

Traditional Peacekeeping

Traditional peacekeeping is the conceptual point of departure for all the other types of peace operations. It is often associated with chronological typologies of peace operations, but this is inaccurate (see chapter 1). Chapters 3 to 5 have demonstrated that traditional peacekeeping was neither the sole form of peace operations undertaken during the Cold War nor exclusive to that era. Traditional peacekeeping today comprises both ongoing operations that began during the Cold War and newer ones. This highlights the enduring perception of its utility and also its continued ability to influence the conduct of other types of mission.

The first section of this chapter examines traditional peacekeeping's core assumptions and the historical factors that influenced its development. The second section then considers how it has been applied in practice by looking at UNEF I in the Middle East, the UN's ongoing operation in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the recently terminated mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). The final section reflects upon some of the limitations of traditional peacekeeping and raises questions about the value of using it as the conceptual basis for all the other types of operations.

7.1 What is traditional peacekeeping?

Although there is no consensus on what activities constitute traditional peacekeeping, its underlying principles and implied objectives are reasonably clear (Diehl 1994: 13; Durch 1994a: 1–3; Goulding 1993: 452). Traditional conceptions of peacekeeping are premised on the so-called holy trinity of consent, impartiality and the minimum use of force (see figure 7.1).

Traditional peacekeeping is intended to assist in the creation and maintenance of conditions conducive to long-term conflict resolution by the parties themselves, often in conjunction with international mediation (see box 7.1). In practice, this means non-coercive, consent-based activities, usually to support a peace process or interim ceasefire, to help prevent the resumption or escalation of violence, and/or to establish a stable peace. Traditional peacekeeping is therefore what Alan James described as 'an activity of a secondary kind' (1990: 1). It is neither a creative force in wider conflict resolution processes nor a coercive instrument in defence of such processes. As activities of




Figure 7.1 The 'holy trinity' of traditional peacekeeping

a secondary kind, the creation and success of traditional peacekeeping missions depend upon the consent and positive contribution of the disputants.

Traditional peacekeeping usually takes place in the period between a ceasefire and a political settlement and is designed to cultivate the degree of confidence between belligerents necessary to establish a process of political dialogue. As such, it is based on three assumptions: the primary belligerents are states; the combatant units are hierarchically organized, Clausewitzian militaries; and the protagonists wish to end the conflict and search for a political resolution.

Traditional peacekeeping activities typically range from simple observation and fact-finding to monitoring compliance with the conditions of ceasefires and physical interposition between the belligerents. Peacekeepers monitor

Box 7.1 Some popular definitions of traditional peacekeeping

[Operations] involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers... to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict. These operations are voluntary and are based on consent and co-operation... they achieve their objectives not by force of arms, thus contrasting them with the 'enforcement action' of the United Nations under Article 42. (UN 1990: 4)

Field operations established by the United Nations with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under United Nations command and control, at the expense collectively of the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them, acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary. (Goulding 1993: 455)

Peacekeeping operations are generally undertaken under Chapter VI of the UN Charter with the consent of all the major parties to a conflict, to monitor and facilitate the implementation of a peace agreement. (HMSO 1999: 1.1)

... the imposition of neutral and lightly armed interposition forces following a cessation of armed hostilities, and with the permission of the state on whose territory these forces are deployed, in order to discourage a renewal of military conflict and promote an environment under which the underlying dispute can be resolved. (Diehl 1994: 13)

borders, help establish and patrol buffer zones separating opposing forces, verify the various aspects of demilitarization (including weapons decommissioning and troop withdrawals), and attempt to create a political space that will facilitate a political resolution of the conflict. They do not devise political solutions themselves or enforce agreements between the competing parties.

