Reclaiming Peace in International Relations

Oliver P. Richmond*

What is peace? This basic question often appears in contemporary orthodoxy to have been settled in favour of the 'liberal peace'. Yet, this has, in many post-conflict settings, proved to create a 'virtual peace'- empty states and institutions which are ambivalent about everyday life. In this context peace is widely referred to but rarely defined. Though the concept of peace is often assumed to be normatively irreproachable, formative in the founding of the discipline, and central to the agendas of liberal states, it has rarely been directly approached as an area of study within IR. This essay endeavours to illustrate how developing accounts of peace helps chart the different theoretical and methodological contributions in IR, and the complex issues that then emerge. These include the pressing problem of how peace efforts become sustainable rather than merely inscribed in international and state-level diplomatic and military frameworks. This also raises issues related to an ontology of peace, culture, development, agency and structure, not just in terms of the representations of the world, and of peace, presented in the discipline, but in terms of the sovereignty of the discipline itself and its implications for everyday life. In an interdisciplinary and pluralist field of study – as IR has now become – concepts of peace and their sustainability are among those that are central. This raises the question of what the discipline is for, if not for peace? This paper explores such issues in the context of orthodox and critical IR theory, methods, and ontology, and offers some thoughts about the implications of placing peace at the centre of IR.

There is scarcely any peace so unjust, but it is preferable, upon the whole, to the justest war.[1]

Introduction

What is peace? This basic question often appears in contemporary literature to have been settled in favour of the 'liberal peace', made up of a victor's peace at its most basic level, an institutional peace to provide

* This article is derived from the Closing Address of the *Millennium* Annual Conference on 'Peace in International Relations', held at the London School of Economics on 20-21 October 2007.

1. Desiderius Erasmus, *Querela Pacis* [*Complaint of Peace*] (Chicago: Open Court, 1917 [1521]).

© Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2008. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 36 No. 3, pp. 439-470

international governance and guarantees, a constitutional peace to ensure democracy and free trade, and a civil peace to ensure freedom and rights within society.[2] Yet, the liberal peace has, in many post-conflict settings, proved to create a 'virtual peace', empty states and institutions that are ambivalent about everyday life.[3] In this context peace is widely referred to but rarely defined. Though the concept of peace is often assumed to be normatively irreproachable, formative in the founding of the discipline, and central to the agendas of liberal states, it has rarely been directly approached as an area of study within IR. Instead various sub-disciplines have taken on this challenge.

Developing accounts of peace helps chart the different theoretical and methodological contributions in IR, and contributes to IR's envisaged mission by highlighting the complex issues that then emerge. These include the pressing problem of how peace efforts become sustainable rather than merely inscribed in international and state-level diplomatic and military frameworks. This also raises issues related to an ontology of peace, culture, development, agency and structure, not just in terms of the representations of the world, and of peace, presented in the discipline, but in terms of the sovereignty of the discipline itself and its implications for everyday life.[4] In an interdisciplinary and pluralist field of study – as IR has now become – concepts of peace and their sustainability are among those that are central.[5]

Orthodox IR theory (by which I mean those deploying positivist methods for realist, liberal, or Marxist-oriented approaches) has been in crisis for some time. Orthodox IR has found it very difficult to attract the attention of those working in other disciplines, though critical IR scholars have themselves drawn on other disciplines.[6] Even those, for example, working in the sub-disciplines of peace and conflict studies, an area where there has been a long-standing attempt to develop an understanding of peace, have often turned away from IR theory because it has failed to develop an account of peace, focusing instead on the dynamics of power and war, and assuming the realist inherency of violence in human nature and international relations, and the sovereignty of such views, encapsulated by the state, over rights and justice.

This raises the question of what the discipline is for, if not for peace. For many, IR theory simply has not been ambitious enough in developing

2. For a discussion of these components see, Oliver P. Richmond, *The Transformation of Peace* (London: Palgrave, 2005), esp. conclusion.

3. Ibid.

4. See among others Christine Sylvester, 'Bare Life as Development/ Post-Colonial Problematic', *The Geographical Journal* 172, no.1 (2006): 66–77, 66–7. She draws upon G. Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).

5. This paper does not claim to cover or explain IR theory comprehensively – it is already perhaps over ambitious – or to move beyond its western corpus (as it probably should) but it endeavours to be particularly sensitive to the claims of IR theory about the pros and cons of even having a debate about peace.

6. See Costas Constantinou, Oliver P. Richmond and Alison M Watson (eds), 'The Culture of Global Communication in IR', Special Issue of *Review of International Studies* (Cambridge University Press, 2008).

an 'agenda for peace' in addition to investigating the causes of war. Axiomatically, Martin Wight once wrote that IR was subject to a poverty of 'international theory', focusing as it did on the problem of survival.[7] Commonplace arguments usually support the view that liberal polities, notably in the western developed world, are linked oases of democratic peace, and legitimate their constant struggle for survival – or a 'war for peace'.[8] This infers a peace-as-governance. Yet, many orthodox approaches to IR theory routinely ignore the question – or problem – of peace: how is it constituted, one peace or many? Many hoped that science would, as Hobbes wrote, open the way for peace.[9] Hobbes, writing in the aftermath of a bloody civil war, wrote *Leviathan* (often held up to be the epitome of tragic realism in IR) to illustrate that peace was plausible in spite of hatred, scarcity, and violence. Of course, he also developed the notion of the Leviathan as a way to moderate the 'natural state' of war. IR has focused on war as a natural state rather than peace and the supposed Freudian death instinct has resonated powerfully through the discipline,[10] legitimating liberal notions of global (even hegemonic) governance, conditionality, and on occasion, coercion. Yet, as Fry has argued, a vast range of anthropological and ethnographic evidence shows that peace, conflict avoidance, and accommodation, are the stronger impulses of human culture.[11]

Critical innovations in the discipline infer searching questions in terms of methodology, epistemology, and ontology about peace, ranging from ways of knowing peace, knowing the minds of others, connecting with debate on gender, culture, and identity. This concerns peace as emancipation, and post-structuralist concerns with discourse, knowledge and power, identity, othering, and empathy. This has opened up pluralist methodologies, empowered feminist readings of the discipline and of peace, a move towards texts, language, artistic expression, and emotions as legitimate sites of concern. These developments have provided fertile ground for placing an everyday peace at the centre of IR. This paper explores such issues in the context of a collage of orthodox and critical IR theory, methods, and ontology, and offers some thoughts about the implications of placing peace at the centre of IR.

7. Martin Wight, 'Why is there no International Theory', in *Diplomatic Investigations*, ed. H. Butterfield and M. Wight (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966), 12–33.

8. Oliver P. Richmond, *Maintaining Order, Making Peace* (London: Palgrave, 2002), esp. Conclusion.

9. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 [1651]), ch. 5.

10. Sigmund Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (New York: Norton [1922], 1975).

11. Douglas Fry, *Beyond War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 7 and 208. For an excellent re-reaching of the classical texts of the discipline, which accentuates concerns about peace over war, see also Beate Jahn (ed), Classical Theory in International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2006).

A Sketch of Peace in Orthodox IR Theory

Much of the debate about war that dominates IR is indicative of assumptions about what peace is or should be. This ranges from the pragmatic removal of overt violence and the creation of order, an ethical peace, to a debate about a self-sustaining peace. Anatol Rapoport conceptualised 'peace through strength'; 'balance of power'; 'collective security'; 'peace through law'; 'personal or religious pacifism'; and 'revolutionary pacifism'.[12] Hedley Bull saw peace as the absence of war in an international society,[13] though war was the key guarantee for individual state survival. The three main orthodox theories of the discipline are often taken to offer determinist grand narratives: realism offers an elite and negative peace based on inherency arguments; liberalism offers a one-size-fits-all progressive framework for the 'good life' mainly through elite governance with little recognition of difference; and structuralism offers grass-roots emancipation from determinist class structures of the international political economy via a revolutionary politics. Orthodox IR theory makes a number of key assumptions about these issues across its spectrum of approaches via its problem-solving methodology. The essentialisation of human nature is common. The extrapolation of state behaviour from a flawed view of human nature as violent assumes that one reflects the other. This also rests on the assumption that one dominant actor, in this case often the state, is the loci around which power, interest, resources, and societies revolve, moderated by institutional governance. In this sense, IR is often perceived to be immutable, reflecting the forces which drive it and their permanence.

Idealism and liberalism claim a future possibility of a universal peace in which states and individuals are free, prosperous, and unthreatened. The idealist aspect of the first 'great debate'[14] in IR, in which idealism and liberalism opposed realism and its inherency orientation, offered an ambitious, ethically oriented account of peace through liberal-internationalism and governance. It focused on its implications for the conceptualisation of peace that led to a discussion of international-level ethics, interdependence, and transnationalism. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, liberal thought represents one of the largest bodies of work on peace that exists in IR theory, drawing on earlier idealist thinkers such as Zimmern, Bailey, Noel-Baker, and functionalists and pluralists such as Mitrany, and Burton and most famously, the approach of Woodrow

12. See Anatol Rapoport, *Peace: An Idea Whose Time Has Come* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992).

13. Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); Hedley Bull and A. Watson, *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).

