Leashing the Dogs of War
Conflict Management in a Divided World

Edited by Chester A. Crocker,
Fen Osler Hampson,
and Pamela Aall

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STATE BREAKING AND STATE FAILURE, both unavoidable accompaniments of the state-making process, lie at the root of most conflicts that the international system has witnessed since the end of World War II. The veracity of this assertion is demonstrated by two generally accepted facts. The first is the incontestable reality that the overwhelming majority of conflicts since the end of World War II have been located in the postcolonial countries that constitute the Third World. The second is the equally incontrovertible fact that most such conflicts either have been primarily intrastate in character or have possessed a substantial intrastate dimension, even if they appear to the outside observer to be interstate conflicts. This means that problems of international and domestic order have become closely intertwined during the current era and are likely to remain so well into the foreseeable future.

The validity of both these assertions, that is to say, the concentration of conflicts in the Third World and the primacy of domestic sources of conflict, is confirmed by the latest data presented in the SIPRI Yearbook 2005. These data demonstrate that all nineteen major armed conflicts that were recorded in 2004 were classified as intrastate in character. However, the report makes clear that “[i]n a reversal of the classic spill-over of conflict from intra- to inter-state, developments in Iraq during 2004 raised the prospect of an international conflict creating a fully fledged civil war.” Iraq, therefore, stands out as the exception that proves the rule. In the previous year, 2003, SIPRI (the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) had identified nineteen major armed conflicts as well, but had noted that two of them, the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and the invasion of Iraq by the United States and the United Kingdom, were interstate in character. While both Kashmir and Iraq continued to figure in the 2004 list, the basic character of these conflicts was perceived as having been changed by the amelioration of the India–Pakistan dimension of the Kashmir conflict on the one
hand and the “success” of the U.S. invasion on the other.

Almost all of the conflicts in 2003 and 2004 were located in the old or new Third World, as had been the case in previous years. The new Third World refers to states in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans that emerged out of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the dismemberment of Yugoslavia. In terms of their colonial background, the arbitrary construction of their boundaries by external powers, the lack of societal cohesion, their recent emergence into juridical statehood, and their stage of economic and political development, the states of the Caucasus and Central Asia and of the Balkans demonstrate political, economic, and social characteristics that are in many ways akin to those of the Asian, African, and Latin American states that have traditionally been considered as constituting the Third World. There are abundant data, therefore, to support the conclusion that the overwhelming majority of conflicts in the international system since 1945 have been “a ubiquitous corollary of the birth, formation, and fracturing of Third World states.”

**State Making in the Third World**

The events since the early 1990s, by removing the Second World from the international equation, have helped present the dichotomy between the global core and the global periphery—the First World and the Third World—in very stark terms. By eliminating the Cold War overlay from Third World conflicts and thus exposing their fundamental local dynamics, the end of bipolarity has also demonstrated the close linkage between these conflicts and the dynamics of state making (and its obverse, state breaking and state failure) currently under way in the global periphery. The proliferation of conflicts in the periphery, when compared with the image of relative tranquillity within and amity among the industrialized countries of Western Europe and North America, has augmented the impression that there are actually two distinct zones in the international system—the zone of peace in the North and the zone of turmoil in the South—and that the two work according to different logics, a Lockean one in the former and a Hobbesian one in the latter.

However, this dichotomous representation of the First and Third Worlds hides the essential similarity in their process of state making, which has been (and is) crucial in determining the political trajectories of states. This point becomes clear if one compares the current situation in the Third World, not with that prevailing within and among the industrial democracies today, but with the situation from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century in Western Europe, when the earliest of the modern sovereign states were at a stage of state making that corresponded with the stage where most Third World states find themselves today.

Youssef Cohen and colleagues have most succinctly defined the process of state making as “primitive central state power accumulation.” Thus defined, state making must include the following:

- The expansion and consolidation of the territorial and demographic domain under a political authority, including the imposition of order on contested territorial and demographic space (war)
- The maintenance of order in the territory where, and over the population on whom, such order has already been imposed (policing)
- The extraction of resources from the territory and the population under the control of the state, resources essential not only to support the war-making and policing activities undertaken by the state but also to maintain the apparatuses of state necessary to carry on routine administration, deepen the state’s penetration of society, and serve symbolic purposes (taxation)
All three broad categories of activities outlined here, however, depend on the state’s success in monopolizing and concentrating the means of coercion in its own hands in the territory and among the population it controls. That is why the accumulation of power becomes so crucial to the state-making enterprise; the more primitive the stage of state building, the more coercive the strategies employed to accumulate and concentrate power in the hands of the agents of the state. Cohen and colleagues stated in a seminal article published in 1981, “The extent to which an expansion of state power will generate collective violence depends on the level of state power prior to that expansion. . . . The lower the initial level of state power, the stronger the relationship between the rate of state expansion and collective violence.”9 One needs to be reminded that the violence generated during the process of state making is the result of actions undertaken both by the state and by recalcitrant elements within the population that forcefully resist the state’s attempt to impose order.

The inherent similarity in the logic of the state-building process provides us explanations for the current replication by Third World states of several dimensions of the early modern European experience of state making. Simultaneously, the difference in the pace at which state building has to be undertaken and completed in the Third World and the dramatically changed international environment in which Third World state making has to proceed explain the divergence in other dimensions from the earlier European model of state building. The similarities and the differences are equally important, as is the bearing they have on problems of authority and governance within Third World states.

It should be noted that in most of Europe, state making usually antedated the emergence of nations and nation-states by a couple of centuries. This is why it is essential not to confuse the building of modern sovereign states with the emergence of nation-states in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.10 Sovereign and relatively centralized states that have performed successfully over a long period of time—and have therefore knit their people together in terms of historical memories, legal codes, language, religion, and so forth—may evolve into nation-states or at least provide the necessary conditions for the emergence of nation-states, but they are not synonymous with the latter. Historical evidence has convincingly demonstrated that in almost all cases in Europe, with the exception of the Balkans (an exception that may provide the clue to the current violence and strife in that region), the emergence of the modern sovereign state was the precondition for the formation of the nation.11