The conceptual roots of this approach to peacekeeping lie in the Cold War and the UN's attempt to develop a role for itself in the pursuit of international peace and security. Although the architects of the UN Charter envisaged a powerful institution capable of enforcing collective security, the rapid deterioration of relations between its two most influential members, the US and the USSR, meant that many of the instruments that were originally envisaged (including a standing army and a strong Military Staff Committee) failed either to materialize or to take on their assigned role (Lorenz 1999). Superpower rivalry soured working relations and created a lack of consensus in the Security Council. This meant that the organization was unable to fulfil the collective security function that was initially envisaged for it. The 1950 'Uniting for Peace' General Assembly resolution created an alternative way of thinking about the role of the UN in international conflicts, though this was a very different form of collective action than that initially envisaged by the Charter's authors (see chapters 2 and 3).

Within this context the UN adopted alternative techniques to fulfil its role in 'preventive diplomacy' sketched out by Secretary-General Hammarskjöld (see chapter 3), initially through observer missions but later in the form of traditional peacekeeping. Observer missions attempt to monitor a situation with the consent of the concerned parties and report their findings to the UN (Hillen 1998: 33–57). They are usually deployed following a ceasefire agreement in order to provide an impartial international presence to monitor compliance. They can also be deployed within a country to investigate allegations of criminal activity, humanitarian problems or external interference in domestic politics. This was the case with the first UN observer mission, sent to the Balkans in 1947 after Greece requested a UN presence on its territory to monitor the activities of its northern communist neighbours (Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia). Along with early UN efforts on the Indian subcontinent and in the Middle East, UNSCOB was in many respects the forerunner to traditional peacekeeping.

The fragile peace between the communist and non-communist fighters in the wartime Greek resistance movement fractured soon after liberation and Greece descended rapidly into civil war (O'Ballance 1966). As the war spread north, the communists began to receive material support from the surrounding communist states, particularly Tito's Yugoslavia. Greece complained to the UN about this external interference and the organization responded by sending a Commission of Investigation early in 1947. The resulting UNSCOB (1947–51) consisted of two-man teams working in six

areas along Greece's northern border. These teams reported back to the mission's small headquarters in Salonika, which in turn sent its findings directly to the General Assembly. Like the later traditional peacekeeping operations that its experiences informed, UNSCOB was meant to be impartial, its activities were entirely consent-based and it had no enforcement capabilities. Also, like its more complex successors, it suffered from variable levels of consent and cooperation from the parties to the dispute and considerable external constraints upon, and interference in, its work (Birgisson 1994a: 81–2).

The Cold War tensions apparent in the Greek civil war and throughout the Balkans more generally were indicative of the environment within which the UN was expected to work. Throughout the conflict the Security Council was deadlocked by Soviet vetoes and its rejection of UNSCOB's findings (Higgins 1981; Bailey and Daws 1998). Nevertheless, the fact that the organization played a limited role in the conflict provided the first example of its adaptation to the political constraints imposed by the Cold War.

During its first decade, the UN undertook two further missions under similar circumstances, in the Middle East (UNTSO, 1948–present) and on the Indian subcontinent (UNMOGIP, 1949–present). Both missions were premised on the same principles as UNSCOB and both were organized and deployed on a similarly ad hoc basis (UNTSO is discussed in more detail on the companion website). Thus, while in retrospect these early observer missions can be viewed as the progenitors of traditional peacekeeping, their significance as a distinct form of engagement was not acknowledged at the time.

While UNSCOB, UNMOGIP and, especially, UNTSO contributed significantly to the formulation of the key concepts of UN peacekeeping, and also highlighted some of its primary limitations, they were not directly responsible for the formalization of a traditional conception of peacekeeping. It was the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I), deployed to the Sinai in 1956, that provided the impetus for the codification of the organization's approach to peacekeeping for the next forty-five years. This mission helped produce a set of concepts that remain influential today. There were four main reasons for this:

- the deepening Cold War made it more difficult for the UN to pursue the collective security role envisaged for it in the Charter;
- the Suez Crisis prompted the organization to consider alternative techniques for promoting international peace and security and gave it a first opportunity to demonstrate that it had an important role to play in international conflicts;
- the greater complexity of UNEF I demanded conceptual clarification of the core tenets underpinning it;
- two highly influential figures, UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and the Canadian diplomat Lester B. Pearson, attempted to define a clear role for the UN in international conflict resolution.