14. Even the existence of this debate is contested in that 'idealists' were rather more pragmatic than realists often argued, and realists more interested in norms than often idealists thought. See, for example, Peter Wilson, 'The Myth of the First Great Debate', *Review of International Studies* 24 (1998); Lucian M. Ashworth, 'Where Are the Idealists in Interwar IR?', *Review of International Studies* 32, no.2 (2006): 291.

Wilson at Versailles after WW1.[15] So-called idealists who argued for disarmament, the outlawing of war, adopted a positive view of human nature and international capacity to cooperate, were often accused of being unable to focus on facts, understand power, or see the hegemonic dangers of universal claims[16] (despite the fact that realism itself makes a universal claim about being able to expose the objective truth of inherency). Idealist thinking about IR rested upon various notions of internationalism and interdependence, peace without war, disarmament, the hope that war could be eradicated eventually,[17] the right of self-determination of all citizens, and the possibility of world government or a world federation. In this sense it saw itself as eminently practical rather than utopian, reflecting an ontology of peace and harmony, often derived from Kant.[18] Underpinning this is the optimistic argument that human nature is not intrinsically violent, and even if it is social and political norms, regimes, and organisation can prevent violence.

The ontology offered by these debates indicated that there was a human and social potential for a more sophisticated peace, though, of course, Kantian-derived approaches also indicated an often violent tension with non-liberal states and systems that implies a liberal imperialism.[19] An epistemology of this peace was required which could be engineered in a pragmatic manner, resting on the normative foundations offered by liberalism. This can be found in the literatures that emerged on international organisation, internationalism, functionalism, constitutionalism, as well as on norms, regimes, and global governance. This fertile ground for thinking about peace has been one of IR's strongest influences, despite the common focus on derivations of *realpolitik*. This infers an ontology in which governance and international organisation can be used to develop

15. Key contributors to the idealist canon include among many others: Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion* (London: Heineman, 1910); P.L. Noel-Baker, *The Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes* (London: King and Son, 1925); A. Posonby, *Now Is the Time: An Appeal for Peace* (London: Leonard Parsons, 1925); L. Woolf, *The Framework of a Lasting Peace* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1917); Alfred Zimmern, *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law* (London: Macmillan, 1936); H.N. Brailsford, *The War of Steel and Gold: A Study of Armed Peace* (London: Routledge, 1998 [1917]). See also Andreas Osiander, 'Rereading Early Twentieth Century IR Theory: Idealism Revisited', *International Studies Quarterly* 42, no.3 (1998): 409–32; C. Sylvest, 'Interwar Internationalism, the British Labour Party, and the Historiography of International Relations', *International Studies Quarterly* 48, no.2: 409–32.

16. For more on this see Peter Wilson, *International Theory of Leonard Woolf* (New York: Palgrave, 2003), 20.

17. Norman Angell, *The Fruits of Victory* (London: Collins, 1921); L. Woolf, *International Government* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1916), 8.

18. This reading of Kant has more in common with John Macmillan's recent reading, rather than that of the liberal peace or democratic peace theorists. *See John MacMillan,* "Immanuel Kant and the democratic peace" in Beate Jahn (ed), *Classical Theory in International Relations* (see footnote 11 above), 52-73.

19. Beate Jahn, 'Kant, Mill, and Illiberal Legacies in International Affairs', *International Organisation* 59 (Winter 2005): 177. Beate shows how liberal projects in IR rarely engage with the consent of target or local peoples, ibid., 185.

peace as a common good for all, through which a specific epistemology and methods can be practically deployed to create progress towards an ideal of peace. This process depends upon a peace that can be created by those with specialised capacities suitable both for themselves and for others. Peace is represented as both process and outcome defined by a grand theory resting upon territorial sovereignty and international governance, which every theoretical and conceptual stage should work towards in a linear and rational fashion, offering the liberal claim of a 'peace dividend'. All of this is strongly influenced by a mixture of western cultural and historical normative frameworks, which claim some degree of universality.

Realism infers a victor's peace that has Darwinian, exclusive, and unreflexive qualities. This version of peace is a privileged concept only available to the powerful and a 'commonwealth' they may want to create. Most realist analysis expends its energy in reactive discussions based upon the inherency of violence in human nature and states (now discredited in other disciplines) as a counter to other strands of the main debates, from idealism to the methodological challenge that followed later.[20] Its different iterations imply a peace found in the state-centric balance of power, perhaps dominated by a hegemon. [20] For these approaches' tragedy lies in their unitary internal assumptions of a shared peace within political units based upon common interests and values, and the difficulties in maintaining peaceful relations with other external polities that have their own notions of peace.[21] Even so, Hobbes envisaged a commonwealth that might tame the international.[22] Indeed, Hobbes offered education rather than the use of force as a path to peace.[23] In other words, Hobbes is concerned with a peace within and between societies, even if his prescriptions for a Leviathan might be taken to lead to anarchy or authoritarianism rather than freedom.[24] This tension between norms and interests pulled later iterations of realism away from a consideration of peace, but also remained a critical force often deployed against them, as can be seen in the tension between Waltz's work focusing on men, states, and war, and Wight's and Bull's opening up a concept of international society as opposed to anarchy.[25] As Carr wrote:

20. See, for example, much work in social anthropology which is generally appalled by the militant line IR takes. Fry, *Beyond War*, 184 and 193. Even if Darwin was right about natural selection Fry argues, then we would have bred any violence out of society by the engineering of non-violence.

21.Chris Brown, 'Tragedy, "Tragic Choices" and Contemporary International Political Theory', *International Relations* 21, no.5: 5. Richard Ned Lebow, *The Tragic Vision of Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Barry Buzan, 'The Timeless Wisdom of Realism' in *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 51.

22. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ch. 26.

23. David, van Mill, 'Civil Liberty in Hobbes's Commonwealth', *Australian Journal of Political Science* 37, no.1: 25.

24. Ibid., 25.

25. Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959): Hedley Bull, 'The Theory of International Politics 1919–1969', in

> the utopian who dreams that it is possible to eliminate self-assertion from politics and to base a political system on morality alone is just as wide of the mark as the realist who believes that altruism is an illusion and that all political action is based on self-seeking.[26]

The dominant mode realist approach, however, which underpins most orthodox IR theory and policymaking today is that 'the logic of strategy pervades the upkeep of peace as much as the making of war'.[27] War can even be seen as the 'origin of peace' by exhausting opponents and their resources.[28]

Marxism offers a form of peace derived from the absence of certain types of structural violence, often in structures which promote economic and class domination. It offers the view that the global economy, world trade, and global economic relations are structured to the advantage of small elites and social classes and is chained to their control of state and international institutions, leading to global injustice and the disempowerment of much of the world's population.[29] Accordingly, the elite's status and resources depends upon the disempowerment of the many. Peace in these terms cannot exist while such structures exist. The question here arises as to whether the agency of the masses can overcome injustice caused by elite political and economic structures, and replace them with a 'revolutionary' form of economic justice, either through a peaceful reform or coercive measures. There is a surprising paucity of literature directly relating IR theory to Marxism,[30] often put down to the argument that Marxism had little to say about the international and much more about the domestic (though this criticism rests on the now discredited national–international divide of realism). Indeed, Marxism had much to say about the transnational,[31] and how '[t]he bourgeoisie …. [i.e. capitalism] creates a world after its own image'.[32]

Marx offered an understanding of relations between classes in the context

---

The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics 1919–1969, ed. B. Porter (Oxford University Press, 1972), 35; Martin Wight, 'Why Is There No International Theory', in *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics*, ed. H. Butterfield and M. Wight (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966), 33.

26. E. H. Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis* (London: Macmillan, 1939), 68 and 97; Jim George, *Discourses of Global Politics* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 78.

27. Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1987), xi.

28. Ibid., 57.

29. For a discussion of the different types of Marxism see Michael Gurevitch, Michael, Tony Bennett, James Curran and Janet Woollacott (eds), *Culture, Society and the Media* (London: Methuen, 1982).

30. See Vendulka Kubalkova and Albert Cruickshank, *Marxism and International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985); John Maclean, 'Marxism and International Relations: A Strange Case of Mutual Neglect', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies,* 17, no.2 (1988).

31. Justin Rosenberg, 'Isaac Deutscher and the Lost History of International Relations', *New Left Review* (Jan/Feb 1996): 5.

