2

Why the Peripheral Peoples Did Not Become Russians

In the nineteenth century Alexis de Tocqueville accurately foresaw the clashes of civilization that would mark Russian society for a century and a half:

> There are, at the present time, two great nations in the world, which seem to tend towards the same end. . . . I allude to the Russians and the Americans. Both of them have grown up unnoticed; and whilst the attention of mankind was directed elsewhere, they have suddenly assumed a most prominent place amongst the nations. . . . All other nations seem to have nearly reached their natural limits, and only to be charged with the maintenance of their power; but these are still in the act of growth. . . . The American struggles against the natural obstacles which oppose him; the adversaries of the Russian are men; the former combats the wilderness and savage life; the latter, civilization with all its weapons and its arts: the conquests of the one are therefore gained by the ploughshare; those of the other, by the sword. The Anglo-American relies upon personal interest to accomplish his ends, and gives free scope to the unguided exertions and common sense of the citizens; the Russian centres all the authority of society in a single arm: the principal instrument of the former is freedom; of the latter, servitude. Their starting-point is different . . . yet each of them seems to be marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe.[1]

Manifest destiny, Russian style, did not foster the construction of a new continent-wide identity (such as "American"). To be sure, attempts to construct an inclusive "Russian" identity in the nineteenth century, and a "Soviet" identity in the twentieth, had some success. But within the boundaries of the Russian empire (and the

[1] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, trans. Henry Reeve (1835; New York: Schocken Books, 1961), 1:521–22.

Soviet Union), linguistic diversity in particular and national diversity more generally remained and even prospered.

The incomplete rationalization of language and culture within the boundaries of the Russian empire provides the historical context for this book. But this chapter—in going over well-trodden historical fields—seeks as well to demonstrate the contingency of this outcome. I seek to show how Russian (and Soviet) rationalization was possible but unsuccessful. The subsequent rationalization projects of four of the former Union republics resulted (or have as yet failed to result in) a strategic turning of the cultural tide rather than the inevitable (in the Hegelian sense) fulfillment of four national dreams. We cannot assume that all states will become nation-states by historical necessity, a myth that underlies many of the post-Soviet national projects—but with historical perspective it will be possible to analyze the likelihood that these four will.

Russian Expansion to the Continental Peripheries

From the end of the fifteenth century, with Ivan the Terrible's conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan, through the end of the nineteenth, with the conquest of the khanates of Kokand, Bokhara, and Khiva and the annexation of the Transcaspian region, the Russian empire expanded at a rate of some fifty square miles per day.[2] Eastern Ukraine (the left bank of the Dnieper) came under tsarist protection in 1654. In the early eighteenth century after victory over Sweden, Peter the Great took the territory that is today's Estonia and Latvia. Throughout the eighteenth century, Russian trade and state control moved into what is most of today's northern Kazakhstan and annexed it.

Like the Habsburgs in Spain and the Bourbons in France, the Romanovs did not make formal distinctions between their governance in what Pipes calls "Russia proper" and in its "imperial hinterlands."[3] To be sure, the western end of empire was marked by "boundaries" (*rubezhy*, or *granitsy*), while the east was marked by a frontier (*mezha*). These terms were used conventionally and represented a clear distinction in imperial expansion. In the east, expansion was through peace treaties (*shert'*, a Turkic word), which were conceived of by Moscow as pledges of allegiance of "eternal slavery to the grand tsar." The main mechanisms of rule were through hostages. Tribute in furs was expected; the tsar made exchange through gifts (*gosudareevo zhalovan'e*, or sovereign's compensation).[4] Despite these different vocabularies of rule, tsarist lands east and west were divided into provinces (*gubernii*), which were ruled by governors general or viceregents. All rules were equally valid throughout

[2] Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917–1923* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 1, calculation attributed to A. Brückner, *Die Europäisierung Russlands* (Gotha, 1888).

[3] Pipes, *Formation of the Soviet Union*, pp. 6–7.

[4] Michael Khodarkovsky, "From Frontier to Empire: The Concept of the Frontier in Russia, 16th–18th Centuries," *Russian History* 19 (1992): 115–28.

the empire, were written in Russian, and were administered in a unified bureaucratic system of classified offices. Furthermore, nobles from non-Russian lines were given rights similar to those of the Russian nobility, and russified foreigners were quickly recruited into state service.[5]

Russian-speakers emigrated to the new tsarist territories in waves. From the earliest period of territorial incorporation, the state recruited a quasi-independent military caste, the Cossacks, and entrusted them with the task of protecting Russian settlements in the borderlands, and with protecting the boundaries of the empire from foreign predators. For this, after twenty years of service, they were given land to till, and they became moderately wealthy landowners. By the beginning of the twentieth century, 4.4 million people living outside Russia proper traced their origins to Cossack settlement. Peasant migrations from Russia and Ukraine to the south and west were a second major source of settlement into imperial territories. The lust for the black earth, especially by freed serfs who were unable to cover their redemption payments, led at first to temporary migrations to the cities to earn cash, and after 1906 (when redemption payments were canceled, railroad transportation was available, and formal travel restrictions had been removed), to the rapid prerevolutionary colonization of Central Asia and the eastern steppes.[6] Traders, artisans, and skilled workers moved inexorably to the frontier through much of the second half of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. By the 1897 census, those characterized as Russians constituted 8.5 percent of the population (and over a quarter of the urbanites) outside the boundaries of what was to become the Russian Federation.[7]

State and Nation-Building in Russian History

This tale of expansion appears no different from that of France into Languedoc or England into Wales.[8] Those expansions are without question thought of as examples of early state building. Yet today (with the knowledge of the Soviet collapse in 1991), we think not of France (vis-à-vis Languedoc) or England (vis-à-vis Wales) as the proper framework for understanding Russian expansion, but rather of the Ottomans and the Austrian Habsburgs (where the states shed their separate national components). It is true that in comparison with the expansions of England and France, Russia's cultural impact on the indigenous populations was quite limited. Linguistically, Welsh and Languedocians by the end of the nineteenth century were assimilated into the dominant state language; meanwhile Balts, Kazakhs, and even Ukrainians relied principally on the language of their forefathers; very few had developed fluency in Russian.

[5] Roman Levita and Mikhail Loiberg, "The Empire and the Russians: Historical Aspects," in Vladimir Shlapentokh, Munir Sendich, and Emil Payin, eds., *The New Russian Diaspora* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), p. 5.

[6] Robert Kaiser, *The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 47–50.

[7] Robert A. Lewis et al., *Nationality and Population Change in Russia and the USSR* (New York: Praeger, 1976), p. 149.

[8] See James Given, *State and Society in Medieval Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).

What explains the incomplete incorporation of peripheral subjects into the Russian state-building project? Russian state building was not all that unlike its Western counterparts. In fact, Russian tsars since Catherine II saw rationalization of the Russian language—that is, its standardized use in all official and quasi-official domains—throughout their empire as an important ingredient of state building.[9] This is not simply a function of "Great Russian chauvinism." Catherine II, after all, was a German princess. And for generations, the Russian nobility communicated with one another in French. Rather it was a part of a program "to extend [the legal] administrative system into the countryside."[10] Catherine II wrote (in 1764) that Ukraine, the Baltic provinces, and Smolensk should russify "and cease to look like wolves in the forest," implying that russification would lower the chances of political subversion. Surely this is why she promoted Russian most actively in the Polish provinces, where loyalty was of the greatest concern.

The nineteenth century is a story of toleration for language diversity (under Alexander I) mixed with periods of promotion of an "official nationality" (under Nicholas I). Yet the logic of rationalization—especially in response to foreign threat—regularly appeared on the tsarist agendas. Nicholas's response to the Polish rebellion (1830–31) was to demand a fusion of the languages spoken in the Polish-influenced areas of the empire—a mix of dialects that were much later formalized as Byelorussian and Ukrainian—with Russian.[11] Alexander II put down a rebellion in Poland and Lithuania in 1863 and subsequently sought to limit the use of Polish and Lithuanian. In the face of Polish aristocrats' courting of Ukrainians peasants with an eye to possible incorporation of western Ukraine into a restored Poland, Alexander II issued the Ems Ukaz (1876) prohibiting inter alia the import of Ukrainian-language books and the teaching of the Ukrainian language.

Rationalization continued under Alexander III and Nicholas II. Alexander III reversed earlier efforts by Catherine II to rule the eastern provinces through a unified Turkic tongue. In the eighteenth century, Catherine induced the Tatars to settle in the steppe area of today's Kazakhstan, and Tatar became the official language of imperial administration. When a Kazakh became a clerk, he had to write in Tatar, which was of the same family but a distinct language nonetheless. By the mid-nineteenth century, egged on by Nikolai Il'minskii, a Russian Orthodox lay missionary (and linguist), who feared that the Tatars represented a threat to Orthodox rule of Central Asia, Alexander III ordered instruction in the schools to be conducted in Russian, effectively banning the Tatars from teaching in the school system.[12] Later, Nicholas II promoted Russian in the administration of Finland, fearing that the

[9] This notion of rationalization relies on Max Weber's "formal rationality," that is, the use of standardized procedure rather than "substantive rationality," which concerns the content of the law. See Weber, *Economy and Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 809–38.

[10] George L. Yaney, *The Systemization of Russian Government: Social Evolution in the Domestic Administration of Imperial Russia, 1711–1905* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973), pp. 75–76.

[11] Hugh Seton-Watson, *The Russian Empire, 1801–1917* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 269.

[12] Martha Brill Olcott, "The Politics of Language Reform in Kazakhstan," in Isabelle T. Kreindler, ed., *Sociolinguistic Perspectives on Soviet National Languages: Their Past, Present, Future* (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1985), p. 188.

continued use of Finnish would make their administrative incorporation into Russia less secure.[13]

To be sure, the tsars were not entirely successful in their russification program. But the point here is that they perceived an administrative and security advantage in having a single official language and sought to change the language repertoires of officials in incorporated territories so that Russian would become predominant for official uses. While they often faced counterpressures, there is little doubt that except for Alexander I, the tsars tried to enhance the role of Russian whenever they had the chance.

Perhaps (as Tocqueville implies) the elites in the Russian periphery were more resistant to russification than the lords ruling over the incorporated regions of Western European states? One reason might be that the lords in the periphery of the Russian empire could seek the protection of the rulers of other states. Georgian elites, for example, wavered between the tsars and the rulers of Iran and Turkey.[14] But the lords of Catalonia, Toulouse, and Alsace had options to negotiate with more than one central leader, and did so. Once a state establishes effective administrative rule, as was the case in France and Spain, peripheral elites might hope for systemic breakdown, but they cannot bargain their way out of the central state. The situation for lords in Russia's periphery was therefore similar to that faced by lords in other states' peripheries.

Historical evidence suggests that Russian rulers paid a higher cost for compliance with language-rationalization legislation than the rulers of other multinational societies did. But the outcomes were not wholly different. Evidence from the Baltics, Georgia, and Kazakhstan demonstrates the considerable pressure that regional elites faced to pay the transactions costs in communicating with the center by learning Russian. In the Baltics, despite the attractions of German for ambitious Estonians and Latvians, the rising classes (in the mid–nineteenth century), as well as the German nobles (in the late nineteenth century), began making concerted efforts to learn Russian. Edward Thaden reports that the Baltic representatives in the first two dumas (mostly Baltic peoples) and the second two dumas (mostly from the German nobility) all spoke Russian fluently.[15] Ronald Suny has similar findings in his work on the Georgian nationalist intelligentsia in the mid–nineteenth century. Dmitrii Kipiani, one of its luminaries, wrote primarily in Russian, including his memoirs.[16] By the end of the century, 91 percent of the schools in the Caucasus relied on Russian as the sole medium of instruction. Both the intelligentsia and those co-opted by the Russian state apparatus had become fluent in Russian.[17] Martha

[13] Edward C. Thaden, "The Russian Government," in Edward C. Thaden, ed., *Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855–1914* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 82; Baron von der Osten-Sacken, *The Legal Position of the Grand-Duchy of Finland in the Russian Empire* (London: Lamely, 1912), p. 154.

[14] Ronald Suny, *The Making of the Georgian Nation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), chap. 3.

[15] Thaden, *Russification*, p. 75.

[16] Ronald Suny, personal communication.

[17] Suny, *Making of the Georgian Nation*, pp. 70, 351.

Olcott's history of the Kazakhs tells a similar story. After 1870, aristocrats and elders sent their children to Russian schools "in order better to represent their people upon assuming their fathers' positions." That generation wrote exclusively in Russian.[18] The regional elites in the Russian empire, this evidence demonstrates, had a strong incentive to invest in Russian-language competence.

If language rationalization occurred on the peripheries of the Russian empire as it did in the continental peripheries of Western European states, a major difference between the cases is that the broader societal ramifications of rationalization were different. Although France, Spain, and England would face language-revival movements in their peripheries in the 1970s, it is fair to say that a dominant language had achieved quasi-hegemony by World War I. But Russia could only be described as an aggregation of nationalities where co-opted elites and a small intelligentsia in various provinces had facility in Russian. Why was the expansion of Russian so limited, and why did the ultimate success of rationalization among the elites not motivate successively lower strata of the populations to learn Russian?[19] Scholars point to two crucial factors to account for these differences in outcome.

First is the geography of the open steppe.[20] The Russian countryside was always open to marauding bands of conquerors. One consequence, it is sometimes pointed out, is a far greater cultural heterogeneity than in the West. A second consequence was that the Muslim hordes brought such fear to the Russian settlers that cultural intermingling rarely took place. Muslims were considered to live on the other side of a divide that was unbridgeable for Europeans. A third consequence of the open steppe—and this adumbrated by Anthony Smith[21]—is that unlike the state builders of Western Europe, whose expansionary appetites were constrained by natural barriers, the Russian tsars could continue to expand without limit. Their ability to assimilate such a gargantuan space would be beyond even a Napoleon. Although the expanse and heterogeneity of the empire cannot be denied, I am reluctant to rely too heavily on this explanation. First, Eastern expansionary appetites are probably exaggerated in Western historiography. Second, cultural differences among peoples in today's successfully consolidated nation-states would have been emphasized more strongly, had their national projects failed.

A second reason why rationalization in language did not quickly penetrate to the lower strata is that state rationalization occurred later than it did in Western

[18] Martha Brill Olcott, *The Kazakhs* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1987), pp. 104–5.

[19] This dichotomy between a bilingual elite and monolingual lower strata is exaggerated. Itinerant merchants and artisans (such as the Chuvash) picked up Russian; Muslim elites, however, tended to ignore the imperial language. Yet compared with other states where language rationalization occurred, in Russia there was far less of a cascade through all levels of society toward monolingualism in the state language. This is the outcome that I seek to explain.

[20] John A. Armstrong, "Toward a Framework for Understanding Nationalism in Eastern Europe," *East European Politics and Societies* 2 (1988): 280–305. Reinhard Bendix, *Kings or People* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), as I discuss in Chapter 11, emphasizes this same phenomenon to explain the persistence of Russian patrimonialism.

[21] Anthony D. Smith, "Ethnic Identity and Territorial Nationalism in Comparative Perspective," in Alexander J. Motyl, ed., *Thinking Theoretically about Soviet Nationalities* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 54.

Europe, which put new constraints on leadership.[22] The early state rationalization laws in France were in place by the early sixteenth century; in Tudor England rationalization of language was in full development in the late sixteenth century. In Spain, the essential decrees were passed in the early eighteenth century, but the pressure on lords to learn Spanish occurred much earlier.[23] Comparable legislation did not occur in Russia until the mid–nineteenth century, in a world-historical period of mass literacy, which was itself a factor inducing language-revival movements among incorporated nationalities throughout the world. Under these circumstances, newly instituted mass education policies relying on the language of state rationalization more easily engendered popular resistance. The spread of a state language, under novel historical circumstances, faced new and powerful popular obstacles.

We get a clear sense of language politics for late developers by examining the career of Il'minskii, whose activities in mid-nineteenth-century Kazan coincided ideologically with Nicholas I's promotion in 1833 of "official nationality." Just like his French and English "colleagues" in Africa, Il'minskii was faced with the problem of teaching "natives" basic literacy. He found that it is easier to fulfill educational goals (and to reach students' souls) in the mother tongues of the students, and therefore helped develop written forms for a variety of Asian tongues.

To be sure, as already mentioned, Il'minskii's work had russifying elements. He relied on the Cyrillic alphabet as a means of promoting Orthodox values, and to wean Asians away from the Arabic script with its links to Islam. Also, in his schools, while the local languages were taught as subjects, the language of instruction after the second year of primary education was Russian.[24]

Yet we see in Il'minskii's career a problem for nineteenth-century state builders. Since mass literacy was becoming an essential aspect of the "state function," by virtue of the needs of increasingly bureaucratized business firms and the state itself (soldiers, clerks, and others needed to send and receive written messages), virtually all states had Ministries of Education with mandates to provide trained personnel to fulfill these new functions. As these ministries sought to widen the scope of educational activities, the issue of the language of instruction in the mass public school became relevant for the first time.[25]

There remained, however, pressures and counterpressures in the educational establishment. On the one hand, the lessons of the missionaries had considerable influence in state educational circles. As early as 1879, the Russian Ministry of Education issued regulations authorizing "elementary schools with Volga languages as

[22] David Laitin, Roger Petersen, and John Slocum, "Language and the State," in Motyl, *Thinking Theoretically about Soviet Nationalities*, pp. 129–68.

[23] I show this quantitatively in David D. Laitin, Stathis Kalyvas, and Carlota Solé, "Language and the Construction of States: The Case of Catalonia in Spain," *Politics and Society* 22 (1994): 5–29.

[24] Isabelle T. Kreindler, "Nikolai Il'minski and Language Planning in Nineteenth- Century Russia," *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 22 (1979): 5–26; see also her article "The Non-Russian Languages and the Challenge of Russian," in Kreindler, ed., *Sociolinguistic Perspectives on Soviet National Languages* (Berlin: Mouton, 1985), pp. 345–67.

[25] Abram de Swaan, *In Care of the State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

media of instruction."[26] On the other hand, in the 1880s, I. D. Delianov, the minister of education, strongly favored russification; and his successor, D. A. Tolstoi (who had earlier russified the Polish educational system), fought to get the Baltic educational system out of Lutheran (with German as the medium of instruction) hands through the promotion of Russian. Yet Tolstoi also supported Il'minskii's efforts to promote native-language education in the east, suggesting that the Ministry remained cross-pressured on this issue.

Economic planners also began to speak, albeit haltingly, for the recognition of peripheral languages. N. Bunge, minister of finance in the 1880s, supported tolerance of the Baltic languages in order to permit economic growth without provoking nationalist disturbances; and Count Witte in the 1890s supported German education in the Baltics in order to get competent and loyal economic managers.[27]

When mass education and government economic management arrived in states that had consolidated in earlier eras, there was already an elite stratum among nearly all language groups—children of state functionaries or commercial bourgeois families seeking "national" markets—that was capable of teaching in and interested in spreading the language of the central state. In Russia, the historical fact of starting late changed the context of language rationalization. Built into the state apparatus was a core institution (the Ministry of Education) that was in the business of standardization and development of languages of the periphery. Also, with the state interested in the management of industrial firms, its functionaries perceived (especially in the regions designated as growth nodes) language rationalization as a threat to development.

In light of these two variables—the special geographical context of Russian state expansion and the fact that Russia did not begin building a consolidated state until so late in its history that state interest in linguistic rationalization conflicted with state interest in mass literacy and economic growth—we see that at the time of the Revolution, despite successful language rationalization among peripheral elites, the Russian language was not a core part of the language repertoires of many social strata in the periphery. Whereas in the final third of the nineteenth century, peasants had already become Frenchmen,[28] in Russia, although peripheral nationality groups had many elites who were capable Russian-speakers (fulfilling the rationalization program), their peasants (and members of other strata as well) had not become Russian.

Russification in the Soviet Period

The legacy of limited language rationalization was not substantially altered during the seventy-four years of Soviet rule, in spite of unremitting state centralization.

[26] Isabelle T. Kreindler, "The Mordvinian Languages: A Survival Saga," in Kreindler, *Sociolinguistic Perspectives*, p. 241.

[27] Thaden, "Russian Government," pp. 48–49, 54–55, 70–71.

[28] Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976).

The startling fact among the nationalities of the Soviet Union was that "unassimilated bilingualism" remained the widespread and stable language repertoire.[29]

To be sure, there were exceptions. In eastern Ukraine, Belarus', and in a number of industrial cities outside of Russia, there were unambiguous trends toward full assimilation. Meanwhile, in rural Central Asia, there are large rural pockets where parochialism remains the linguistic norm. Data collected by Martha Olcott and William Fierman suggest that in the Asian republics, vast numbers of youth have no functional knowledge of Russian. Finally, in some areas such as in Armenia and in the Baltics there has been a deliberate deemphasis of Russian, even to the extent of (based on census figures) intergenerational loss of proficiency. From a Russian or Soviet specialist's point of view, these exceptions carry great weight. From a comparative perspective, however, the variations are small compared to the general outcome of stable "unassimilated bilingualism."

Brian Silver's analyses of Soviet census data suggest that the level of intergroup contact was sufficient to explain variation in the move from parochialism to unassimilated bilingualism.[30] The Muslim/Orthodox variable and the degree of urbanization, however, had little explanatory power. Silver suggests from this that the acquisition of Russian as a second language is almost entirely a matter of economic and practical consideration, with the ethnic significance of this language step playing only a minor role.[31]

As for the switch from unassimilated bilingualism to assimilation, Silver's data show a clear difference by cultural group. With high levels of contact with Russians, non-Russian but Orthodox nationalities (which include the ambiguous case of the Ukrainians) move in a monotonic way toward assimilation. For the Muslim, Arme-

[29] This term is Brian Silver's. He distinguishes parochialism (knowing only the language of the locality), unassimilated bilingualism (knowing as well the language of the center, but using it in limited domains, and with great difficulty), assimilated bilingualism (relying principally on the central language, but maintaining some facility in the local language), and assimilation (becoming monolingual in the central language). Brian Silver, "Methods of Deriving Data on Bilingualism from the 1970 Soviet Census," *Soviet Studies* 27 (October 1975): 574–97.

[30] Soviet census data are not fully to be trusted. Respondents gave subjective accounts of their language abilities, but the accuracy of these self-assessments was not tested. Also, respondents often denied competence in Russian to voice opposition to the regime. There is also evidence of political tampering with the data. William Fierman reports, for example, that the first secretary of the Uzbekistan Communist Party, a promoter of the Russian language, delivered a census report in 1979 that showed a 34.8 percent rise in the use of Russian over a period of nine years. See William Fierman, "Language Development in Soviet Uzbekistan," in Kreindler, *Sociolinguistic Perspectives*, pp. 220–21. This is highly unlikely from a sociolinguistic point of view. The 1989 census data show that knowledge of Russian among Uzbeks dropped from approximately 53 percent in 1979 to about 22 percent in 1989, confirming that the reported 34.8 percent rise of the previous decade was most likely fraudulent. On these 1989 data, see Barbara A. Anderson and Brian D. Silver, "Demographic Sources of the Changing Ethnic Composition of the Soviet Union," *Population and Development Review* 15, no. 4 (1989): 644–46. For an excellent study of verbal self-identification in the Soviet census, see Rasma Karklins, "A Note on 'Nationality' and 'Native Tongue' as Census Categories in 1979," *Soviet Studies* 32, no. 3 (1980): 415–22.

[31] Brian Silver, "Language Policy and the Linguistic Russification of Soviet Nationalities," in Jeremy Azrael, ed., *Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices* (New York: Praeger, 1978), pp. 282–86, and "Bilingualism and Maintenance of the Mother Tongue in Soviet Central Asia," *Slavic Review* 35, no. 3 (1976): 414.

nians, and Baltic nationalities, both contact and high levels of urbanization are necessary for a full switch, and even in those cases the level of switch is very low. More precisely, Silver found that the switch from original language to Russian was higher than predictions based solely on contact and urbanization in 14 of the 17 Orthodox ethnic groups, lower than expected in 22 of 23 Muslim groups, and lower for the three Baltic groups.[32]

Marginal differences in region aside, the overwhelmingly clear outcome (based on data from the 1970 and 1979 Soviet censuses and ignoring the more nationally charged environment of the 1989 census; see Table 2.1) is that of stable unassimilated bilingualism, especially among the "titular nationalities," those language groups that gained control over Soviet republics.[33] As E. Glyn Lewis puts it, perhaps too forcefully, the data on retention of national languages, "make nonsense of the claim that . . . it is possible in the foreseeable future to envisage a merging of languages or the creation of a common language."[34]

An explanation for the maintenance of unassimilated bilingualism in the Soviet peripheries needs to account for how the titular national elites successfully consolidated local power through a linguistic regime under their control.[35] To be sure, nationality policy in the early Soviet years focused on the linguistic rights of the individual, not the territorial republic of settlement. In many areas, this policy continued to define the Soviet educational mission. By 1938–39 I. T. Kreindler points out that Uzbekistan offered instruction in twenty-two languages; Ukraine in seventeen, and Dagestan in twenty.[36]

But a very different policy arose from seeds planted in the People's Commissariat for Nationalities, the Treaty with Union Soviet Republics (December 1922), and the first constitution of the USSR (1924), where the political relations between nations were organized along strictly territorial principles, and within each republic, political advantages accrued to the titular nationalities at the expense of minorities. These decisions had far-reaching effects. As Lewis puts it:[37]

[32] See Brian Silver, "Social Mobilization and the Russification of Soviet Nationalities," *American Political Science Review* 68, no. 1 (1974): 59; similar findings are reported in Ronald Wixman, *Language Aspects of Ethnic Patterns and Processes in the North Caucasus*, Research paper no. 191, University of Chicago, 1980, for the North Caucasus and Central Asia; Olcott, "Politics of Language Reform," for Kazakhstan; and George B. Hewitt, "Georgian: A Noble Past, a Secure Future," in Kreindler, *Sociolinguistic Perspectives*, pp. 163–79, for Georgia.