More than any other individuals, Hammarskjöld and Pearson created a role for the UN in international peace and security at a time when heightened superpower rivalry threatened to exclude the organization from such issues entirely. Hammarskjöld, in consultation with Pearson and other influential advisers (such as Hans Engen of Norway and Frederick Boland of Ireland), developed the concept of preventive diplomacy (first formally expressed in the UN *Annual Report* of 1960). As we noted in chapter 3, Hammarskjöld conceived preventive diplomacy in a different fashion to the concept of the same name that was later described by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in *An Agenda for Peace* (1992: 11). Hammarskjöld understood it as preventing direct superpower confrontation rather than the violent conflict *per se* (UN 1960). By projecting an image of the UN as the neutral third party attempting to prevent conflict escalation, Hammarskjöld set important boundaries for the organization's activities within a climate of superpower rivalry. The UN thus acquired a significant, albeit limited, role in the maintenance of international peace and security. Within this, peacekeeping became the primary ingredient of Hammarskjöld's conception of preventive diplomacy.

Before the Suez Crisis, the UN's peacekeeping experience had been limited to the observer missions mentioned above. The organization could thus not afford to squander the opportunity to play a prominent role in resolving the crisis presented by the superpowers' mutual determination to avoid serious escalation. The creation of UNEF I was thus crucial, first as a practical demonstration of the UN's worth in such circumstances and subsequently to the development of the key concepts of traditional peacekeeping. The organizing principles that underpinned UNEF I (see box 7.2) became the guiding principles of traditional peacekeeping. They reflected the UN's limited past experience, the Cold War environment and the limited amount of time it had to put a viable operation together.

The details were hammered out in a few frantic days at the beginning of November 1956. Allowed considerable freedom of action by the Canadian government, Pearson played a leading role in the process by first broaching

Box 7.2 Hammarskjöld's principles for the conduct of UNEF I

- 1 UNEF was dependent upon the consent of the parties for both its deployment and future operations.
- 2 It would not constitute an enforcement action.
- 3 Its military functions would be strictly limited.
- 4 It should not in any way seek to influence the politico-military power balance between the parties.
- 5 It would be temporary in duration.

Source: Second Report of the Secretary-General on the Feasibility of a UN Emergency Force, 6 November 1956 (A/3302).

the idea of a UN force (informally with Hammarskjöld and then formally to the first Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly on 2 November). Hammarskjöld was initially sceptical about the viability of a UN force and spent many hours in discussion with Pearson exploring all the options (Urquhart 1994: 178–9). At Pearson's behest, the General Assembly then formally invited the Secretary-General to submit a report within forty-eight hours on the feasibility of establishing 'a United Nations Force large enough to keep these borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out' (General Assembly Resolution 998). These discussions between Hammarskjöld and his advisers concerning the potential nature of UN engagement were informed as much by political considerations about what the Security Council would permit the organization to do as by technical thoughts about what the aims and activities of peacekeepers should be (Urquhart 1994: 175–83). With France and Britain directly involved in the crisis and the two superpowers looking to avoid entanglement but nevertheless retaining strong interests in the region, Hammarskjöld believed that the UN needed to be pragmatic rather than idealistic in its approach. This perception contributed to the influential idea that peacekeeping was (and should be) an ad hoc response to particular problems rather than being guided by a rigid blueprint for international action.

Hammarskjöld remained sensitive to the Cold War context and tailored his response accordingly. His subsequent report led to the establishment of UNEF I on 5 November 1956 under General Assembly Resolution 1000, while his second, and final, report written overnight on 5–6 November and presented to the General Assembly the following day 'laid the foundations for an entirely new kind of international activity and set out principles and ideas that were to become the basis for future UN peacekeeping operations' (Urquhart 1994: 180). At its heart lay the 'holy trinity' of consent, impartiality and the minimum use of force.