32. Karl Marx and Frederich Engels, *Communist Manifesto*, [1848], in H Selsam and H Martel, *Reader in Marxist Philosophy*, (New York: International Publishers, 1963) ch. 1.

of capitalism and their implications for both domestic and international relations. He argued that for mutual interest to emerge, which was a prerequisite of the form of peace implied by Marxism, capitalist property relations must be abolished in order to remove the exploitation that occurred between 'nations',[33] leading to social justice. The class framework enabled a transnational view of IR in which a struggle over the nature of order takes place not just between states, but also between mobilised classes aiming at economic justice and equality (by taking control of the means of production and removing private property rights). This was not only concerned with developing a form of peace (in the form of a classless society) through communism or socialism, however, but also with the problem that the brunt of any war or conflict was borne by the working classes (a subtle addition to Kant's position), implying a need for peace between states, even if they were capitalist. Indeed, what was most significant in this approach to international relations was that the transnational organisation of the masses who would take discursive and practical action to resist elite structures of exploitation was actually possible and represented a viable alternative to the top-down and state-centric nature of domestic and international politics. This emancipatory discourse is one of Marxism's most important contributions (if ironic) to IR's possible approaches to peace, in addition perhaps to Lenin's critique of imperialism[34] and Trotsky's theory of uneven development.[35]

The uncovering of the significance of the conventionally defined 'powerless' subject in IR has given rise to a clearer understanding of the significance of peripheries and 'grassroots actors', the processes by which they are marginalised, how resistance occurs, emancipation, and of 'bottom-up' perspectives in IR. The structural ontology of peace is impeded by an environment of hierarchical exploitation and self-interest by elites, which can only be curtailed by social actors aiming at social justice, whereby a new ontology would come into existence. This offers a concept of peace that emphasises that a civil peace required social justice and equity – a classless peace. This has enabled a theory of peace resting upon local and transnational resistance to structures that dominated and oppressed (in this case, international economic and class structures), encompassing everyday life and its issues.

The English School debates about an international society offered an alternative to such debates. As with Carr's seminal attack on idealism,[36] peaceful change is seen to be the key problem that needed to be addressed

33. Saul K. Padover (ed.), *The Karl Marx Library, On Revolution* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), 35.

34. VI Lenin, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (New York: International Publishers, 1997 [1917]), parts VII and IX.

35. L Trotsky, *Results and Prospects* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1978); L. Trotsky, *The History of the Russian Revolution* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1936), vol. 3.

36. Tim Dunne, *Inventing International Society* (London: Palgrave, 1998), xii. However, this attack now seems very flawed: indeed many of the institutions and concepts that idealism helped develop are now key to the liberal international order and are focussed on combating the sorts of dynamics realism observed.

in IR.[37] Thinkers within the English School were always aware that the norms of international society were limited[38] though Hedley Bull, one of its main proponents, was able to be critical of both realism and of universalism.[39] The notion of an 'international society' based upon shared values and interests between states as a framework for peace between states follows a narrow path between a balance of power and stable social relations between states and within their societies. For Bull, the main questions revolved around the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, great powers, and war in an 'anarchical society'. Consequently, a concept of peace remained a subtext, never closely developed, and implicitly dependent upon a harmonious confluence of these dynamics – in the same way that Bull also saw human rights.[40] This of course, was an improvement on the bleaker realist view of a negative or victor's peace. In this context, peace lay in the identification, development and expansion of international society, extended by the debate on human rights that developed in the context of the English school.[41] Bull had argued that human rights would always be limited by the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention, meaning that they were merely the luxury of those whose political conditions seemed to be more conducive to human rights.[42] Vincent argued that human rights were the prerogative of transnational norms developed by individuals and non-state actors that now constrained the actions of political elites.[43] Buzan characterised this argument as evidence of a shift from an international society of states to a world society of multiple actors.[44] As the English school developed, there was a movement away from seeing human rights, one of the core components of any liberal notion of peace, as subservient to power and interest, to the point where it became one of its core assumptions and driving dynamics. This was a step towards an emancipatory version of the liberal understanding of peace, *contra* realism, in which key issues and actors were not merely derived from states, but recognised that different forms of political organisation may transcend the states-system involving a much broader range of actors and the issues that arose from this move. Such arguments were extended in various ways via normative,[45]

37. Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis*, 209.

38. Dunne, *Inventing International Society*, xv.

39. Ibid., p.103. See Bull, *The Anarchical Society*.

40. Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 85 and 292.

41. John Vincent, *Human Rights and IR* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

42. Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, 292.

43. Vincent, *Human Rights and IR*, 130.

44. See Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

45. See in particular, Charles Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars* (New York: Basic Books, 1977). See in particular, John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971).

cosmopolitan,[46] and institutional[47] approaches, which later emerged.

The broad approaches of constructivism[48] are mainly concerned with the role of states as central to the moderation of anarchy and the processes of socialisation. As constructivist approaches argue that state behaviour is determined by their identities and interests, this implies that their construction of peace is also determined by their interests and their identities. This represents a picture of an identity- and interest-based peace deployed for others, on a normative and interest basis, which may well fluctuate over time. From this perspective, as socially constructed states create or control international anarchy they also create and control peace, and they do this according to their own values and interests. Adler and Barnett have developed the idea of 'security communities' in which states act in groups to establish a community with its own institutions aimed at providing a stable peace.[49] In a pluralistic, transnational, security community, states retain their own sense of identity while at the same time sharing a 'meta-identity' across the security community.[50] Here the work of Waever and Buzan, and the 'Copenhagen School' on 'securitisation' has made the key contribution. This has effectively defined securitisation as a discursive process dependent upon societal and historical contexts leading to an existential threat to a particular community.[51] This means that peace in these terms moves towards a discussion of the qualitative conditions of peace for those who actually experience them (starting with 'desecuritisation' in Aradau's critical terms, for emancipation).[52]

Though these accounts challenge orthodox approaches to IR on ontological and methodological grounds, they also arrive at a problem familiar to the liberal and realist canon. It is more a hybrid based upon rationalism and incorporating some aspects of more critical thinking.[53] The state remains the central, dominant, actor, around which the understandings of peace revolve. For this reason the socially constructed peace, offered by constructivism, is conditioned by interstate relations, domestic politics, and

46. David Held, 'Cosmopolitanism: Globalisation Tamed', *Review of International Studies* 29, no.4 (2003): 470.

47. See in particular, Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

48. For a detailed analysis, see Maja Zehfuss, *Constructivism in IR* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

49. E Adler and M Barnett (eds), *Security Communities* (Cambrudge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

50. For a discussion of issues related to this see, E Adler, 'Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 26, no. 2 (1997): 249–77; E Adler, 'Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics', *European Journal of International Relations* 3 (1997): 319–64.

51. See Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security. A New Framework for Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

52. Claudia Aradau, 'Security and the democratic scene: desecuritization and emancipation', Journal of International Relations and Development 7 (2004): 388-413.

53. For an excellent critique of the 'new wine in old bottles' type see in particular, Anthony Foreman, 'Social Theory, Europe and Politics', *BSIS Journal* 2 (2005).

securitisation, which undermine intersubjective factors such as identity and therefore indicates a liberal and progressive ontology of peace, limited by governance run by state elites and the rationalist bureaucratic and administrative power which goes with statehood.

Lying behind such thinking is one of the core implicit debates in orthodox IR theory. Peace is seen to be something to aspire to though it is perhaps not achievable. This failure rests on human nature for realists, or the failure of institutions for liberals and idealists. The Westphalian international system represents a compromise upon both positions. This is indicative of Galtung's negative and positive peace framework, which is the most widely used conceptualisation of peace,[54] extended, as Rasmussen has indicated, into a negative and positive epistemology of peace.[55] In the context of such debates, the liberal peace has often emerged as the main blueprint for a compromise. What is most important about this treatment is that as an objective point of reference, it is possible for the diplomat, politician, official of international organisations, regional organisations, or international agencies, to judge what is right and wrong in terms of aspirations, processes, institutions, and methods, in their particular areas of concern. The liberal peace is the foil by which the world is now judged. It is closely associated with the orthodoxy of IR theory, and can be seen as a hybrid – *liberal-realism.*

The following dynamics are characteristic of the way in which peace is often thought of and deployed in orthodox IR:

(i)Peace is always aspired to and provides an optimum, though idealistic, point of reference;

(ii) it is viewed as an achievable global objective, based on universal and cosmopolitan norms;

(iii) it is viewed as a geographically bounded framework defined by territory, culture, identity, and national interests;

(iv) it is presented as an objective truth, associated with complete legitimacy;

(v) it is related to a certain ideology or political or economic framework (liberalism, neoliberalism, democracy, communism or socialism, imperialism, etc.);

(vi) it is a temporal phase;

(vii) it is based upon state or collective security;

(viii) it is based upon local, regional, or global forms of governance, perhaps defined by a hegemonic actor or a specific multilateral institution;

(ix) it is a top-down institutional framework and/or a bottom-up civil society oriented framework;

(x) there needs to be little discussion of the conceptual underpinnings of peace because it is one ideal liberal form;

(xi) it is predicated on preventing conflict, and at best creating an externally supported peace, not on creating a self-sustaining peace.