[33] These data are from titular nationalities of only the highest level of republic, known as union republics. Below that level are the autonomous soviet socialist republics (ASSRs), which received, as I shall analyze later, far fewer resources for cultural autonomy. In Table 2.1, I ignore 1989 census data, since it is highly likely that in 1989 respondents were declaring ignorance of Russian to make a political point, at least in several republics.

[34] E. Glyn Lewis, *Multilingualism in the Soviet Union: Aspects of Language Policy and its Implementation* (The Hague: Mouton, 1972), pp. 134–35.

[35] B. A. Anderson and B. D. Silver, "Some Factors in the Linguistic and Ethnic Russification of Soviet Nationalities: Is Everyone Becoming Russian?" in Lubomyr Hajda and Mark Beissinger, eds., *The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and Society* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 95–130.

[36] I. T. Kreindler, "The Changing Status of Russian in the Soviet Union," Research paper no. 37, Soviet and East European Center, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1979, pp. 4–5.

[37] Lewis, "Multilingualism," pp. 58–59. But, as Edward A. Allworth, *The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to the Present, A Cultural History* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1990),

Table 2.1. Unassimilated and assimilated bilingualism of titular *nationalities, 1970–1979*

	Percent claiming Russian as second language		Percent switching native language to Russian	
	1970	1979	1970	1979
Turkmen	15.4	25.4	1.1	1.3
Kirghiz	19.1	29.4	1.2	2.1
Uzbek	14.5	49.3	1.4	1.5
Tajik	15.4	29.6	1.5	2.2
Georgian	21.3	26.7	1.6	1.7
Azerbaijan	16.6	29.5	1.8	2.1
Kazakh	41.8	52.3	2.0	2.5
Lithuanian	35.9	52.1	2.1	2.1
Estonian	29.0	24.2	4.5	4.7
Latvian	45.2	56.7	4.8	5.0
Moldovan	36.1	47.4	5.0	6.8
Armenian	30.1	38.6	8.6	9.3
Ukrainian	36.3	49.8	14.3	17.2
Byelorussian	49.0	57.0	19.4	25.8

Note: These data include members of each nationality living outside their republic and therefore overstate the switch to Russian for titulars living in "their" republics.

Source: Tsentral'noye Statisticheskoye Upravleniye pri Sovete Ministrov, SSSR, *Itogi vsesoyusnoy perepisi naseleniia 1970 goda* (Moscow: Statistika, 1973), 4:20–319, and *Chislennost' i sostav naseleniia SSSR: Po dannym vsesoiuznoi perepisi 1979 goda* (Moscow: Finansy i Statistika, 1984), pp. 71–137.

In consequence, whereas before this decision 66.5% of the total Uzbek population of Central Asia lived within the Turkestan ASSR, 22.2% and 11.3% within the Republics of Bukhara and Khorezm respectively, after the delimitation of 1925 over 82% of all Uzbeks in Central Asia were concentrated in Uzbekistan. The Turkmen population were originally even more dispersed, only 43% living within the Turkestan Republic, 27% and 29.8% in the Bukhara and Khorezm Republics respectively. After delimitation of territories over 94% of all Turkmen were brought together. . . . Naturally the concentration helped to ensure . . . the greater linguistic homogeneity of the various republics. The Uzbeks came to constitute nearly 75% of the population of the Republic, Turkmen over 70% of the population of the Turkmen SSR, and in the case of Tajikstan and Kirgistan the national group in each constituted over 74% and 66% respectively. Such unification and increased homogeneity made the task of providing vernacular education and literature much easier, and so promoted the non-Russian national languages.

Thus began a system, originally sold as a policy of *korenizatsiia* (nativization). Its origins were in the Twelfth Party Congress in 1923, when Great Russian chauvinism

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perceptively insists, it is anachronistic to think of this as the movement of peoples to "their" republics. More probably, people identified themselves (or were compelled to identify themselves) with the titulars and made the (often slight) cultural adjustments to fit in with their newly adopted group.

was declared a greater danger than local nationalism. The campaign, lasting more than a decade, not only gave special rights to minorities within both Russian and non-Russian regions through the creation of "national soviets" (a policy that had no long-term legacy), but also (and with a profound legacy) gave considerable leeway for national elites controlling titular republics to promote their national cultures. In one interpretation, *korenizatsiia* "provided opportunities for nationalities representing over 93% of the non-Russian population to create ethnically distinct stratification subsystems within Union or autonomous republics."[38]

Within the distribution politics of each republic, based in part on access to linguistic capital, the titular nationals used their positions to assure their ethnic brethren the more visible jobs of power and patronage;[39] they were (in the Asian republics especially) the beneficiaries of affirmative action programs for educational placement and technical jobs;[40] they had subsidized publications in their languages;[41] and they used the lack of language competence to deny minorities within their republics access to educational and job opportunities.[42] In light of these policies, children of mixed Russian/titular marriages, when living in the titular republic, often declared themselves as members of the titular nationality.[43] And, after decades of russianization (that is, the migration of Russians into the titular republics), the titular elites were by the 1980s able to reverse the tide. In the late Soviet period, therefore, there was significant migration of nontitulars out of the republics, and of titulars from outside back into their "home" republics.[44] The titular elites took responsibility for managing ethnic relations within their republics in order to retain control of a vast "neotraditional" patronage system.[45] To be sure,

[38] On *korenizatsiia* see William Fierman, *Language Planning and National Development: The Uzbek Experience* (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1991), and George Liber, *The Urban Harvest: Ethnic Policy, Legitimization, and the Unintended Consequences of Social Change in the Ukrainian SSR, 1923–1933* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1992). The quotation is from Philip G. Roeder, "Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization," *World Politics* 43 (1991): 204. He exaggerates the level of opportunity for non-Russians, because he counts members of nationality groups living outside their titular republics as being advantaged by the system when they were not. According to Kaiser, *Geography of Nationalism*, p. 155, in 1926 only 79.5 percent of the members of the eleven titular nationalities lived within their titular republic.

[39] Rasma Karklins, *Ethnic Relations in the USSR* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986), pp. 80–81; Suny, *Making of the Georgian Nation*, p. 290.

[40] Nancy Lubin, "Assimilation and Retention of Ethnic Identity in Uzbekistan," *Asian Affairs* 12 (1981): 227–85.

[41] Lewis, *Multilingualism*, p. 177.

[42] Soviet ethnographers confirm the linguistic advantages that have accrued to members of titular nationalities. See M. Guboglo et al., "Etnolingvisticheskie protsessy," in I. V. Bromlei, ed., *Sovremennye etnicheskie protsessy v SSSR* (Moscow: Nauka, 1975), pp. 259–313; table 12, p. 301. For example, between 1926 and 1970, the correspondence between nationality and native language increased for ten out of fifteen titular nationalities, but decreased for seventeen out of nineteen nationalities having a lower form of autonomy. See also Roeder, "Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization," p. 204, and Karklins, *Ethnic Relations*.

[43] Karklins, *Ethnic Relations*, p. 38.

[44] G. I. Litvinova and B. Ts. Urlanis, "Demograficheskaia politika Sovetskogo Soiuza," *Sovetskoe gosudarvstvo i pravo* 3 (1982): 45, quoted in Karklins, *Ethnic Relations*, p. 94; see also Anderson and Silver, "Demographic Sources."

[45] Andrew G. Walder, *Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).

not all titular nationals were pleased; there is some evidence that many titular nationality parents wanted more Russian education than "their" elites were willing to provide.[46] Yet as long as the titular leaders could assure Moscow that there would be peace in the republic, they were, for decades, able to sustain neotraditional political structures.

This system permitted the Soviet elites to promote "primordialism" but to severely limit its mobilization into direct confrontations with Soviet power.[47] Primordialism, in the Soviet context, could be promoted by allowing nationalities to use their "own" languages, just so long as they did not make political demands on the basis of nationality on the central state. But with titular languages used not only for cultural expression but for republic-level administration as well, titular nationals had an incentive to remain unassimilated bilinguals. Their languages represented capital for jobs and opportunities. The question that remains puzzling is why would a regime that was so centralized support and even protect titular languages?

Some might suggest that the Leninist ideology of national self-determination became enshrined in the organization of language zones controlled by titular nationals. But Lenin's writings on language and nationality give equal and contradictory regard to the goals of national self-determination and proletarian internationalism. If either of these themes is emphasized at the expense of the other, Lenin's pronouncements can be invoked in support of a wide continuum of language and nationality policies. Lenin is widely known for his support for the national self-determination of peoples. Yet he can also be cited for his ultimate goal of the "complete Russification of non-Russian nationalities."[48] In fact, Lenin's followers used his name to give greater autonomy to the titular nationalities *and* to make special opportunities available for native-language primary education to the members of nontitular nationalities. Lenin's writings on nationality could have been used to support both the rationalization of Russian and the promotion of regional languages.

There is a macrohistorical as well as a micro-incentive alternative to the explanation based on Leninist ideology. The macro dimension concerns the pacification efforts of the new Soviet state in the period immediately following the civil war, both to preempt pan-Turkism and pan-Islamicism and to expand the revolution westward. Both of these strategies had the consequence of giving republican elites

[46] Karklins, *Ethnic Relations*, p. 105, interprets her data to emphasize the considerable majorities of the titular nationals who wanted *more* education in their language. But the data can also be read to show that there were significant minorities that wanted more Russian. The Soviet state attempted at various times to respond to the felt demand for Russian as a medium of instruction in the union republics. Khrushchev's policy of 1958 to allow for parental choice in regard to medium of instruction was severely criticized by the titulars, since they feared that their own people would choose Russian. This policy did not have a major impact on educational reality within most republics. See Lewis *Multilingualism*, pp. 67–80. In the 1970s, the Ministry of Education proposed that in Georgia, technical material in higher education should be in Russian. Concomitant attempts to delete Georgian from its official status in Georgia induced the titular elites to argue vociferously against these efforts. See Suny, *Making of the Georgian Nation*, p. 301.

[47] Roeder, "Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization," pp. 196–232.

[48] This quotation is Anatoly Khazanov's gloss. See Khazanov, *After the USSR* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), p. 12.

far more linguistic autonomy than an overall strategy of russification would have permitted. The micro dimension brings us to the tipping game, introduced in Chapter 1, to explain why there was no cascade toward Russian after accommodating elites attained power helped by their knowledge of Russian.

Overcoming Pan-Turkism

The awesome power of nationalism shocked Lenin in 1917, and again during the civil war.[49] The territorial integrity of Russia was immediately threatened. In Central Asia, the revolutionaries faced a credible pan-Turkic threat. Pan-Turkism had been crystallized in 1882 when Ismail bey Gaspraly developed a Turkic *koine* for his newspaper, *Terjuman* (The Interpreter), that was easily understood through much of Russian-controlled Central Asia. In 1904–5, a political organization, Ittifaq al-Muslimin, advocated pan-Turkic social and linguistic but not political goals.[50] By 1917, at the Pan-Russian Conference of Muslims, delegates assumed—surely ignoring the existence of quite separate Tatar, Azeri, and Kazakh literary languages—that there was in Russia a single Muslim nation with one tongue. The Soviet regime was compelled, for lack of other allies, to deal with these Pan-Turkic ideologues. For example, Najmuddin Efendiev-Samurskii, leader of the Communist Party of Daghestan, published a book in 1924 advocating education in a common Turkic language. Sultan Galiev, the highest-ranking Muslim official in the communist hierarchy, was also a strong advocate of pan-Turkism. These "national communists" found themselves in a good bargaining position, mediating between local cultures and the weak Soviet state, whose leaders thoroughly distrusted their Asian allies. The Bolsheviks probably overestimated the possibility of a mobilized secession from a united Turkic movement. Nonetheless, this fear explains their primary goal to weaken these elites' claims for a common Turkic culture. The Communist Party's "divide and rule" policy "involved breaking up the large mass of Muslim and Turkic populace into fragments and then putting the pieces together into the required number of units, each of them having an exact territorial demarcation."[51] This was not a difficult task, given the dialect, tribal, and social differences that already existed, and the fears of some Central Asian peoples that they might face Volga Tatar domination in the name of pan-Turkic unity.[52] The regime named and subsidized publications in

[49] This section is borrowed from Laitin, Petersen, and Slocum, "Language and the State." In that article, we portray this conflict as a formal game in which the equilibrium outcome is the promotion of the local variants of Turkic. Here I summarize the argument without the game model. In that article, we portrayed the outcome of this conflict as the motor for *korenizatsiia* throughout the Soviet Union. Since the publication of that article, Terry Martin has convinced me, as reflected in the next section, that there was a more powerful motor driving *korenizatsiia* in the west.

[50] Alexandre Bennigsen, "Panturkism and Panislamism in History and Today," *Central Asian Survey* 3, no. 3 (1985): 41–43.

[51] Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet Union* (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 126.

[52] Allworth, *Modern Uzbeks*.

new languages and worked to distinguish them from their dialectical cousins. Examples of dividing close speech forms and calling them separate languages, as was done with Tatar and Bashkir, with Kazakh and Kirgiz, and with Balkar and Karachai, have been well documented.

Lenin, whose father was a colleague of Il'minskii, and (perhaps because of that) was very sensitive to the nationality issue, felt that it was important not to alienate the Turkic peoples. Turning them into active supporters of the regime would need to be delayed. He therefore pressed Stalin and others to respond positively to nationalist demands and to challenge "Great Russian chauvinism."[53] In Central Asia the development of loyalty was especially crucial, given the nature of the Muslim communist elite. In the period of communist consolidation, this elite was still composed of "unreliable" class elements heavily tainted with nationalism; they were tolerated only because of the weakness of the Soviet state. The central party foresaw that long-term stability would depend on replacing this old elite with a new set of cadres from the general population, especially workers. Forcing the Russian language on this population would no doubt alienate the future base of recruitment to an extent that the Bolsheviks could not afford.[54]

The politics of orthography in Central Asia nicely illustrates the desire first to block pan-Turkism, and only later to seek loyalty to the Soviet regime. In the 1920s, the Latin alphabet became the new script for the Turkic languages to replace the Arabic script, which might have helped foster a pan-Muslim identity. The Latin script, richer in vowel representation than Arabic, also helped to differentiate dialects that looked the same with Arabic spellings.[55] It was not until the late 1930s, after the First Five-Year Plan had utterly destroyed the so-called Turkish feudal elite, when loyalty to the Soviet regime was no longer a pressing problem, that the conversion to Cyrillic (done through a central dictate, without any linguistic preparation) was made. The Cyrillic script, along with the introduction of Russian root words for key concepts dealing with political and technical areas, helped the project of blending the languages, a precursor, in Soviet thinking, to linguistic rationalization.[56] Thus the primary goal to prevent pan-Turkism was met first by eliminating the Arabic script; the secondary goal of procuring loyalty (or at least not engendering anti-Russian feelings) was met by abjuring the Cyrillic script; the tertiary goal of language rationalization was delayed a decade.

By the late 1930s, circumstances had changed; full rationalization was both feasible and desirable. With the pacification of Central Asia, cyrillicization would be possible. At this time, international security issues might have been decisive. Perhaps reflecting the need for Russian-speaking conscripts in the face of the growing secu-

[53] I. T. Kreindler, "A Neglected Source of Lenin's Nationality Policy," *Slavic Review* 36 (1977): 86–100, and "The Non-Russian Languages and the Challenge of Russian: The Eastern Versus the Western Tradition," in *Sociolinguistic Perspectives*, p. 348.

[54] See Olcott, *Kazakhs*, p. 206.

[55] Michael Kirkwood, "Language Planning: Some Methodological Preliminaries," in M. Kirkwood, ed., *Language Planning in the Soviet Union* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), p. 32.

[56] Simon Crisp, "Soviet Language Planning, 1917–53," in Kirkwood, *Language Planning*, pp. 29–30.

rity threat from Germany, the Soviet state in 1938 required the teaching of Russian in all non-Russian schools.[57] In the following year, again with the probable linking of state security to rationalization, the Latin script for Central Asian languages was officially replaced by Cyrillic. This would facilitate bilingualism in Russian among Turkic speakers.

Turkic elites had their own agenda. At the Pan-Russian Congress of Muslims in May 1917, "the delegates [including traditionalists and radical communists such as Sultan Galiev] expressed near unanimity on the fundamental concern of all factions—that the destiny of the Muslim peoples must be made separate and distinct from that of Russians."[58] This desire for a separate destiny was held equally strongly by the Muslim National Communists in the period following the October Revolution. They had replaced the traditionalists who dominated the 1917 congress but shared their goals in regard to language.[59] The primary goal was indeed to nurture a Pan-Turkic language. But if this goal could not be reached, they saw a necessity to prevent Russian from overrunning their language(s), and would have accepted separate development of their local languages rather than russification. Given the Soviet fear of pan-Turkism, the Turkic elites saw room for a compromise that would serve their interests. If the representatives of Central Asia were willing to accept the promotion of local languages, they speculated, Soviet authorities would grab the opportunity.

Indeed this compromise depicts what transpired in language politics during the period following 1923: the center opted for promotion of local languages while the Muslim elites held on to the pan-Turkic alternative. Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush describe the historical dynamics in the following terms:[60]

> The Muslim national communists['] . . . opposition to the linguistic division of the Soviet Turkic world after 1923 was especially pronounced. Seeking at first to have Kazan Tatar declared as the lingua franca of all Turkic territories of the Soviet Union . . . in 1926 [they] fell back to a three-region linguistic strategy. Under this plan Kazan Tatar would become the language of the European part of the Soviet Union, Azeri would be the language of the Caucasus, and Chagatay would serve all Central Asia. They also opposed the introduction of Latin and later of Cyrillic alphabets, arguing instead for the universal use of the Arabic alphabet.

From 1923 on, the regime sought to reduce the power of the pan-Turkic elite. By 1928, as Stalin consolidated his power, a massive purge severely reduced the leadership

[57] Terry Martin, "The Soviet Nationalities Policy, 1923–1938" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1996), p. 919, reports that Stalin's speeches in 1935 offer a *military* justification for linguistic rationalization (knowing enough Russian to obey orders), without any implications of assimilation.

[58] Alexandre A. Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, *Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union: A Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 20.

[59] Although there were some among this new communist elite who believed the best way to avoid Russian domination was to more fully develop local cultures, the pan-Turks who stressed Central Asian regional unity in politics and culture were the more significant group, especially in the maneuverings concerning language development of the 1920s.

[60] Bennigsen and Wimbush, *Muslim National Communism*, p. 88.

ranks of the already weakened pan-Turks. Sultan Galiev was imprisoned and later executed, and anyone suggesting a pan-Turkic agenda was accused of "Sultangalievism" and suffered a similar fate.[61] The purge effectively eliminated the pan-Turkic (or even the three-region) option, but there was still a local alternative to russification. The Muslim elite, recognizing the fact that the Party could now insist, without opposition, on the local variants of Turkic, accepted this as certainly better than russification. Galimdzhan Ibragimov, an influential Muslim communist, argued along these lines. His widely publicized essay in 1927 *Which Way Will Tatar Culture Go?* advocated the spread of his local Tatar language, which in his statistical semantics, was growing in importance and use. Unconnected to the "Sultangalievist" circle, his controversial statements gave legitimacy to the local option.[62] Stalin's *korenizatsiia* campaign, which lasted in Central Asia through 1933, and in many places up till 1938, reflects this agreement.

The Piedmont Principle

Soviet pacification of Ukraine had a very different plot but an outcome similar to that of Central Asia—the promotion of the republican language at the expense of russification.[63] When the leaders of the Ukrainian Communist Party felt pressured to russify after the civil war, an article in the newspaper of the Central Committee observed: "There was a time when Galicia served as the 'Piedmont' for Ukrainian culture. Now, when Ukrainian culture is suffocating in 'cultured,' 'European' Poland, its center has naturally shifted to the Ukrainian SSR."

The image of Piedmont—the magnet to draw in all of Italy—suggested the idea, in Terry Martin's account, "that Soviet Ukraine would likewise first culturally and then politically unify the divided Ukrainian populations of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania . . . [since] cross-border ethnic ties could be exploited to foment national discontent in neighboring states."

This Piedmont perspective helps explain a good deal of the nativization that took place in the western republics. It is certainly true, as was the case in Central Asia, that the Bolsheviks lacked support in the countryside and did not want further to provoke the populace with a russification drive. Yet in the west, the Bolsheviks had a grander vision supporting nativization policies. Ukraine's communists pressed for minority national soviets within each republic, as this would humiliate Poland, which was being criticized by the League of Nations for its national minority policies. Similarly, the Soviets created the Moldavian ASSR, in the hope of using that

[61] The question of Sultan Galiev's loyalty to the Soviet regime has been reopened in "Who Is Sultangaliev," published in 1989 in the Tatar journal *Kazan Ultari*. See Azade-Ayse Rorlich, "The Disappearance of an Old Taboo: Is Sultangaliev Becoming *Persona Grata*?" *Report on the USSR*, September 29, 1989, pp. 16–17.

[62] Azade-Ayse Rorlich, "Which Way Will Tatar Culture Go? A Controversial Essay by Galimdzhan Ibragimov," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* 15, no. 2 (1974): 363–71.

[63] This section relies heavily on Martin, "Soviet Nationalities Policy." Although references to "Piedmont" abound in contemporary accounts, the term "Piedmont principle" in this context is Martin's invention.

territory as a Piedmont to attract Bessarabia, which Romania had annexed to the chagrin of the Soviets. Again, in late 1923, the Politburo of the Soviet Union agreed to extend the boundaries of Byelorussia by transferring sixteen *uezdy* from the RFSFR (the Russian Federation), in order to make it a strong and attractive republic. This would help, in the eyes of Soviet authorities, to foment rebellion by White Russians against Polish rule in Polish Belorussia. The Soviet chairman of the border dispute commission insisted that for this policy to succeed, it was necessary to derussify the population. The apotheosis of the Piedmont principle took place in the late 1920s in Kuban, where Cossacks were able to ukrainize all districts in which they were the majority in this area of the RFSFR. A bureaucratic cascade ensued, in which even the fully russified Ukrainian peasants in Kazakhstan were compelled to ukrainize. In accordance with Piedmont strategy, Ukraine sent teachers, books, theatrical productions, and radio programs to all areas in which Ukrainians lived within the Soviet boundaries. By 1932, after a brutal collectivization effort had nearly caused a counterrevolution in the Kuban, and after Moscow had adopted a less missionary foreign policy orientation, the Piedmont principle was drastically modified. Ukraine would have no more cultural influence outside its republican boundaries. Although Ukrainian schools would continue to educate virtually all Ukrainians, there was to be full russification of Slavs within the RSFSR.

Stalin continued his assault on the titular languages through the decade. In 1933 a decree abolished the right of the constituent republics to grant orders of distinction. In this era, Frederick Barghoorn writes,

> Writers such as [Mykola] Khvylovi, who proclaimed an "Asiatic Renaissance," in which a Western-oriented Ukraine, not Moscow, was to be the leader of socialism, statesmen such as education Commissar [O.] Shumski, economists like [N.] Volobuev, who in 1928 denounced Moscow's "colonialism," leaders like [G. I.] Petrovski, who as early as 1926 attacked the habitual use of the Russian language at Ukrainian Party meetings, were imprisoned or shot, committed suicide, or simply disappeared.

By World War II, Stalin was unrestrained in his substitution of Russian nationalism for Soviet patriotism. In November 1941, in an oft-quoted speech, Stalin declared that the fascists "have the impudence to demand the destruction of the Great Russian nation, the nation of Plekhavov and Lenin, of Belinski and Chernyshevski, of Pushkin and Tolstoi, of Glinka and Chaikovski, of Gorki and Chekhov, of Sechenov and Pavlov, of Repin and Surikov, or [and now, Stalin lists two tsarist generals] Suvorov and Kutuzov."[64]

After Stalin's death in 1953, the Soviet government continued what was tantamount to a policy of russification. Khrushchev's educational reforms of 1958, for

[64] Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Soviet Russian Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 16, 37, 39. Jerry F. Hough, in chapter 6 of his *Democratization and Revolution in the USSR: 1985–91* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1997) takes the counter view. By his recruitment of non-Russians into the Party, and by reifying nationality on the passport in 1934, Stalin, because "he remained a Georgian at heart," actually promoted non-Russian identities.

example, promoted parental free choice for educational medium of instruction in schools throughout the Union. Many national elites saw this as a code word for russification. Talk about the "merging" of nations (that is, the russification of the Soviet Union) as a historically inevitable process was a leitmotif in the Khrushchev years. But under Brezhnev, the notion of "merging" was quietly dropped. The historical legacies of the Piedmont principle and the effort to destroy pan-Turkism through the promotion of distinct Turkic languages had an enduring legacy in the Soviet Union. Both policies, although repealed, helped to perpetuate the unassimilated bilingual outcome throughout the Soviet Union through the greater part of the twentieth century.

The Failure to Tip to Russian

Macrohistorical factors, having to do with the state-building efforts of Russian tsars and commissars, explain why language rationalization did not spread through all social strata as it did in Western European states. Yet a microanalyst will ask: what prevented ordinary people, despite interests by local elites to prevent them, from assimilating into the dominant culture (and becoming fluent in the dominant language) of the ruling state? To answer this question, the microfoundations of Russian language rationalization must be examined. Before I provide those foundations, I shall specify more fully than I did in Chapter 1 how payoffs can be assigned in a tipping model.

Consider a state-building tipping game, as portrayed in Figure 2.1 but identical in structure to the national-revival game portrayed in Figure 1.1. In this game, the principal players are people living in the periphery of a heterogeneous state who must decide whether to adopt, or equip their children to adopt, the state language. An examination of Figure 2.1 shows that the overall payoff for speaking the central state language (Lc) as opposed to the regional language (Lr) is largely determined by whether other members of their community (speakers of Lr) are adopting Lc. Thus people, by the logic of the model, are pushed into an intergenerational coordination game with their conationals.

As with all coordination efforts, strategic problems arise. What incentive was there for the first Kazakh to learn Russian, or to send his child to a Russian-language school? Was he excoriated by his own community for having done so? Did the Russians praise assimilators in general but discriminate against them in particular because of other cultural differences? Would it have been wiser to wait for a significant Russian-speaking community of Kazakhs to develop? If so, suppose every speaker of Lr decided to wait until 40 percent of the Kazakhs had learned Russian, or a significant number of Kazakh children had completed a Russian-language school? The macroresult of this microprocess would have been the nonassimilation of Russian by the Kazakh speech community.