This generalization applied as much to latecomers such as Germany as it did to the earliest examples of modern states, such as England and France. Without the central role performed by the Prussian state, Germany would probably have remained nothing more than a geographic or cultural expression. The similarity between the German experience on the one hand and the French experience on the other has been summed up well by Cornelia Navari: “When Hegel insisted that it was the state that created the nation, he was looking backwards to the history of France, not forward to the history of Germany. When Germany was unified ‘from above’ in 1870 and the Reich was formed, this way of proceeding did not appear to most Germans to be at variance with the experience of their Western neighbors—a substitution of Union ‘by force’ for the ‘organic growth’ of France and England. It appeared to be a repetition of it, differing only in that it was less bloody. Here, as there, the state was moving outwards into diverse feudal remnants of the old order, dissolving them, making all obedient to the same law.”12

The chronological sequence of the establishment of the sovereign state and the evolution of nationalism in the Third World bears very close resemblance to that of modern
Europe, with the state taking clear historical precedence over the nation. As Anthony Smith has put it very succinctly, "[T]he western model is essentially a 'state system' rather than a 'nation system'; and this has been its fateful legacy to Africa and Asia." Smith goes on to point out that despite the differences in geopolitical and cultural terms between Europe and the Third World, "the central point . . . of the western experience for contemporary African and Asian social and political change has been the primacy and dominance of the specialized, territorially defined, and coercively monopolistic state, operating within a broader system of similar states bent on fulfilling their dual functions of internal regulation and external defence (or aggression)."13

In this context, it is instructive to note Charles Tilly's point that "the building of states in Western Europe cost tremendously in death, suffering, loss of rights, and unwilling surrender of land, goods, or labor. . . . The fundamental reason for the high cost of European state building was its beginning in the midst of a decentralized, largely peasant social structure. Building differentiated, autonomous, centralized organizations with effective control of territories entailed eliminating or subordinating thousands of semiautonomous authorities. . . . Most of the European population resisted each phase of the creation of strong states."14 Tilly's description of conditions in Europe at the birth of modern sovereign states has an uncanny resemblance to present conditions in many Third World societies. It thus helps to explain why, if one arranges the current state-building strategies employed in the Third World on a continuum ranging from coercion to persuasion (with the two ends representing ideal types), even those states like India that fall relatively close to the persuasive end of the continuum rely on significant amounts of coercion—as witnessed over the past several decades in Punjab, Kashmir, and the northeastern states—to entrench and consolidate the authority of the state in regions where it faces, or has faced, major challenges.

In order to replicate the process by which relatively centralized modern states are created, Third World state makers need above all two things: lots of time and a relatively free hand to persuade, cajole, and coerce the disparate populations under their nominal rule to accept the legitimacy of state boundaries and institutions; to accept the right of the state to extract resources from them; and to let the state regulate the more important public aspects of their lives. Unfortunately for Third World state elites, neither of these two commodities is available to them in adequate measure. This is because, unlike European states, postcolonial states have to build states and nations within limited time spans, thus forcing them to collapse sequential phases of state and nation construction into one mammoth phase. They have no alternative because their failure to accomplish in decades what European states took centuries to do is likely to hold them up to international ridicule and consign them to permanent peripherality in the international system. Simultaneously, contemporary international norms demand that postcolonial state elites treat their populations humanely and according to codes of civilized behavior, thus restraining their capacity to use force in the pursuit of state making and nation building. The lack of adequate time and normative constraints imposed on state makers make their task very difficult and encourage the emergence of secessionist movements that challenge the state's authority and lay the basis for intrastate conflict.15

The point regarding the availability of time becomes clear if one examines the amount of time it took for the states of Western Europe to emerge as full-fledged sovereign states, enjoying the habitual obedience of their populations, basically secure in the legitimacy of their borders and institutions, and, therefore, in a position where they could respond positively to societal demands, since these demands no
longer ran counter to the logic of state building and the accumulation of power in the hands of the state. It was not until the beginning of the twentieth century that the states of Western Europe and their offshoots in North America emerged as the responsive and representative modern states that we know them to be today—the end products of the state-making process that had unfolded for at least three or four hundred years. It is instructive to remember that the survival of the American state in its present form hung in the balance in the 1860s, only 150 years ago, and it managed to survive only after a bloody civil war that left millions dead. Although leading historians of state building in Europe differ about the exact dating of the origins, in the sense of beginnings, of the modern sovereign state, there is little argument about the fact that “it took four to five centuries for European states to overcome their weaknesses, to remedy their administrative deficiencies, and to bring lukewarm loyalty up to the white heat of nationalism.”

Unfortunately for Third World state makers, their states cannot afford the luxury of prolonging the traumatic and costly experience of state making over hundreds of years à la Europe. The demands of competition with established modern states and the demonstration effect of socially cohesive, politically responsive, and administratively effective states in the industrialized world make it almost obligatory for Third World states to reach their goal within the shortest possible time. The pioneers of European state making (although not the latecomers like Germany and Italy) were remarkably free from systemic pressures and demonstration effects, because all the leading contenders for statehood—England, France, Spain, Holland—were basically in the same boat, trying to navigate the same uncharted sea. Where European states did not have this luxury and had to compress some of the sequential phases that together constituted the process of state building, they suffered from a “cumulation of crises.” This applied particularly to the states of Germany and Italy, which emerged as unified sovereign entities only in the closing decades of the nineteenth century and were immediately faced with the pressures of mass politics. In fact, it can be argued that the emergence of Italian Fascism and German Nazism was a result of the Italian and German state elites’ inability in the first two decades of the twentieth century to respond successfully, in a context of mass politics, to the accumulated crises threatening their respective states.18

If this was the case with Germany, which had the well-established Prussian state at its core, one can well imagine the enormity of the challenge faced by the postcolonial states of the Third World. The latter’s problems have been compounded by the fact that they are under pressure to demonstrate adequate statehood quickly; to perform the task of state making in a humane, civilized, and consensual fashion; and to do all this in an era of mass politics. The inadequacy of the time element and the consequent fact that several sequential phases involved in the state-making process have had to be telescoped together into one mammoth state-building enterprise go a long way toward explaining the problems of authority and governance faced by the Third World states today.19 Given the short time at the disposal of state makers in the Third World and the consequent acceleration in their state-making efforts necessary to demonstrate that they are moving speedily toward effective statehood, crises erupt simultaneously and become unmanageable as the load they put on the political system outruns the political and military capabilities of the state, thus further eroding the legitimacy of the already fragile postcolonial state.