54. See Johan Galtung and Carl G. Jacobsen, *Searching for Peace: The Road to TRANSCEND* (London: Pluto Press, 2000).

55. Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, *The West, Civil Society, and the Construction of Peace* (London: Palgrave, 2003), 113.

Methodological Considerations

The above investigation of IR theories' discourses of peace indicates the problematic dynamics of positivist and problem-solving approaches[56] and allows for a deeper interrogation reaching beyond the state than a traditional positivist theoretical/empirical approach.[57] This enables an examination of competing concepts and discourses of peace derived from IR theory rather than accepting their orthodoxies. This allows for an identification of the key flaws caused by the limited peace projects associated with peace in IR, and for a theoretical and pragmatic move to place some consideration of peace at the centre of what has now become an 'interdiscipline'.

From this perspective, IR has been instrumental in developing a liberal discourse of peace after WWII, though this in itself has been, and continues to be, much contested. Even peace research has been criticised for having the potential to become 'a council of imperialism' whereby telling the story of 'power politics' means that researchers participate and reaffirm its tenets through disciplinary research methods and the continuing aspiration for a 'Kantian University'.[58] This effectively represents a 'differend' underlining how institutions and frameworks may produce injustices even when operating in good faith.[59] This requires the unpacking of the 'muscular objectivism'[60] that has dominated IR in the western academy and policy world, and a broadening of its representational practices, allowing an escape from what can be described as a liberal-realist methodology and ontology connected to positivist views of IR. The demand that all knowledge is narrowly replicable and should be confirmed and implemented by 're-search' in liberal institutions, organisations, agencies, and universities without need for a broader exploration is no longer adequate if IR is to contribute to a broader understanding of peace, and its multiples.[61]

To gain a multidimensional understanding of peace as one of the great questions of IR[62] one needs to unsettle mimetic approaches to representation that do not recognise subjectivity and breadth, rather

56. This argument rests upon Michel Foucault's post-structuralist, and Marxist related, critique of liberalism. See Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977*, (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 30; Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (London: Tavistock Publications Ltd, 1972), 205.

57. Roland Bleiker, *Popular Dissent, Human Agency, and Global Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), esp. introduction.

58. Rick Ashley, Comments at a conference on his work and 'oeuvre', University of Newcastle, 19 April 2007. He argued that the attempt to create a Kantian 'commonwealth of peace' was futile and motivated by the 'fear within'.

59. Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Differend*, ed. Georges Van Den Abeele (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1988), xi.

60. See Arjun Appadurai, 'Grassroots Globalisation and Research Imagination' in Arjun Appadurai (ed.), *Globalisation* (Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, 2001), 6.

61. Ibid., 8.

62. Ian Shapiro, 'Problems, Methods, and Theories' in Stephen K. White and J. Donald Moon (eds), *What is Political Theory?* (London: Sage, 2004), 194–213.

than trying to replicate a narrow eternal truth or reality, or to make problematic claims of universality.[63] IR's often unproblematised claim to be able to interpret and govern the other that its orthodoxy may be guilty of producing needs to be replaced. IR needs to have an agenda for peace incorporating the interdisciplinary work that has been carried out in the areas of, for example, transnationalism and globalisation, political economy, development, identity, culture and society, gender, children, and the environment. Where social anthropology, for instance, has recently elucidated this sort of agenda clearly, IR has been more reticent, despite the claims about peace made on the founding of the discipline.[64] IR now has the tools (borrowed or otherwise) available to 'uncover counterhegemonic and silenced voices, and to explore the mechanisms of their silencing'.[65] Thus, peace can now be viewed from a number of perspectives. It can be a specific concept (one among many): this infers an ontological and epistemological position of being at peace, and knowing peace; it infers a methodological approach to accessing knowledge about peace and about constructing it; and it implies a theoretical approach, in which peace is a process and outcome defined by a specific theory.

Critical Perspectives on Peace in IR Theory

> The future lies with those who can resolutely turn their back on [the past] and face the new world with understanding, courage and imagination.[66]

A universal, single form of peace will inevitably be seen by some as hegemonic and oppressive, and though there may indeed be a dominant version or agenda for peace in IR theory and in practice (currently the liberal peace) this reflects the intellectual limitations of the orthodoxy of the discipline, its culture, ontology, and methods, rather than its achievements. More critical narratives establish a broader, interdisciplinary reading of peace. Theory indicates the possibility for human action and ethical and practical potential,[67] meaning that the study of peace must be a vital component of engagement with any theory. Yet the main theoretical patterns through which peace is imagined, theorised, and practised and deployed within orthodox, liberal-realist oriented IR

63. Roland Bleiker, 'The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 30, no.3: 527. See also T.W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); H.G. Gadama, *Truth and Method* (New York: Continuum, 1999); Costas Constantinou, 'Hippopolis/ Cynopolis', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 30, no.3 (2001); Costas Constantinou, *Political Discourse: Words, Regimes, Seditions* (London: Routledge, 2004).

64. See, for example, Clifford Gertz, *Available Light* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

65. Rebecca Bryant, *Imagining the Modern* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2004), 8.

66. E.H. Carr, *The Conditions of Peace* (London: Macmillan, 1942), 115.

67. Steve Smith, 'Positivism and Beyond', in *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 13.

theory, often encompass a discursive imaginary of world politics and of the mechanisms, institutions, actors, and methods required to entrench the liberal peace.

Critical contributions to IR theory offer a more sophisticated conceptualisation of peace as well as a powerful critique of the liberal orthodoxy and the neoliberal overtones that it increasingly has adopted, particularly in the form of hyper-liberal state regulation, economic rationalism, individualism, and of course its claims to represent objective fact.[68] They aim to theorise a post-Westphalian peace, in which territorial sovereignty and its ontology no longer disfigure the global normative landscape and political cartography. Given the immediacy of the politics of everyday life, the liberal peace is simply not responsive enough to the demands made upon it by states, officials, and communities, particularly in the empathetic spheres of social welfare, culture, and identity. The emergence of the critical impulse in IR theory, drawing upon critical social theory, has perhaps been one of the most important developments in IR theory over the last generation.[69] This reflected a widespread dissatisfaction with both realism, Kantian-derived liberalism as a more normative response, and structurally determinist approaches derived from Marxism. Different strands rested partially upon a rejection of the objective and subjective divide, liberalism, and a 'linguistic turn'.[70] In the context of these developments, a complex concept of peace, relating to a discursive, empathetic, and emancipatory project, reflecting the everyday life of all, men, women, children, in the varied contexts around the world suddenly became part of the interdiscipline.

An emancipatory version of peace would be based upon, and revolve around, forms of communication designed to facilitate emancipation, both for the individual and for others, leading to empathy between them. This 'discourse ethic' requires that principles be established through a dialogue which does not exclude any person or moral position. All boundaries and systems should be examined through this process to avoid exclusion.[71] This would facilitate the recognition of the intersubjective nature of knowledge even in instrumental areas such as the workings of the global political economy. It would be derived from the evolution of social learning; from pre-conventional morality in which laws are obeyed because of fear of punitive consequences of not doing so, conventional morality where norms exist within a specific and limited moral community, and post-

68. Robert W. Cox, *Production, Power, and World Order* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).

69. For an excellent early review of this see George, *Discourses of Global Politics*, 139. See Robert W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States, and World Orders', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 10, no. 2 (1981): 126–55: Richard K Ashley, 'Political Realism and Human Interest', *International Studies Quarterly* 25 (1985): 204–36; Andrew Linklater, *Men and Citizens in the Theory of IR* (London: Macmillan, 1982).

70. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans GE Anscombe, 2nd edn (London: Blackwell, 1998), section 23.