UNEF I's subsequent claim to be a largely successful operation seemed to confirm Hammarskjöld's position, particularly his decision to keep faith with the lessons of previous observer missions as the basis for the more complicated operations envisaged by his embryonic concept of preventive diplomacy. It also filled him with confidence about the UN's potential in this area. In 1959, for instance, he argued that

the UN simply must respond to those demands which may be put to it. If we feel that those demands go beyond the present capacity... that in itself is not a reason why I, for my part, would say no, because I do not know the exact capacity of this machine. It did take the very steep hill of Suez; it may take even steeper hills. (UN 1959)

In this sense, UNEF I had a profound impact on the Secretary-General and, by extension, perceptions about the potential for UN peacekeeping more generally. Its core principles were enshrined in the concept of traditional peacekeeping and, largely unquestioned, continued to inform UN operations until

the end of the Cold War, when the changed international environment exposed its flaws (see chapter 4).

Those limitations (discussed below) were ever present and reflected the circumstances of the birth of the concept of traditional peacekeeping. The Westphalian character of traditional peacekeeping set the parameters for its techniques and defined its limits. Most obviously, reliance on the 'holy trinity' left no room for more forceful action when notional consent failed to translate into compliance with the UN's demands. This is an inevitable problem for a form of peacekeeping based on the Westphalian premise that its central aim is to create space for others to resolve conflict, not to do so itself. This means that, for traditional peacekeepers, 'the importance of the military factor in the equation of success is considerably less than the political factor' (Mackinlay 1989: 199). Traditional peacekeeping is founded on the assumption that the belligerents have the political will to resolve the conflict, an assumption that is often not supported in practice.

7.2 Traditional peacekeeping in practice

There are numerous examples of traditional peacekeeping operations in both the Cold War and post-Cold War periods (Hillen 1998: 13–30). This section concentrates upon three of the most significant. UNEF I is discussed because it represents the first major military peacekeeping operation which formally laid down the principles upon which traditional peacekeeping would be based. UNFICYP provides a particularly useful and ongoing illustration of the strengths and weaknesses of traditional peacekeeping, while UNMEE represents a more recent example of the challenges posed to traditional operations when the conflict parties withdraw their consent.

UNEF I in Egypt (1956–1967)

UNEF I came in response to the Suez Crisis, which threatened to trigger a wider escalation and possibly superpower confrontation. It provided the first serious test case for the UN to demonstrate that it could play the role of what Hammarskjöld later dubbed a 'preventive diplomat' (UN 1960). The background to the crisis was complex, but the immediate cause was the nationalization of the Suez Canal by President Nasser of Egypt in July 1956 (Rikhye 1978; James 1990: 210–23). Nasser had been frustrated by the British and American decisions to cancel their financial assistance for the building of the Aswan Dam, which had prompted the World Bank to cancel its loan to Egypt. This left Nasser with a potentially bankrupt project, which he decided to bankroll by seizing control of the French-owned Suez Canal. For their part, the Western allies were suspicious of Nasser's nationalism and interpreted his refusal to enter into the Western alliance, his dealings with the Eastern bloc, and his aggressive stance towards Israel as confirmation of his pro-Soviet


leanings. Nasser's nationalization of the canal thus provided a convenient justification for Israel, France and Britain (the other major shareholder in the Suez Canal Company) to intervene militarily. Diplomatic activity through the UN during August and September masked military preparations for a combined attack, the details of which were secretly agreed in France on 23 October. The plan was for Israeli forces to launch an attack across Sinai, after which Britain and France would demand that both Israeli and Egyptian forces retreat 10 miles from the canal or face the consequences. An Anglo-French expeditionary force would then be despatched under the pretext of 'protecting' international access to the canal. The plan went ahead six days later when Israel launched its invasion. Britain and France issued their ultimatum the following day before bombing Egyptian military targets on 31 October.