It follows from this strategic situation that it is individually irrational for a speaker of Lr to switch to Lc (or prepare her children to do so) if virtually no one in the speech community has made the switch. If this is the case, and we accept ratio-



Figure 2.1. State-building tipping game: Percentage of population that speaks central state language

nality assumptions, how could intergenerational assimilation ever occur? There are a number of possibilities. For one, an individual's payoff for switching may be higher than the average, for example if he learns language easily or if he falls in love with a speaker of Lc. Also, states often coerce individuals into assimilation—by putting them in labor camps or in the army, for example. In the Soviet army, there were units with Russian majorities and units with mixed minorities, but no units of a majority of any one minority. The mixed minority units were usually stationed in Russian-speaking zones. This strategy evidently worked well in catalyzing the widespread understanding of Russian in all social strata.[65] When soldiers returned home, they automatically raised the percentage of Lr members who spoke Lc.

Several intricacies of the model might be raised now. First, if it is irrational at first to assimilate, at the tipping point k, it becomes irrational to refuse to switch. The tipping model should therefore enable us to calculate the rates of language shift depending on the number of Lr speakers who have already made the shift. Second, on both payoff functions (Lc–Lc and Lr–Lr) the curves reverse direction at the extremes. I explain the phenomenon that this represents—the high returns for being one of the very few members of your group with an unusual language repertoire—in Chapter 9. Here it is best to focus on the central aspect of tipping—that great social shifts seem impossible at one point but inevitable at another.

If rational-choice theory is to be applied to issues of cultural identity, as I indicated in Chapter 1, it must go beyond material calculations. If it were the case that the only rationality is that of material benefit, then rational models would quickly

[65] Robert Cullen reports that the Soviet comedian Evgenii Petrosian earned hilarious laughter in Rostov-on-Don when a punch line mentioned that in an army base of thousands of soldiers, "none of them speak Russian." *New Yorker*, June 12, 1989. M. B. Olcott and William Fierman, "Soviet Youth and the Military" (U.S. Department of State, contract no. 1724-620124, Washington, D.C.), report that this image of incompetence in Russian among non-Russian army recruits is reflected in many stories in the regional newspapers. But once in mixed minority units, we can surmise, with Karklins, *Ethnic Relations*, p. 101, that most soldiers achieve some facility in Russian. In my discussions with Estonians who had served in the Soviet army, I found that they developed a rudimentary understanding of Russian and a rich and eloquent mastery of Russian *mat'* (profanity).

find themselves ill-equipped to deal with issues of culture. But I do not believe that the only form of rational calculation is that of material benefit. In fact, a good first cut into the utility functions Lr–Lr and Lc–Lc is to think about three separate calculations. First, and this concerns material benefits, a potential assimilant needs to calculate the expected economic returns for adding a language to her child's repertoire (less the opportunity costs for learning it). But after this calculation, we enter the world of honor and status. Second, a potential assimilant will want to assess whether members of the in-group will punish potential assimilants as cultural apostates. This value I call *in-group scorn*. Third, the potential assimilant will want to consider the degree to which members of the out-group (who speak the language her child might be assimilating) will accept an assimilant as one of their own, for example, as a potential marriage partner for a member of their family, or as a member in a private club. This factor I call *out-group acceptance*.

Applying the tipping model to the Soviet Union makes it possible to analyze the largely successful tip from parochialism to unassimilated bilingualism.[66] The economic benefits for bilingualism were moderately high, and the first learners of Russian did not face any significant in-group scorn. Though out-group acceptance was not great outside the Slavic republics in the west, in the move toward unassimilated bilingualism, out-group acceptance (outside of gaining rewards for linguistic mediation) was not consequential. Most regions of the Soviet Union, as I showed, passed the tipping point toward unassimilated bilingualism. As long as the Union was holding, an increasing number of non-Russian Soviet citizens were developing competence in Russian as a second language.

The Soviets, at least by the 1930s, were not satisfied with unassimilated bilingualism. Their hope was basically to attain assimilated bilingualism.[67] But this was in most republics not very successful. Consider first economic returns. Given the patronage power of titular elites who favored speakers of Lr, the added economic returns for assimilation into Russian were low through much of the country. Perhaps only in regions economically behind central Russia, and especially in ASSRs and lesser units where the patronage for speakers of the titular language was paltry, were

[66] Readers might still object—as have scores of seminar participants who have heard me present this model—that this is not a realistic portrayal of how people really think about cultural matters, even if I abandon a pure materialist choice perspective. I urge the reader to suspend disbelief, until Chapter 5, where I use extensive ethnographic data to demonstrate the real-world calculus of cultural identity.

[67] There is no consensus on this point. Frederick Barghoorn, "Russian Nationalism and Soviet Politics: Official and Unofficial Perspectives," in Robert Conquest, ed., *The Last Empire: Nationality and the Soviet Future* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), p. 32, refers to "Stalin's policy of maximum feasible Russification." Most Soviet commentators, e.g. Iu. Bromlei, in *Natsional'nye protsessy v SSSR: V poiskakh novykh podkhodov* (Moscow: Nauka, 1988), emphasized the goal of the flowering of all nations. Although the Soviet policy was not graced by consistency in this matter, it is fair to say that in Soviet eyes, an ideal patriot was, in an earlier statement by Frederick Barghoorn, in *Soviet Russian Nationalism*, p. 11, "a complex of the highest values and loyalties of Soviet citizens, with loyalty to the particular culture of one's own nation in the second order of priority and loyalty to international communism on the third level." This sense of priority is consistent with the goal of assimilated bilingualism.

these payoffs (less learning and in-group scorn costs) for assimilated bilingualism positive. A Tatar—in Tatarstan, an ASSR—who knew Russian better than Tatar, one study found, had over a 50 percent chance to improve his or her job training while a Tatar who still knew the Tatar language better than Russian had only a 10 percent chance of improvement.[68] But in regions that were economically more advanced or not dependent on Russia, such as the Baltic republics, Georgia, and Armenia, people throughout the Soviet era saw little economic advantage in making Russian their primary language, though learning Russian as a second language was considered useful.

Concerning in-group status, there was some variation across republics, and over time. In regions that are culturally similar to Russia (the Slavic republics of Ukraine and Byelorussia), early assimilators faced little in-group scorn. In Ukraine of the 1970s, for example, with arrests still being made of Ukrainian cultural figures, it was imprudent for self-appointed patriots to sanction their brethren for not upholding national traditions.[69] In other republics, assimilators were held in much deeper suspicion by their fellow nationals. Many sold out indeed, but they paid an in-group cost for so doing. As time went on, however, in-group status took on greater importance in titular calculations. This was due to the perception, beginning in the Brezhnev period but accentuated in the Gorbachev years, of imperial decline. If, for example, Georgians believe that Georgia is likely to become an independent country in the next generation, they will worry far more about in-group status and will begin to discount heavily the expected economic returns for learning Russian. To the extent that people believe that one's children will be living in a sovereign state of Armenia, Georgia, Estonia, Kirghizia, they will worry about what fellow nationals will think about their having assimilated into the culture of the former center. Especially for those groups that had tasted sovereignty in the recent historical past (Baltics, Georgia, west Ukraine), and those whose linguistic brethren have sovereignty across an international border (Moldovans and Tajiks), the in-group status costs of Russian dominance in one's linguistic repertoire increase.

Concerning out-group status, despite the propaganda supporting the "merging" of all peoples, the rewards for assimilation were hardly impressive. Ability to penetrate all-Union party circles was clearly related to whether the non-Russians were Orthodox in religion and Slavic in culture, and even then the widespread belief that all power positions were reserved for Great Russians lowered the potential status rewards for assimilation. A Ukrainian who spoke Russian may not have been considered a complete outsider; but a Kazakh who spoke perfect Russian continued to experience residual prejudice and suspicion as a possible fifth columnist. So religious and cultural similarity raised the probability of out-group acceptance, but they never raised it very high.

[68] Peter Shearman, "Language, Sovietization and Ethnic Integration in the USSR," *Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies* 8, no. 3 (1983): 243–44.

[69] Alexander Motyl, *Will the Non-Russians Rebel?* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), chap. 6.

Despite the seventy-seven years of "Moscow Center" in Soviet rule, the expected returns for the intergenerational move toward assimilated bilingualism—from unassimilated bilingualism—were not impressive for the titular nationalities of the Union republics. The microanalysis of individual choice complements the macro-historical account in helping to explain the maintenance of unassimilated bilingual repertoires in the Soviet period.

3

Three Patterns of Peripheral Incorporation

Alain Besançon portrayed the Russian empire as having three faces.[1] It expanded into Siberia like the United States, incorporated Central Asia like Great Britain, and controlled Ukraine and the Baltics like Austria-Hungary. Yet, as Besançon points out, central leaders, ultimately to their chagrin, denied these differences. In the previous chapter, I emphasized the broad historical similarities of Russian expansion into the peripheries. In this chapter, while not replicating Besançon's categorization precisely, I illustrate three different patterns of Russian state control that spanned the tsarist and Soviet periods: a most-favored-lord pattern exemplified by Ukraine, a colonial model exemplified by Kazakhstan, and an integralist model exemplified by the Baltic states. I also show the effects of the heroic, if ultimately unsuccessful, attempts by Moscow center to deny, or even defy, those differences.

This chapter will therefore set the stage for an examination of the national revivals in the Union republics that began in the late 1980s. The cultural revivalists in Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, and Kazakhstan faced a common problem, that of dismantling the centralized Soviet structures. Because of their different legacies of political incorporation, however, the revivalists had quite different levels of resources and their populations were linguistically russified to different degrees. The historical legacy of political incorporation influences three key outcomes: first, the degree to which Russians assimilate into the titular cultures now that independence has been achieved; second, the threat of interethnic conflict in the newly independent states; and third, the degree to which the newly independent states will become rationalized as classic nation-states.

[1] Alain Besançon, "The Russian Past and the Soviet Present" (1974), summarized in Paul Goble, "Three Faces of Nationalism in the Former Soviet Union," in Charles A. Kupchan, ed., *Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 134–35. My differentiation relies more heavily on John Armstrong's classic statement, "The Ethnic Scene in the Soviet Union: The View of the Dictatorship," in Erich Goldhagen, ed., *Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union* (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 3–49.

The Elite-Incorporation Model of State Expansion

The elite-incorporation model of state expansion focuses on the role of elites in the periphery at the time their territory was first incorporated into a centralizing or expanding state.[2] If the newly incorporated elites can join high society at the political center, at more or less the same rank and standing they had in their own territories, they are said to enjoy a status of "most favored lord." By this I mean that elites in the incorporated region of a state have rights and privileges equal to those of elites of similar status and education in the political center.[3] These concerns might be thought of as the historical or macro basis for the "out-group status" calculation that drives the tipping game.

Under most-favored-lord conditions, there are strong incentives for many of the elites in an incorporated territory to allow themselves to be co-opted into the power establishment at the center. Some elites in the incorporated territory do not take advantage of this opportunity, in large part because of the social pulls of their community. They seek instead to build a future in their own region. But intergenerationally, if increasing numbers of the upper strata of the regional society identify culturally with the central elites, the regional language and culture begin to be seen as backward and poor. Over generations, mass education and military conscription provide inducements to lower strata to assimilate into the dominant culture.[4] When this process reaches fruition, the imperial state is transformed into a national state—or, in Eugen Weber's oft-repainted image, "peasants become Frenchmen."[5]

The construction of a nation-state from the variety of nationalities within a territory need not be permanent. Regional cultures, attended to by poets and philologists, help preserve (or even create) the memories of national glory. These memories can be mobilized, Peter Gourevitch argues, when the regional bourgeoisie in industrialized capitalist societies exhibits economic dynamism while the political center experiences economic decline.[6] Under these conditions, the bourgeoisie will want

[2] David D. Laitin, "The National Uprisings in the Soviet Union," *World Politics* 44, no. 1 (1991): 139–77. This key variable was recognized by Rupert Emerson; see his *From Empire to Nation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 44–47. The variable is embedded in a model that relies on the dynamic approach toward nations developed by Karl Deutsch—see his *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1953)—but is more sensitive to the expected utility of elites and their choices. Ernest Gellner also used a variant of this model in his *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). I compare his model with mine in Chapter 9. Gary B. Miles relies heavily on a model of elite expected utility in his "Roman and Modern Imperialism: A Reassessment," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 32, no. 4 (1990): 638–40.

[3] My concept of most favored lord is borrowed from the notion of most favored nation in international trade negotiations. Many of the states given most-favored-nation status are not themselves nations; similarly, many of the incorporated elites were not lords.

[4] The most sophisticated elaboration of this pattern, without the focus on "most-favored-lord" being a necessary condition for success, is in Abram de Swaan, *In Care of the State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), chap. 3.

[5] Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976).

[6] Peter Gourevitch, *Paris and the Provinces* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), chap. 10. Before a peripheral nationalist movement can mobilize, the people of its region must see

rapid changes in tariff policies, capital markets, and corporate laws—changes that will not strike a responsive chord at the center. The regional bourgeoisie will patronize and promote the national poets and philologists, as their symbols will help mobilize the rural folk, who, in seeing a new recognition of folk culture, will suddenly find themselves having common ground with the bourgeoisie. Although the rural populations will not be concerned about capital markets, they will see regional independence as a way to protect their communities from "foreign" encroachment.[7] Nationalism is an ideology—infused as it is with symbols of language and religion, and reinforced through common folk rituals—that can forge a peasant and bourgeois alliance. From such an alliance may spring national revivals in economically dynamic but politically peripheral regions. Leaders of such movements often dream of national separation from the consolidated state.

Political movements seeking regional sovereignty in the most-favored-lord peripheral regions of modern states have achieved considerable successes in our democratic age. Canada, Belgium, Spain, and even France have yielded autonomy to their regions in several policy domains. The willingness of the political center to be responsive to the appeals from the regions has, however, exposed deep tensions within the elites of the newly revived nations. Those members of the peripheral elites who fully assimilated into the culture and society of the center—that is, those who took advantage of their most-favored-lord status—saw the nationalist symbols of the revival as antiquated and provincial. Unable to compete in the language of their own ancestors, they feared the consequences of the full realization of their national dream. Symbolic nationalism would have sufficed for them. The most bitter tensions of national revival under conditions of previous incorporation through most-favored-lord status have thus been the tensions *within* the new national elites.[8] In the cases of revival politics in Western democracies in the 1970s, the apparently rapid movement toward full independence was slowed, not so much by central resistance, as by the conflict of interest within each of the national elites.[9]

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themselves as having a distinct identity. Gourevitch does not speculate on how ethnic identities are seen to be distinct. Without independent criteria of ethnic difference (very difficult to establish, given the multiple possibilities of ethnic reidentification), Gourevitch's theory tends toward tautology. In Laitin, "National Uprisings," I suggest a way to avoid this move.

[7] Rural populations in Catalonia, for example, blamed Madrid for extortionate taxes and for forcing them to billet troops. When "Spain" was in trouble in the seventeenth century and in need of new taxes, rural folk in the peripheries saw local nobles as potentially more benign than those at the center. J. H. Elliott, *The Revolt of the Catalans* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963). The Catalan national revivals in the 1920s and 1970s also relied on an alliance between the rural folk and the rising bourgeoisie.

[8] This is the argument in my study of the Catalan revival in Spain: see Laitin, "Linguistic Revival: Politics and Culture in Catalonia," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 31, no. 2 (1989): 297–317.

[9] Hudson Meadwell, "A Rational Choice Approach to Political Regionalism," *Comparative Politics* 23, no. 4 (1991): 401–21. His discussion of national revival politics in Brittany is a sophisticated analysis of the internal dynamics of nationalism among elites from the periphery. I do not wish to imply that these tensions are invariably unresolvable. Note the division of the Jura into two cantons, one French and one German, in Switzerland, or the velvet divorce in Czechoslovakia. I only suggest that the internal conflicts of separating groups are often neglected in analyses of regional movements.

This situation of ethnic difference crossed with economic dynamism is not, as Gourevitch recognizes, the only route to national revival.[10] Suppose, for example, that in the period of political incorporation, elites from the region do not receive most-favored-lord status, as was the fate of Indian and African royalty during the era of European expansion. This is the standard "colonial" model of expansion. Control from the center requires mediators from the elite strata of the "titular" nationality. Native elites serving as mediators between the center and their own masses garner rich payoffs. Many will be co-opted for sure; but even so they will not be able to translate their economic rewards into social status at the center. Suppose those elites who learn the language of the political center, and even convert to its religion, still face status deprivation and are not accepted as elites with a status similar to those who trace their ancestry to the culture of the ruling classes. Under these conditions, the most ambitious and powerful members of the periphery will operate with an eye to their homeland, rather than to the state that controls it. Economic dynamism is constrained under these conditions because indigenous elites tend to suppress the activities of entrepreneurs whose economic successes might challenge their status in society. And without economic dynamism, the logic of Gourevitch's model will not hold.

National independence movements have a distinct development path when they arise in the wake of political incorporation that has been achieved without granting elites most-favored-lord status. In these cases, younger generations of subject nationalities, educated in the schools built by the political center, face many barriers to mobility: the ruling native elites have no incentive to turn over power across generations; and by definition the opportunities at the center are equally constrained. The idea of full political independence becomes attractive to these "new men," who feel blocked by the center and by their fathers' generation as well. Independence, however, would give them access to all sensitive jobs currently held by nationals from the center, and this would benefit both the older and the younger generation. The strategy for seeking sovereignty has a political twist—it places the co-opted native elites in a bind. On the one hand, the status quo protects their welfare; on the other hand, they cannot let themselves be seen as opponents of independence—that would cost them their credibility as the "natural" leaders of the region. They are therefore compelled to support, albeit unenthusiastically, a national-independence coalition with the "new men," with the goal of full national sovereignty.

Pressure by the "new men" is not the only possible motor that will propel a movement for national sovereignty in a subject territory. The lower strata of these societies pay heavily for having to rely on their elites for any communication with the political center: they will have uncountable grievances about the corruption of their leadership and their own inability to communicate directly with political authority. Furthermore, they will surely take note of neighboring regions or countries

[10] Gourevitch, *Paris and the Provinces*, pp. 209–10, points to Ireland as the principal exception to his model for Western Europe but provides a rather ad hoc account for this exception. The elite-incorporation model proposed here (see Laitin, "National Uprisings," for a fuller statement) provides a theoretical account of cases such as Ireland.

that are mobilized into national action: nationalism is "contagious" in this situation. And once the lower strata are mobilized, the titular rulers, in fear of being supplanted by the new men, find themselves leading the movement for national sovereignty.

Whichever the motor, the new men or contagion—the ensuing national independence movement will follow a script different from that of the national uprisings in areas where elites "enjoyed" most-favored-lord status. Here, the alliance between the established titular elites and the new men (or the mobilized lower strata) must rely on notions of cultural distance from the center, a belief that they represent (in Michael Doyle's words, setting the criterion for imperialist as opposed to state-building expansion) "another political society."[11] This alliance will muzzle the antagonisms between social strata within the periphery for the duration of the struggle. (These will reappear after independence, though.)

There is a concomitant conflict associated with nationalist movements of this type: that between the "authentic" nationals of the periphery and minority populations. An exclusivist nationalist ideology will be attractive to the new men and the lower strata of the dominant nationality group in the periphery—in the Soviet world, all those who were called titulars. The potentially oppressed minority peoples will likely see continued rule by the center as their only chance for a better life. Since the national cause is built on the indignities suffered by the authentic cultural group, nonmembers who live within its designated boundaries become forgotten people—or worse, they will face discrimination. Since non-most-favored-lord situations offer few incentives for minority groups within the territory to assimilate into the larger groups, central rulers, in an attempt to co-opt minorities, often appoint them to subaltern positions. For this reason, peripheral regions tend to remain multiethnic. The titular groups, especially the new men seeking social mobility, will have an incentive to exclude minorities from government jobs. The hidden struggle for independence in regions that were incorporated without receiving most-favored-lord status is therefore the one between the titular nationals and minority peoples.

Three Contexts of State Expansion

At the twilight of tsarist rule, considerable demographic differences between Ukraine, the Baltics, and Kazakhstan were apparent. Consider Table 3.1, culled from material in Robert J. Kaiser's *Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR*.[12] On indicators of literacy, education, concentration of titulars, and Russian settlement, three distinct patterns are clear. In 1897, literacy rates in the Baltics were on the order of three times that of Russia. Meanwhile literacy in Russia was about three-and-a-half times that of Kazakhstan. Literacy in the Russian heartland

[11] Michael Doyle, *Empires* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986).

[12] Robert J. Kaiser, *The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

Table 3.1. Demographic differences across republics (percent)

	Kazakhstan	Estonia	Latvia	Ukraine	Russia
Literacy in 1897	8.1	96.2	79.7	27.9	29.6
Russians in republic, 1917	20.5	2.8	6.7	9.9	
Number of students per 1,000 aged 10–19, 1911	104.3[a]	390.8[b]	390.8[c]	232.1[d]	290.2[e]
Concentration of titulars in their republic, 1959	77.2	90.3	92.7	86.3	

[a] Data from the north only.

[b] Data generalized for the three Baltic republics.

[c] Data generalized for the three Baltic republics.

[d] Data represent the mean value of separate figures provided for Novorossiia, Left Bank and Right Bank.

[e] Data from central industrial region only.

Source: Robert J. Kaiser, *The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), tables 3.6, 3.2, 2.9, and 4.1.

and Ukraine were about the same. As for education, now in 1911, the Baltic states had far greater percentage of the school-aged population enrolled in school than Russia did. North Kazakhstan (and here we are mainly talking about the colonists; the figure would be far less if all of Kazakhstan were counted, or if only Kazakhs had been counted) had far less. The figure for Ukraine is again comparable with that of Russia. On the issue of Russian settlers in the imperial periphery, the percentages are quite low in the Baltics, very high in Kazakhstan, and near the mean in Ukraine.

Ukraine represents the classic most-favored-lord model. In Ukraine ambitious titular elites were able, with minimal transition costs, to cultivate career ambitions in both Ukraine and Russia. In 1785 the tsar's "Charter to the Nobility" exempted Ukrainian nobles from all government and military service. The Cossack ruling body, the Hetmanate, invented a noble tradition and created ex nihilo a Society of Notable Military Fellows. Thousands of Ukrainian petty officers and wealthier Cossacks took advantage of a period of uncertainty and their ability to forge documents to claim and be awarded noble status. Consequently, as most favored lords, members of the Ukrainian elite obtained posts not only in the imperial administration of the former Hetmanate, but also in the recently acquired Crimean lands and even in Georgia. In this period, many Ukrainian nobles abandoned their colorful Cossack dress, began to speak Russian and French, and accepted the Russian church hierarchy.

The Soviet period, albeit with one long relapse, told a similar story for Ukraine. In the *korenizatsiia* period, Ukrainians flourished in an era of expanding opportunities, both in Ukraine and elsewhere in the Soviet Union. But this closed up in the famine and repression of the 1930s, and after 1938, there were no Ukrainians in the Politburo. Yet by 1954, with the 300th anniversary of the Russian-Ukrainian reunion, Ukrainians were elevated to "junior elder brothers" in relationship to the

lesser nationalities, and data from Seweryn Bialer show that they received more top jobs at the Soviet center than any other non-Russian nationality group.[13]

The incorporation of Ukraine on equal terms with the center was an easy political task. Not only are the languages quite similar, but the level of social development, as we saw in Table 3.1, was similar as well. A strategy of co-opting Ukrainians into central organs of power would not be threatening to Russian bureaucrats. Furthermore, a policy of co-optation would be attractive to many educated Ukrainians, especially those in the east. If they developed literacy in the hegemonic Slavic language, they could be core members of a vast state apparatus. As Soviet ethnologist Iu. V. Bromlei has pointed out in regard to the Soviet era, it was quite expensive to prepare "national cadres" to lead development outside Russia and Ukraine.[14] With 7.9 million Ukrainians living in the Russian republic (according to the 1926 census) who were largely russified in language, and many millions of Ukrainians in the east of their republic treating the Ukrainian language as a "hick" dialect of Russian (locally called *khokhol*, a term of derision, evidently used by russified Ukrainians), co-optation had very low costs. Furthermore, as waves of rural Ukrainians urbanized in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, their children abandoned the peasant dialects spoken at home, and most became "Russian" in language.[15] Rather than see Ukraine as Besançon did, as analogous to a province in the Austrian empire, I see it as the exemplary case of most favored lord and therefore closer to the model of Languedoc and France.

Kazakhstan represents the classic "colonial" model, where elite ambitions could only be fulfilled as subalterns under Russian surveillance within the titular republic. In the subaltern pattern, the ladder of ambition can only be realistically climbed within the republic, and even there at substantial cost. To achieve high positions within the republic required learning the language and bureaucratic norms of the center. The benefits, however, were greater still, since the prospects of mobility in colonial society were extremely high compared to that of nomadic life in Kazakhstan. Mediating between Russian authority and Kazakh society brought rewards

[13] See Seweryn Bialer's data on Ukrainians holding high all-Union positions in the 1970s, in *Stalin's Successors* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 219, 223–24. The classic study of the recruitment of Ukrainians in Soviet political structures is that of John Armstrong, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite* (New York: Praeger, 1959). This discussion also relies on material from Frederick Barghoorn, *Soviet Russian Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 52–57. He cites John S. Reshetar Jr., "National Deviation in the Soviet Union," *American Slavic and East European Review* 12 (April 1953): 173. Kolstø, in a personal communication, suggests that western Ukraine (where I did not collect data) did not experience any sort of most-favored-lord advantage under Soviet rule. It was ruled in "integral" style, very much like the Baltics. I address some of the implications of this regional difference in Chapter 13. For the best study on regional differences, see Dominique Arel, "Language and the Politics of Ethnicity: The Case of Ukraine" (Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 1994).