71. Andrew Linklater, 'The Achievements of Critical Theory' in *International Theory*, ed. Smith, Booth, and Zalewski (see footnote 66 above), 286.

conventional morality where actors and individuals seeks norms that have universal appeal and consequently lead to a universal moral community.[72] Ultimately, Critical theory offers a vision of an emancipatory, everyday and empathetic form of peace in the context of a post-conventional, post-Westphalian IR. It is driven by an intellectual question about what form emancipation would take in material and discursive terms, and how it can be achieved. It offers an account of a systemic process of emancipation built into the communicative institutions of IR, as well as an attempt to show how individuals can achieve emancipation within such moral communities. This implies a negotiated but universal peace through a radical reform of politics, attainable though dialogue in various fora. This positive epistemology of peace suggests an overall ontology of peace (as opposed to an institutional, class-based, or balance of power ontology): emancipation is both plausible and pragmatic, and an epistemic basis and methodology to realise this is possible, despite the age-old problems related to entrenched understandings and discourses of interests and difference. This form of peace may only come about when the inherent contradictions of capitalism, of the nation state, self-determination and identity, and the requirements for free universal communication, are resolved, along the lines of the methods offered by Critical theory. Indeed, these suggest very pragmatic agendas when put into the context of the post-sovereign, emancipatory, and everyday form of peace that this engenders. Indeed, the notion of an empathetic, everyday peace implied by Critical theory also links with debates about peace as a form of care in its different IR contexts – representing a more active and interventionary form of peace.[73]

As Laclau has argued, notions of emancipation inevitably have to skirt between the twin dangers of relativism and universalism, and indeed that emancipation is merely a stage leading to an even wider freedom, which may be beyond the common currency of democracy and self-determination.[74] A universalism which recognises that individuals create their world – or in this case, forms of peace – may well be a sufficient response to this problem, though of course, liberalism, neo- or otherwise, constrains this authorship which should entail emancipations rather a singular emancipation.[75]

The common understanding of peace that is offered through Critical theory is not unproblematic, given its reliance on a specific and claimed universal set of human norms and discourse ethics, but these have brought a much richer set of issues and dynamics to the debate.[76] As Barkawi and

72. Ibid., 285.

73. Pierre Allan, 'Measuring International Ethics', in *What is a Just Peace?*, ed. Pierre Allan and Alexis Keller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 91. See also Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).

74. Ernesto Laclau, *Emancipation(s)* (London:Verso, 1996), 18–19, esp. note 2.

75. Ibid., 122.

76. For an interesting stock-tacking of Critical theories' contribution to IR see Nicholas Rengger and B. Thirkell-White (eds), 'Critical IR Theory after 25 Years', *Special Issue of Review of International Studies* 33 (2007).

Laffey have argued, even Critical security studies, an attempt to move beyond Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian frames reference by focusing on emancipation, actually rely on underlying liberal-realist discourses,[77] often replicating their western-centric ordering claims about international relations. Thus, Critical theory is in danger of falling back into the familiar territory of liberal thinking about peace and its dependence upon rational states and institutions which progressively provide emancipation from above, with only limited engagement with those being emancipated. This critique indicates that peace is close to a 'messianic' liberal ideal form (redeemed only in the future), or what the utopians or idealists of the early part of the twentieth century might have imagined, but more thoroughly negotiated through discursive strategies that arrive at consensus rather than an implicit hegemony of liberal norms. Indeed, it is these latter qualities that prevent Critical theory from following the liberal urge towards colonialism and imperialism as a way that liberal peace might be consolidated. It certainly claims to offer an attractive framework for the creation of an everyday, emancipatory peace, though from this perspective, even Critical theory is in effect a search for a rationalisable form of peace, given a universal identity. This is also at risk of representing Critical IR as a white, male, and Euro-centric, possibly racist, and interventionary endeavour, even if it is aimed at achieving an emancipatory peace;[78] raising the questions of who is peace for? who creates it? and why? For Hobson, for example, western hegemony has been the unfortunate starting-point by which history, and by implication, peace, has been understood even within Critical theory.

Post-structuralism offers a second wing of the critical front that has focused on interrogating, undermining, and moving beyond the positivist and rationalist theoretical frameworks that had dominated orthodox approaches to IR in the western academy and policy world. Its attack is more concerted than that of Critical theory, given its anti-foundationalist stance against Enlightenment meta-narratives of progress, structural determinism, or tragedy, arguing that orthodox theories are ontologically and methodologically flawed. Post-structuralism opens upon radically new possibilities for an ontology, or ontologies, of peace, for methodology, and towards an understanding of the relationship between discourse, texts, knowledge and power. It negotiates with the powerful criticism of the discipline that rational theory effectively reifies a 'liberal empire' which rests upon the residue of liberal imperialism by offering meta-narratives and grounded facts or truths that are simply the interests of the powerful. In effect, this is an attempt to escape the illiberalism that is inherent in the liberal-realist imaginary of the Leviathan, or the determinism of structures, through which hegemony is expressed (perhaps through 'foreign policy', 'international trade', 'peacebuilding' and 'statebuilding', though governance and liberal institutions, and

77. Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, 'The Post-Colonial Moment in Security Studies', *Review of International Studies* 32, no. 2 (2006): 332.

78. J.M. Hobson, 'Is Critical Theory Always for the White West and for Western Imperialism?', *Review of International Studies* 33 (2007): 91–116.

through the orthodox discourses and assumptions of the discipline).[79] Though this raises the question of whether peace is a concept or framework that can have any currency at all in post-structural theory, it clearly points to the inadequacies of theory developed to explain IR and the world (let alone peace) via white, western, male, Christian, developed, liberal and neoliberal political mechanisms. Given its resistance to meta-narratives, post-structuralism does not offer an explicit theory, approach, or concept of peace, but implies its multiplicity and hybridity.

Underlying the post-structural turn in IR is a 'differend'. Lyotard identified this as the dilemma of institutions and frameworks that even when operating with good faith and consensus, still produce injustices for their members or components.[80] This can be termed a 'peace differend', as opposed to the liberal claim of a 'peace dividend'. This underlines the importance of moving across boundaries of knowledge, as Feyerabend suggested in the context of his own epistemological debates.[81] Post-structuralism offers IR genealogical and deconstructive approaches, which claim to navigate around orthodox cartographies designed to impede interpretation or emancipation by substituting an 'Archimedean point'.[82] Around this point are grouped dualities such as realism–idealism or domestic–international which prejudge explanation in specific ways that reproduce forms of power and juxtapose illegitimate forms against these. As a result 'the post-Enlightenment "will to knowledge" has quite literally become a "will to power"'.[83] Genealogical approaches help uncover the mechanisms through which this has occurred. Deconstruction allows IR to be 'read' as a text, opening up a reflective debate on meaning, knowing, and the problems caused by logocentrism and the binary oppositions that emerge from liberal and positivist epistemologies.[84] Such binaries are culturally and historically defined according to post-structuralist thinkers, who perceive declarations of fixed meaning as camouflaging privileged meaning, self-interest and 'violent hierarchies'.[85] This represents a concern with how social meaning is constructed discursively through language in a Derridean sense. What is particularly important in the post-structural canon is the way in which power relations are exposed through deconstruction and genealogy, particularly in what were once thought to be 'private' spheres of life through these sorts of strategies that aim at uncovering age-old assumptions which are so foundational that they are normally thought to be timeless and concrete rather than subjective and exploitative.

79. See in particular, Linda S. Bishai, 'Liberal Empire', *Journal of International Relations and Development* 7 (2004): 48–72: Beate Jahn, 'Kant, Mill, and Illiberal Legacies in International Affairs', *International Organisation* 59 (Winter 2005): 177–207.

80. Lyotard, *The Differend*, xi.

81. Imre Lakaros and Paul Feyerabend, *For and Against Method* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 295.

82. George, *Discourses of Global Politics*, 31.

83. Ibid., 32.

84. Ibid., 191.

85. Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, Trans. G Spivak, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP, 1976).

From this perspective much of IR's orthodoxy is anti-peace. Even liberal or idealist accounts effectively favour a discursive and hegemonic framework derived from western/developed ontologies and interests. Everyday life within is instead rationalised within a virtual 'universal' knowledge system, which is actually biased towards specific, normally western, localities.[86] Alternatives can be found, as in Bleiker's work on aesthetic approaches to IR,[87] in work on development that has been critical of its neoliberal orthodoxy's tendency to create 'bare life' for those who are being 'developed'[88] even within the shell of the state provided by the liberal peacebuilding project. In addition, post-colonial theory illustrates the 'othering' impact of western liberalism against non-liberals,[89] denoting 'orientalism' in which liberals discursively dominate and dehumanise the non-liberal, non-western subject.[90] An important part of such moves has been encapsulated within feminist approaches, which emphasise post-structural concerns with ontology of peace, resistance to marginalisation and the public/private dichotomy. This offers another dimension of peace that critiques the wealthy, male-dominated views of power and the priorities that are embedded in the international system itself. As with other emancipatory projects in IR and other humanities and social science disciplines, the feminist project (or projects) seek(s) various routes to recognise both the intersubjectivity of gender and identity, but also to understand the power relations that attempt to objectify them and marginalise them. As Sylvester has shown, feminist theorising makes clear the need to engage with everyday life, and indeed that there is an 'everyday realm to international relations' where 'empathetic cooperation' has potential.[91]

This implies a more subtle form of emancipation, incorporating an understanding of the politics of resistance, solidarity, and indigenous movements (perhaps through a consideration of international political sociological dynamics) rather than following the conceptualisations offered through elite intellectual and interventionary practices and

86. For a fascinating exposition of this insight into abstraction see Christine Sylvester, 'Art, Abstraction, and IR', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 30, no.3 (2001): 540–1: see also Barry Buzan and Richard Little, 'Why IR has Failed as an Intellectual Project and What to Do About It', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 30, no.1 (2001). They point out that other disciplines do not bother to engage with IR.