The diplomatic façade did not have the desired effect, not least because the Anglo-French ultimatum was issued *before* the Israelis had advanced to within 10 miles of the canal and the military action appeared to be too well prepared and coordinated to be coincidental. The evident collusion was confirmed within a week when British and French airborne forces landed near the canal's northern entrance, at Port Said and Port Fouad respectively. International condemnation of the attacks was immediate and widespread. The Anglo-French intervention also alienated the United States. President Eisenhower's administration believed that it could not be seen to endorse such behaviour, especially since it risked allowing the Soviet Union to extend its influence in the region. At the UN, the US publicly distanced itself from its allies.

UN calls for a ceasefire were ignored, but a rare instance of superpower consensus allowed the deadlock in the Security Council (engineered by Britain and France) to be by-passed by the General Assembly under the 'Uniting for Peace' mechanism (see chapter 2). The US secretary-of-state, John Foster Dulles, sponsored a resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire (General Assembly Resolution 997). This was followed by Lester Pearson's initiative, which ultimately led to the establishment of UNEF I on 5 November. UNEF I's mandate was considerably more ambitious than anything the UN had undertaken to date and is set out in box 7.3.

Under intense diplomatic and economic pressure, Britain, France and Israel reluctantly acquiesced to a ceasefire on 6 November on the condition that the UN force deploy rapidly. Egyptian cooperation was secured on the condition that the UN entered into a 'good faith' agreement with regards to guaranteeing its national sovereignty (Urquhart 1994: 181–91). The result was that UNEF I's mandate was far more complex than that of any of the UN's previous operations and involved a stronger, though still non-coercive, military component.

As the UN's first armed military force, UNEF I represented a significant development in the organization's approach to peacekeeping. The need for rapid deployment required the UN to mobilize its resources considerably



Map 7.1 Egypt

faster than had previously been the case. This, coupled with the deadlock in the Security Council, invested the office of the Secretary-General with the authority to implement the decision to intervene. Hammarskjöld assumed full responsibility for mandating and organizing UNEF I, developing it in consultation with a small group of advisers. These consultations were given

Box 7.3 UNEF I's mandate

- 1 The securing and supervision of a ceasefire by the formation of a buffer zone between British, French and Israeli forces and their Egyptian counterparts (in accordance with Resolution 997)
- 2 The supervision of the withdrawal of foreign forces from Egyptian territory
- 3 The supervision of canal clearing operations
- 4 The patrolling of border areas and deterring of incursions
- 5 Securing adherence to the provisions of the Egypt-Israel Armistice provisions

Source: UN General Assembly Resolution 1000, 5 November 1956.

direction by the need to make the proposals acceptable to the belligerents. The Secretary-General also took advice from the force commander of UNTSO, Lieutenant-General Burns, whom he subsequently appointed as UNEF I's first commander. Hammarskjöld decided to select troop contingents from neutral states wherever possible, in this case including Brazil, Canada, Denmark, India, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia. UNEF I was financed through the regular budget of the UN.

After consultations with potential candidates, ten countries were initially selected to take part in the operation, which had an authorized strength of 6,000. Its advanced units arrived in the region on 15 November. They were met by an interim headquarters staff, seconded from UNTSO, which had arrived three days earlier, and the operation quickly reached full strength, at which it remained until 1965 (Ghali 1994b: 117). UNEF I had a decentralized command structure. Each contingent was led by its own officers and was not integrated into a truly multinational force (Baehr and Gordenker 1994: 79). This set an important precedent for traditional peacekeeping.


UNEF I achieved the first four elements of its mandate within six months (see box 7.3). It rapidly placed itself between the opposing forces, monitored the withdrawal of the Anglo-French contingents (which was completed by December 1956) and effectively controlled the northern Suez Canal area that they had vacated. It also supervised the canal clearing operations that were well under way before the end of the year. It proved far more difficult to secure the withdrawal of Israeli forces, which had made substantial inroads in the Sinai. Nevertheless, a considerable amount of personal diplomacy by Hammarskjöld and Lieutenant-General Burns, coupled with vociferous support from Eisenhower, finally persuaded Israel to pull back. Over the next few years UNEF I set up seventy-two permanent observation posts along the ceasefire lines and the international frontier, and continued to patrol the front line (which extended for nearly 500 km) until the operation ended in 1967. Finally, although UNEF I had neither the capacity nor the mandate physically to stop border incursions by either side, its presence provided an important deterrent, and instances of cross-border raiding reduced considerably during its deployment (Ghali 1994b: 123).