INTERNATIONAL NORMS OF STATEHOOD AND HUMAN RIGHTS

In addition to these internal factors, the workings of the international system, especially the
policies adopted by the superpowers during the Cold War era, have complicated the process of state making in the Third World. With the export of superpower rivalry to the Third World in the form of proxy wars, both interstate and intrastate, and the transfer of weapons to governments and insurgents in fragile polities in volatile regional environments, the bipolar global balance during the Cold War era greatly accentuated the insecurities and instabilities in the Third World. Numerous cases in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East attest to the veracity of this statement.20

Equally important, certain international norms that have crystallized relatively recently have also had mixed effects on the security and stability of Third World states. The first of these norms relates to the inalienability of juridical sovereignty or statehood once conferred by international law and symbolized by membership in the United Nations. The sanctity of the borders of postcolonial states forms the logical corollary to this norm. While this international norm has done much to preserve the existence of several Third World states that may have otherwise been unviable, it has also, paradoxically, added to the security predicament of the Third World state. This point can best be understood by recalling that the elimination of states considered unviable, either because of their internal contradictions or because their existence did not suit great-power aspirations, was perfectly acceptable to the European international community virtually through the end of World War I. The Prussian annexation of several Germanic principalities in the 1860s and the periodic disappearance and reappearance of Poland in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are prime examples of this phenomenon.

The international consensus on the alienability of juridical statehood began to change during the interwar period and crystallized after World War II in the context of the decolonization of Asia and Africa. Colonies, once granted independence, acquired the right to exist as sovereign entities, even if many of them (especially in Africa) did not possess "much in the way of empirical statehood, disclosed by a capacity for effective and civil government."21 This change has meant that, while this international norm has protected the legal existence of postcolonial states without regard to their internal cohesiveness or the effectiveness of their domestic control, it has been unable to solve the security problems that such states face as a result of the contradictions present within their boundaries and inherent in their statemaking process.

It is worth noting here that this guarantee encompassing juridical statehood and territorial integrity has begun to weaken in the post-Cold War era. This has been witnessed in a whole host of cases, ranging from northern Iraq to Kosovo, where the international community, led by the major Western powers, has intervened in contravention of the principles of state sovereignty and the territorial integrity of established states. However, this change in international norms, if consolidated, is unlikely to alleviate the Third World’s security predicament. In fact, it is likely to worsen that situation considerably and to add to the prevalent instability and disorder in the Third World, because it has become linked to the issue of the right of ethnic groups to self-determination. It appears, therefore, that the Third World is caught in a no-win situation as far as this set of international norms is concerned.

A second set of international norms that has affected the security of the Third World is related to the issue of human rights, with primary emphasis on civil and political rights. While the modern conception of human rights can be traced to the natural law approach developed in eighteenth-century Europe, the recent normative force that human rights have acquired in the international arena is the result of the acceptance by the vast majority of states of the existence and validity of such rights for all human beings, regardless of their status as citizens of particular states.22
The changing attitude toward human rights as a legitimate concern of the international community meant that they needed to be brought within the ambit of international law and rescued from their status as the exclusive preserve of sovereign states in relation to their own citizens. This led to their inclusion in the Preamble and Article 1 of the United Nations Charter and to their codification in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948, and the two International Covenants on Human Rights, which were opened for signature and ratification in 1966 and became operative in 1976. This was a major development in the evolution of norms that govern the international system, for it acknowledged more clearly than ever before that individuals, as well as states, could now be considered subjects of international law. It also signified the international acceptance of the principle that individuals and groups have rights that are independent of their membership in individual states and that derive not from their national status but from their status as members of the human species.

The major problem with the implementation of human rights in the Third World is that the concept of human rights owes its empirical validity to the existence and successful functioning of the industrialized, representative, and responsive states of Western Europe and North America. These states set the standards for effective statehood, as well as for the humane and civilized treatment of their citizens. They do so by their demonstrated success in simultaneously meeting the basic needs of the large majority of their populations, protecting their human rights, and promoting and guaranteeing political participation. But these states have, by and large, successfully completed their state-building process, are politically satiated and economically affluent, and possess unconditional legitimacy in the eyes of the overwhelming majority of their populations. They can therefore afford to adopt liberal standards of state behavior in relation to their populations, because they are reasonably secure in the knowledge that societal demands will not run counter to state interests and will not put state structures and institutions in any grave jeopardy.

While norms regarding human rights have been a touchstone of civilized behavior on the part of states for almost half a century, a similar status has begun to be accorded to democratic governance since the 1990s. The rhetoric emanating from Washington and other Western capitals and the political conditionalities attached to International Monetary Fund and World Bank loans to developing countries since the 1990s have privileged political participation and encouraged democratic transition in postcolonial countries. One cannot deny that the policy of promoting democratic governance has innate merits. However, in the short run such a policy has the capacity to impede state- and nation-building activities by putting constraints on state elites’ pursuit of these goals. This is especially the case in multi-ethnic societies, where the transition to democracy often accentuates ethnic cleavages and sharpens competition for access to the privileges of power. The danger of systemic breakdown becomes particularly acute when democratization becomes equated merely with procedural or electoral democracy and not much attention is paid to putting in place constitutional and judicial constraints that would prevent majorities from riding roughshod over minority opinions and interests. In divided societies, such as those in the Third World, democracies can easily turn into majoritarian polities where parties engage in competitive chauvinism that widens societal fissures to such an extent that divisions become irreversible. Sri Lanka is the classic case in point, but Iraq seems to be moving in the same direction.23

What are currently considered in the West to be norms of civilized state behavior—including those pertaining to the human rights of individuals and groups as well as democratic governance—are, in the Third
World, not infrequently in contradiction with the imperatives of state making. These imperatives, as has been pointed out more than once, not only sanction but also frequently require the use of violent means against recalcitrant domestic groups and individual citizens. Furthermore, the international norm upholding human rights runs directly counter to the norm that prescribes the inalienability of juridical statehood for Third World states.24 While the latter is uncompromising in upholding the legality of the existence of Third World states within their colonially constructed boundaries, the former undermines the political legitimacy of these same states by prescribing standards and yardsticks in terms that most Third World states, struggling to perform the minimum tasks of maintaining political order, will be incapable of meeting for many decades to come.

Moreover, the simultaneous but contradictory operation of the two norms contributes to the creation and augmentation of internal discontent within Third World states. It does so by, on the one hand, forcing all the diverse and dissatisfied elements within Third World states to remain within their postcolonial boundaries and, on the other, encouraging these very elements to make political, administrative, and economic demands on the states that these states cannot respond to successfully. The states cannot respond either because they lack the capabilities to do so or because doing so could seriously jeopardize their territorial integrity.