87. Bleiker, 'The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory', 510; Roland Bleiker, 'Forget IR Theory', *Alternatives*, Vol.22, No.1, (1997): 57-85. Indeed Bleiker points out that increasing interest in this area in IR means there has been an 'aesthetic turn'.

88. See Sylvester, 'Bare Life as Development/ Post-Colonial Problematic', 67: Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development,* (Princeton University Press, 1995).

89. See S. Chan, P. Mandaville and R. Bleiker, *The Zen of IR* (London: Palgrave, 2001).

90. Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London: Penguin, 1978), 291.

91. Christine Sylvester, 'Empathetic Cooperation: A Feminist Method for IR', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 23, no.2 (1994): 315–34: see also Michel De Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.

action in top-down hegemonic institutions. Thus, it could be said that post-structuralism implies multiple ontologies of peace as discourse, not through the active and material intervention of elites and states, but through the laying bare of the disciplinary and biopolitical nature of liberal-realist discourse, allowing for a broad-ranging empathy and a subsequently 'purer' form of self-emancipation. This ontology of peace through discourse cannot in anyway be connected with disciplinary biopolitics, assumptions of the inherency of violence due to nature or structure, and certainly not to the Enlightenment meta-narrative of rational progress, which it rejects as engendering and disguising genealogies of violence and oppression. This represents emancipation, but not just from hegemony, but also from logocentrism, phonocentricism, from meta-narratives, from the Enlightenment project of rational, teleological progress, and from universal claims – ontologies of peace through discourse.

One avenue that offers a perspective on how an ontology of peace may be thought of is derived from the notion of hybridity.[92] This implies the overlay of multiple identities and ideas, and their transmission without necessarily resulting in the domination of one core identity or idea. In this sense, social movements and alternative spaces which are not necessarily delineated or patrolled by states (such as the internet) are crucial.[93] Walker argues that 'critical social movements' are able to operate and develop in new issue areas and find new spaces in, and methods with which to open up these areas for debate. This results in radical challenges to the mainstream orthodoxies of politics and IR and, effectively, new forms of political and human community. This means that peace itself is radically reconceptualised, not necessarily as an objective but as a method and process, and never a totalising end state. In this context difference is accepted, others are acknowledged, but not at their own expense or that of hybridity. Uncovering hybridity – the fluid and intersecting identities shared by all – forms a *via media* between difference.[94]

Post-structural approaches offer at the very least an 'enhanced reflexivity', particularly in view of embedded assumptions and norms, for both the restructuring of IR theory and therefore for forms of peace.[95] They question the possibility of a universal ethic of an emancipatory approach to peace as offered by Critical theorists. They problematise the claim of

92. Homi K. Bhabha, 'Introduction: Narrating the Nation', in *Nation and Narration*, ed. Bhabha (New York: Routledge, 1990); Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994).

93. R.B.J. Walker, 'Social Movements/World Politics', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 23, no. 3 (1994): 669–700.

94. For one such example, see Costas M. Constantinou, 'Aporias of Identity and the "Cyprus Problem"', Draft paper for the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, April 2006. This paper shows how the Cyprus problem has been defined by conflicting ethno-nationalist Greek or Turkish notions of peace, defined in terms of sovereignty, at the expense of a hybrid identity that has long existed on the island.

95. Yosef Lapid, 'The Third Debate', *International Studies Quarterly* 33 (1989): 235.

IR theory to be able to interpret, catalogue and organise on behalf of the other. They engender resistance to an accepted norm and institutional approach to knowledge, and the privilege that the discipline's orthodoxy claims in order to interpret the 'unknowable other'- particularly the 'non-liberal/western' subject. They raise the question that Dillon has asked about how one knows one is emancipated,[96] and furthermore, how one can assume legitimately the privilege of knowing the mind of the other (a privilege that orthodox approaches claim unquestioningly) so their emancipation can be facilitated? For post-structuralists peace involves accepting difference, rejecting all sovereignties (cutting off the king's head) and making space for hybridity without resorting to power or coercion, thus producing ontologies and discourses of peace through what might be equated with Bourdieu's *heterodoxa*.[97]

Implications for Peace in IR

Orthodox IR has become associated with closure, the proscription of dissent, and with the distancing of everyday life.[98] This is especially so in the contemporary world where conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, the 'war on terror', weak or failing peacebuilding projects in many other countries, as well as poverty and environmental dangers appear to have dispersed the post-Cold War liberal 'peace dividend'. Despite the inference that the liberal peace is a 'civilised' and 'enlightened' compromise between idealism and realism, the discourses and practices associated with it are often more representative of the dystopian than the moderated utopian. This is particularly so in its application and experience outside of its western roots, and in the current applications of a recently evolved muscular liberal peace, which can be observed in the statebuilding attempt in Iraq with its inherently neoliberal ideological focus. The attempt to mimic the liberal state in Iraq has done much to discredit the universal claims of the transferability of the liberal peace in political terms,[99] adding to the obvious failures of its neoliberal components, which have been observed in a wide range of cases from the UN assistance mission in Cambodia in the early 1990s to the return of UN peacekeepers to East Timor after the crisis of 2006 – all of which have at best resulted in a 'virtual peace'. Thus, the liberal peace spans both civil and uncivil forms of peace, being based on international consensus, but often on a much weaker local consensus. Indeed, the rhetoric of local ownership, participation, and consent is often a disguise for non-consensual intervention, for dependency and conditionality, there being little space

96. In particular see Michael Dillon, 'A Passion for the Impossible: Jacques Ranciere, Equality, Pedagogy and the Messianic', *European Journal of Political Theory* 4, no. 4: 429–52.

97. See, for example, Heiki Patomaki, 'The Challenge of Critical Theories', *Journal of Peace Research* 38, no.6 (2001): 732: Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

98. Phillip Darby, 'A Postcolonial Rethinking of Relations International', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 33, no.1 (2004): 1.

99. For an interesting exploration of this, see Rajiv Chandrasekaran, *Imperial Life in the Emerald City* (London: Bloomsbury, 2007); Alia A. Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).

for empathy, emancipation, or indigeneity in the liberal peace framework, other than through a romanticised view of the local. Orthodox IR's implicit perspectives on peace have been ensnared by liberal-realist theories and a western-centric view of the world, in particular elevating governmental elites and institutions over societies and everyday life. Cultural neutrality and a failure of recognition mean that liberal peace is often equated by its recipients with the colonial or hegemonic. This indicates that emancipation is absent, certainly that it fails to achieve any form of empathy or care,[100] and that it fails to facilitate an negotiation of the ontologies of peace. The liberal peace is unable to communicate across cultures, rests upon a legalistic framework, dissociates law from norms, rests upon preserving the pre-existing liberal order, and claims a problematic universality.[101] As a result of this failure, it fails often to provide even the 'thin recognition' let alone mutual consent and recognition that are often claimed, given the paucity of local consent. What is missing here is a discussion of dialogue and communication – indeed a discourse ethic – of notions of emancipation and care, and an understanding of the ontologies of peace. The liberal concept of toleration, and liberalism's link with sovereignty and the state, as well as its homogenising tendencies, and its failure to engage with issues such as culture and welfare, provide obstacles for this broader engagement[102] leading to what Williams has argued is an 'auto-ambivalence',[103] which disguises the negative consequences of the liberal peace.[104] Yet, even 'enlightened' debates on the concept of peace which generally tend to draw on approaches such as Galtung's negative/positive framework, the notion of a 'just peace', even an emancipatory approach, or the widely used concept of human security, tend to draw on, either by mimicking, extending, or contesting, the liberal-realist paradigm, where peace is theorised as something which is at best institutionally constructed around states to engage with individual needs and emancipation, or in its more limited form a postponement of the tragedy of IR. Even Critical and post-structural contributions revolve around the defence or attack of universalist principles and norms of peace with an eye to developing a more broadly representative, rather than reductionist, version.