[14] Iu. V. Bromlei, *Natsional'nye protsessy v SSSR: v poiskakh novykh podkhodov* (Moscow: Nauka, 1988), p. 60

[15] George Liber, *The Urban Harvest: Ethnic Policy, Legitimization, and the Unintended Consequences of Social Change in the Ukrainian SSR, 1923–33* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1992), provides data on early rural-urban migration and its social consequences as background for this period.

for incorporated Kazakh elites; but their prospects for positions in Moscow in tsarist times were negligible. In the Soviet period, rewards for co-optation were perhaps higher than in tsarist times, in part because it was not the case that Kazakh subalterns were submissive agents of Russian principals. Kazakh leaders such as D. A. Kunaev—as first secretary of the Party and member of the Politburo—attained great autonomy to take care of his own horde in Kazakhstan (while ruling with impunity over the competing hordes) and not inconsiderable power at the center as well. When Gorbachev tried to replace him with a Russian in 1986, there were riots in Almaty, and Gorbachev quickly abandoned his policy of the "interrepublic exchange of cadres." Within three years a Kazakh, Nursultan Nazarbaev, was appointed first secretary, and he achieved great power and wealth. Despite the great benefits for becoming subalterns, Kazakh elites were not really taken seriously in Moscow circles. Perhaps the most telling evidence of this is the fact that in the wake of the Soviet collapse, Russian president Yeltsin did not even invite Nazarbaev to the founding meeting of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Leading Kazakhs had considerable distributive authority within their republic but remained outside the corridors of Soviet power.

Thus the incorporation of Kazakhstan was very different from that of Ukraine. Few Kazakhs had the education qualifying them for positions of central authority. And the cultural differences between Russians and Kazakhs raised considerably the costs of accepting Kazakhs as equals in Moscow ministries. Here Besançon's analogy with the British empire is apt, but given the developmental differences and high rates of colonial settlement (a variety of non-Muslim nationalities including Russians, Belarusans, Ukrainians, and Jews settling in a Muslim area), perhaps France and Algeria (with French, Portuguese, Greeks, and Jews as colonists) is closer to the mark. Kazakhstan's incorporation followed, in the terms of the elite-incorporation model, the "colonial" pattern of state expansion.

Estonia and Latvia represent a unique historical form, not recognized in Besançon's categories. In the early eighteenth century Russia ruled those states indirectly through a German aristocratic elite. While in the nineteenth century small segments of the Estonian and Latvian population converted to Orthodoxy and learned Russian in the hope of displacing their German overlords in service to the tsar, it was generally the case that the Balts converted to Lutheranism and learned German in order to achieve social mobility.[16] Social intercourse between Russians and Balts in the imperial period was therefore minimal. In the interwar period, with independence, full social mobility was possible for Balts without any need to learn a foreign language or convert to a foreign religion. After the war, now under Soviet rule, but legally recognized in the West as independent states, Baltic titular elites (except in those rare cases of Russian-born Balts who participated in the Revolution) had little need for Russia. Their levels of education and literacy were far higher than those in Russia itself. One can see the results of this in Table 3.1. Few titulars could be induced to move elsewhere in the Union. Bureaucratic practice was largely institutionalized

[16] Edward C. Thaden, "The Russian Government," in Edward C. Thaden, ed., *Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855–1914* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 75.

in the titular languages. The Russian rulers of the Baltic periphery had to adapt to the peripheral culture rather than the other way around. Not only were Estonian and Latvian elites fully capable of running their own republics; because those who experienced freedom in the independent republics were never trusted by Soviet elites, they could not aspire to high appointments in the *nomenklatura*. Victor Zaslavsky, relying on a theoretical notion developed by Raymond Breton, claims that under Soviet rule, the Baltics achieved "institutional completeness." By this he means that each of the Baltic republics developed parallel set of institutions for indigenous and Russian speakers with little communication across the language divide. It was fully possible for Balts to experience a complete cultural, professional, and social life without entering into the Russian (or Soviet) world.[17] This notion of institutional completeness parallels what I have called the integralist model of political incorporation. Or to put it differently, the expanding state was unable to undermine the cultural integrity of its conquered people on its periphery. If Languedoc is the model for Ukraine and Algeria that for Kazakhstan, then perhaps Germany into Alsace is a reasonable analogy for the Baltics. While Alsatians certainly have had a long-standing claim for cultural autonomy, they considered German rule to be culturally demeaning; identification (as with the Balts to Germany or Scandinavia) with the West (i.e., France for most Alsatians) was more suitable.

Soviet Nationality Policies

Soviet nationality policies were deeply contradictory. On the one hand, reflecting a centralizing—difference denying—mentality,[18] the ultimate in political *hubris*, all Union republics were treated as if they were the same. On the other hand, Soviet cadre policy reified and extended the three patterns of incorporation that I just identified.

The Denial of Difference

In three crucial respects, Soviet policy sought to incorporate all Union republics on the same terms. First, as I indicated in Chapter 2, Bolshevik authorities after the civil war began to reject the goal of full assimilation of any nationality, and all non-Russians were to be returned to, or nurtured by, their roots, in a policy that came to be called *korenizatsiia*. The "Piedmont principle" and the fear of pan-Turkism led in this period to the near total rejection by Soviet authorities of the right to assimilate.

[17] Victor Zaslavsky, "The Evolution of Separatism in Soviet Society under Gorbachev," in Gail W. Lapidus et al., eds., *From Union to Commonwealth: Nationalism and Separatism in the Soviet Republics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 73. See also Raymond Breton, "Institutional Completeness of Ethnic Communities and the Personal Relations of Immigrants," *American Journal of Sociology* 70 (1964): 193–205.

[18] The literature on the history of Soviet nationalities policy is vast. In my judgment, the research of Terry Martin, "The Soviet Nationalities Policy, 1923–1938" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1996), based on recently opened archives, is now the authoritative source.

The wishes of the populations in these territories, should they have aspired to assimilation, were ignored. This policy, serving a foreign policy interest to the west, and an internal security interest in the Turkic regions, came to be generalized for the entire Union. Every nationality would have its own "Piedmont." Stalin waxed about this opportunity in his "Marxism and the National Question" as a "flowering" of nations. The results were impressive: Ukrainians living in Kazakhstan, who had been going to "European" schools (with Russian as the medium of instruction) would now be educated in Ukrainian by people who had voluntarily left Ukraine to support the flowering program. In the Mari Autonomous Oblast, 20 percent of the population who lived in the mountains spoke a different dialect from the meadow Maris. In 1932 central Soviet authorities, to the shock of the Mari oblast leadership, declared the mountain Mari to be a new nation, deserving its own national ***raion*** (district). Central authorities, now to the deep chagrin of Georgian leadership, sought (but this time unsuccessfully) to declare the Mingrelians a separate nation, though Georgian permission was required for the publication of educational material in that language.[19] In these first two decades of Soviet rule, assimilation was impermissible, and all nationalities merited recognition. The nationality scene in the Soviet Union altered substantially later; but the antipathy toward assimilation has left an enduring imprint.

In a second general pattern in Soviet nationalities policies, even after the collapse of ***korenizatsiia*** in the mid-1930s, national cultures were subsidized not according to their social, demographic, or economic situations but rather according to their place on the territorial hierarchy. Thus all Union republic titular nationalities were to be treated similarly. Data on party membership in 1970 show the percentage of party members of the five titular nationality groups analyzed in this book (Russians, Kazakhs, Estonians, Latvians, and Ukrainians) as a percentage of high-school graduates ranges from nineteen to twenty-six, reflecting Herculean efforts to give every Union republic nationality group equal representation in formal party structures.[20] Following also from this principle, titulars in Union republics had greater national rights than those in autonomous republics (ASSRs), who themselves had greater rights than those in autonomous oblasts (AOs), who had greater rights than those in autonomous okrugs (ADs), who had greater rights than recognized indigenous nationalities without territorial recognition. For example, Anderson and Silver looked at the average highest grade with the titular language used as a subject of study in 1981–85. At the Union republic level it was 10.0; at the ASSR level it was 8.9; at the AO level it was 7.4; at the AD level it was 1.9; and for the nonterritorialized nations, it was 0.4.[21] The hierarchy is reproduced in almost all domains of social, economic, and political life. Given these data, it is not surprising that sover-

[19] Martin, "Soviet Nationalities Policy," chap. 4.

[20] Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union Is Governed* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 352.

[21] Barbara A. Anderson and Brian D. Silver, "Some Factors in the Linguistic and Ethnic Russification of Soviet Nationalities: Is Everyone Becoming Russian?" in Lubomyr Hajda and Mark Beissinger, eds., *The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and Society* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990), p. 105.

eignty was won in the post-Soviet collapse only by the Union republics, and for all of them. Furthermore, this centralized hierarchalization of national rights meant that Estonia and Latvia, even though they were not part of the Soviet Union during the *korenizatsiia* period, shared the same rights, resources, and privileges as did Ukraine and Kazakhstan, since all were Union republics.

Third, and crucial for this book's concerns, Russians outside of the RSFSR were protected from coming to terms with their "minority" status. After the retreat from *korenizatsiia*, Soviet authorities worked unremittingly to cultivate a Russian cultural presence in all the Union republics. No titular nationality had the right to speak in the name of its people who were living in another Soviet republic. But the Soviet Union could speak for Russians outside the RSFSR. Russians in other republics beyond the RSFSR would no longer be called "minorities" as they had been during the *korenizatsiia* period when they were classified with all nontitulars, each having rights to connect with their cultural roots.[22] In consequence, the RSFSR could never represent the Russian nation, and unlike all other republics, there was never an RSFSR Communist Party. Only the Soviet Union could speak in the name of a Russian national interest. Tatars in Bashkortostan, Ossetians in Georgia, and Ukrainians in Kazakhstan all knew themselves to be, in an important sense, minorities. But for Russians in non-RSFSR republics, minority status was unnecessary; they were a plurality in the Soviet Union. These Russsians, as we shall see, were the quintessential new Soviet men and women.

The totalitarian ambitions of Soviet rule therefore provided an impressively similar climate for all Russians living in the Union republics. A Russian manager in Kazakhstan who was transferred to Estonia would have available to her a flat with perhaps the exact room layout as the one she left. The radio station would be on the same frequency. The educational curriculum for her child would be the same. The costlessness of transferring schools is truly impressive: an Estonian who had traveled to many places in the Soviet Union said he could find the office of the director in every technical college with his eyes closed. All such schools shared the same architectural design.

Survey results demonstrate that Russians in all republics were able to and in fact did live in separate enclaves.[23] In these post-Soviet surveys, Russian respondents in the four republics reported on the level of cultural mixing with the titular nationalities (see Table 3.2 for the similarities). The five rows represent distinct indexes on internationality mixing. These indexes reflect the degree of mixing in friendship, in marriage, and in language use.[24] As can be seen from the table, the scores on cosmopolitanism, Russian-titular mixing, and language mixing are quite low, reflecting

[22] Martin, "Soviet Nationalities Policy," pp. 921–22, writes that in 1926 Russians were treated as "national minorities" in Central Asia, but after 1933, the term was not often used, and in 1937 it disappeared, along with "Russian national soviets," as these organizations were not sufficiently dignified. Russians, according to contemporary Soviet records, should "no longer feel like minorities anywhere in the Soviet Union."

[23] These surveys were conducted in collaboration with Jerry Hough. Subsequently, they will be referred to as the "Laitin/Hough surveys." Details about the surveys and information on access to the data for purposes of replication are available in the Methodological Appendix.

[24] For the full specification of the indexes, see the Methodological Appendix.

Table 3.2. Common situation of Russians in the four republics

Index	Kazakhstan	Estonia	Latvia	Ukraine
Cosmopolitanism (probability that close family and friends are of different nationality from respondent)	.169	.150	.234	.278
Russian-titular mix (probability that close family and friends are of the titular nationality)	.036	.048	.094	.253
Language-use homogeneity (probability that respondent speaks his or her native language with family members, at work, and with best friend)	.881	.850	.786	.893
Language mixing (probability that respondent mixes language with close family and friends)	.019	.065	.094	.036
Linguistic homogeneity of family (probability that respondent's family all have same first language)	.863	.847	.786	.832

Note: All figures are mean scores for respondents who claimed Russian nationality in the Laitin/Hough surveys. All indices are scaled from 0 to 1. For rows 1, 2, and 4, a 0 reflects absolute Russian homogeneity; for rows 3 and 5, a 1 represents absolute homogeneity.

low levels of internationality mixing, whereas the scores on language homogeneity, within family and for general use, are quite high. Only in Ukraine do the scores suggest moderate degrees of mixing; but it should be emphasized that these data represent only two cities, one in eastern, the other in central Ukraine, neither having an insular Ukrainian-speaking population. But since all the data are from urban areas, where mixing might be considered most likely, it is reasonable to conclude from these data that in the four republics, Russians and titulars lived in separate social worlds, with no significant differences based upon mode of elite incorporation.

Differing Recruitment Practices

The impressive similarity of situation of Russians throughout the four former Union republics, despite the vast differences in the imperial challenges, needs to be kept firmly in mind. Nonetheless, the realities of difference—levels of social and economic development, degrees of cultural similarity with Russians, degree of rootedness of the Russian settlers, and previous experiences of sovereignty in the Baltics and western Ukraine—had a discernible impact on the experience of Russians and titulars in the Union republics. Here, the elite-incorporation perspective helps delineate those differences, and we can see clearly the impact of the three patterns of elite incorporation even under centralizing Soviet rule.

Both the most-favored-lord and the colonial models, in contrast to the integralist model, gave high incentives for ambitious titulars to adopt many aspects of Soviet culture. In Ukraine, one motivation for titulars to learn Russian (a major element of Soviet culture) was to become Soviet officials, transferable to any region within a

vast state apparatus. The Soviets eliminated virtually all opportunities in east and central Ukraine for education in Ukrainian; yet there is little indication of hostility against this policy among Ukrainians. Furthermore, learning Russian for a Ukrainian, especially an east Ukrainian, was inexpensive, since the languages are similar and the territories are contiguous. Low cost and moderate rewards assured high rates of assimilation. For Kazakhs, the motivation to learn Russian was to become, in Abram de Swaan's formulation, "monopoly mediators" standing between Russian rule at the center and Kazakh society in the periphery.[25] Those who learned Russian and developed other forms of cultural capital enabling them to earn the trust of Soviet officials were not only able to get higher education (unavailable in Kazakh) but were also able to advance to positions of local or regional authority. They were rewarded for their efforts at indirect rule—that is, assuring compliance and political quiescence among "their" people, while following guidelines set by (Russian, or sometimes Ukrainian) second secretaries, who themselves had direct access to all-Union hierarchies in Moscow. With ambitious titulars in Ukraine and Kazakhstan rushing to invest in cultural capital as Russians, there was little incentive for Russians working in these republics to accommodate at all to local mores. Assimilation into republican society was seen as either unnecessary (in Ukraine) or absurd (in Kazakhstan).

In the integral regions, by contrast, ambitious titulars had fewer incentives to accommodate themselves to Russian culture and norms. To be sure, as in the case with Kazakhstan, second secretaries in Estonia and Latvia were at first monolingual Russian speakers; however, nearly all of them were russianized Balts—that is to say, Balts born in Russia who had not lived under sovereign republican rule during the interwar years, and who had participated in or shown sympathy with the Revolution. These russianized Balts, over the course of the 1950s, assiduously studied the languages of their ancestors and maneuvered within the Leninist framework to indigenize administrative and managerial practice. The result of widespread indigenization of political authority was that in both Estonia and Latvia, higher education, government directives, intraregional memoranda, and high party gossip all relied far more on the indigenous language than was the case in Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The indigenization of high officialdom in the Baltics helped close titular networks from any incentives to develop social ties with Russians. Meanwhile, at least relative to the titulars (and more so in styles of living than language) the Russians in the Baltic states made greater efforts to adapt to local culture than they made in other republics.

Data on elite recruitment support this claim that despite the centralizing goals of the Soviet state, there were clear republican differences in practice. Consider the data (published in Kolstoe) in Table 3.3. Ukrainians captured the highest percentage of all-Soviet positions in their republic, with the Kazakhs capturing the fewest. The Baltic republics come very close to Ukraine, and although they had fewer members in the Central Committee Secretariat, they had full control over the position of the Capital Gorkom secretary. Estonia also did better than Ukraine in getting positions

[25] Abram de Swaan, *In Care of the State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), chap. 3.

Table 3.3. Russian occupancy of leading positions in four Union republics, 1955–1977

Position	Kazakhstan	Estonia	Latvia	Ukraine
Central Committee Secretariat	29.5	79.2	91.7	100
First secretary	33*	100	100	100
Organizational secretary	0	75	50	100
Agricultural secretary	40	0	100	67
Capital gorkom secretary	0	100	100	50
Trade union chairman	100	100	100	100
Komsomol first secretary	67	100	100	100
KGB chairman	25	50	50	100
Member of Presidium, Council of Ministers	48.8	94.4	75.7	86.7
Chairman, Council of Ministers	100	100	100	100

*In Kazakhstan two Russians served as first secretary for a total of about five years, and the one Kazakh for the remaining seventeen. It is therefore not very useful to think of this figure as far lower than the comparable figures for the other republics. Jerry Hough provided me with this insight.

Source: Paul Kolstoe, *Russians in the Former Soviet Republics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), p. 94.

on the Presidium's Council of Ministers. In general, Ukrainian communists were the most-favored-republican-lords in the four republics, while Kazakhs were the least-favored. The Baltic titular communists were in an intermediate position. Other data presented by Paul Kolstoe show that Russians in the Baltics did far better than Russians in Ukraine or Kazakhstan in getting jobs in administrative and production sectors; but the Baltic Russians did far worse than their counterparts in Ukraine and Kazakhstan in getting positions in the sciences and the arts.[26] Control over intellectual life (and loss of it in administrative control) captures some of what I have meant by integralist incorporation. In the Baltics, the Russians were never the accepted *intelligentsiia*.

Data from the Soviet period on cadres moving into important roles outside their republics—the real incentive for the most-favored-lord model—also support the three-part elite-incorporation model. It should be emphasized at the outset, however, that movement from republican to all-Union circles throughout the Soviet period was quite low, and a leading student of quantitative measures of cadre selection, Grey Hodnett, did not even quantify movement from republican positions to all-Union ones, since the phenomenon was so rare. Rather, he relied on providing the few outstanding examples.[27] On data concerning transfers from the republics to positions in RSFSR (which were assumed to be promotions, often involving moves to Moscow) and to ambassadorships, less than ten percent of all transfers were to positions in another republic or abroad. Hodnett concludes from this that "there are no . . . career based incentives for republic leaders to concern themselves with the interest of several national republics."[28] This implies that the logic of "most

[26] Paul Kolstoe, *Russians in the Former Soviet Republics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 96.

[27] Grey Hodnett, *Leadership in the Soviet National Republics* (Oakville, Ont.: Mosaic Press, 1978), pp. 5 and 49–50n.

[28] Ibid., p. 306.

favored lord" doesn't carry all that much weight in the career planning of republican cadres. Yet, as the data show, to the extent there were incentives for career planning, they are consistent with the three models of elite incorporation that I have outlined.

Table 3.4 provides the data on elite positions in the Center that went to republican elites, and elite positions in the republics that went to nationals. The first two rows show the considerable number of Ukrainian elites who held key positions in the Soviet Politburo; on this dimension, Kazakhstan comes in second place. Estonians and Latvians played almost no role at this level of great symbolic importance, though Latvians did get some representation.[29] We can surmise, from data on the third row, that the Kazakh presence on the Politburo was largely symbolic. Here, I took Hodnett's data on all transfers out of the republic (that is, of the 9.8 percent of all transfers that went outside the republic) and subtracted the percentage of native cadres from non-native cadres. A high negative number reflects the much greater probability of natives getting promoted out of the republic than non-natives. Again, Ukraine is the "most-favored" republic. Here the position of the Baltics and Kazakhstan is reversed. Kazakhs, it seems, can be put into high symbolic positions, but hard-nosed administrative positions (which Hodnett's data capture) elude them. For the Baltics, natives do about as well as non-natives among the low number of transfers.

The data on rows 4 and 5, showing the percentage of natives in all leading jobs within each republic, and then on jobs concerned with personnel (which Hodnett says requires a very high level of trust), again show the supremacy of Ukraine. The Baltics are a close second on this dimension, after Ukraine. Kazakhstan is a distant fourth, a reflection of its near-colonial status within the Soviet regime. The final two rows, which reflect a degree of autonomy within the republics, give an indication of why I refer to the Baltic relationship with the USSR as "integral." The Balts have almost complete control over their scientific apparatuses, with Ukraine in third place and Kazakhstan once again a distant fourth.

The data on Table 3.4 show that Ukrainians in the Soviet period had comparatively good access to positions in Russian and Soviet structures.[30] Ukraine is therefore best categorized as a most-favored-lord republic. Kazakhstan received strong symbolic representation in the Soviet system, but its cadres played virtually no role in mid-level structural jobs in the RSFSR; nor did they play much of a role in technical and scientific roles in their own republic. Kazakhstan reflects a typical colonial

[29] For Latvians born in Russia who served key roles in the Latvian Communist Party (LKP), central roles in Moscow were not out of the question. Boris Pugo became head of the Party Control Commission in Moscow. Arvīds Pelše joined the CPSU Politburo. Augusts Voss became chair of the Committee of Nationalities of the USSR's Supreme Soviet. But I know of no Latvians born in Latvia who in Soviet times became "favored lords." See Andrejs Plakans, *The Latvians* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1995), chaps. 8–9. Jerry Hough, in a personal communication, suggests that in the Brezhnev era, young Latvians were beginning to secure prized all-Union positions. In Estonia, elite mobility into Russian circles in Russia was apparently even rarer.

[30] Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin's Successors* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 223–24, gives abundant examples in support of this claim. John Armstrong, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite* (New York: Praeger, 1959), pp. 91–92, notes that nationality has little effect on the career prospects of newspaper editors.

Table 3.4. Most favored lord: Evidence from the Soviet period

	Ukraine	Estonia	Latvia	Kazakhstan
Full members of Politburo	37	0	0	14
Candidate members of Politburo	47	0	3	6
Percentage of native cadres subtracted from percentage of non-native cadres transferred to administrative positions outside the republic	-8.8	-3.4	3.0	9.3
Native occupancy, all leading jobs, 1955–72 (percent)	85.3	83.7	81.5	46.6
Native occupancy, jobs related to personnel, 1955–72 (percent)	83.5	37.5	60.5	6.7
Non-Russian scientific workers, 1960 (percent)	48.3	78.9	65.4	21.4
Non-Russian scientific workers, 1973 (percent)	50.6	85.3	56.1	29.8

Sources: Donna Bahry, *Outside Moscow* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 28; Grey Hodnett, *Leadership in the Soviet National Republics* (Oakville, Ont.: Mosaic Press, 1978), pp. 309, 103, 108; Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin's Successors* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 216.

model. The Baltics lie somewhere in between. They had virtually no role in Soviet affairs (although Latvia had some key actors on the high-visibility Soviet political stage); but their dominance within their region, in technical positions and in the scientific establishment, suggest that in the nonpolitical technical fields, they were nearly autonomous republics within a gigantic heterogeneous state. This is why I code them as "integral" republics. Despite, then, heroic attempts at centralization of rule and homogenization of bureaucratic practice, the Soviet regime replicated the pattern of elite incorporation that they inherited from the ancien régime. These differences had vital implications for Russian-titular social relations within each of the republics.

Elite Incorporation and Social Relations in the Four Republics

Most-Favored-Lord and Colonial Models versus the Integralist Model

The elite-incorporation model makes some similar predictions for the most-favored-lord and colonial republics. For both types, we should expect high incentives for titulars to develop cosmopolitan cultural practices—in the most-favored-lord case, in order to achieve mobility at the center, and in the colonial case, in order to serve as mediators between central rulers and their people. Meanwhile, in the integral republics, it would be the Russians who would have the greater incentive to develop cosmopolitan practices, since the titulars have sufficient autonomy to run their republics in their own cultural mode. This expected pattern, differentiating the most-favored-lord and colonial models from the integral model of incorporation, shows up on five indexes, most of which rely on language use as a proxy for national identification. Each of the indexes is a conglomerate of responses to the Laitin/

Hough mass urban survey. The first two indexes reflect patterns that go back into the Soviet period. Consider first Figure 3.1, "Linguistic Homogeneity of the Family," described earlier. Kazakhstan and Ukraine stand apart from the Baltics. In Kazakhstan and Ukraine, it is the Russian respondents who are relatively more linguistically homogeneous in their family networks. In the Baltics, on the other hand, the titular respondents were more likely to emphasize linguistic homogeneity at home than were the Russian respondents. Thus in the integralist model of state expansion in the Baltics, in the few cases of intermarriage, the titulars are more likely to report an all-titular linguistic home than the Russians are likely to report an all-Russian linguistic home. In Kazakhstan and Ukraine it is the Russians who are (slightly) more likely to emphasize linguistic homogeneity at home.

The second index provides data on bilingualism, and is reported on Figure 3.2. This index picks up on a five-point scale on reported fluency (I think in it; I speak it freely; I speak it with some difficulty; I speak it with great difficulty; I don't speak it at all) in the titular language for Russian respondents and Russian for the titular respondents. Because reported fluency is a very weak measure of actual fluency, on this index we add value to those respondents who have used the language as a medium of instruction in school, or who buy newspapers, watch TV, or read literature in the other language. A score of 1 is normalized to reflect the maximum level of bilingual ability possible; a score of 0 is normalized to reflect the minimum. The results here are extremely robust for the pattern elucidated in this section. In Kazakhstan and Ukraine, the titulars have higher bilingualism scores than do the Russians; in the Baltics the levels of bilingualism are more symmetric between the two nationalities.