One can make the argument on behalf of Third World states, still struggling to translate their juridical statehood into empirical statehood, that the case for human rights (whether of individuals or of groups) and against the state's use of violent means to impose order is not as morally unassailable as it may appear at first sight. This point can be made most effectively in the context of the failed-states phenomenon, where state structures have completely collapsed.25 In these cases, it can be demonstrated that in the absence of even rudimentarily effective states to provide a minimum degree of political order—as in Lebanon for the fifteen years of civil war, or as currently in Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and, above all, Iraq, where dozens of people are killed every day—the concept of human rights remains nothing more than a pure abstraction. In such a context, the human rights ideal is impossible to implement even minimally, because in the absence of an effective sovereign a truly Hobbesian state of nature prevails, and the very survival of large segments of the population cannot be assured.

These comments should not be taken as an apologia for authoritarian regimes in the Third World that ostensibly emphasize order at the expense of both justice and political participation. Authoritarian regimes quite often contribute a great deal to the creation and augmentation of disorder in Third World states despite paying lip service to the objective of maintaining and promoting order. Iran under the shah, the Philippines under Marcos, Zaire under Mobutu, Nicaragua under Somoza, and Zimbabwe under Mugabe—to cite but a few instances—all provide good examples of this tendency.

It is also true that most regimes in the Third World attempt to portray threats to their regimes as threats to the state. Discerning analysts must, therefore, carefully distinguish between issues of regime security and those of state security. However, in many cases, given the lack of unconditional legitimacy both of the regime and of the state structure in the Third World and the close perceptual connection between regime and state as far as the majority of the state's population is concerned, the line between regime security and state security becomes so thin, and the interplay between the two so dense, that it is virtually impossible to disentangle one from the other. As one perceptive scholar pointed out in connection with the Middle East, "[T]hose who rule must attempt to encourage loyalty to the state, of which they hope themselves to be the chief beneficiaries, while at the same time seeking
to disguise the fact that their system of power, and thus the identity of the political structure itself, frequently owes more to the old ties of sectarian and tribal loyalty." In many such countries the fall of the regime is likely to signal the failure of the state as well; any student of Tudor England or Bourbon France will find this phenomenon very familiar. Iraq provides the latest testimony to the veracity of this proposition.

ETHNONATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION
The human rights issue raises a further problem. Given the multiethnic nature of most Third World states, if human rights are interpreted as group rights and, therefore, are seen to include the right to ethnonational self-determination, they are likely to pose grave threats to the territorial integrity and juridical statehood of postcolonial states, once again pitting one set of international norms against another. The legitimation of the notion of ethnonational self-determination, however partial and selective, following the end of the Cold War—symbolized by the prompt recognition accorded to the successor states to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and the separation of Slovakia from the Czech Republic—is likely to have encouraged demands for ethnic separatism in the Third World. Given the latent tensions between ethnicity and state-defined nationalism even in functioning federal polities like India and the clear contradiction between ethnonationalism and state-defined nationalism in much of the Third World, any development anywhere in the international arena that may encourage ethnic separatist demands in the context of state and regime fragilities prevalent in the Third World is bound to add to the great strains already existing within these polities. The effects of such a contagion spreading have been summed up in a Council on Foreign Relations study that concluded that “while the creation of some new states may be necessary or inevitable, the fragmentation of international society into hundreds of independent territorial entities is a recipe for an even more dangerous and anarchic world.”

A major problem with ethnonational self-determination relates to the definition of the ethnic self that is seeking to determine its future. The self-perception and self-definition of ethnicity is usually subject to change, depending on the context in which it operates at any point in time. This is what Crawford Young has referred to as “the dynamic and changing character of contemporary ethnicity: Far from representing a fixed and immutable set of static social facts, cultural pluralism is itself evolving in crucial ways and is in major respects contextual, situational, and circumstantial.” Therefore, to link such a potent ideology as that of self-determination to a malleable idea like that of ethnicity—and then to legitimize this combination by reference to the principle of human rights of groups—is bound to introduce even greater disorder in the Third World than is already present, because it endows the demands of every disgruntled ethnic group with the legitimacy of the ideal of national self-determination. The danger is that this is exactly what the renewed popularity of the idea of ethnonational self-determination may end up achieving, to the great detriment of both order and justice in the Third World.

The problem is further confounded by the fact that, given the ethnic mixtures of populations in most countries, hardly any pure ethnic homelands still exist. This fact contradicts the ethnonationalists’ assumption that “the earth’s entire population, or most of it, divides into a finite number of distinct, homogeneous peoples. It follows that the world’s ideal condition consists of that finite number of nation-states.” Attempts at ethnonational self-determination are, therefore, bound to run into resistance from ethnic minorities in presumed ethnic homelands. As William Pfaff has succinctly put it, “The ethnic state is a product of the political imagination; it does not exist in
With Jackson involvement the important impact of the global South. Yugoslavia true popularity ingredient nationalism, the satisfactory alternative structures not filling the basic needs, and when satisfactory alternative structures are not readily available. While this may not provide the total explanation for the revival of ethnonationalism, it does capture a very major ingredient that has contributed to the recent popularity of the ethnonationalist ideology, namely, the lack of effective statehood. This is true not only in the case of the components of the former Soviet Union and of the Former Yugoslavia but also in many parts of the Third World. The lack of effective statehood was responsible for the emergence of what Robert Jackson has termed "quasi-states" in the Third World. These quasi states can now clearly be seen as precursors of failed states in the global South.

The end of the Cold War has had an important impact on the transformation of some of these quasi states into failed states. This is especially true in the case of those states that had witnessed high levels of superpower involvement in the military sphere, including the arena of arms transfers, during the Cold War era. At the height of the Cold War, the superpowers attempted to strengthen client governments in internally fragmented states, each often seeking to maintain a semblance of stability within countries that were allied with itself. One major instrument of such support was the transfer of large quantities of relatively sophisticated arms to friendly regimes. In several instances, such arms transfers led to countervailing transfers of weaponry by the rival superpower to forces opposed to the central authorities. Afghanistan during the 1980s came to epitomize this action-reaction phenomenon.