The response to such a catalogue of issues has been vibrant, of which the failure of one universal notion or ontology of peace to triumph over others is indicative. Indeed, the many dimensions of contemporary theorising are necessary for a consideration of peace. IR is perhaps no longer the 'backwards discipline' – in some quarters at least because of such a transformation, interdisciplinary connections and debates. Placing peace at the centre of the discipline indicates that to fully engage with the international, IR theory needs to embrace its complexity rather than

100. Pierre Allan and Alexis Keller, 'The Concept of a Just Peace', *What is a Just Peace*, ed. Alan and Keller, 196.

101. Ibid., 212.

102. Bhikhi Parekh, *Rethinking Multiculturalism* (London: Macmillan, 2000), 185–94.

103. Andrew Williams, *Liberalism and War* (London: Routledge, 2006), 215.

104. See, for example, John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Culture of Contentment* (London: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1992), 10.

avoid it.[105] Though the liberal peace offers a form of emancipation, this is potentially hegemonic, and perhaps reflects what Rorty has described as a 'liberal utopia'.[106] As Walker has argued, IR theory fails when it attempts to present a truth as anything other than a 'historically specific spatial ontology'.[107]

Jabri has articulated a significant conceptualisation of peace in contemporary IR. She argues that,

> the politics of peace, the capacity at once to both resist violence and struggle for a just social order, is not just within the purview of the liberal state or indeed an international civil service, but is located primarily with individuals, communities and social movements involved in critical engagement with the multiform governance structures, as well as non-state agents, they encounter in their substantial claims for human rights and justice. The politics of peace must then rely on a conception of solidarity that has a capacity to transcend the signifying divide of state and culture, while at the same time recognising the claims of both.[108]

This represents a critical rendition of the concept of peace, to which can be added the need for emancipation and empathy for the most marginalised. This means that individuals have primacy in terms of their rights, freedoms, and participation,[109] recognition is central, as is the way in which categorisations are made to include or exclude others.[110] Recognition implies empathy, care, and thus, solidarity and reconciliation, but the latter cannot occur before the former if a polity is to achieve a sustainable and mutually constituted form of peace.[111]

Perhaps the methodological question is the most controversial in that it raises important epistemological questions about how research interrogates the foundations of political organisation, whom it favours, and what it is constructed for. In particular it opens up the questions of who the discipline privileges, how the construction of IR and society interact, and the type of knowledge that is required to understand this.

---

105. For recent attempts to introduce new methods, literatures and sources to IR, see Christine Sylvester, 'Whither the International at the End of IR?' *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* (2007); Steve Smith, 'Singing our World into Existence', *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (2004): 499–515 (the title refers to the Aboriginal 'dreamtime'); Roland Bleiker, *Aesthetics and World Politics* (Palgrave, forthcoming 2008); Bleiker (ed.), 'Poetic World Politics', special issue of *Alternatives* 25, no.3 (2000). See also my own 'Dadaism and the Peace Differend', forthcoming in *Alternatives* (2008).

106. Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), xv.

107. R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), ix.

108. Vivienne Jabri, *War and the Transformation of Global Politics* (London: Palgrave, 2007), 268.

109. Allan and Keller, 'The Concept of a Just Peace', 16–17.

110. Keller, 'Justice, Peace and History', in *What is a Just Peace*, ed. Allan and Keller, 49.

111. Ibid., 51.

Of course, in the realm of IR, and in particular relating to peace, this demands that policymakers are able to influence IR correspondingly in order to reproduce a specific approach to peace. Thus, the methods used to investigate IR, and the question of peace, are vital in this epistemological circle, in which knowledge is produced and passed on to policymakers to act upon, or at least to modify their policies. This also relates to the problematic claims of the orthodoxy of IR towards a value-free approach to politics, when basic assumptions about human nature (peaceful or violent), about the nature of political organisation, about political, social, and economic ideologies, are related to the interests of societies, groups, and polities. For this reason, a single peace, whether institutional or emancipatory, translatable across all such groupings, interests, and ideologies is unlikely to stand up to an interdisciplinary investigation or escape coercive and disciplinary tendencies.

This raises the question of how the voices of IR from outside of the developed world and its institutions and academies can express their understanding of the indigenous or everyday, and contribute, and be empathised with (indeed, be heard) on equal terms in the context of IR. This requires such alternative methodologies as derived from interdisciplinarity and intellectual pluralism, but it also requires that local academies and policymakers are enabled to develop approaches to help them understand their own predicaments and situations as well as those of the west, or developed world, without these being tainted by western, liberal, and developed world orthodoxies, which cannot be easily transferred without inserting their own biases, agendas and shortcomings. In other words, to gain an understanding of the indigenous factor (and to empathise with it) for the overall IR project of building peace, liberal or otherwise, a *via media* needs to be developed between emergent local knowledge and the orthodoxy of international prescriptions and assumptions about peace (which, in knowledge terms – and even in the context of critical theory – has become hegemonic because of the weight of so many actors, institutions, and academies that assume emancipatory forms of the liberal peace to be potentially universal).

This represents an everyday ontology of peace, enabling political, social, and economic organisations and institutions that respect the communities they are in a contractual relationship within its specific circumstances and environment, requiring also the flexibility to respond to any changes. As a consequence, this notion of peace would be locally and transnationally constituted, self-sustaining, socially, politically, economically, and environmentally, and would provide a *via media* between different identities and interests. As far as possible, these interlocking and interrelated versions of peace would also provide justice and equity, avoid violence both direct and structural, and would be based upon empathy, emancipation, and cooperation.

Conclusion

In order to capitalise on the emerging pluralist debates on peace, some preliminary assertions can be made. Ontologies, epistemologies,

theories, concepts and methods should be broadly representative of all actors at multiple levels, public and private, gendered and aged, and of multiple identities, reproducing hybridity. Its identities should be clearly understood and any claimed boundaries, rules, rights, freedoms, and norms must be generally recognised and consented to by all, but especially the most marginalised. This means also foregrounding the problems of gaining the consent of those who most marginalised, and also addressing those who are willing to use violence. Bottom-up, social ontologies developing an empathetic account of emancipation based upon mutual ontologies and methods of peace would therefore influence the shape of institutions. This does not preclude peace being legitimate and formalised in state, governmental, institutional or constitutional structures and legal frameworks, or a social contract, but these must derive from consent and an engagement with difference and hybridity and sensitised to the never-ending unintended consequences of the exercise of any type of knowledge or power. It should provide social, economic and political resources sufficient to meet the demands made upon it by its local constituencies and a transnational and international community of which it is a stakeholder. Any viable concept of peace that conforms to the above conditions cannot not displace indigenous legitimacy with preponderant institutions that are inflexible and actually obscure the indigenous. Interdisciplinary and cross-cutting coalitions of scholars, policymakers, individuals- indigenous, local, transnational- and civil society actors can develop discursive understandings of peace and its construction in this context, for each context. By placing the study of multiple concepts of peace at the centre of IR, a research agenda is implied to develop multiple conceptions of peace, focused upon the everyday life of their constituents in the context of an institutional framework and social contract, together with a *via media* between them. Recognition of these requirements are crucial to counter the inherent tendency of any utopian, liberal, and critical, and emancipatory institutional attempts to create a single and universal blueprint for peace, which recent experience from Cambodia to East Timor and beyond shows rarely succeeds.

As Schmid claimed, research aimed to facilitate peace, '…should formulate its problems, not in terms meaningful to international and supranational institutions, but in terms meaningful to suppressed and exploited groups and nations.'[112] This opens up claims to emancipate the subaltern from structures of oppression, be they state, military, or derived from social, economic, or class structures. It allows for a negotiation of a discursive practice of peace in which hegemony, domination, and oppression can be identified and resolved. This pluralist and critical approach to peace may be more sensitive to the changing pattern of grass-roots needs and objectives, in the context of institutions and hierarchy, and ultimately open up a concern with the self-sustaining nature of any attempt to create a process or dynamic of peace. Peace should not become a differend, it should not be utopian, and therefore unobtainable, but it

112. Herman Schmid, 'Peace Research and Politics', *Journal of Peace Research* 5, no.3 (1968): 219.

also should not be dystopian, and therefore lack legitimacy among those who are subject to it. Furthermore, it must be able to mediate across its own subjective boundaries, without dominating, but at the same time upholding its own internal logic, norms, legitimacy, and standards, for all to see and understand. Any version of peace should cumulatively engage with everyday life as well as institutions from the bottom up. It should rest on uncovering an ontology, perhaps indigenous, on empathy and emancipation, and recognise the fluidity of peace as a process, as well as the constant renegotiation of 'international' norms of peace. Agents of peace should endeavour to see themselves as mediatory agents of empathetic emancipation, whereby their role is to mediate the global norm or institution with the local before it is constructed. This involves an exploration of different and hybrid ontologies of peace.

It is also very difficult to see how this interdisciplinary, pluralist agenda can be sustained while clinging to notions of a territorially bounded international space and concurring with sovereign liberal or neoliberal governance. A significant aspect of IR's role may now be to facilitate the development of an understanding of the emancipatory ontologies, theories, methods, and issues, of self-sustaining peace across disciplines, beyond these constraining factors.

The long-held notion that peace is a nebulous concept, which cannot be theorised, and is methodologically and ontologically problematic, can now with some certainty be consigned to the graveyard of orthodox IR theory. This notion was deployed to censor discussions of peace in favour of representing power, states, sovereignty, and recently the liberal peace as the ontology of the discipline. If IR is to be a discipline that uncovers and inscribes an understanding of peace rather than inflicts violence upon its subjects, it should engage with the implications of this. Knowing or speaking peace always reproduces some version of it. Emerging from the interdisciplinary, pluralist – indeed empathetic, emancipatory – research that now surrounds IR, it is clear that a debate about peace has always been an implicit part of its major debates, theories, methods, and epistemes. As a result making this explicit, drawing on what is an increasingly rich interdiscipline, such an agenda may now be understood like ethics as an 'ongoing historical practice'.[113] Acknowledging these dynamics is an important step towards the explicit development of the heterodox conditions of, practices of, and understanding of, a pluralist and everyday peace across diverse contexts.