The third index moves us to issues of language use and language-use homogeneity. The pattern reflected in the data on intermarriage and bilingualism holds. The results are portrayed on Figure 3.3. A score of 0 reflects using a language other than the one respondent declared as his or her native language for all reported relationships; a score of 1 reflects total use of one's native language in all dyadic relations to



Figure 3.1. Linguistic homogeneity of titular and Russian families in the four republics: Probabilities that respondent's mother, father, and first spouse have the same first language as the respondent



Figure 3.2. Bilingualism of titulars and Russians in the four republics: Mean bilingualism scores, from 0 (completely monolingual) to 1 (fully Russian-titular bilingual).

which the respondent gave an answer. As the data show, the titulars in Kazakhstan and Ukraine are the least homogeneous in their language use of any group. Meanwhile, the titulars in the Baltics are far more homogeneous than the titulars in Ukraine or Kazakhstan, though less so than the Russians in the Baltics, although these scores are quite close.

The fourth index reflecting this same pattern is that of "Language-Use Mixing," also described earlier. In Kazakhstan and Ukraine, titular respondents were far more mixed in their language use across relationships than were the Russians. In contrast, in the Baltics, while both groups were far less prone to mix than were the titulars in Ukraine and Kazakhstan, it was the Russian respondents who reported mixed use of language at higher rates than did the titulars. The comparative data on language mixing are presented on Figure 3.4.



Figure 3.3. Homogeneity of language use by titulars and Russians in the four republics: Mean scores (from 0 to 1) on the probability of using one's native language in a variety of home and work settings



Figure 3.4. Mixed use of language by titulars and Russians in the four republics: Probabilities (from 0 to 1) of mixing Russian and titular in normal conversations at home and at work

The final index, "Language and National Accommodation," takes us to attitudes about who should accommodate to whom in situations of societal multilingualism. Here we asked respondents about the language of street signs, controlled for degree of bilingualism of the respondent and the percentage of the respondent's nationality group in the locale of the interview. As we can see from Figure 3.5, Russians and titulars in both Kazakhstan and Ukraine were more or less equally accommodating to the needs of the other group. Meanwhile, in the Baltics, Russian respondents were far more accommodating linguistically than were their titular counterparts, who compared with the titulars in Ukraine and Kazakhstan, were remarkably unaccommodating linguistically.



Figure 3.5. Language and national accommodation of titulars and Russians in the four republics: Accommodative attitudes (normalized from 0 to 1) in regard to the appropriateness of street signs in the other language, controlling for the population mix of the city in which the interview took place

The elite-incorporation model predicts that in the most-favored-lord (Ukraine) and colonial (Kazakhstan) republics, titulars would be far more cosmopolitan and live in far more mixed cultural environments than would the Russians. Meanwhile, in the integralist (the Baltics) republics, the titulars would remain insular, and the dominant Russians would show greater cosmopolitanism than their compatriots in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. The survey data reported in this section confirm these expectations.

Most-Favored-Lord and Colonial Models Differentiated

The curvilinear relationship portrayed in Figures 3.1–3.5 is based on a claim that there are three distinct patterns based on rates of elite incorporation into positions of authority in the Soviet period: high in Ukraine, moderate in the Baltics, and low in Kazakhstan. The data on relative internationality accommodation are consistent with the hypothesis that the relationship between the rate of incorporation and the pattern of internationality accommodation is curvilinear. Titulars are relatively more accommodating than Russians at low and high levels of elite incorporation; while Russians are more accommodating than titulars at medium levels of elite incorporation. My reason for this, stated earlier, is that titulars in most-favored-lord republics and colonial republics have different incentives to learn Russian and accommodate to Russian rule—one for social mobility at the center, the other for mediation in the periphery. But an equally plausible interpretation is that the data reveal only two patterns, with some underlying variable differentiating Ukraine and Kazakhstan from Estonia and Lativa. This interpretation, however, is inconsistent with other data collected in the survey which show that relatively high titular accommodation in Ukraine and Kazakhstan occurs for different reasons, a conclusion that is in accord with the expectations of the elite-incorporation model.

Perhaps it is best to begin with a revealing similarity and difference between Ukraine and Kazakhstan on intergenerational shifts in the media of instruction at the kindergarten and elementary levels in the four republics. We asked respondents what the medium of instruction was for themselves at each level up the educational ladder, and the same question in regard to their first child. Standard accounts of Soviet education policy suggest that a generation ago (when most respondents were in kindergarten and elementary school) residues from the policy of ***korenizatsiia*** guided most students into schools where their native language was the medium of instruction; however, the 1958 Khrushchev educational reforms, which allowed for more parental "choice" in the language of instruction, signaled to many analysts that an inexorable shift toward Russian as the medium of instruction was about to begin. Given that the average respondent began secondary school in 1959, the theory of inexorable russification of education predicted that Russian respondents and their children would not report an intergenerational shift in the language of instruction but that titular respondents and their children would.

The data, portrayed on Table 3.5, reveal that intergenerational shift from the titular language to Russian among titulars was significant in both Kazakhstan and Ukraine, but inconsequential in the two Baltic countries. This reflects the initial

Table 3.5. Intergenerational shift in medium of instruction

	Kazakhstan	Estonia	Latvia	Ukraine
Kindergarten (titular)				
From titular to Russian	11.0	1.2	3.7	27.0
From Russian to titular	15.2	2.1	4.5	6.5
Kindergarten (Russian)				
From titular to Russian	0.2	1.8	2.0	1.3
From Russian to titular	0.6	7.5	5.6	5.5
Elementary (titular)				
From titular to Russian	14.7	2.4	2.4	32.8
From Russian to titular	11.1	2.0	0.8	5.2
Elementary (Russian)				
From titular to Russian	0.1	0.4	1.7	3.0
From Russian to titular	0.6	3.1	4.6	2.5

Note: Figures represent percentages of respondents whose medium of instruction at various levels was different from that of their first child. These were all urban samples.

Source: Laitin/Hough surveys.

pattern, that in both the most-favored-lord and the colonial republics, especially long after Khrushchev permitted "free choice," titular children moved into the Russian language stream. Meanwhile, in the integralist republics, the titulars continued to be educated in their own language.

Yet the data also reveal significant countertrends among titulars in Kazakhstan and Ukraine, from Russian to the titular language in the past generation. While the countertrends in Ukraine are rather small, the countertrend in Kazakhstan is higher than the trend itself at the kindergarten level and somewhat smaller than the assimilationist trend at the elementary level. These data suggest that under the colonial model, there were pressures by state authorities to expand the indigenous language stream, most probably (as our ethnography will suggest) to create a class of workers literate enough for low-status jobs but insufficiently "worldly" to seek jobs at the all-Union level. This "colonial" educational strategy (used by the British in India and Africa) served as an unintended investment in a separatist future, one that gave a generation of workers an interest in an exclusively Kazakh-language mobility structure. Assimilationist trends, therefore, were discernible in both the most-favored-lord and colonial situations (as opposed to the lack of such trends in the integralist situation); but only in the colonial situation do we see, at least in the intergenerational shifts in medium of instruction, a strong anti-assimilationist interest.

With intergenerational shifts in medium of instruction as background, we can now consider the attitudes, first of the titulars, and then the Russians, about the national rights of the other group. In both of these cases, we will see strong differences in inter-nationality assimilationist attitudes between Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Consider first the index of "National Exclusiveness" reflected in Figure 3.6, which captures titular attitudes. For this index, we asked four questions that tapped into



Figure 3.6. National exclusiveness of titular groups in the four republics: Index of titular respondents, normalized from 0 (open) to 1 (closed) on the degree to which they were closed to nontitulars in their families and in their republics

titular values about assimilation that were divorced from the strategic learning of Russian for purposes of occupational mobility. We asked how they felt about small entrepreneurs operating freely in their republic. This, in the late Soviet context, is often a proxy for feelings about foreigners coming to live in the titular republic. We also asked how they felt about their son, and their daughter, marrying outside the nationality. On this chart, the Kazakh respondents, who are by far the most exclusive, diverge in a polar manner from the Ukrainians, who are the least exclusive. Learning Russian and accepting the political reality of high Russian linguistic status, as we saw in the previous section, are attitudes prevalent in most-favored-lord *and* colonial settings; but seeing that strategy as part of a more assimilatory cultural framework occurs only in the most-favored-lord environment. In the colonial pattern, language learning has a far more instrumental quality, with the expectation that even learning the language of the central state would not give the titular full acceptance in the society of that state. This leads to a greater cultural solidarity among the colonized.

The differences among the three patterns show up not only on the mass survey but on census data as well. Consider Table 3.6, derived from Robert Kaiser's *Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR*.[31] First, the situations of Estonia and Latvia are distinguished from those of Ukraine and Kazakhstan by the rates of titulars who are directors of enterprises or organizations and titular-language publications compared with the percentage of Russians in the republics. In 1989, enterprise directors in the Baltic states were far more likely to be titulars than Russians. The greater relative presence of titulars in the corridors of industrial power allowed for the regional languages to remain languages of upward mobility. The data on publications of books, journals, and newspapers again distinguish the Baltic states, where

[31] Robert J. Kaiser, *The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), chap. 3.

Table 3.6. National differences in the Union republics

	Kazakhstan	Estonia	Latvia	Ukraine
Indigenous directors, 1989[a]	100	134	121	109
Publications in indigenous language, 1988[b]				
Books	72.7	102.7	96.4	29.4
Journals	83.1	108.9	110.4	65.6
Newspapers	94.5	112.6	114.4	96.8
Russians who speak titular language, 1989 (percent)	0.09	13.7	21.1	32.8
Change in composition of urban population from 1959 to 1989 (percent)				
Titulars	10	−11	−8	4
Russians	−7	8	7	−1

[a] The figures in this row reflect the percentage of titular directors divided by the percentage of titulars in the republic multiplied by 100.

[b] The figures in this row reflect the percentage of total publications in the indigenous language, indexed to the titular percentage of the republic's population. For example, the figures for book publications in Ukraine equal the Ukrainian-language percentage of the titles published in Ukraine divided by the Ukrainian percentage of the total population in Ukraine multiplied by 100.

Source: Robert J. Kaiser, *The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), tables 5.14, 6.3, 6.9, and 5.6; p. 259.

in 1988, the rate of titular-language publications was higher than the percentage of titulars in the republic. On both of these measures, Ukraine and Kazakhstan have discernibly lower rates than the Baltics do. Finally, the change in the national composition of Union republic cities from 1959 to 89 shows a corresponding pattern. Kazakh and Ukrainian cities, in the period of massive industrialization, were able to draw on their own rural peripheries, leading to greater rates of indigenization. But the two Baltic states were already highly urbanized with their indigenous bourgeoisies, and the post–World War II industrialization drew mainly on demobilized or otherwise geographically mobile Russians. Here again the integral model stands opposite that of both the colonial and most-favored-lord models.

But the differences between the most-favored-lord and colonial models show up in these data as well. The fact of widespread (as opposed to a few monopoly mediators) Ukrainian facility in Russian explains the extremely low rates of Ukrainian book and journal publications in 1988. Most Ukrainians, unlike Kazakhs, were taking full assimilation as a practical (if unwanted) reality.[32] If Ukrainians were comfortable reading in Russian, the third row of Table 3.6 shows that Russians were at ease in developing facility in Ukrainian, as 34.4 percent claimed to have in the 1979

[32] "Unwanted" may be an understatement. With the crackdown on the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the Shcherbit'skyi period, Russian was imposed in many elite milieus. Still, this reaction succeeded only because Ukrainian elites were already fluent in Russian.

census.[33] Meanwhile, less than one percent of Russians in Kazakh claimed facility in the Kazakh language. This asymmetry in language facility reflects a colonial, rather than a most-favored-lord pattern of incorporation. On this measure, Russians in the Baltics were less linguistically accommodating than in Ukraine. But the greater difficulty for Russians in learning either Estonian or Latvian, as compared with Ukrainian, needs to be factored in. And even still, the survey data (those reported earlier and the data that will be presented in Part III) show that in the Baltics Russians have been relatively more accommodative to local culture than Russian residents have been in Ukraine.

THE data in this chapter show that in both the tsarist and Soviet periods, the incorporation of elites from the peripheral republics had three distinct patterns: the most favored lord, the colonial, and the integral. Furthermore, despite Soviet territorial policies seeking to treat all Union republics similarly, the three distinct strategies of elite incorporation have had discernable implications for interethnic accommodation. For the cases of low (Kazakhstan) and for high (Ukraine) incorporation of elites into central hierarchies, there were strong incentives for titulars to learn sufficient Russian as a language of work and knowledge; meanwhile, for cases of medium incorporation in the Baltics, there were weaker incentives for titulars to rely on Russian, and greater relative incentive for Russians (especially the russianized Balts who were born in Russia and returned to the Baltics as rulers) to accommodate themselves to, and even begin to assimilate into, titular culture. Yet the cases of low and high incorporation yield strong differences in regard to internationality relations. In the case of low incorporation (Kazakhstan), there are higher levels of titular separation from Russian culture (where language learning is instrumental, and not a basis for a more complete cultural shift) and therefore greater attempts to invest in a separatist future than was the case of high elite incorporation (Ukraine), where linguistic assimilation coincided with other forms of cultural blending, and where there were fewer attempts by parents in the Soviet era to invest in a separatist future.

These findings from the elite-incorporation model—the macro complement of the tipping game—play an important role in understanding the response by Russians to titular sovereignty when the political tides turned, leaving Russian-speakers beached in the newly independent Union republics.

[33] This figure should be discounted somewhat because it is likely that a significant number of russified Ukrainians claimed to be Russian to the census takers and claimed facility in Ukrainian as a second language.

6

If Not Assimilation, Then What?

Assimilation is a strategy that nontitulars resident in a nationalizing state must consider. But nontitulars do not merely sit around and ask themselves whether or not to assimilate. There are a range of other strategies that can be pursued instead of, or simultaneously with, assimilation. First, they can seek merely to make the most minimal concessions to the national culture consistent with the attainment of citizenship. While this strategy is fully possible in Kazakhstan and Ukraine, the citizenship laws of Estonia and Latvia demand cultural concessions. Second, in another move that serves the purposes of the nationalizing elites, nontitulars can also return to their putative homelands. Facilitating this legally, the Russian Federation invited all former citizens of the USSR to take Russian citizenship and to resettle, if they wished, in Russia. Third, they can organize politically to seek recognition as an autonomous group within their state. Fourth, they can seek to exploit ethnic tensions through the instigation of violent confrontations. These strategies (deviating somewhat from Hirschman's formulation here) can be called, "loyalty," "exit," "voice," and "arms."[1] Finally, there is a move that doesn't fit well into the Hirschman framework, that of redefining Russian identity in a way that changes the ethnic calculus in the republic—in the cases at hand, in the invention of a "Russian-speaking protonationality." This chapter offers an ethnographic accounting of these five options.

Loyalty (Through Passive Integration and Citizenship)

Linguistic assimilation is not the only integrating process taking place in the post-Soviet republics. Russians are becoming more like titulars in other ways as well. This nonlinguistic integration process, especially when coupled with citizenship, is yielding a new form of national identity that blurs the divide between titulars and nontitulars, to the chagrin of the "purist" nationalizing elites.

[1] Albert Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

Despite the image of "civilizational divides," there is abundant evidence that the Russians in the titular republics are taking on cultural characteristics once thought to be distinctive of the titulars. Young Russians in Latvia have started wearing the silver braided ring that Latvians wear as a national symbol. Russians in Kazakhstan are cooking more with rice and less with potatoes. In all the republics some Russians are making conspicuous efforts to show that they are different from the Russians in Russia. One informant in Almaty told Dave, "We are more rural, more family-oriented, more mixed in family, than Russians in Russia." In Ukraine, one of Arel's informants went out of his way (at least when he thought Ukrainian nationalists were around) to watch (unbearably boring) Ukrainian TV, and showed a special interest in Ukrainian songs, as a form of overcompensating for his Russianness. He may have been just acting to earn tolerance from the nationalists; but to the generation that follows, such activities can come to be seen as normal. In such a way, culture shifts.

In my field work in Estonia, I often came across the language of unbridgeable cultures—Russian and Estonian. I cited in Chapter 1 the vivid description by my collaborator, Marika Kirch, of "the civilizational border" that divides her homeland from Russia. In private conversations, Kirch elaborated on this comment. She told me that you can always tell a Russian household in Estonia because of the use of blue paint on the balcony. Estonians use only green or yellow. Russians, she observes, enjoy concentrated housing; Estonians yearn for a separated house. And Russian voices within housing complexes, she noted, are decibels louder than those of their Estonian neighbors. The leading Estonian pollster, Andrus Saar, in a private conversation, picked up on these subtle differences. Russians, he observed, do not understand "the Estonian sense of reserve, privacy, keeping one's personal distance. Estonians simply withdraw when they are in a group of Russians." From the Russian side, a mirror discourse is often heard. Nina Sepp, who is linguistically assimilated, holds that the Orthodox tradition lies deep, and thus she has "confidence in the unbreakability of the Russian soul, that can withstand the loss of religion and change in language."

Despite this discourse of difference, nonlinguistic assimilation by Russians into an Estonian world has been significant. I observed that the Russians in Narva interacted in public places far more like Estonians than like Russians in Moscow—they were quieter and they drank less beer and alcohol in public. Also, as data collected by Tuisk and others, using an "Identity Structure Analysis," shows, Russians in Estonia feel themselves closer in basic values to Estonians than to Russians in Russia. This experiment asks subjects to evaluate a range of items, and then to guess how the typical "Estonian," the typical "Russian in Russia," and the typical "Russian in Estonia" would evaluate the same item. The answers of Russian-Estonians about themselves were consistently closer to their guesses about "Estonians" than their guesses about "Russians in Russia."[2] In the data collected by Aksel Kirch, Marika

[2] Tarmo Tuisk, "Identity Structure Analysis in Estonia—An Interplay of National Allegiance or Ethnic Hostilities," in Marika Kirch, ed., *Changing Identities in Estonia: Sociological Facts and Commentaries* (Tallinn: Estonian Science Foundation, 1994).

Kirch, and Tarmo Tuisk on such items as orientation toward work, the longer the Russian-speakers were in Estonia, the more their answers are like those given by Estonians, and the further away from those given by recent immigrants from Russia.[3] And despite Marika Kirch's image of the two castles, and her observations about enduring cultural differences, she revealed to me in her home town of Pärnu that just by watching young couples walking, or mothers walking their children, she could not tell (without listening) whether they were Russian or Estonian. The (nonlinguistic) cultural divide separating Russians and Estonians is eroding perhaps faster than Kirch's sociological categories.

The slow cultural shift by Russians has been accompanied by a desire to become citizens of their republic of residence. While large numbers have taken Russian citizenship, since it is free for the asking, many Russians aspire to become citizens of the republic in which they were born, or in which they have spent a significant number of their most productive years. In Latvia, Pettai has recorded cases where informants have purchased language certificates, enabling them to get their citizenship without learning the language. This can be interpreted as defiance of the government in order to become a legal member of the state. In Estonia, in a 1992 survey, 60 percent of Russian respondents put positive value on Estonian citizenship.[4] Unlike Joseph K., Russians in the Baltics are pursuing a meaningful goal; but like him, they seem to be walking through bureaucratic mazes in order to get nowhere.

In Ukraine, especially in the center and east, there is among Russians a strong desire to become part of a reconstituted union, which would include Russia, Ukraine, and perhaps other former Soviet republics. Yet for most Russians in Ukraine, passively accepting Ukrainian citizenship and adapting to the realities of Ukrainian independence is the prudent course of action, despite the vitriolic xenophobia of the more extreme nationalists.

Even in Kazakhstan, Russians have some sense of membership in a Kazakhstani state. The term "Kazakhstani" is significant. Unlike "Kazakh" it refers to the political unit and not the ethnic/national group that claims a special right to rule over that unit. Volodia and Lida are clearly, in this sense, Kazakhstanis. When Dave asked them for the first time (in late November 1993) what citizenship they will choose or have already chosen, Volodia responded, "Where's the question of choosing," implying that they are unquestionable natives (*korennyie*) of Kazakhstan. The entire family, Volodia and Lida told her, immediately opted for Kazakhstani citizenship. They continued to maintain that "so far there is no problem. If some sort of nationalism breaks out in the distant future, Russia will accept all the ethnic Russians in the 'near abroad.' We aren't concerned, we feel well rooted in Kazakhstan." Somewhat later, in January 1994, Dave asked them how they felt on the citizenship issue. Volodia, having just heard that President Nazarbaev had ruled out dual citizenship as an option, said that had things been "normal" they wouldn't need dual citizenship. "But ours is not a normal system, and there is a lot of justification for

[3] Aksel Kirch, Marika Kirch, and Tarmo Tuisk, "Russians in the Baltic States: To Be or Not to Be," *Journal of Baltic Studies* 24, no. 2 (1993): 177.

[4] Ibid., p. 182.

dual citizenship in our absurd circumstances. I know that no 'normal' country has such legal provisions." Then Lida said, "For the time being of course we have chosen Kazakhstani citizenship." (Indeed I saw their passports in December 1995, and they had "citizens of Kazakhstan" stamped on the inside cover of their red passports, over the printed USSR insignia. That stamp was free, but it costs 1,000 tengi [64t = U.S. $1] to get a new Kazakhstani passport, and they did not need to spend this money.) Lida continued, "We still have time to rethink until [March] 1995 [the supposed deadline, since extended, for unencumbered Russian citizenship]. Of course all our ties, friends, relatives, are here. Thank God, the Kazakhs that we know and work with are more or less educated and cultured people, and they don't make us uncomfortable." Volodia interjected, "There are 'fools' all around, and enough at the top. I hope they don't get more numerous over there." The editor of *Kazakhstanskaiia pravda*, who came to Kazakhstan in 1954, from Ukraine, has a similar orientation. He considers himself a "Kazakhstani," a person who is a citizen of Kazakhstan, irrespective of national identity.

Noah Webster, through his dictionary project, sought to construct an "American" identity that would be different from "English."[5] To a certain extent, many Russians in the near abroad would be pleased to see a similar construction of national identities based somewhat on language but more on territory and common approaches to life. In these ways, significant assimilation is already taking place. These identities are sometimes referred to as "civic," but they have, as I've tried to show, a cultural element in them, and many Russians have assimilated along these lines. Along with this assimilation, there is willingness to commit to (even purchase!) citizenship. This option—with only minimal (if any) linguistic assimilation, still remains open. In a sense, it could be called (in a passive sense) "loyalty."

Exit

For most Russians, in three of our four republics (Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine) emigration to Russia was not, in the aftermath of the double cataclysm, a feasible option. In Kazakhstan the double cataclysm combined with trends going back to the 1960s make exit seem the only feasible option. The reasons for this have little to do with degrees of unhappiness of the Russians, or the degrees to which Russians are welcomed by the titular elites, or the relative cost of emigration, or the economic conditions faced by Russians in their republics of residence. Our field data do not provide a clear answer to explain the vastly different orientation in Kazakhstan. There is a clear perception, discussed in Chapter 4, that while things are fine today, when Russians are no longer necessary to administer the economy, they will be "history." Another plausible inference from our data is that Russians cannot abide the status reversal of being ruled by a nationality group they had always considered subservient. And once a critical mass of Russians living in Kazakhstan packs its suitcases, there will be an emigration cascade.

[5] Brian Weinstein, "Language Strategists," *World Politics* 31, no. 3 (1979): 345–64.

Russians in all four republics manifest a thoroughly ambivalent reaction to Russia and Russians living in Russia. On the one hand, Russian informants resident in all four republics, but especially in Estonia and Ukraine, told us on many occasions that Russia was "chaotic" and Russians from Russia were "foreign" to them. Nina Sepp, the rector of the Narva Teachers Training College, who is a deeply religious Orthodox Russian, and who recruited many faculty for her school from St. Petersburg, felt she knew why there was so little emigration to Russia from Estonia. "Fear of chaos, or disorder," she told me in September 1993, "is far greater than the fear of loss of identity or dignity, that they face in Estonia." In the wake of Yeltsin's assault on the White House in October 1993, *Severnoe poberezh'e* (October 6) did man-on-the-street interviews in Narva. Vladimir, a taxi driver, responded diffidently: "I don't think that these events will harm us; we live in a foreign country, and we have sufficient worries of our own." In a conversation in the home at which I lived, Andreu Grigor'ev, eldest son of Pavel, mentioned to me that in his trips to Russia he learned that the "Russians hate us Russians from Estonia because we live so well, and that our thinking has changed. We think much more like people from the West, and they see us as different." He couldn't really give an example of this, however hard I pushed him, but he was sure that this was the case. Pettai talked similarly with Svetlana Kustavus, a Russian from Tver', who married a russianized Estonian and came to Tallinn on work assignment in the mid-1950s. By now, she says, she has few ties with Russia "and can't stand it when she visits." Natasha Bobrov, sixteen, from the Haabneeme kolkhoz, learned Estonian in kindergarten, since there was no Russian kindergarten in Haabneeme, and then later commuted to Russian-language schools to finish her education. She aspires to enroll at Tartu University, much to the chagrin of her friends. She told Pettai that she has "visited Russia only a few times and found it very different and unfamiliar." Marika Lugonova from Narva told me that her mother is now living alone (her father is working in the Tallinn electrical station), but would never think of returning to Russia, since she sees herself as being a Russian "from" Estonia. I received a similar answer from Volodia, the Russian-born husband of the secretary to Narva's mayor, whose father is Estonian and mother Russian. Volodia expected shortly to be laid off from his job at the textile factory. I inquired rather intensively about whether he planned to look for work outside Narva. He said that he would never think of looking in Russia, nor does anyone he talks with at work. "It is a mess there," he said, "and life in Estonia is much better." Leonid Guzhvin gave Pettai an answer in the same terms: "They're even more messed up there than we are."

