: to sustain a military force in Bougainville was costly and at the same time the copper incomes were lacking. The government had in fact appointed a "razor gang" to make deep cuts in government spending. If the fighting ceased, that saved money and, as a new mine was about to open up elsewhere in PNG, money would start coming in. Thus, a thorough peace agreement had few supporters in the capital. The peace process was left to a small group of concerned leaders and citizens. It is interesting to observe that by the end of the 1990s the situation had changed, not the least through the emergence of women's groups that pressed strongly for an end to the conflict. Peace processes without manifest popular support are likely to be more fragile and be more exposed to the wishes, hopes, and even whims of particular decision-makers who may act without accountability.

This means that individual third parties are not involved in a conflict for a long period of time. They are probably more useful under particular conditions, when there are possibilities of agreement. The very moment the opposing sides agree to receive a third party may be the optimal one. There is curiosity about what will now happen; the third party may bring in some fresh perspectives and thus bring about some changes in the dynamics. If it is successful, an agreement can be concluded. As time passes, however, conditions also change (new issues, new power constellations, new events on the battlefield, new policies among secondary parties, new economic developments). It is likely that a third party or third parties are most effective if he/she/they can ride on an initial momentum and thus bring about a movement in the conflict in a peaceful direction. After a while, that momentum is likely to be lost, and new injections may be needed.

Certainly, this is true when the third parties come from small countries, from NGOs, or from universities. The picture may be different if the mediator also has a vested interest in the situation and can bring power to bear. The line between a mediating third party and a self-motivated power-broker may then be blurred or

even eradicated. Certainly, the USA took over a “mediating” role from Norway when the first agreement was signed between Israel and the PLO on the White House lawn in September 1993. The issue of peace became vital foreign policy for the Clinton administration. However, that turned into another type of peacemaking than the one that took place on the island of Bougainville in 1990. There are limits to academic diplomacy, but it also has its strengths. Some of those were demonstrated during some hectic weeks in February 1990.

A general note

This account is largely based on my own notes, memos, and recollections. Considerable information on the background of the conflict was available at the time from many researchers at the University of Papua New Guinea in Port Moresby. They were helpful in briefing me and sharing published and unpublished papers. The entire endeavor benefited from the tireless efforts of the members of the think-tank. They have not been consulted for this account. I remain entirely responsible for this text. Many thanks to Bill Montross for repeatedly reading this chapter and contributing to a more precise narrative.

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