113. R.B.J. Walker, 'Social Movements/World Politics', 53.

Appendix

Figure 1 Peace in IR theory

(i) Idealism depicts a future complete peace incorporating social, political and economic harmony (of which there are no examples) represented by internationalism, world government, and federation. This type of peace is represented as desirable but effectively unobtainable. It is an 'ideal form', though for idealists this does not mean that attempts to achieve it should be abandoned. Some idealists saw the League of Nations, and later the UN, attempts at disarmament, and the outlawing of war, as an attempt to attain this peace. Indeed, this institutional architecture is its legacy.

(ii) Liberalism, liberal internationalism/institutionalism, neoliberalism, and liberal-imperialism, and ultimately *liberal-realism* depict an achievable general peace derived from international institutions and organisations representing universal agreements and norms. This provides a basis for individualism, and social, political and/or economic rights and responsibilities, based upon significant levels of justice and consent. It is generally acknowledged that this form of peace will probably be occasionally marred by injustice, terrorism, secessionism, or guerilla warfare perpetrated by marginalised actors which do not accept the norms and frameworks engendered in such universal agreements. Still, this represents a form of peace that is believed to be plausible, achievable, though often geographically limited by boundaries that exclude actors who do not conform to such a view of what is essentially an international society. Peace in this framework can be constructed by actors with the necessary knowledge and resources, probably resembling a Kantian Perpetual Peace. This is commonly referred to as the liberal peace, embodied in the UN system and a post-Cold War 'international society'.

(iii) Realism (and other power/interest-focused theories) represents IR as relative anarchy managed by a powerful hegemon or an international system, which produces a basic international, though not necessarily domestic, order. This imposes a limited temporal and geographically bounded order, which attempts to manage or assuage border conflicts, territorial conflicts, ethnic, linguistic, religious (and other identity) conflicts). The resulting type of peace rests upon sovereignty, the balance of power, or domination, perceptions of threat, and the glorification of national interest in relation to military might. There have been many examples of this type of peace, from Alexander's conquest of the ancient world, the Pax Romana (and the destruction of Carthage), the Westphalian states-system, and the Paris Peace Treaty of 1919.

(iv) Marxist-inspired structuralist insights into peace represent it as resting on social justice, equality, and an equitable system of international trade, where states and actors are not hierarchically organised according to socio-economic class indicators. Peace in these terms is achievable, but probably only after massive, and probably revolutionary, upheaval in

the international political economy and in traditional class and economic hierarchies and systems. This would reorder states and the international in a way which better represents the interests of workers and society, rather than wealthy elites.

(v) Critical theory and post-structuralism, resting to some degree upon the intellectual legacy of (i), (ii), and (iv), depicts an emancipatory peace, in multiple forms, in which consideration of forms of justice, identity, and representation allows for marginalised actors (such as women, children, and minorities) and environmental factors can be considered. Critical theory seeks a universal basis to achieve such an outcome through ethical forms of communication, whereas post-structural approaches are wary of accepting its plausibility in the light of the dangers of universalism, the problem of relativism, and the genealogical scale of the obstacles to emancipation. Hypothetically, both approaches concur that marginalised actors and discourses should be recognised, and discourses and practices of domination should be removed through radical reform. Whether there can be a universal peace or multiple states of peace, reflecting pluralism/relativism is heavily contested. However, there is still a strong sense that peace as an ideal form could be achieved within Critical theory. Post-structuralism certainly does not deny the possibility of multiples of peace, but sees these as reflecting difference, everyday life, hybridity, and personal agency.

Figure 2 Explicit contributions of IR theory to peace

IR theory	Concept of peace
Idealism	Positive epistemology of peace (harmony and cooperation are inherent in human nature and society/states) offers a utopian ontology of ethical harmony; depends upon disarmament, pacifism internationalism, international institutions (civil and institutional peace), carried out by social movements and states. Peace represents an absence of any form of violence.
Liberalism(s)	Positive epistemology of peace, but more guarded upon ontological grounds than idealism with respect to its reflection of the inherency of violence in human nature. Proper social and political conditions need to be established to achieve a positive peace through standardised democratic governance that depends upon the capacity of states and their organisations to determine the appropriate mixture of freedom and constraint required to promote and police a positive, liberal form of peace. Peace represents an absence of physical and structural violence for the majority in each state and can be constructed through liberal peacebuilding.
Pluralism	Peace is found in a transnational world society, which represents a positive epistemology of peace derived from an ontology determined by human needs. This can be developed through conflict resolution approaches. Peace represents a distribution of human needs adequate for all.

IR theory	Concept of peace
Realism(s)	A victor's peace, or a negative peace, derived from a negative epistemology of peace, arises through security dilemmas, the balance of power between states, and an inherent ontology of violence and fear. Absence of interstate war is enough to denote peace, though imperial hegemony based upon victory would be an optimum version of peace. Contracts between states and between states and citizens rest upon fear, but for as long as such contracts survive this can be called peace. Conflict management is the best that can be achieved in this environment. Peace is the space between wars.
Structuralism(s)	Structural frameworks such as capitalism and class block peace as social/economic justice for individuals. Peace represents progressive emancipation. Ontologically, a classless, socially just peace is plausible, given the correct methodology, upon discovery of which it eventually becomes inevitable even if revolutionary change is the only way it can occur. However, it is also assumed that structural and physical violence occurs in the interaction between classes, leading eventually to revolution via which an emancipatory peace emerges.

IR theory	Concept of peace
English School	Drawing on both realism and idealism/ liberalism, 'civilised/liberal' states create a stable 'international society' (and human rights), resting upon a balancing of both a positive and negative epistemology of peace in their domestic and international settings. Both negative and positive epistemologies of peace are present, but negative epistemologies are more visible in an international setting – though they are also manageable.
Normative theory	Peace lies in a recognition of universal normative system and individuals as ends in themselves, reflected in either in cosmopolitan or communitarian institutions and norms. A positive epistemology of peace depends upon toleration, recognition, and also a recognition of the dangers of unethical behaviour.
Constructivism	As with liberalism and English School thinking: in addition a balance of identity, ideational tolerance and state cooperation or hegemony promotes a peaceful order moving towards that offered by Critical theory (below).
Environmental theory	Offers a radical critique of state-centric IR theory, often drawing on critical approaches to IR theory; a concept of peace that requires the structural prioritisation of the environment and its preservation for future generations. Only in these terms is an environmental ontology of peace possible.
Critical theory	Offers a positive epistemology of an emancipatory peace resting upon empathy and possibly active care, and a concern with both institutions and everyday life. A post-Westphalian, emancipatory peace may arise through discourse ethics.

IR theory	Concept of peace
Gender	Using critical approaches, this develops a positive epistemology of peace incorporating both gender critiques and sensitivities in order to develop an understanding of alternative, social and political ontologies of peace (and barriers to these).
Post-structuralism	Offers a positive epistemology of post-sovereign ontologies of peace through a pluralist, textual/ genealogical examination of the broad range of issues and dynamics that lead to or constitute identity difference, and hybridity.
War studies	Peace is limited – victor's peace or negative peace (realist approach)
Peace studies	Peace should engender social justice, but at the very least achieve an absence of violence between states (structuralist or liberal approach/also as in peace studies).
Democratic peace	International peace is represented by democratic states and free trade as in the Kantian Project (liberal approach).
Security studies	International peace is derived from watertight pre-emptive security measures (realist/liberal approaches).
Critical security studies	Transnational peace is emancipation (critical approaches).
Conflict studies:	
Conflict management	Negative peace/basic security (realist).
Conflict resolution	Positive peace/human needs (pluralist).
Peacebuilding/statebuilding	Liberal peace/governance (liberal-realist hybrid approach).
Fourth-generation approaches	Emancipation and ontology of peace.

IR theory	Concept of peace
IPE/dependencia	Drawing upon liberalism or structuralism, free trade or global economic equality and social justice leads to peace. Implies a positive epistemology of peace once either international institutions/ regimes have been perfected or global capitalism has been modified or defeated.
International law	Peace should be based upon a normative rule of law respected by all states.
International political sociology	Opens up an understanding of the dynamics of peace in an otherwise marginalised interdisciplinary area of sociological investigation of the international.
Development studies	Locally sustainable, emancipatory development or modernisation models based upon the liberal-realist/neoliberal hybrid.
Post-colonial studies	Peace should contend with the dangers of subtle neocolonial hegemony and domination through discursive and material means of liberal governance.

Oliver P. Richmond is a Professor in the School of International Relations and Director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of St Andrews, UK.