Arel heard a similar refrain from Russians in Ukraine. Oleksandra is a left-bank Ukrainian, but with deep Russian roots; she is descended on her father's side, some ten generations ago, from a Russian serf named Ugarov who escaped to Ukraine. When she is in Russia, she no longer thinks that she is home. When there was a union, the whole union, she repeated the popular refrain, was her address. But it is absolutely clear to her that those times are over and that her address is now Ukraine. Arel asked her whether she feels closer to people who speak Russian than to ukrainophones, when she visits Galicia. The former is definitely the case. But if she were to find herself in Moscow with west Ukrainians, then she would feel closer

to west Ukrainians, no matter what. Trying to make sense of this, a young scholar told Arel confidently that what unites Ukrainians, from east and west, is their mentality (*mental'nyi kharakter*). Oleksandra agreed with that point, although she was not able to define the features of this mentality. At her institute, they actually had a discussion on the topic. "Is it patriotism, the love of the land? You can't explain it, but to understand it intuitively," she adds, "you have to live here." She was sure that all who live in Ukraine distinguish themselves from the people who live in Russia, and look at things differently: "You can always distinguish a Ukrainian from a Russian. Even the Russians from Ukraine, at least those who have lived all their lives in Ukraine, distinguish themselves from the Russians 'over there.' " In Snezhanna's eyes, it has more a territorial than an ethnic connotation. This young Ukrainian, who could trace her origins back ten generations to a Russian serf who escaped and settled in the village in which she was born, is sick of these divisions between national minorities, and she does not like the word *natsiia* (nation).

The ethnic Russians from Kiev whom Arel knew best, Iaroslav and Lida, felt similarly. Despite his longing for Russia, Iaroslav never thought of moving there, since it is "simply not an option." Indeed, his entire family is in Russia but he has not been back to Samara (the town of his birth) in three or four years. If he had a nice job offer, with good conditions, perhaps he would consider it. But he does not think about it and says that he likes Kiev and is well settled. Considering her attachment to Ukraine, it is unclear whether Lida would agree to leave. Lida has no attraction to Russia, but she used to identify solely with the Soviet Union: "We lived in the Soviet Union. We did not feel that we lived in Ukraine. As in the popular Soviet song, my address was the Soviet Union." After the collapse of the Soviet Union, she did not transfer her sympathies to Russia. She believes, however, that Ukraine must maintain close economic links with Russia: "It is stupid to believe that Ukraine can live without an economic union with Russia." Arel asked her once how she would define herself, irrespective of her official passport nationality. She answered: "Ukrainian."

Arel's ever-complex friend Leonid has also lost his psychological attachment to Russia. He does not think Ukraine will survive, not because he is bothered by any "nationalizing" trend, but because any state must care for its people. There is no such care, he said, "we live like cattle." He therefore, as I indicated earlier, would happily vote for reunification with Russia. His longing, however, appears to be less, if at all, for a greater Slavic cultural-political world, than for a world (the Soviet Union) where things used to be more orderly, when "everything used to be linked." A realist, he believes that the USSR will probably not be resurrected, since it is not in the interests of those in power to do so. And for all his conviction that Ukraine should rejoin Russia, he cares little about what is going on in Russia. When Arel asked him about his opinion on the December 1995 parliamentary elections in Russia, he said he did not follow it and is mostly interested about what is happening in Ukraine! This feeling was not unique to Leonid. I took a taxi ride in Kiev on the day of those (exciting, to our research team) elections. I asked the driver, a russophone, if he had heard any early election returns. He responded (I think, making a point of his regard for Russia rather than his knowledge of current affairs) that he knew nothing about any election.

If on the one hand, our informants seemed to go out of their way to point to the chaos and foreignness of Russia, it should be remembered that excluded from our sample of respondents were those Russians who indeed did pack their suitcases and return. From surveys conducted with these populations, and consistent with the intergenerational tipping model, the plurality of respondents to these surveys reported that their principal motivation had to do with education and job opportunities for their children, with a heavy emphasis on the language demands that would be made upon them.[6]

Even the Russians who remained in the republics were not one-sidedly averse to Russia. Many referred to Russia as their "historic homeland" and center of their culture. The notion of Russia as "homeland" (*rodina*) reoccurs in everyday talk. Concerning the "cataclysm" that took place in October 1993 in Moscow, Narva politician, N. Kulikov, wrote in the local paper *Narvskaia gazeta* (October 5, 1993), "Russia—my historical homeland although I wasn't born there and have never lived there. But my father . . . I have a brother, sister, aunt, uncle there. . . . My soul hurts for them." More prosaically, in an overheard conversation in Riga, on problems of passport and money, a bitter young man said (and referring here to Ukraine), "You can't even travel anywhere. You can't even go to your homeland."

Because Russian television is still generally available, Russians in the near abroad often express great interest in Russian public affairs. During the tragic events of October 1993, word spread about the first killings in Moscow after the Yeltsin/White House confrontation. While Pavel Grigor'ev was harvesting apples at his dacha, one of his friends passed by his house with just a phrase telling him about the deaths. This was very much a sense of talking about their "local" news, and not of some foreign country. Roma, his youngest son, then in the sixth grade, reported the next day that most of the kids in his class supported Aleksandr Rutskoi, Yeltsin's vice-president and enemy, because he was a war hero. This was the first time I heard him discuss anything political at home, and certainly never anything about events taking place in Tallinn.

And so, despite their self-professed insouciance toward Russian politics, many Russian-speakers we visited were intensely interested. On New Year's eve of 1994, Dave was invited to Volodia and Lida's place to celebrate. Everyone was listening to Nazarbaev's address, but not that attentively. But at 3 A.M. (midnight in Moscow), they were very eager to know what Yeltsin had to say. The children were hushed, and the volume was turned up. On the eve of elections in Russia, Volodia and his colleague Boris were well abreast with what was going on and mentioned that they supported the Iabloko, Iavlinskii's party. But after elections were declared in Kazakhstan, Dave asked them if they were going to vote. Both Volodia and Lida said "of course." But they didn't know who the candidates were. Before the December 1995 elections in Russia, Dave and I were dining with Liudmila, the owner of the apartment where Dave was living. She had been calling up her friends and relatives in Russia advocating that they vote for the Communist candidate,

[6] E. I. Filippova, "Novaia russkaia diaspora," in M. Iu. Martynova, ed., *Novye slavianskie diaspory* (Moscow: RAN, 1996), p. 65.

Ziuganov. Obviously she was more engaged in Russian politics than in Kazakh public affairs.

Our Russian-speaking informants were also broadly engaged in Russian culture in its multifarious forms. For Olga Guzhvin from Estonia, it was the annual singing jamborees that took place on the shores of the Volga River. For Natal'ia Berezhkova, a teacher in Tallinn, it was the holiday celebrating the victory over the fascists, and waving flags on May 9th, with kids standing on guard at the Eternal Flame in downtown Tallinn. Also, she reminisced about the artistic and historical displays in the Lenin Room in her high school (as in all Soviet high schools). For Lydiia Kuzminitzna, from Narva, who is an artist, it is the "high" culture, such as Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy, that is quintessentially Russian. She criticized Estonians who speak Russian for not treasuring the ability to partake in this world-class artistic culture. For Dmytro Mishchenko from Crimea, Russia is also defined by its great literature. He wrote in *Osvita*: "We, Russian people, educated by the culture of Pushkin and Lermontov, are reduced [*tolkaiut s*] to the village culture of Ukraine."[7] For Lena, a Russian woman Pettai met while visiting a Latvian family, it is sports. She finds the Latvian Olympic team "pathetic," and identified only with the Russian team.

"Russia," it needs to be recalled, for most respondents implies the Imperial or Soviet boundaries. And this represents a special culture. Russians in the union republics felt like Ibn-Khaldûn, the fourteenth-century sociologist from Tunisia, who could travel through half the world speaking only Arabic. The Russian language and Soviet symbology served similar purposes. Pavel Grigor'ev explained that traveling from Samarkand to Tallinn using one language and one currency had given him a sense of mastery. Zheniia, aged sixty-one, is committed to staying in Latvia but says she misses "Russian culture," especially through TV. But Pettai's field notes say that she traveled extensively through Russia, for example to the Caucasus, and to Central Asia. She clearly thinks of "Russia" as having Soviet boundaries, and it is that expanse that is missed.

Thus we see two contradictory lines of thinking: Russia as "foreign" and Russia as "homeland." Sometimes the ambivalence comes out in a single person. In Almaty, Evgenii (Zheniia) Zhovtis is vice-president of the Independent Trade Union Center of the Republic of Kazakhstan. (In Soviet times, he was classified as a Jew by nationality.) In an interview with Dave, he insisted, "I have no ties with Russia—Russia is an alien country for me [*Rossiia mne chuzhaia*]." Yet, a few days later, Dave was walking home with Zheniia and a couple of others from the Dom Demokratii after attending a meeting of the political opposition to Nazarbaev. An acquaintance of Zheniia, who is a newspaper reporter, asked him about his recent trip to the United States. Zheniia mentioned the overall efficiency of capitalist countries, but felt that things are too efficient and rather cold there: "Americans aren't as emotional as we are . . . they are too businesslike." He went on: "Of course I could emigrate there, I have had offers, but I don't think I can survive in such a stiff environment. I'd rather live amidst this absurdity [*teatr absurdov*]." This was the popular

[7] "Shcho tse za natsiia," *Osvita* (in Ukrainian), March 2, 1994, p. 33.

Soviet characterization of life in the USSR. Zheniia is both "alien" to Russia and part of its essential culture. Russians in all four republics are more or less similarly ambivalent about Russia; so the vision of the homeland can hardly explain differences in the propensity to return.

The propensity to exit cannot be explained by signals by the titulars that the Russians are unwanted either. If that were the case, there wouldn't be any Russians to be found in post-Soviet Estonia. There, the titular rhetoric of "repatriation" is matched by the Russian rhetoric of "don't pack your suitcases."

Because of a commitment to join Europe shared by the entire Estonian elite, Estonian leaders never talk about "forced" repatriation. But they come quite close! In an interview in December 1992 with Endel Lippmaa, a well-regarded chemist at the Academy of Science and an active politician as well, he rhetorically asked me that if General Eisenhower could deport the Germans Hitler had resettled in Poland, why was it so undemocratic to contemplate sending Russians back to Russia? Although he insisted that this is not a recommendation, he surely raised the specter of forced remigration. When the Isamaa coalition formed the government, with Peter Olesk as minister of citizenship and migration, the specter reappeared. In April 1994, he was quoted to the effect that "I think that for a lot of people there is no place in this country."[8]

Estonian leaders, even before sovereignty was achieved, dreamed of easing the transition by helping Russians emigrate back to Russia in a peaceful, "voluntary" manner. This dream was unrealistic, and after independence, a heavy-handed attempt to rid the country of its Russians—through negotiations with Canada and Argentina, asking these countries to accept the Russians as immigrants—helped set a new frame for Russians in Estonia, that Estonians did not want them in their picture. This view that Russian-speakers in Estonia are not wanted by Estonians is articulated by Estonian leaders on all sides of the political spectrum. The fringe right-wing Estonian Progressive Party ignored local Russians in order to meet with "real Russians" in Russia to work on plans to resettle Estonia's Russian in Russia. Their "Central Decolonization Initiative" condemned the granting of citizenship for "service" to the state. On the respectable right, however, the position was not that different. Merle Krigul, a linguist and parliamentarian, insisted to me in an interview in July 1992 that Russians are not a minority but an "occupying force" or are "refugees" since they have no "historic roots" in Estonia. She is a member of the board of the "Estonian Foundation for Migration." This is a government-funded organization, and in 1993–94 had a budget of 10 million kroons. Its director was the then prime minister, and it had fourteen members (bankers, mayors, a deputy minister). They were trying to become a private foundation but had received almost no funds. While they did provide help to some Russian families who wanted to return but lacked sufficient resources, their principal effect has been to give the impression to Russians that they are not wanted. At the same time, in an interview with Marju Lauristin, who is considerably more liberal than Krigul, she told me that the government is willing to pay Russian residents, based on auctions, and time of resi-

[8] "Ty vinovat uzh tem . . . ," *Molodezh' Estonii*, April 21, 1994.

dence, for their rental properties. But, she said (I think expectantly), "Many Russians are waiting till full privatization so that they can sell their apartments and return to Russia as millionaires." And even a critic of government policy, Andres Kolist, attacked the Law on Aliens, not for its intent, but for its unenforceability. "Who is responsible," he asked, "when a law is unrealistic and brings Estonia only political damage? That is, when it doesn't help solve the main thing—helping non-Estonians to really leave Estonia."

When prime minister, Tiit Vähi positioned himself in the absolute center of this narrow political spectrum on the nationality issue. Few Estonian politicians would diverge greatly from the views he expressed when running for his second term as prime minister:

> I had said very clearly, that I support remigration, but it has to be voluntary. And we found that remigration policy from the Estonian Republic has first to be the creation of a remigration fund, which gives support to these families, who want to go back to their home sites, but who don't have financial possibilities to do so. The second point was to negotiate with the mayor of Saint Petersburg and with the head of Leningrad oblast, that they should facilitate the creation of good living conditions for those who leave from Estonia into these areas. . . . And as for the third condition—we wanted seriously to resist a new immigration. These three points were the "cornerstones" of our nationality politics.

Russians in Estonia picked up these signals. In the Narva City Council, in February 1993, after voting to commit themselves to a constructive process of internationality peace, City Council members denounced the "Estonian decolonization fund." Although they [the Estonians] talk of the "velvet" application of international human rights norms with their "decolonization fund," one member said sardonically, if their goal is 80 percent Estonians, this will mean a "velvet expulsion." Or in the words of one Russian woman from Tallinn, born and bred in Estonia, and interviewed by Estonian TV: "It's as if they [the Estonians] are saying, 'I want you to leave, I want your kids to leave, there is no higher education for them.' They look down upon us from on high. . . . I didn't feel any problems or obstacles at first. I wasn't a Russian person. But later I began to feel it." She got the message quite clearly. It was hard to miss.

Almost in dialectical response to the Estonian chorus of "we wish you would voluntarily leave," leaders of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia have urged their fellow Russians to "unpack their suitcases." To be sure, those Russians who have left Estonia have also left the debate about whether to leave; but public discourse among Russians in Estonia is not over the question of when to leave, but on how to stay.

The most eloquent spokesman for remaining in Estonia is Sergei Sovetnikov. He was born in the Narva area, is fluent in both Estonian and Russian, and he and his wife are citizens of Estonia. Now, in retirement, though a member of the City Council, his entire existence (his everyday interactions, his reading, his TV watching) is in Russian. His daughter lives in Russia and he visits there regularly with his

wife. He once told me in a visit in October 1993 that he is different from Pavel Grigor'ev in that Pavel thinks the future for Narva is in ties with the West, but he (Sergei) believes it must be with the East. Yet his articles in the Estonia's Russian-language press had a continuing theme: "Don't pack your bags. Stay in Estonia." In another article, he showed worry about the project of the "national radicals" and irritation that they were calling all Russians "foreigners." Yet he remained optimistic. He argued that with a decent budget for language instruction, eventually there will be many Russian votes in Estonia, who will be able to change things for the better. And then he went back to his leitmotif, urging readers not to pack their bags. Sovetnikov was also against any referendum for a Northeastern Secession from Estonia; such a move, he argued, would be nothing more than a repetition of the debacle in the Transdniester region, which he "categorically opposed." He has consistently argued that "we must get a handful of Russian-speaking Estonian Republic citizens to support our interests, and to work to increase our number of citizens." To help move this along, Sovetnikov has pressed for lower standards of Estonian language for citizenship tests in places where it is difficult to learn it. His work on the citizenship law, when he was a member of the Estonian Supreme Soviet, emphasized a lowering of barriers for those Russian-speakers who wanted it, rather than stiffening the requirements.

Considering himself someone who has always been and will always be a communist, Sovetnikov is hard to categorize as a moderate. Yet there are Russians in Estonia who are considered far more anti-Estonian than Sovetnikov. But they too, in general, advocate staying in Estonia. Consider the position of the Russian Society of Estonia, a group that remains nostalgic for the Soviet Union and for the Russian culture which dominated it. Yet in their journal *Obshchina: Russkii vestnik*, they write: "We are absolutely against the outmigration of Russians from the republics . . . as we consider ourselves as rooted residents as the Estonians are. Here is our land." And in Narva, the firebrand politico who asserts Russian rights is Iurii Mishin, the head of the organization "Russian Citizens of Narva." At a meeting in October 1993, Mishin said that his organization would support candidates for the Russian election who give support for "the rights of the Russian diaspora." What he was advocating was that Russian citizens with residency in Estonia should have full right both to Russian benefits (economic vouchers, voting in Russian elections) and Estonian benefits (unemployment insurance, voting rights) as well. He and his fellow members had no intention of returning to the land of their citizenship.

Parallel to Estonia's elite discourse is a popular discourse of the impracticality of exit. The obstacles to exit are many.

A difficult housing market—Russians seeking to resettle in Pskov told Pettai that they could not sell their apartments in Estonia because of their cooperatives' implicit requirement that sales can only be to Estonian citizens. But, they claim, few Estonian citizens are in the market for flats, especially in largely Russian neighborhoods. This problem is compounded by an unregulated moving industry. New firms have entered the market, charging exorbitant fees for organizing a resettlement. Yet once many of these firms have been paid, they disappear. One resettler told Pettai of being defrauded of 150,000 kroons by one such firm. Fear of high and

unregulated transition costs holds back explorations of new possibilities in Russia. Similarly, Russians underemployed at an electronics factory in Narva told me that the market for flats situated near comparable factories is equally dry in Russia, so they can't take the risk of moving. To be sure, housing markets are liquefying rapidly in the post-Soviet world; but in Estonia, Russians tend to focus on the illiquidity and high transactions costs of the housing market.

Insufficient resources—One group of Russians from Narva had organized themselves to homestead in Russia. They heard of the resettlement funds available from Estonian organizations and sought to tap into those resources. L. Shliminov, a correspondent from the *Narvskaia gazeta*, interviewed them and found they were utterly disgusted that the actual funds available to them were paltry. They gave up their effort. Nikolai Vaganov, writing in *Estoniia* (April 8, 1994) reported that all of the examples of searching for help and money should prove to any potential settler that he is not needed by anyone. Klara Hallik confirmed to me that the repatriation organizations of Estonia had much spirit but almost no funds.

No real "homeland" to return to—Few Russians in Estonia could provide Pettai or me with a locality that is their home. For example, Natal'ia Berezhkova sees herself as "Russkaia," but couldn't say precisely where her homeland was. Or again, Olga Guzhvina claimed that she moved around so much that she couldn't really say where her homeland is. In the Estonian-language class that I participated in for the unemployed, an early dialogue required us to say (in Estonian) where we were from. More than half of the students who did not say "Estonia" reported places outside of the core Russian zone, such as Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Moldova, and Siberia. I surmised that many of them grew up in prison camps, yet like many Russians even today were unwilling to admit it. Virtually all lived in families where there was such fear of the state that information about parental roots was hidden from the child. For most Russians in Estonia whom we spoke to, there is no village, no neighborhood, no housing bloc in Russia, that represents their "real" home.[9]

Declining links to Russia—Russia has since 1991 slowly begun to fall beyond the horizon for Russians in Estonia. Ninety-five percent of Estonian trade was with Soviet states in 1991; only 26 percent in 1993.[10] Lena in Tallinn saw free access to Russian TV as her link to the homeland. "If they cut Ostankino," she told Pettai, "it will cut the last thread we have left to Russian culture. We all grew up on Ostankino and learned about culture through it. All our favorite actors and artists are there. We know them all. Now we will lose them."[11] Liuba Grigor'ev was affected in another way, living halfway between St. Petersburg and Tallinn. It used to be, she said, if

[9] In answering surveys in the 1970s, Russians in Russia pointed to place of residence as a uniting factor for the national self-consciousness two to three times as often as Russians in other republics. See Iu. V. Arutiunian et al., *Russkie: Etno-Sotsiologicheskie Ocherki* (Moscow: Nauka, 1992), p. 378.

[10] Republic of Estonia, *Estonian Economic Survey* (Tallinn: Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1994).

[11] Indeed, Estonia stopped the transmissions of St. Petersburg TV on May 1, 1993. Transmissions of Russia's Ostankino programs were stopped a year later because the Russian Company failed to pay its 2.5 million kroon debt to Estonian Telekom. The Latvian State TV and Radio Council cut off broadcasts of Russian state TV (then Ostankino) on August 29, 1996. See the *Baltic Independent*, May 5, 1993; the *Baltic Times*, September 5, 1996; and Radio Free Europe, "Russia's Ostankino TV Defaults on Payments: Broadcasts to Cease," March 28, 1994.

you needed to get your cat spayed, you would take it to St. Petersburg, as there is no such facility in Narva. But now the border is too slow, and it is better to do that kind of business in Tallinn. Russia is slowly disappearing from Russian-Estonian consciousness as their "exemplary center."[12]

Some, however, are hanging on. The headmistress of School No. 13, Tat'iana, was brought up in Siberia and received her higher education in Leningrad. We talked about the cultural connections with Russia that still exist, and she insisted that regular trips to St. Petersburg (for the museums, the theater, the exhibits) were still part of her school's regular schedule. Someone from the school goes to the Russian consulate and gets a "group" one-day visa for a class of students. And all is easy, she bragged, as there is rarely a check by officials on either side of the border. I started to really push this claim. It turns out that the students (they are now quite few) with Estonian passports run into trouble at the second border post at Kingisepp, beyond the free border zone. And coming back into Estonia, where the non-Estonian-citizens face troubles, they usually send out one Estonian-speaking person who tells the Estonian guards that all the students are from the Estonian school and very tired from a long day of travel, and the Estonian border guards so rarely hear Estonian, they usually let all the students through without checking their passports, not all of which are in order. During our conversation, I saw a stack of books on the divan in the headmistress's office, and was told they were prizes for students who won in this year's academic "olympiad." All were published in Moscow or St. Petersburg. I asked if they bought them in Russia. The answer was that they were bought in the local store, because it is difficult to get them through customs. I concluded from this interview that cultural trips for schools to Russia are still a reality, but the possibility to do this easily, without visa costs, and without all sorts of legal hassles, is quickly disappearing. The school cultural trips are being maintained by a visionary teacher, a cooperative Russian consulate, and a certain amount of cleverness when dealing with slack officialdom. It is a process that cannot be sustained indefinitely.

A tight job market in Russia—Just after independence, Andres Tarand (who was then a minister of environment, but was to become an interim prime minister) told me, many highly technical personnel, "the ones we least wanted to lose," emigrated to Russia. "But many are remigrating," he told me in December 1992, "and we make sure they can get their jobs back. They found nothing for themselves in Russia." The message that there is nothing in Russia was loudly heard by potential emigrants. There can be little doubt that had Russia's economy boomed after the collapse of the Soviet state, the emigration figures of Russians from the republics would have been significantly larger.

This catalog of obstacles to emigration is well known to Russians in Estonia. In spite of this, some emigrate anyway, and quickly, fearing that the opportunity to do so will soon vanish. Russian citizenship for Russians living in the near abroad had a deadline, and this motivated some in Estonia, as we saw in Kazakhstan, to

[12] This phrase, taken out of context, is from Clifford Geertz, *Negara* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).

act quickly. Russians living in Estonia realized that once they had Estonian passports they would need visas to visit Russia. Since Russian visas had become expensive and difficult to obtain, this was unacceptable in terms of keeping up family contacts. As Pskov-resettled Olga told Pettai, Estonian citizenship "will open doors to new countries, but not to Russia. For us the most important country is Russia." Some wanted to leave mostly due to severe economic distress, and still others to assure their children's formation in Russian, and these were the reasons most often given by those seeking Russian citizenship, according to the Russian consul in Narva. But the great majority of Russians in Estonia have no intention of leaving.

A vibrant Russian cultural life therefore remains *in* Estonia. The Russian Theater of Tallinn, for example, puts on a full repertory. On the evening I was there, the play was a modern work called *Oboroten'* about a young blind man whose mother intervenes in a romance between her son and his neighbor. The theater was about half full. The audience consisted of people of all ages. The Russians remaining in Estonia have a settled cultural life, and their suitcases are not packed. Despite the clear desire of the Estonians that they leave, the Russians in Estonia have resolutely decided to remain.

In Kazakhstan, however, a cascade is in the making. The official government position, reiterated time and again by the president, is that Kazakhstanis of all nationalities are welcome in Kazakhstan. Nazarbaev has said, "We are a multiethnic state, there is no distinction between Russian and non-Russian-speakers, since all our inhabitants are Russian-speaking ones [*russkoiazychnoe naselenie*]." Citizenship was open to all with legal residence in Kazakhstan. While there certainly have been anti-Russian incidents in the streets and in certain ministries, unlike in Estonia, there was no official drive to induce Russians to leave the republic.

The cascade will begin as soon as a critical number of Russians believe that a critical number of Russians believe that a critical number of Russians will leave. That is all it will take. Clearly, Kazakhstan is not Tajikistan of 1991–93, or Bosnia in 1996. Life is peaceful in Kazakhstan for Russians, and no immediate decisions are necessary. Still, Dave in 1994 asked Lida and Volodia, both highly trained scientists, if they thought the situation was alarming enough now, or could get worse soon. Both of them were very guarded in their responses. They had obviously given the issue some thought and were trying to stay as calm and collected as possible. Lida said, "Time will tell. We'll wait and see. What the hell . . . if they don't want us, we'll leave. One wants to live with some dignity, and lead a normal life. If we have to leave, it won't be the end of the world. We are still fit, capable of working. But Kazakhstan is our *rodina* [homeland] . . . we'll wait and see." At that point Volodia filled the glasses with the last drops of vodka and said a toast, "Chtoby durakov ne bylo" (Let's wish that fools don't prevail), echoing a poem by Vysotsky.