Past superpower policies of pouring arms into fragmented polities have, however, become a major source of instability and disorder in the post-Cold War period. The presence of large quantities of relatively sophisticated weaponry (ranging from AK-47s to Stinger missiles) and the withdrawal of superpower support to weak and vulnerable regimes—support that was essential to prevent the central authorities from being overwhelmed by domestic rivals who, in turn, were divided among themselves—created near-total anarchy in countries like Afghanistan and Somalia, where central authority completely collapsed, thereby turning these quasi states into failed states.

Furthermore, the failure of the international community, principally the major powers and international organizations, to prevent and control the flow of small arms, which are responsible for the majority of deaths in current conflicts, is exploited by private arms dealers and transnational criminal cartels as well as states interested in making fast money in the murky area of arms trade. This unregulated arms bazaar not only adds to the misery of the populace but also undermines state authority in countries and regions most vulnerable to internal conflicts.

The relationship between state failure and internal conflict is, however, not a one-way street, with the former inevitably leading to the latter. The relationship is in many cases circular, as the two phenomena feed on each other, with state weakness providing the political space for the intensification of conflicts among political factions and/or ethnic groups, and the conflicts in turn further eroding the
capacity of the state to maintain order and provide security to its citizens. Suffering from acute insecurity, individuals often turn to political factions, ethnic groups, and even criminal gangs (and sometimes it is difficult to distinguish among the three categories) to provide them with protection in exchange for their loyalty and contribution—financial, physical, or both—to the “war effort.”

There is another dimension of state failure that has a major impact on the level of conflict within societies. Alex de Waal has pointed this out with great clarity in relation to Africa. He has argued that economic crisis in Africa has meant that “governments find it more difficult to sustain and control armies, which then turn to local sources of provisioning. These include requisitioning, looting and taxing populations, involvement in commerce, and diverting humanitarian aid. Though the causes of war in Africa and the aims of the combatants are still almost exclusively phrased in terms of achieving state power and affecting constitutional change, the realities on the ground reflect more intense predatory behaviour by soldiers.”

This search for “survival” on the part of unpaid or poorly paid soldiers, who command great coercive power in relation to the rest of the population, contributes to the reality and perception of state failure while serving a “rational” purpose for those engaged in it.

Finally, state failure, like state making, must be viewed as a process, not an event. In I. William Zartman’s words, it is akin to “a long-term degenerative disease” rather than something that occurs at a particular point in time. Such an understanding of state failure will help one comprehend the fact that, as the Lebanese example demonstrates, the process is not irreversible. Furthermore, it will assist one to understand why this process is usually accompanied by long-drawn-out “civil” wars during which political factions fight over what they presume to be the state’s carcass and the state attempts to revive itself, drawing on its residual capacity and legitimacy. If and when one faction succeeds in by and large subjugating the others, it usually dons the mantle of the state in order to legitimize the concentration of coercive power in its hands.

Similarly, if one views conflict and war as process and not merely in terms of final outcomes, one can conclude that there are usually groups, factions, and individuals that benefit economically, as well as politically, from the prolongation of such wars. They come to acquire a vested interest in perpetuating such conflicts. This is why “[c]onflict entrepreneurs, as well as conflict victims, must be part of any analytical framework” devised to study what has been termed “complex political emergencies.”

Such a perspective can help unravel the rationality behind what appear to the outside observer to be totally irrational conflicts.

**DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE THIRD WORLD**

It may seem obvious to the lay observer that the principal method to prevent state making from being transformed into state failure is to grant greater political participation to those sectors of society—whether ethnic or socioeconomic—that have heretofore been excluded from the exercise of political power. It would be too naive to believe, however, that democratization—defined in terms of increasing guarantees for the exercise of civil and political liberties and in terms of political participation through the medium of competitive electoral politics—by itself, and in all contexts, will succeed in neutralizing ethnic separatism.

The success of the democratic experiment in defusing ethnic tensions will, therefore, depend on a number of factors, identified by Renée de Nevers as including “the speed with which ethnic issues are recognized; the level of ethnic tension when the democratization process begins; the size and power of different ethnic groups within the state; the ethnic composition of the previous regime and its opposition; the political positions of the leaders..."
of the main ethnic groups; the presence or absence of external ethnic allies; and the ethnic composition of the military."

There is, however, another side to the democratization coin. The demands of state building and democratization can be reconciled only if the democratizing state in the Third World is credibly able to monopolize the instruments of violence within its territories, thus preventing dissident groups from attempting to change the state's boundaries when political controls are relaxed. This monopoly over instruments of violence is essential because "often the first act of forces liberated by the introduction of democracy is to seek some permanent escape from the state they see as having oppressed them."40

This is where the most severe problems are likely to arise, even if democratic political systems become the norm rather than the exception in the Third World. Democratic and (even more important) democratizing regimes cannot afford to be seen as weak when confronted by separatist challenges and cannot, in the final analysis, give up their right to lay down and enforce the rules (even if some of these have been negotiated with the opponents of the state) by which the game of politics is to be played within the boundaries of states over which they preside. Otherwise, the "democratic center may be questioned for its inefficiency in creating or its weakness in handling the secessionist crisis, opening the way for military intervention."41

This point is inadequately understood by many proponents of democratization in the Third World, who tend to equate democratic states with weak states on the assumption that strong states are bound to be autocratic by nature. By making this assumption they fail to learn from the European experience that democracy emerged as the final stage of the state-building process and not at the expense of state building. Even in today's context, when democratization cannot wait until state building is completed, it cannot thrive in the absence of the political order that only a strongly entrenched state can provide. Democratization, therefore, must complement rather than contradict the process of state making; without the political order that can be provided only by effective states, the gains of democratization cannot be sustained. Anarchies—as the examples of Somalia, Liberia, Afghanistan, and Iraq clearly demonstrate—are no respecters of democratic values and human rights.

However, the reconciliation of the two imperatives of the consolidation of state power and democratization is not, and will not be, an easy task even if tremendous goodwill is present on all sides. Major tensions are bound to arise between state elites and their ethnic and political opponents who would like to put significant curbs on the power of the central state. In addition, where separatist insurgencies are already under way, major problems between separatists and democratizing central governments are likely to revolve around two basic questions: What is the guarantee that groups espousing separatism will indeed surrender all arms and reconcile themselves to autonomous or semiautonomous status that will continue to be essentially dependent on the good faith and the continuing political sagacity of the central government? What is the guarantee that central authorities, after persuading separatist ethnic groups to lay down their arms and thus having overcome immediate internal security crises, will continue to abide by their commitment to popular political participation, the constitutional protection of minority rights, and regional autonomy?