But not everyone is this guarded. A common expression among Russians, *chemodan nastroyennie* (which I gloss as "suitcase fever"), suggests that at every meal they ask, "Should I stay or leave," and keep their suitcases ready to go. Consider Galia. Galia's mother was Russian, her father Kazakh. Her husband's father is Kazakh and mother Tatar. She and her husband are both linguistically russified and

hardly speak Kazakh. Their seventeen-year-old son knows no Kazakh. In discussions with Dave, Galia referred to how the number of Russians (with whom she identified) leaving has drastically increased. "Just look at all those ads in *Karavan* for selling apartments. They are selling apartments at rates much lower than the market rates. They have panicked so much, fearing that they may not be able to sell their property at all." Subsequently, Dave heard from an acquaintance of theirs that Galia's sister and her husband Oleg (Russian-Chechen background) had already succeeded in exchanging their Almaty apartment for one in Moscow. Galia is right that the ads for apartments for sale indicate that the buyers are few and the sellers many. Prices are falling. The common topics of conversation among Russians are who has already left, who is leaving, the growing instances of attempted and successful looting/burning of their dachas (very few Kazakhs have dachas), and the failure of the *militsiia* (which is mainly Kazakh) to take any action.[13]

And even the level-headed Volodia and Lida are affected by this sense of imminent cascade. On a hike in January 1993, Lida mentioned that Volodia's sister Liuba, who lives in the village Malovodnoe, was planning to move to Russia. "We had some serious discussions on issues during last week's visit. Unfortunately, things are no longer the same outside Almaty. The Kazakhs over there aren't very educated. Mother and Liuba hear all the time 'you colonizers . . . go back to your Russia . . . we don't need you . . . you have overstayed your welcome.' Perhaps Liuba can move to Almaty, but the economy is so bad, and so hard to find a job. Besides who knows what will happen here?"

One of the big sources of fear among Russians in Kazakhstan is their inability to procure dual citizenship.[14] To become Kazakhstani citizens, they must renounce Russian citizenship, with no promise that they will be able to attain it again. In an interview that Dave conducted with the editor of *Kazakhstanskaiia pravda*, he downplayed the exodus, arguing that there has been a constant in- and outmigration of Russians. Many Russians, he pointed out, are moving to the northern and eastern regions of Kazakhstan from places like Kyzyl-Orda and the war-ravaged Tajikistan.

But then he got to the issue of citizenship. Of course, he admitted, many Russians are leaving places like Mangyshlak and Shevchenko (Aktau) because they are anxious about the citizenship issue. Dual citizenship is very important to these Russians. Most of them were sent to Kazakhstan to work (*po napravleniiu*), without knowing how long they would be there. They have settled down and raised families and cannot easily relocate. If dual citizenship were granted—and he agreed that it is a rather absurd institution ("No civilized country has such a practice to my knowl-

[13] For a good journalistic account of the buyer's market for apartments, see Boris Giller and Viktor Shatskikh, "Opredelenie berega: russkoiazychnye v Kazakhstane," *Karavan*, December 12, 1993, pp. 1–3. They also point out that hundreds of three-to-five-ton containers labeled "to Russia" were leaving the capital.

[14] Since Dave's field research, Russia (in a treaty with Kazakhstan) has promised automatic change of citizenship to Russians when and if they immigrate. To the extent that this provision is credible, it will certainly reduce fears of non-Kazakhs that they will become people without a homeland should they feel the need to leave Kazakhstan.

edge, but then our country is replete with absurdities")—then they will feel more secure. They will at least know that they have some place to go back to.

In a conversation with Sergei, the Russian in Almaty who complained about being thrown around like a football by Kazakhstani officials (see Chapter 5), Dave asked if he were a rooted (*korennoi*) Kazakhstani. "How can I not be a *korennoi*? I was born and brought up here, I am a third-generation Kazakhstani Russian," he said. Yet, he sardonically added that still, anything can happen, because it is "their" country.

Kazakhstan is not Tajikistan. But nevertheless, the Russians there do not believe that they or their children have a future in Kazakhstan. Consider Igor's story—begun in Chapter 5—whose paternal grandfather emigrated from Ukraine and settled in a village called Bezlesnoe (literally, "without forest") on the southern border of the Kokchetav Oblast. He was one of those peasants "liberated" by the Stolypin reforms who came to the steppes in search of farmland. Igor's father, Fedor Alekseevich, was born in 1938 in the Kokchetav Oblast. They came to Almaty in 1964. Igor's father finished technical school in north Kazakhstan and worked as an accountant. Yet Igor and his Kazakh wife, Madina, are thinking of leaving. Where to? It is not yet clear. Dave remembered that during her very first meeting with Igor, he had said that he does not feel there is any "discrimination" against Russians, that Russians are generally treated well. A month and a half later, he no longer thought so. In fact, he was thinking about quitting his job to give himself time to look around, perhaps even in Russia. His parents were very upset the first time he mentioned his anxieties about his future, the future of their daughter Marina, and the general treatment of Russians as second-class citizens by the state. His father did not even talk to him for the whole week, saying, "If you leave, you are not my son anymore." But gradually the wider family has noted a steady deterioration of the ethnic situation and the elders say, "We will manage to live here somehow, after all we have eaten the bread of this land. But things have changed so much, you and your children have no future in this country." And Igor adds: "I am fourth-generation 'Russian' in Kazakhstan, yet I am *nekorennoi* [not indigenous]." He went on: "I don't want to be treated as a second-class citizen. I want to have the right to speak in a language that I prefer. I don't want them to dictate to me what school my child should go to. I don't want to be singled out based on what I look like." And Madina ruefully noted: "With a name like Marina Igor'evna Grib, our daughter has no future here. Heaven forbid, if things didn't work out between us and we would have to divorce, the stigma will still stay. If I kept Marina, I would still have to answer all the questions like why she looks the way she looks, why is she called Marina, and so on."

The assessment of the future has also affected Lida and Volodia. Lida said, "We've told Kostia [their son] to look around for options in Russia." He has been accepted at the graduate program at Tomsk University, but he still hadn't heard whether he would be receiving a fellowship. Under the circumstances, his parents felt, it was the best thing for him. "If things settle down here, he'll come back, if not, we will see. He is still young," his parents told Dave, "he doesn't have to decide now." And in my meeting with the family in December 1995, Kostia had won the fellowship, and the family was pretty sure he would settle in Russia, because there are

no opportunities for "science" (they did not say "Russians") in Kazakhstan. E. V. Kolomeets, Volodia's dissertation adviser, is in a similar situation. His daughter and son-in-law got their masters degrees in physics from Syracuse University. Both are now working in New York. The son-in-law will get his green card soon. The father is very pleased to have them out of Kazakhstan.

Migration continues from Kazakhstan with 70,000 registered migrants in 1995 and 26,200 in the first six months of 1996. A report of Russian immigrants working in the Tutaev motor factory in the Iaroslavl region of Russia found that for the first six months of 1996 they received no pay, and this was because they were not considered by locals to be "our own." The reporter found that immigrant families were starving for months, with children sick with TB and a nervous illness. Many said that they wanted to return to Kazakhstan. In one survey, every fifth person who left Kazakhstan for Russia had returned, because of job and living conditions, and even for being refused local residence permits. President Nazarbaev bristled over allegations that Russians were unwelcome in Kazakhstan. "Regarding 'ousting,' " he said, "every day I sign decrees about the restoration of citizenship to those former Kazakhstanis who are returning from Russia." Yet the flood from Kazakhstan remained twice as high as any of the former union republics in the eighteen months since January 1995.[15]

In Kazakhstan, then, a cascade is being set in motion, not by present catastrophe, but by a subjective assessment of future possibilities, only partially ameliorated by the knowledge of long-term official welcome by Russia as citizens, which should reduce the temptation to do so now, and by the knowledge of the terrible circumstances that exist in places that earlier emigrants settled. Yet to the extent that Russians in Kazakhstan watch their neighbors exit because of negative assessments about Kazakhstan's future, the Russians who remain will feel even more isolated and even more fearful about the future.

What accounts for cascades of emigration? Clearly they cannot be explained by a strict accounting of costs and benefits. For Estonia, a glance at the data from the surveys of the sociological team of Kirch, Kirch, and Tuisk shows that where emigration would be least costly (Narva), it is least likely to be considered. They conclude from this and other examples that remigration was a theoretical but impractical issue for Russians in Estonia. From Iaroslav's comment in Kiev, that despite his longing for Russia, he never thought of moving there, since it is simply "not an option," we hear the same point. If the impracticality of emigration is widely believed, precise calculations about its costs and benefits are not made. Nor can the Kazakh cascade be explained by a lack of welcome in the republic, even though some of our informants emphasized this factor. In no case has the welcome mat been less visible than in Estonia; yet in Estonia, there is no movement toward a cascade. Finally, the cascade cannot easily be explained by economic hardship. To be sure, post-Soviet life has not been the fulfillment of an eco-

[15] Natal'ia Airapetova, "Bespredel s pomoshch'iu zakonov," *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, October 26, 1996. Also, Iurii Kirinitsiianov, "Pereselentsev ne zhdut," June 7, 1997; interview with Nazarbaev, in *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, November 11, 1996; and data from *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, November 2, 1996.

nomic dream for Russians in Kazakhstan, but life hasn't been easy for Russians in Russia either.

From our ethnographic data, there is no unequivocal answer to the question of why exit is not an option in Estonia (or in Latvia, or in the Ukraine), yet seems the only option in Kazakhstan. Perhaps the answers lies in the clear sense the Russians in the near abroad have of how their culture ranks against the cultures of the republics in which they are living. Learning a language from the West (Estonian, or Latvian) is not an indignity, if doing so is required for future social mobility in those republics. Learning another Slavic language (especially if it is a higher-status Ukrainian than *surzhik*) is a lateral move, but not a descent. But learning a Turkic language and assimilating *downward* in a status hierarchy is a psychological impossibility. Russians believe that Kazakhs must know the loss of in-group acceptance Russians would face by learning Kazakh, and it is therefore unrealistic to compel Russians to learn it. This is how I interpret Sergei's contemptuous tone when he says, " 'They' don't want us here."

In a similar vein, A. Zhovtis told Dave a revealing anecdote of an event that occurred over twenty years ago, when he was returning from the Medeu mountain resort, and thumbed a lift from a Russian. Moments later, Zhovtis reports, they saw a Kazakh standing on the street, trying to hitch a ride. The driver did not stop. Instead, he muttered, "It is not pleasant when such ugly fat-faced ones ride along. They're all the same." It is hard to conceive of a Russian making such a comment about a Balt or a Ukrainian. The ethnic slurs we heard in Ukraine—*moskali* (allied with Moscow) for Russian-speakers, and *banderovtsy* (Banderites, or followers of a Ukrainian leader with fascist sympathies) for western Ukrainians—do not imply ranking. Arel once heard Anatolii Pohrybnyi, vice-minister of education, refer ironically to the Russian put-down of Ukrainians as *khokhol* or *maloros* ("Little Russian"), but as we shall see, these very terms are also used by Ukrainians to refer to peasants (or Russian-speakers among Ukrainians).

Tales of ethnic slurs by high Russian officials suggesting ranked differences with Kazakhs are the stuff of urban folklore. One story concerns Brezhnev, who was then second secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. A studio director, Semenov, had an appointment with him, yet had to wait for a long time, and there was a Kazakh petitioner already in line ahead of him. The Kazakh said that he only needed a few minutes. He appeared very well educated. He was talking to Brezhnev very politely—though it appeared that they had some disagreement. Then the Kazakh left, and the studio director went into Brezhnev's office. Brezhnev immediately wanted to let off the steam, saying, "Opiat' eti kolbity negramotnye" ("Once again, these illiterate lice"). This particular slur, *kolbit*, or lice, dates back to Cossack times, and is a reference to what was then seen as the nomads' parasitic relationship to the land. More recently, the reckless and racialist V. Zhirinovskii has been quoted as saying, in reference to the president of Kazakhstan, "Just because Nazarbaev can wear shorts and play tennis, it doesn't mean he is civilized." The Russian image of Kazakhs as illiterate lice is evidence of a system of ranking deeply programmed into Russian consciousness.

Accommodating to some lower status "them" (that is, accepting Kazakh rule in Kazakhstan, without Russia's "overrule") implies a revolution in rank. It is something the Russian diaspora in Kazakhstan cannot abide. In the long term, most reckon, if Russians are compelled to integrate into a Turkic state, they will resist. It is better to leave now, or plan for your children to leave, rather than face the inevitable crisis later. This is one important source of the impending cascade.

Voice

Outside Moldova and Crimea (and the attempts to create autonomous republics for Russians outside the Russian Federation), the degree of political mobilization by Russians qua Russians has been quite low in all the republics of the former Soviet Union. Some have attributed this to television, which tends to keep Russians in their living rooms and off the streets.[16] Others have pointed to the scarce resources available to dispossessed Russians, thereby limiting effective political mobilization.[17]

These explanations are not convincing. In all four republics, social ties among Russians make the costs of organization quite low. In Estonia (as in the other republics) all towns have "Houses of Culture" built in Soviet times, with large meeting rooms and professional staff, also held over from Soviet times, to organize events. When the leaders of the Russian community of Narva want to have a meeting, they have access to these culture houses, and announcements of their meetings appear on every kiosk in town. During the early days of independence, there was an organization of moderate Russian-speaking deputies in the Supreme Soviet using the Estonian place name Virumaa to identify themselves. Russian-speakers had little organizational trouble in setting up referenda for autonomy in Narva and Sillamäe. They organized a representative assembly made up of a coalition of a host of previously existing organizations and elected delegates among noncitizen residents of Estonia.[18] In Ukraine, strikes by Donbas teachers and coal miners belie any notion that the Russian-speaking population lacks resources for political mobilization. In Latvia, there are several ethnically based organizations of Russians. There is a Russkaia Obshchina Latvii (Russian Community of Latvia), which was launched in 1992, with over 1,000 members. Its original purpose was to create business ventures to finance Russian culture and community life in Latvia. This idea failed, but its newspaper, *Russkii put'* (*The Russian Path*), has continued to publish and remains a vibrant weekly. There is also a Balto-Slavianskoe Obshchestvo (Balto-Slavic Soci-

[16] Maris Brants, "Kapec Latvija viss mierigi?" *Labrit*, March 10, 1994.

[17] Vello Pattai has recorded problems of mobilization caused by scarce resources in Latvia and Estonia. Dominique Arel, in a personal communication, reports on a Cossack leader who complained to him in an interview that Russian-speakers in Kazakhstan are prevented from mobilizing through denial of registration to certain associations, by the banning of demonstrations, and by arrests of potential fifth columnists.

[18] For a list of participating associations, see *Estoniia*, September 18, 1993, in an article translated from *Hommikuleht*.

ety), which seeks to organize Russians based on a common Orthodox heritage. There are also more secular organizations such as Equal Rights, and League of Stateless Persons active on the political scene. Pettai observed large demonstrations in Riga during his spring 1994 research trip there. One was a demonstration of the League of Stateless Persons and the Equal Rights Movement, with about 2,000 protesters. Another was a demonstration of noncitizens organized by the Association of Independent Trade Unions, and the League of Stateless Persons. The local Hare Krishna organization offered the protesters free stew. In Kazakhstan, Dave met with leaders of Lad (Harmony) and Birlesu (Unity), both organizations representing Russian interests. The most popular newspaper in Almaty is *Karavan*, which makes great profit through its matrimonial classifieds, its apartment-exchange bulletin board, and its soft pornography. Its editorial position is in support of Russians and Russian-speakers of Kazakhstan. The editor is Jewish by passport nationality, who has vowed to remain in Kazakhstan, "his homeland," and to stand up for the rights of Russian-speakers there.

In none of these republics is it reasonable to blame the low levels of mobilization on a lack of organizational resources. Nor can one reasonably assert that the payoffs for mobilizing are too low. Andrus Park, a distinguished Estonian sociologist, pointed out to me that the Russian-speakers, who made an international issue out of the Estonian Aliens' Law in July 1993, got President Meri to veto the first (and more obnoxious) version of the bill. By so organizing, and raising the specter of violence, the Russian-speaking Estonians got results.

Students of international relations are inclined to explain the low levels of mobilization of Russians qua Russians in the former union republics by the fact that they remain physically "secure," given the relative power of Russia compared to the states they live in. If the titular leaders were to threaten their safety, the Russian communities in the republics of the near abroad are confident that Russia would come to their aid. The Russian-speakers get security, as it were, for free.[19] This international relations explanation is powerful and helps explain the lack of violence. But it would be incorrect to hold that should the Russian-speaking communities in the near abroad feel threatened, they lack the organizational infrastructure for rapid mobilization. As of 1996, most strategies by Russians are—as in the assimilation game—individual. But this does not rule out future mobilization as Russians.

Arms

In all four republics, the Russian-speakers are angry and frustrated. They blame the titulars in general, and the nationalist leaders of their republics in particular, for the uncertainty they are currently facing. For many theorists of ethnic tension, this is the recipe for war.

[19] Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival* 35, no. 1 (1993): 27–47; James D. Fearon, "Ethnic War as a Commitment Problem," paper presented to the 1994 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 2–5, 1994.

Yet in these four republics violence has been largely contained. With the market for high-tech weapons open and free in places like Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, it is significant that none of us on the ethnographic research team encountered arms' markets in our countries of study. The lack of preparation for interethnic armed struggle requires explanation. In Chapter 12, I shall make a case for *why* violence is contained, but here I shall say something about *how* potential violence is contained.

In the Baltics, the principal mechanism holding back violent expression of internationality tensions is the institutionalization of what Karl Deutsch has called a "security community."[20] There has been violence in the Baltics, but spokespersons for both sides of the ethnic divide have consistently given this violence a nonethnic "spin." In Ukraine and Kazakhstan, the principal mechanisms holding back internationality tensions from erupting into violence are first the balance of power and, second, the preeminence of *intra*ethnic tensions within the titular community.

This is not to say that interethnic war clouds have not flown over the horizons of the four republics under study. In Estonia, the skies were darkening when Soviet collapse appeared imminent. Perhaps the growing tension had more to do with dual sovereignty than with ethnic conflict, but the issues overlapped. After the August 1991 coup in Moscow, Tiit Vähi traveled to the northeastern city of Kohtla-Järve, in the name of the self-declared independent republic of Estonia, to serve as the prime minister's representative for the northeastern region. (His job, a later incumbent told me, was halfway between a prefect and a foreign dignitary plenipotentiary.) In his first meeting with the press, martial law was discussed, and Vähi reported that local military organizations were already forming. On Vähi's visit to Narva, he called the situation one of "lawlessness." Narva deputies responded by saying that the Estonian Republic had no laws because the republic itself was illegal. Vähi was not merely seeing phantoms. Months later, in 1992, the parliamaentarian Vladimir Lebedev told me that he believed a Transdniester would occur if Estonians tried to stop the election for a parliament of noncitizens, which was then scheduled to take place on September 13. While he insisted he was a "moderate," he feared that extremists would carry the day. And he said to me pointblank: if there is any shooting against the Russians, he would join those Russians fighting for independence. Similarly, at the time of the Narva autonomy referendum of July 1993, which the Estonian government declared illegal, rumors abounded that armed thugs or Cossacks were waiting across the border for a call for help. It was said that if Prime Minister Laar had used police to close the polling, these thugs would have crossed the "Friendship Bridge" over the Narva River and intervened.

The tensions over the establishment of republican sovereignty led young men to think of taking up arms. I had a long conversation with Sasha, nineteen years old in October 1993. He had been married since he was seventeen and already had a two-year-old child. He was working at the Narva furniture factory for 240 kroons per month. He was planning to take off from work that current week to go to Tallinn to

[20] Karl Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

respond to a notice that Russian citizens could get two to three thousand kroons per month to join in some militia. My sense is that he was doing this out of shame at his low salary, especially in comparison to his wife's, who was a skilled seamstress and worked in one of the very few shops still operating in the Krenholm factory. He decided later not to go to Tallinn, after a lawyer advised him that if he went abroad as a fighter for Russia, he might never be able to reenter Estonia, or reinstate his permanent residence rights, and he feared permanent separation from his family. Nonetheless, he is the type that, if the conditions were right, would have joined an anti-Estonian militia.

I spoke to another young Russian man in Estonia in the unsettling months of fall 1993 who had been a cadet during perestroika and had come to believe that Gorbachev was a CIA agent out to destroy the Soviet Union. He hated Yeltsin and believed that he had sold Russia out to the Americans. He liked Vice-President Rutskoi, and he himself had wanted to serve under his command in Afghanistan. He was also unemployed. He knew that there were gangs of young people, his age, on the other side of the border, eager to recruit young Russian-Estonians to vandalize Narva in the name of Russia. He was tempted and felt that unless the economic situation improved, many young people like himself would yield to that temptation.

Extremist groups have brought areas of Ukraine to the brink of ethnic war. The most visible formation is the UNA-UNSO, which regularly denounces Russia for its "imperialist plundering" of Ukraine. More to the fringe, yet more ominous in its rhetoric, is the *Derzhavna samostiinist' Ukrainy* (DSU). In November 1993, Viktor Desiatnykov wrote of efforts by the DSU to bring *sanatsiia* (sanitizing; i.e., extermination of the enemy) to Ukraine. DSU, he wrote, is recruiting small detachments of nationalists, comprised of eight people each, to "take care of" anti-Ukrainian political parties and commercial banking structures.[21] DSU chairman Roman Koval' said that the most urgent task is to instill in the youth aggressiveness, a spirit of revenge, and a commitment to the inevitable punishment of the enemies of Ukraine. The slogan "Death to the Invaders!" is his. In December 1994, the radical nationalist Volodymyr Yavors'kyi, interviewed in *Molod' Ukrainy*, said that "we reject democracy and espouse force and struggle as the spiritual foundation of our union, while the . . . KUN (Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists [the direct descendants of the national liberation movement, the OUN, from the Second World War]) has adopted democracy and objects to a powerful struggle [*sylovu borot'bu*]. We think that it is a big mistake. . . . Our priority task is to fully force out from Ukraine Russian cultural-economic domination."[22]

There had been violence in the streets as well. The violence during the celebration of the 1944 liberation from Germany in Ivano-Frankovsk was probably instigated by UNA-UNSO activists. The UNA-UNSO was also behind a conflict involving

[21] Viktor Desiatnykov, "Zahony Sanatsi vyrushaiut' . . . ," *Demokratychna Ukraina* (in Ukrainian), December 11, 1993.

[22] Volodymyr Yavors'kyi, "My prahnemo ukrains'koi Ukrainy," *Molod' Ukrainy* (in Ukrainian), December 15, 1994.

the attempted liberation of the Kyiv-Patriarchate Church from its supposed subordination to the Moscow Patriarchate. In July 1995, Ukrainian nationalists demanded that the body of Patriarch Volodymyr, the formal head of the Kyiv Church, be buried at the St. Sophia complex in Kiev, an act that would have compelled the government to take sides on a religious issue, one that would set Russians against Ukrainians, something it did not want to do. During the funeral procession, UNA-UNSO paramilitary demonstrators broke through police lines to dig a symbolic grave in front of St. Sophia. They were brutally repelled by riot police. In L'viv, in an incident provoked by the KUN, Stepan Khmara, the son of a famous OUN patriot, was arrested after his parliamentary immunity was suspended for attacking an MVD (Interior Ministry) officer. At a later date, he organized a number of confrontations in order to provoke incidents between Russians and Ukrainians. For example, he recruited trainloads of followers to travel to Crimea in order to stand in visible opposition to secessionist tendencies there.[23] To be sure, ultranationalist Ukrainians do not have a monopoly on fighting words. In Crimea, Sergei Shuvainikov, often called "the Crimean Zhirinovskii," has been most provocative in his public outbursts. The point here is that in Ukraine, there are reasonable fears of ethnic war.[24]

In both Estonia and Ukraine, violence has been contained. In Estonia, notwithstanding Lebedev's provocative comments or the appeal of pan-Russian militias, there seems to be an implicit compact on both sides of the ethnic divide to define acts of violence as random or caused by other factors than ethnic ones. Consider Vähi's mission to the northeast in the wake of the 1991 putsch in Moscow. Although he described the situation as lawless, his meetings with the local councils took place without any personal attacks or threats to the peace. In an interview with me in October 1993, he recalled that period of service as being difficult, but not personally threatening.

The lack of a real threat to the peace is a recurrent theme among people who have actually dealt with interethnic affairs in Estonia. Artur Kuznetsov, the first minister of nationality affairs in the Popular Front coalition, confirmed this view. Although he was anything but hopeful for the future of his Russian community in Estonia, he emphasized to me in 1991 that "our situation is without violence between ethnic groups, without sharp confrontations with victims. . . . Now Estonia is the only republic in the Soviet Union without one person hurt in the ethnic violence, we have had no victims." In my first interview with Mart Rannut, the general director of the State Department of Language, I learned that he was treated brusquely by Russians in his professional role. But he lives in an apartment complex with mostly Russian families. The only interpersonal incident he could report that reflected tension was that his neighbors surreptitiously turned the TV antennas on top of his building to

[23] April 12, 1991: RFE/RE Report; for the train brigade, see "Kak uchili odessitov nen'ku-rodinu liubit'," *Izvestiia*, March 3, 1992.

[24] On nationalist fringe groups in Ukraine, see Dominique Arel, "Ukraine: Stability through Ambiguity," Minority Rights Group (London), 1995. It should be re-emphasized that these ultranationalist groups do not have wide popular support. Altogether there are no more than a dozen ultranationalist deputies in the Ukrainian parliament. But they are quite visible.

improve the reception of the Leningrad station.[25] During his campaign for the presidency of Estonia in 1992, Rein Taagepera attended meetings of Russian militants and stood face-to-face with a Russian paramilitary guard, and never felt himself to be in personal danger.[26] Estonian high school students from Narva have told me that when they go into Russian bars late at night, they don't feel like they are in any special danger because they are Estonians.

Even in my interviews with radicals who raised the possibility of a Moldova or Yugoslavia in Estonia, there was no evidence of preparation for or expectation of communal hostility.[27] Ahto Siig, an Estonian journalist living in Narva, was able to show me some cracks in a window of the Estonian secondary school in Narva, and blamed them on vandalism by Russian hooligans who were incited by the propaganda pamphlets dropped from Soviet aircraft in March 1988. But he had no evidence (or even heard any rumors) of trigger-happy youths ready to take advantage of a tense political situation by engaging in violent acts. And Dr. Vladimir Khomiakov, a pediatrician who became a radical self-appointed spokesman for the plight of the Russians in northeast Estonia, who told me that a "Yugoslavia" was imminent in Estonia, had to admit to me that there were no weapons caches in either community, and that the young generation of Russians is totally apolitical and unmotivated to fight against Estonian oppression.

In a security community there is no expectation of violence, and therefore no preparation for defense against it. Yet if violence does occur, under conditions of a security community, there must be a common interpretive framework on both sides of a cleavage to define that violence in terms that do not refer to that cleavage. This is certainly what has occurred in Estonia. In July 1992, Moscow TV reported on five incidents of Molotov cocktails thrown on the balcony of the Russian ambassador's residence (in Estonia, it is called Zhdanov's balcony). In that same month, Moscow TV reported that a local citizen shot through the tire of a Russian military vehicle in Estonia. Also, TV reports that a Narva-based group called Ours was organizing to fight in Transdniester. A soldier from that war was buried in Narva, and the Russian Intermovement was said to have organized the funeral. In the wake of these incidents, however, there was no rhetoric of expected escalation. Spokesmen on both sides of the nationality divide treated these as isolated incidents and did not even consider them as invitations for revenge.

Political developments in Estonia's northeast have been highly conflictual; but even there without raising the specter of violence. Consider the referenda in the northeast cities in summer 1993 that many feared would bring Estonia to the brink of war. Earlier that year the Riigikogu had passed a series of laws that Russian-speakers saw as discriminatory, culminating with a Law on Aliens that threatened their future ability even to reside in Estonia. In response, leaders of the Russian-speaking population organized local referenda seeking support for territorial autonomy. The Estonian government declared these referenda illegal on the grounds that

[25] Interview with author, June 20, 1991, Tallinn.
[26] Reported in *Estonian Independent*, May 9, 1991.
[27] Ahto Siig, Vladimir Khomiakov, interviews with author, May 24, 1993, Narva.

the constitution had already stipulated that Estonia was a unitary state. I have already mentioned the rumors about the armed bands poised to cross the border. As the date of the referenda approached, international journalists hovered over Narva like ravens, positioning themselves to capture the early battles in what was perhaps to be the next Transdniester.

"Hot" July turned out to be cool, however, and journalists left without a big story. One reason for the peaceful outcome was international pressure. U.S. support for a roundtable discussion (a rather effective use of a mere $15,000 of taxpayer money to get talks started), and wily diplomacy by Max van der Stoel of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) helped work out a compromise in which the election would be held but in which the outcome would not matter.[28] But a stunning move by President Lennart Meri, mentioned earlier as an example of the power of Russian mobilization, was also of great consequence. He humiliated his own prime minister by refusing to sign the initial legislation for the Law on Aliens until it was reviewed by legal experts in the Council of Europe. These experts recommended some softening of registration requirements, and the Riigikogu was compelled to accept these changes. These changes helped defuse some of the rhetoric of those calling for autonomy. The Estonian government permitted the referenda to take place. The results were overwhelmingly positive, though the procedures were questionable. Months later, the Supreme Council of Estonia nullified the results. Autonomy was not granted. Despite the explosiveness of the situation, as I learned from many interviews, no one in Narva (Russian or Estonian) bought arms to protect themselves or their families. This suggests that no one in Estonia took the rumors of armed Cossacks on the other side of the border seriously.

In the year following hot July, there were moments when social order could have broken down, but given the peaceful resolutions of past conflicts between Russians and Estonians, no one expected interethnic violence to break out. The first local elections, scheduled for October 1993, was one such moment. The Estonian Constitution of 1992 stipulated that self-governing localities would have their own elections for city council and mayor, and that permanent residents who were not citizens would have voting rights. It was assumed at the time that voting rights meant the right to vote and be voted for, and Estonian government officials assured foreign observers worried about possible nationality conflicts that this was indeed the case. But when spring 1993 arrived and it was time for local elections, there was still no election law to guide the process. The press hinted that even middle-of-the-road Estonians were worried about the possibility of noncitizens getting positions of local power. Former prime minister Tiit Vähi, who lost out to the more nationalist Isamaa coalition, asked in March, "Can someone who isn't a citizen be held responsible for Estonia's state problems?"[29] And on May 19, with only fifteen votes opposed, the Riigikogu adopted the election law that denied noncitizens the right to run for office in the elections to be held on October 17. Most delegates in the

[28] In 1995 it was renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
[29] See the *Baltic Observer*, March 26, 1993.

Riigikogu knew that they were violating the spirit, if not the letter, of the constitution, but they felt it was more important to undermine the Russian-dominated city councils in the northeast. They also stipulated that mayors had to be not only citizens but also fully competent speakers of Estonian. Thus they hoped to remove or bar from power those Russian-speaking politicians who had received citizenship for service to the state, but who themselves could not have passed the citizenship examination.

The law severely diminished the autonomy of the majority populations in the northeastern towns. First, given the population in the northeastern cities, there was a critical lack of candidates eligible to run in these elections. Therefore, the Estonian government, by virtue of its ability to grant citizenship to Russian-speakers for "service to the state," had enormous power to co-opt leaders who would be eligible candidates. The government was thereby assured that only moderates would hold office. Second, given the incentives of the electoral formula—a modified d'Hondt system, where the total number of votes that a party list received would enhance the chances of any candidate on the list—candidates on long electoral lists had a better chance to win than those on a short list. Consequently, politicians who were best able to recruit ethnic Estonians onto their lists (and thereby lengthening them) were more likely to win themselves. This also brought power to those Russians and Estonians most willing to make cross-ethnic alliances. Third, given the linguistic job requirements for mayors (which almost no Russian-speakers in the northeast could meet) a semi-itinerant group of Estonians who had an interest in administration and some exposure to the region, placed themselves as candidates for mayor, often in more than one city. In the electoral concourse in Narva, where all candidates gave speeches and answered questions, I heard one Russian-speaker whisper that the citizens of Narva were voting for their colonial officer. Despite this set of humiliations, especially for the politicians of the old order, the towns of the northeast remained peaceful and participated in these elections at higher rates than did Estonians in Tallinn. Conflict and humiliation did not, in this case, lead to violence.[30]

In the subsequent months in Narva, there were a few well-publicized murders of prominent Russians. Never was there a finger pointed to any Estonian (qua Estonian); and in my interview with the secretary of the Narva Court, I found that there were no murders that reached the court in which one nationality member was accused of killing a member from another nationality. But in the era of the mafia, she told me, with high officials being in some way implicated, most murder cases do not reach the courts. In late 1995, the only Estonian secondary school in Narva was destroyed by arson. Everyone from Interior Minister Edgar Savisaar to the spokesmen for the Russian community interpreted this attack as an act by the Russian mafia against the police powers of the state. No ethnic retribution followed.

[30] Fuller details of both the referenda and the October 1993 elections are available in David D. Laitin, "The Russian-Speaking Nationality in Estonia: Two Quasi-Constitutional Elections," *East European Constitutional Review* 2, no. 4; 3, no. 1 (Fall 1993/ Winter 1994): 23–27.

Consider the following incident in Narva in May 1994. There was a session in one of the Houses of Culture with a delegation from Tallinn made up of high officials from the Ministry of Immigration. The meeting brought out all the hotheads in the Russian-speaking community, who were excoriating the ministers at every opportunity. The members of the delegation were dressed in expensive suits, and compared to the drab coats worn by the pensioners, the largest group at the meeting, their suits looked like imperial uniforms. The delegates refused to speak Russian and communicated to Narvans through interpreters, which only increased the sense of distance between rulers and ruled. Yet after the rather vitriolic session, as I saw the government ministers leave for their next meeting in a bus without police protection and without incident. Neither side expected violence or sought to provoke it.

In 1996 the Estonian government raised the language requirements for citizenship, which made it even more difficult for Russian-speaking candidates to run in local elections. In response, Iurii Mishin, the head of the Union of Russian Citizens in Narva, went to the streets in protest. Estonian state authorities threatened to try him on sedition charges. Yet the security community survived. Press reports revealed that all parties felt that the conflict would be resolved through negotiations, and neither side made any visible preparations for violent conflict.[31]

The key to the containment of interethnic violence in Estonia in the post-Soviet period is that no one expects it. When no one expects violence, no one prepares extensively for defense against it. When no one makes any preparations to defend themselves against interethnic violence, no one fears that defensive weapons might be used offensively. This sense of no expectation of violence is the essence of what Deutsch meant by the term "security community." A security community exists in the minds of strategic planners, or individuals who cross boundaries, and it is sometimes (but not always) recognized in institutional practice. In Estonia, the security community contains a self-fulfilling prediction that acts of violence between persons of different nationalities do not constitute internationality violence, and therefore do not call for ethnic retaliation. This expectation has been an important mechanism in containing violence in Estonia.

In neighboring Latvia, however, there are signs that the tensions between Russians and Latvians could lead to bloodshed. Indeed there are signs that Russians are growing indignant with Latvians *qua* Latvians. *Diena* reported on a member of the language inspectorate working in Liepaja who complained of impolite treatment and threatening letters and phone calls.[32] In fact, the director of the Latvian Language Bureau, Dzintra Hirsche, told Pettai and me that after Zhirinovskii's parliamentary success in 1993, many inspectors had been attacked, and that one received a broken jaw, and another was beaten into blindness. One inspector's apartment was bombed, she recounted to us in a tone of resigned indignation during an interview on April 25, 1994. But there is a broader anger that is evident in our observations. Leading Russians from the Popular Front (PF) period are angry about the capture

[31] See the *Baltic Times*, May 16–22, 1996.

[32] "Valodas inspektoriem Liepaja draud ar izrekinasanos," *Diena*, March 12, 1994.

of the movement by radical nationalists in the mid-1990s. An article by V. Bykov in the press takes the ditty from the PF era ("we are building a common home") and says that these songs no longer sound the same to the many Russians who signed the petitions demanding Latvian independence.[33] In my conversations with Alex Grigorievs, former journalist and PF activist, I heard the same theme of angry disillusionment. In my first meeting with him in the summer of 1991, he showed anger at Russians (from Russia) who took the best apartments in town, leaving Latvians (as he then considered himself, though of Russian nationality) in cold-water flats. But by 1995 (at a chance encounter, at the convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies), he was complaining to me that the Latvians were undermining all hopes for an open society. Or, as one student who feared the loss of university education in Russian put it: "Up till now, I didn't think anything bad about the Latvian government . . . but now it seems they've suddenly begun to push us toward confrontation." To be sure, there has been no mobilized violence between Latvians and Russians in Latvia. Nor are there any threats of a spiral of violence. Still, no one seems confident that there will always be peace between the two nationalities either. Thus, if violence does break out between gangs from the two nationalities, it will probably be difficult to contain.

Ukraine does not enjoy the interethnic security community that I observed in Estonia. Its potential for violence is more like Latvia's, though it comes from a different source. Ordinary citizens are not buying guns to protect their families; local ethnic entrepreneurs are not storing weapons against a day when internationality violence does erupt. But people are taking the provocations by the ardent Ukrainian nationalists and the equally provocative acts of the Russian Crimean leaders to gain autonomy for their peninsula very seriously. In 1994, Ukrainian troops were reported to have begun a march to Crimea to assure that no secession occurred.

The major mechanism holding back interethnic violence in Ukraine and Kazakhstan—identified earlier as the international relations viewpoint[34]—is the feeling by Russians in both of these republics that if they were ever terrorized (*qua* Russians) by the titulars, the Russian Federation would come to their aid. They did not therefore feel a need to fight for autonomy (as did the Serbs in Croatia) before the newly independent states gained sufficient power to suppress them. But another mechanism reducing the likelihood of interethnic violence in these two republics is the embarrassing fact (for both sides) that the boundaries of opposition are not at all clear. For example, the significant percentage of Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the east, south, and central Ukraine makes it virtually impossible for Ukrainian leaders to count on the support of all Ukrainians in an ethnic confrontation with Russians. Similarly, Russians cannot easily act *as* Russians against Ukrainians, because they share a common interest with Russian-speaking Ukrainians, whom they do not wish to antagonize.

[33] V. Bykov, "My postroim obshchii dom, ochen' druzhno zazhiviom . . . ," *SM-Segodnia*, March 10, 1994.

[34] This is the interpretation James Fearon presents in his paper "Ethnic War as a Commitment Problem."

One result of this *pas de trois* is that the greatest venom spewed in the Ukrainian political context is intra-ethnic, of "pure" Ukrainians against russianized Ukrainians. In everyday life, there was a kind of pejorative attitude from westerners about people from the east. The latter were called *skhidniaki* (easterners, but in a derogatory sense) in Ukrainian. In political debate they have been referred to as *bezbatchenkamy* ("those without a homeland"). "Degenerate" is another common trope. Russophones, claims Oleksa Novak, are "characterized by a disrespectful attitude toward everything Ukrainian. [They are] *comprised of Russians and national-degenerated [vyrodzheni] groups of Ukrainians* from the east and south. . . . These people do not believe in the renaissance of Ukraine, in its statehood."[35] In another context, Yosyp Bahlai held that those who applauded President Kuchma's call for granting Russian the status of an official language were "pro-imperial communo-chauvinists and degenerate 'Russian-speaking' Ukrainians with family names ending in 'enko' [which constitutes] the irrefutable [proof] of their Cossack descent."[36] In a similar vein, the national communist Vitalii Karpenko has written that "it is a myth that independence is responsible for the current critical state of our economy, state, and society. This fabrication is spread by people who are not at all patriots of Ukraine, but by people who have in their genes the instinct of a slave, people who are used to bend and serve with servility [*prysluzhuvaty*]—they simply do not know another life."[37] Arel's informant Oleksandra, a Ukrainian from Poltava, on the Left Bank, who speaks good eastern Ukrainian at home, gave Arel a vivid reminder of how these stereotypes create divides between peoples. She told him that at her Institute (of Foreign Languages, in Kiev), they were told, in Ukrainian, that someone who does not master his/her mother tongue [meaning here the mother tongue of their nationality] is not psychically normal. She is troubled by that. This intra-Ukrainian rhetoric is as hot as any rhetoric one would see between groups on the brink of interethnic violence.

Ukrainian analysis of the intra-Ukrainian divide suggests that it is the source of many of Ukraine's problems. One Ukrainian article argued that "we do not simply have a situation of bilingualism. What we have is a fissure [*rozkolyna*] at the very core of Ukrainian culture."[38] In another article, A. Marenych writes that "among residents of Ukraine there are many Russians and, which is so annoying, Ukrainians who . . . due to spiritual poverty of mind or intellectual laziness are evading the use of Ukrainian, although the great majority knows it. In this way they are not supporting Ukrainian independence, do not believe in it, and have some hope for a return of Ukraine to a new colonial slavery."[39] In this case it is the intra-Ukrainian divide which the author is sharpening. And so, Dmitrii Kornilov, leader of the

[35] Oleksa Novak, "Do pytannia pro natsional'ni menshyny Ukrainy," *Klyn* (in Ukrainian), no. 8, 1993; my emphasis.

[36] Yosyp Bahlai, "Ofitsiina chy derzhavna mova, abo Liapas Prezydenta Zakonovi pro movy v Ukraini," *Shliakh peremohy* (in Ukrainian), September 10, 1994.

[37] Vitalii Karpenko, "Peredvyborni mify," *Vechirnii Kyiv* (in Ukrainian), January 12, 1994.

[38] "Zaiava-protest," *Shliakh peremohy* (in Ukrainian), July 16, 1994.

[39] Anton Marenych, "Masky zniato, bud'mo pyl'nymy!" *Molod' Ukrainy* (in Ukrainian), October 11, 1994.

Intermovement of the Donbas, told Arel (and his collaborator Andrew Wilson) in an interview in July 1993,

> The real conflict is not between Ukraine and Russia, but within the Ukrainian ethnos. [The fight is between pure Ukrainians and] those Ukrainians who think that Ukraine is part of a general Russian [*obshcherusskoi, obshcherossiiskoi*] culture. They simultaneously think of themselves as "Little Russians" as distinct from the Great and White Russians, and, on a higher plane, part of the same nation [*edinaia natsiia*] and [stand apart from] the separatists [*samostiiniki,*] who think that Ukraine and Russia are absolutely distinct, that Ukraine never understood Russia, and vice versa. This struggle has been going on for two centuries.

It is the battle for the souls of the "degenerated" Ukrainians that helps keep internationality conflict between Russians and Ukrainians on a back burner.

In Kazakhstan, as in Ukraine, intra-Kazakh tensions, between the Kazakh russophones (the *mankurty*) and pure titulars, are quite evident in daily life. The cosmopolitan mankurty stereotype the Kazakh nationalists as uncultured. For example, Nurlan Amrekulov wrote, "It is this rural mass with its traditional reverence to the authority structure that is supporting the movement for a strong authoritarian state." His alternative is the small group of mankurty, as "it is this thin layer, acting in unison with the Russian democratic intelligentsia, that is capable of steering the country in a centrist position, and there is absolutely no other alternative to this position in Kazakhstan in the given conditions."[40]

The fissure between the mankurty and the so-called pure Kazakhs has deep roots. As far back as the 1940s, A. Zhovtis claims that he "could not help but notice the animosity between the Russian-speaking and Kazakh-speaking Kazakhs. The latter hated and envied their Russian-speaking brethren. There were all kinds of petty squabbles, intrigues and so on." And he sees evidence of all this today. "Just look at the new minister of science and technology. He is a highly qualified Russian-speaking Kazakh and now he is being swallowed by the nationalists." In an earlier interview, Zhovtis angrily pointed out:

> Just look at Nurkadilov [the infamous mayor of Almaty]. He is far worse than Ruslan Khasbulatov [the equally infamous parliamentary ally of Rutskoi]. All those rural migrants constitute his support base. Such people are responsible for this new polarization and segregation within the society. They simply cannot tolerate Russian-speaking Kazakhs. Russians think they are being persecuted. But they [Russians] simply do not understand what the hell is going on inside.

The irony here is that Nurkadilov and other populists who claim to represent the interests of the pure Kazakhs, are themselves russophones. Take for example a political meeting of all opposition groups that took place in Almaty's Dom Demokratii on November 3, 1993. All discussion was in Russian, and pure Russian at that.

[40] Nurlan Amrekulov, "Demokraticheskii potentsial kazakhskoi intelligentsii: ispytanie suverenitetom," *Panorama*, March 1993, p. 3.

There was no code-mixing or code-switching. Dave noticed Zhasaral Kuanishuli, the uncompromising nationalist, who in November 1992 had written an extremely virulent, angry polemic, published originally in a Kazakh newspaper and translated in *Vechernaia Alma-Ata* for the Russian-speaking Kazakhs. She was surprised to hear him speaking excellent, unaccented Russian at the meeting. This shows, as a practical matter, it is impossible to enter the Kazakhstan political arena without being a russophone. In this case, the fissure between the pure Kazakhs and the mankurty is not as raw as the parallel cleavage in Ukraine.

Meanwhile, the tensions between Russians and Kazakhs seem to dominate, at least when it comes to the production of ethnic vitriol. Consider the following episode: one evening, Almas (speaking in high Kazakh) was narrating a story to friends that had them laughing uproariously. It had several references to some (Russian) drunkard, implying that Kazakhs who spoke the pure language like he did would never drink vodka like that. Sheker, the head (*bastik*) of the oblast department in charge of cultural activities, had a related view of the Russians: "There are very few Russians in Kyzyl-Orda," she observed,

> because they are a shrewd people. They have taken over the best lands of the Kazakhs. They won't live where the soil isn't very good, where there is little water. After all, they need their dachas, with all the greeneries, berries, etc. They want to live in the midst of plenty, and won't tolerate any hardships. The Kazakhs, on the other hand, are very tolerant people who can put up with a great deal of hardship. They will never complain, or express displeasure, and they will never leave their native place [*tugan zheri*]. Russians have no such ties. If it gets hard to live at one place, they will simply pack and leave. No wonder they are all over.

Then she asked Dave to "look at Zhirinovskii. People like him have no roots, they are of obscure origins. That's why no land is enough for them." Mira, whom Dave met at a party, had strong anti-Russian feelings. In the following remarks, her tirade was aimed at Igor, the Russian husband in a Kazakh family:

> As soon as even a little step is taken to restore the prestige, culture, and self-respect of Kazakhs, many people are immediately offended. They simply don't understand. All these years there was unabashed russification. All the Kazakh schools were closed one after another. I came from a village in Jambul oblast to Almaty at the age of six, and knew no Russian whatsoever. My mother was a single parent. She came to Almaty in search for a job and some relatives helped her to get settled. There were no Kazakh schools. I was sent to a Russian school. My mother told me all the time that you have to learn Russian well, even better than Russians themselves, if you want to live like a human being. Stop crying and work hard. Thanks to my mother's insistence, and the fact that I had to give it back to those Russians who would look at us as if we are uncivilized, just because we did not speak Russian. Now I know Russian much better than they know it themselves. I finished the school with distinction, got the best "diploma" and medals, etc., and got admitted to the university on my own merit without any *blat*. We never said a word then. We couldn't . . . when they

> would not let us study in Kazakh. Now things are changing, though so slowly, just a little step is taken in the direction of reviving Kazakh, which was on the edge of extinction, and people start complaining about discrimination.

Discrimination against Russians, now popular, is a theme in everyday conversation. For example, Madina, a young Kazakh mother who is married to a Russian, mentioned to Dave that a neighbor had come to her apartment, collecting money for fixing a lock in the building. She gratuitously mentioned, believing Madina to be as pure Kazakh as she, how "nice it would be for us when these Russians leave. Then we won't have to live in such a faraway district [*mikroraion*]. . . . It will be so much easier to get jobs and so on."

Aziza Zhunispeisova, who was the only surviving child out of sixteen siblings and illiterate, although critical of Russians, was more ambivalent. "We will remain dependent on Russia for years and years to come," she told Dave.

> Russians, especially those who came here during the virgin lands campaign, are slovenly, and extremely limited. They sent all those criminals, drunkards, and idlers from villages in Russia and Siberia. The Russian village has often been in a terrible state, not much better than the Kazakh *aul*. They sent such swindlers and idlers from these villages to us, "to build factories and cities" and these became our urban citizens. Russian people wanted that we remain grateful to them all our life. True, Kazakhs did not know how to work in factories. But did these Russians know? At least those who came here in the 1920s and 1930s were different. They respected our culture, and our language. They all learned Kazakh. If they knew Kazakh, they got a raise in their salary.

Kazakh ethnic self-criticism is prominent in current discourse as well. Here is an analysis from Nellia, Madina's mother, who had in the course of a visit mentioned something about her dacha. Dave seemed surprised that a Kazakh would have a dacha. Nellia reported that this is not at all common, as nomads never really had to work the soil and don't know how to use it productively. But her family was exposed to agriculture a long time ago, and she loves growing her own vegetables and fruits and living far away from the city. Then she went on to say how most Kazakhs are lazy. In the past when "everything was easily available," she explained, there was no need for Kazakhs to grow their own vegetables or fruits. But now, in her opinion, things are so expensive that a person cannot survive without a garden. Now Kazakhs envy all the Russians for having the dachas, but in the past when they were given plots of land, they grazed sheep on it or neglected it. "Just by a look at the property," she sardonically advised, "you can tell who lives there. If you see flowers all around, very well-mowed grass, there is no doubt that it is a German family. When you see lots of berries and vegetables, it is surely owned by a Russian. And when you see an abandoned piece of land, some hungry dogs running around, you know what kind of an owner [*khoziain*] it is."

Russians, as we have seen, are not shy when it comes to stereotyping the Kazakhs. For example, talking about Islam and fundamentalism, Boris (a senior

scientist in Almaty) mentioned how Kazakhs are far more *dikie narody* (savage people) than the Uighurs, Uzbeks, or Tadzhiks, who had some "civilization." Kazakhs, being "savage" in the sense of being uncivilized, are far more receptive to various influences, whether Baptists, Hare Krishnas, or Jehovah's Witnesses. "The party is dead, the *komsomol* is dead, and they have few traditions, but the need to believe in something is there nonetheless. So Baptists and other new sects serve a function." Then Boris referred to the psychology of dependence on Russia from which Kazakhs suffer. He pointed out a sign he read near a gas station "Out of gas; Russia didn't send any" ("Benzina net, Rossiia gaz ne daiot"). He laughed, saying that of course they mention nothing about Kazakhstan's unwillingness (or inability) to pay for it.

The cleavage pattern in Ukraine and Kazakstan has certain parallels, but with important distinctions. In neither country do the Russians feel the need to fight for autonomy. In both, the Russians feel that they can count on help from Russia, should violence break out. The titulars of both countries are also divided by a linguistic intranationality cleavage of some importance. The titular populations of both countries are also divided along regional (in Ukraine) or clan (in Kazakhstan) lines. In Ukraine the regional issue surpasses the ethnic as a source of political conflict, and in Kazakhstan, disputes among the three hordes dominates discussions about government distributions and jobs to a greater degree than any tension between the mankurty and the nationalists or the Russians and the Kazakhs. In both cases, these divisions have helped to prevent (or perhaps only delay) internationality violence.

For practical purposes, the security community that exists in Estonia and the expectation that Russia will come to the aid of the Russian-speakers in Kazakhstan and Ukraine if the need arises have the same result—interethnic peace. But if conditions change—if, for example, Russia becomes less able to project force in the near abroad—the two mechanisms will have somewhat different results. It is unlikely that either ethnic community would take advantage of a new power balance in Estonia; but in Ukraine and Kazakhstan, the nontitulars would react quickly, perhaps even arm themselves, to protect their security.

Reconfiguration of the Choice Set: Toward a Russian-Speaking Nationality

A principal theme of this book is that as Russians in the near abroad decide whether to assimilate, to organize politically as Russians, or to return to their putative homeland, the basic identity categories that guided them in the past become eroded. Russians in all four republics are, with varying degrees of self-consciousness, inventing new categories of identity to help them make sense of who they are. One self-description becoming pervasive in all four republics is that of a "Russian-speaking population" (*russkoiazychnoe naselenie*).[41] It is significant that experienced

[41] According to A. D. Dulichenko, *Russkii iazyk kontsa XX stoletiia* (Munich: O. Sagner, 1994), p. 205, the first time this term appears as a noun in a dictionary is in the twenty-ninth edition of the *Orphograpicheskii slovar'* (1991), where it is defined as the equivalent of *sovetskii* (Soviet).