The answers provided by the Third World's historical record to these questions do not leave much room for optimism. Furthermore, if one goes by the earlier European experience, one is likely to conclude that the historical juncture at which most Third World states find themselves today is unlikely to permit a great deal of ethnic accommodation and political participation. These two processes usually run counter to the overriding imperative of
consolidating state power and fashioning a state that is sovereign, not merely juridically but also empirically. However, one can make an effective argument that the early-twenty-first-century context is so dramatically different from the late-eighteenth- or even the late-nineteenth-century context that radically new solutions must be found for this dilemma.

In other words, the problem of reconciling the demands of state making with those of democratization and human rights—as well as with demands for regional autonomy, devolution of powers, and protection of minority group rights—will have to be addressed much more creatively, and mutually acceptable solutions will have to be found, if the twin specters of failed states and destructive ethnonationalism are to be kept at bay. Above all, this means that the trajectories of democratization (including the preservation of group rights and local autonomy for substate units), on the one hand, and of the consolidation of coercive power and concentration of legitimate authority in the hands of the state, on the other, must not diverge radically. In fact, they should ideally become mutually legitimizing agents, with democratization legitimizing the greater concentration of authority in the hands of the state and the concentration of centralized power legitimizing and facilitating the loosening of political controls and the guaranteeing of political and civil rights to the citizenry.

Most important, the two processes should not be allowed to become the polar opposites of each other. Faced with a stark choice between the territorial integrity of the state and democratization, state elites are invariably bound to opt for territorial integrity over democratization. Where the processes of territorial integrity and democracy collide, democratization cannot prevail without the disintegration of the state. Therefore, in order for the strategy of democratization to work successfully without threatening the disintegration of states, the state elites' decision to democratize must be firmly linked to the negotiated surrender of separatist groups where they exist. The disarming of such groups should proceed in tandem with the implementation of any plans for autonomy or devolution of powers that may have been negotiated between the parties.

**The Role of the International Community in Democratization**

The international community, working through the United Nations, can play a constructive role in encouraging reconciliation between state building and democratization by adopting a very restrictive approach toward recognizing new political entities that attempt to break away from established states in the Third World. A too-permissive approach to state breaking, as witnessed in the early 1990s in the case of the former Yugoslavia, will add to conflict and anarchy rather than preserving international order. Colonially imposed state boundaries may be an iniquitous way of delineating the borders of Third World states, but every other alternative appears to be infinitely worse.

The United Nations must not fall into the trap of giving legitimacy to demands for secession from member states, unless the terms have been peacefully negotiated with the parent state. Exceptions like Eritrea, East Timor, and Kosovo must not influence, let alone determine, the norms of international behavior. Eritrea was a special case because its separation was negotiated with the post-Mengistu regime in Ethiopia. Furthermore, Eritrea regained the colonially crafted political identity within the colonial boundaries that had been compromised in 1952 by the internationally sponsored merger of the former Italian colony with the Ethiopian empire and the subsequent flagrant violation by Addis Ababa of Eritrean autonomy that had formed an integral part of the merger agreement. However, despite Eritrea's peaceful separation from Ethiopia in the early 1990s, by the late 1990s its relations with Ethiopia had deteriorated once again to
such an extent that the two countries fought a bloody border war that has had tremendous adverse consequences for the economies of both states.

East Timor was also not a part of the Indonesian postcolonial state. Unlike the rest of Indonesia, which had been a Dutch colony, East Timor was a Portuguese colony that was forcibly annexed by Indonesia in 1975 when Portugal withdrew from the territory. Although it took twenty-five years for East Timor to regain its independence within its erstwhile colonial borders, the episode demonstrated the deep impact of colonial structures on shaping postcolonial national identities.

Kosovo is unfinished business from the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The division of Yugoslavia into ethnically defined states led on the one hand to major civil conflict in Bosnia and on the other to the assertion of Kosovo's ethnic nationalism. The latter assertion, legitimized by the ethnic division of Yugoslavia, became particularly intense in the context of the Serbian attempt to marginalize politically and economically the large Kosovo Albanian majority by reneging on the province's autonomous status. This forced the Albanians, who formed 90 percent of the population, to live in subordination both to the Serb minority in Kosovo and to the Serbian government in Belgrade. Had the multiethnic Yugoslav federation not been dismantled, the world would not have been faced with the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, the Serb atrocities on the Kosovar Albanians, and the international intervention to prevent the repetition of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.

The international community must be especially wary of allowing these precedents to govern its reactions to the situation in Iraq, however dire it may appear in the short term. Encouraging, or even passively acquiescing in, Kurdish demands for secession will open a hornet's nest in the Middle East, reopening questions regarding state borders that have been considered settled and leading to highly negative reactions, not only from the Arab world but from Turkey and Iran as well. Domestic tensions within Iraq, already exacerbated by the U.S. invasion, will be transformed into a regional conflict of major proportions pulling many of Iraq's neighbors into its vortex.

**Externally Induced State Failure**

The case of Iraq, and that of Afghanistan before it, highlights a major cause of, and catalyst for, state failure that has so far been neglected in the analysis of the subject. It has been demonstrated conclusively that great-power involvement in the domestic and regional conflicts afflicting postcolonial states have often had deleterious consequences for state-building efforts in the Third World. Superpower competition during the Cold War era for the loyalties of states, regimes, and factions in developing countries particularly contributed to the intensification of the security predicament faced by Third World states. But Iraq and Afghanistan are unique in the sense that they have clearly shown that external great-power intervention does not merely contribute to state failure but can be its principal cause by setting up the targeted countries for state collapse. They have also thrown into sharper relief earlier cases of great-power intervention that led to state debilitation bordering on state failure. These latter cases include Angola and Mozambique from the mid-1970s until the 1990s. Covert U.S. support to insurgent groups and tribal factions in these sub-Saharan countries played a key role in undermining the effectiveness of postcolonial regimes that were supported by the Soviet Union. This deliberate policy of state debilitation seriously detracted from the capacity of governments in the two countries to maintain order within their domains and provide security to their populations. Mahmood Mamdani argues quite convincingly that the United States applied with great effect the lessons it had learned in Angola and Mozambique, as well as in
Nicaragua, where it armed and equipped the Contras against the socialist Sandinista government, to its venture in Afghanistan, where it once again aimed at destabilizing and incapacitating a regime that was a Soviet ally. In the process, it set up Afghanistan for state failure but this time of a much more dire sort and with enormous unforeseen and unintended consequences.

The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan began in earnest in December 1979, to save a tottering client regime that had come to power in April 1978 but was riven with discord and was at the same time reeling under the pressure of an insurgency supported by the United States and Pakistan. The United States responded to the direct Soviet intervention by ratcheting up its support to the insurgents and launching what amounted to a full-fledged proxy war in Afghanistan billed as a jihad against godless communism. This jihad not only facilitated the ingathering of transnational jihadi elements in Afghanistan but also launched that country on the slippery slope of state failure. Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, U.S.-armed jihadi factions fought each other brutally, destroying what was left of the state infrastructure. Thus, they succeeded in creating a political vacuum that facilitated the creation by transnational jihadi big men of a safe haven from which they could launch their global campaign of terror. It is indeed ironic that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 were in large part the direct consequence of the externally induced collapse of the state in Afghanistan, for which the United States bore much of the responsibility. It was the absence of political order in Afghanistan that provided al Qaeda with the opportunity and the space to plan and execute the attacks on the United States.

These terrorist attacks triggered a U.S. response that targeted not only Afghanistan but also Iraq as part of the Bush administration’s “war on terror.” Iraq was targeted despite the fact that there was little evidence connecting al Qaeda to the Saddam regime. The U.S. invasion of Iraq created the conditions for the debilitating and potential dismemberment of the Iraqi state by destroying the Iraqi state apparatus and failing to put in place an alternative structure that would be both effective and legitimate. Equally important, according to Robert Malley and Peter Harling, “Washington’s conviction that the Ba’athi regime was essentially Sunni (it was not) and that large numbers of Sunni Arabs therefore were inherently opposed to its overthrow (they were not) became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Fearing resistance in Sunni Arab areas before it actually materialised, US forces treated them harshly. This helped heighten hostility from Sunni Arabs who increasingly, albeit reluctantly, identified themselves as such.” The consequent alienation of Sunni Arabs from the emerging post-Saddam structure helped create a hospitable environment for the transnational jihadi to operate in.

It would be wrong to equate the Iraqi insurgency merely with transnational jihadi activities. However, faulty U.S. policies provided crucial momentum and operating space to shadowy organizations, such as the al-Zarqawi-led al Qaeda in Iraq, to prepare for and conduct acts of terror both within Iraq and in neighboring countries. The U.S. invasion thus created conditions that not only seemed to be pushing Iraq toward disintegration but also helped provide transnational jihadi terrorists, who had lost their safe haven in Afghanistan following the U.S.-led invasion of that country in 2001–2, with a new base from which they could operate. It is no wonder that President George W. Bush’s repeated declaration that Iraq had become the center for international terrorism became a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The blowback for the United States from the Iraq invasion is likely to be far greater than that from the U.S.-supported war against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s. This will be the case because, as Peter Bergen and Alec Reynolds have pointed out, “Fighters in Iraq
are more battle hardened than the Afghan Arabs, who fought demoralized Soviet army conscripts. They are testing themselves against arguably the best army in history, acquiring skills in their battles against coalition forces that will be far more useful for future terrorist operations than those their counterparts learned during the 1980s.  

Just as many of the leading lights of the current generation of Islamist militants are veterans of the Afghan war, the insurgency in Iraq is likely to produce the leadership for the third generation of jihadis, who are likely to pose major threats to Muslim regimes allied to the United States. According to Bergen and Reynolds, “[T]he blowback from Iraq is likely to be as painful for Saudi Arabia as the blowback from Afghanistan was for Egypt and Algeria during the 1990s.”

Afghanistan and Iraq provide grave warnings to major powers and international institutions that they should desist from undue interference, especially of the military kind, in the domestic affairs of developing countries currently in the early stages of state making. Given the fragile and contingent nature of the state-building exercise, such intervention has immense potential to become the proverbial last straw that may break the camel’s back, thus leading to state evaporation. Both Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate that the disintegration or collapse of states, even those initially not considered important actors in the international system, often possesses the capacity to affect the strategic interests of great powers in direct and indirect ways, thus turning such states into major issues of global concern and primary sources of systemic destabilization.

The International Community and Humanitarian Intervention

These warnings are particularly relevant today since humanitarian interventions have come into vogue since the 1990s. The U.S. invasion of Iraq has also been justified post facto as humanitarian. The normative changes regarding human rights mentioned earlier have led from the early 1990s to a dramatic increase in cases of humanitarian intervention undertaken by major powers in the name of the international community. Some of these, such as in Haiti, Bosnia, and East Timor, were authorized by the UN Security Council; others, such as the one in Kosovo, did not receive UN Security Council authorization but were undertaken nonetheless under the aegis of regional organizations such as NATO. Yet others, such as the invasion of Iraq in 2003, were undertaken unilaterally by the lone superpower, the United States, with the token help of allies and camp followers in the teeth of opposition by most states, including the majority of the permanent members of the Security Council.

These multifarious types of interventions have raised critical questions about who has the right to act on behalf of the “international community.” The sideling of the Security Council, as in the cases of Kosovo and Iraq, has detracted enormously from the authority of the United Nations as well as from the legitimacy of the interventions themselves. These latter interventions have also raised the specter of externally assisted state breaking: Kosovo, virtually independent of Yugoslavia, and Iraq, in the throes of a brutal insurgency, are candidates for state failure or dismemberment or both. Such military interventions, even if undertaken for humanitarian reasons, which most people doubt, especially in the case of Iraq, are likely to be counterproductive and end up creating greater disorder in the international system. The invasion of Iraq should, therefore, act as a dire warning that the international community, acting through the Security Council, should prevent the recurrence of unilateral interventionism even if contemplated by the lone superpower.

Conclusion

It is in order to conclude with some policy prescriptions. International norms and the
policies of international actors—primarily great powers and international institutions—can play a crucial role in preserving international order if they are used sagaciously to persuade domestic protagonists to make deals with one another without violating the sovereignty of existing states. Above all, the international community must strengthen the juridical status and bolster the political authority of Third World states by refusing to countenance secessionist demands while trying to persuade all parties to accept the notion that self-determination must be delinked from secession and should be defined in terms of empowering those segments of the population that have been denied access to political and economic power. In other words, self-determination should be perceived as synonymous with democratization (and its attendant power-sharing arrangements), rather than with the breakup of existing states.

Such an attitude, if adopted by the international community, will send clear signals to all concerned that the sovereign existence of post-colonial states is an essential prerequisite for the creation and maintenance of both domestic and international order. It will also signal that regimes that do not demonstrate a willingness to democratize must be ready to face international opprobrium, pariah status, and even sanctions. Such a stance on the part of the international community is necessary to prevent the Third World from sliding into greater anarchy. For, above all, it must be recognized that the problem of order in the Third World can be tackled, not by trying to transcend the Westphalian model (a world made up of sovereign states), but by attempting to strengthen it. The root cause of disorder in the Third World is linked to the inadequacy of state authority and not to the excessive use of state power. The augmentation of authority usually leads to a decrease in the reliance on force by the state because, as Robert Jackman has argued, power without force is the true measure of the political capacity of states.53

Finally, major powers, but especially the United States, must desist from intervening in the domestic affairs of even those states that may have unsavory or hostile regimes unless the latter directly threaten them militarily. The doctrine of preventive assault, as distinct from the preemption of imminent attack, espoused by the current U.S. administration, derogates from international order not merely because it provides a strong justification for many future interventions by many states in many locales. It is very deleterious from the perspective of both political order and political development of targeted states because it ends up creating greater disorder and undermining the legitimacy of established states. Furthermore, it can also be extremely counterproductive and end up creating real threats to the security of the intervenor rather than ameliorating any presumed threats. Iraq provides an eminent example of all these outcomes occurring simultaneously.

The Iraqi state today is in a shambles, and the United States is widely blamed for turning it into a failed state where life is “poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” The severe deterioration in state capacity resulting from the U.S. invasion has transformed Iraq into the largest and safest haven for international terrorists whose principal aim is to target the United States and its allies. It has also led to a precipitate increase in hostility in the Muslim world toward the United States, thus helping create a reservoir of potential terrorists that is likely to pose an increasing threat to U.S. interests worldwide if not to the U.S. homeland itself. The major lesson one should draw from Iraq is that, while it is easy to destroy state capacity by the use of overwhelming force, it is next to impossible to resurrect such capacity except over a long period and after great travails. Moreover, there is no assurance that such a revived state will not turn revanchist and revisionist once it has attained appropriate capabilities. State making has to be an indigenous process in order for the final product to be at
peace with itself. External intervention, even when undertaken with the best of intentions—and usually it is not—has the distinct potential to lead to state disintegration or state failure with highly negative consequences for both domestic and international order.

NOTES

This chapter is adapted from the author's chapter in Between Development and Destruction: An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-Colonial States, ed. Luc van de Goor, Kumar Rupesinghe, and Paul Sciarone (London: Macmillan, 1996).

1. Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 22, table 2.1. The table provides data on armed conflicts by type and region from 1945 to 1995. According to Holsti's tabulation, which does not include anticolonial wars of national liberation, 77 percent of the wars during the fifty-year study were internal in character. If one includes anticolonial wars, the proportion is likely to be considerably higher, probably somewhere around 90 percent.


10. The distinction between modern sovereign (or, as Charles Tilly would call them, "national") states and nation-states has been highlighted by Tilly, who has defined the former as "relatively centralized, differentiated, and autonomous organizations successfully claiming priority in the use of force within large, contiguous, and clearly bounded territories." Nation-states, on the other hand, are those "whose peoples share a strong linguistic, religious, and symbolic identity." Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990 (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 43.


15. For details of this argument, see Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Riener, 1995), especially chap. 2.


18. For theoretically informed accounts of the "cumulation of crises" in Italy and Germany, see the chapters on Italy and Germany by Raymond Grew and John R. Gillis, respectively, in *Crises of Political Development in Europe and the United States*, ed. Raymond Grew (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978).

19. The earliest modern states of Western Europe were able to complete their state-making process in three near-distinct phases: (1) establishing the centralized, "absolutist" state at the expense of a feudal order that had begun to lose much of its economic and political utility, (2) welding together the subjects of the centralized monarchy into a people with a common history, legal system, language, and, quite often, religion (in the sense of Christian schisms), thus leading to the evolution of a national identity and the transformation of the centralized monarchical state into a nation-state, and (3) gradually extending representative institutions (dictated by the necessity to co-opt into the power structure new and powerful social forces that emerged as a result of the industrial revolution), over decades, if not centuries. Above all, as Stein Rokkan has pointed out, "what is important is that the western nation-states were given a chance to solve some of the worst problems of state building before they had to face the ordeals of mass politics." Rokkan, "Dimensions of State Formation and Nation Building," 598.

20. For details of this argument, see Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament*, chap. 5.


24. As Seyom Brown has pointed out, the intellectual position that "servicing . . . basic human rights is the principal task of human polities—and that the worth of any polity is a function of how well it performs this task—has put the legitimacy of all extant polities up for grabs, so to speak. Whether particular nation-states, and the prevailing territorial demarcations, do indeed merit the badge of political legitimacy is, according to this view, subject to continuing assessment; accordingly, neither today's governments nor today's borders are sacrosanct." Seyom Brown, *International Relations in a Changing Global System: Toward a Theory of the World Polity* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992), 126.


29. Charles Tilly, "National Self-Determination as a Problem for All of Us," *Daedalus* 122, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 30.


37. Jonathan Goodhand and David Hulme, “From Wars to Complex Political Emergencies: Understanding Conflict and Peace-Building in the New World Disorder,” *Third World Quarterly* 20, no. 1 (February 1999): 19. The authors provide examples from Sudan, Liberia, and Afghanistan to demonstrate that conflict entrepreneurs benefit from internal war and thus possess a vested interest in their indefinite continuation.

38. Democratization is used in the sense of movement toward democracy; the latter is perceived as the desired goal, while the former is the process through which this goal is achieved or at least approximated.


43. Mahmood Mamdani, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror* (New York: Pantheon, 2004).


48. A number of stringent critiques of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the subsequent failure in putting together a viable system in the country, and the impact of both these factors on the war against terrorism have been published recently. The following are among the best: George Packer, *The Assassin’s Gate: America in Iraq* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005); Larry Diamond, *Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq* (New York: Times Books, 2005); and Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Next Attack: The Failure of the War on Terror and the Strategy of Getting It Right* (New York: Times Books, 2005).


50. Ibid., 6.