Despite its achievements, UNEF I also displayed considerable weaknesses that warned of future problems. First, it was powerless to prevent the parties breaking the terms of the ceasefire. Second, its reliance on consent meant that it was never able to patrol the Israeli side of the border, nor could it refuse Egypt's request that it leave Egyptian territory before the outbreak of the 1967 war. Finally, because it was meant to create a space to allow the belligerents to reach a political settlement, it could do very little itself to build stable peace in the region. It was caught in the paradoxical position of being a temporary force that could not leave because it was incapable of creating the conditions that would enable it to do so. Instead, the resumption of war between Egypt and Israel forced it to withdraw after eleven years. Of course, these were not faults with UNEF I *per se* because it was not designed to address the underlying issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict or to enforce a particular political resolution. However, its limitations meant that the UN was unable to contribute significantly to building a stable peace despite its long-term presence in the region. This tension was also apparent in UNFICYP.

UNFICYP in Cyprus (1964–present)

UNFICYP was created in 1964 to help manage the escalating violence between the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus. The immediate catalyst for violence was the promulgation of a constitution that was designed to protect the rights of both ethnic groups after the island achieved independence from British rule in 1960. However, its elaborate provisions exacerbated animosities and failed to quell the Greek Cypriot desire to be incorporated within Greece. Violence erupted in late 1963 when Archbishop Makarios, the president of Cyprus, proposed amendments to the constitution that would effectively end the special protected status of Turkish Cypriots (Birgisson 1994b: 220–1). Britain, which still had forces stationed on the island, suggested a combined British, Greek and Turkish peacekeeping force under British control (James 1990: 224–5). The Cypriot government agreed with the proviso that the force was authorized by the UN.

The initial peacekeeping force was unable to prevent further violence and was supplanted by a formal UN force, UNFICYP, created on 4 March 1964 by Security Council Resolution 186. UNFICYP was mandated to 'use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of the fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions' (Resolution 186). It was not authorized to use coercive force or undertake activities that would affect the political balance in Cyprus. Instead, it was to act as an interposition force, though this time between communities scattered across the island rather than between armed forces separated by clearly demarcated buffer zones. After a considerable struggle to persuade other states to join Britain and provide troops, UNFICYP became fully operational on 27 March 1964 with a complement of 6,200 troops



Map 7.2 Cyprus

drawn principally from seven contributing states (Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Britain). The force was commanded by Lieutenant-General Gyani from India. In addition to concerns about the safety of the force in a volatile environment, the UN's financial crisis (generated in large measure by its operation in the Congo; see chapters 2 and 9) made potential contributors more reticent because UNFICYP was to be funded by voluntary contributions, the first time that a mission had been financed in this way. The willingness of Britain and the US to shoulder much of the burden assuaged fears of onerous financial obligations, but the financial concerns of potential troop contributors appeared prescient once UN peacekeeping was formally removed from the regular budget when UNEF II was established in October 1973.

UNFICYP was intended to be deployed for only three months but is still in place today. Between 1964 and 1974 it succeeded in fulfilling its functions but, like UNEF I, lacked the mandate and wherewithal to address the underlying causes of the conflict itself. Thus, when Turkey invaded northern Cyprus in 1974, UNFICYP found itself in a similar situation to that faced by

UNEF I on the eve of the Six Day War in 1967. Unlike UNEF I, however, UNFICYP was able to stay in place during the Turkish invasion and actually engaged in combat to defend itself and endangered civilians around Nicosia. Its activities brought it respect from the civilian population and, eventually, the combatants themselves (Birgisson 1994b: 234). It remained in place after the cessation of hostilities with a modified mandate of monitoring the buffer zone between Turkish-held northern Cyprus and Greek-dominated southern Cyprus, as well as providing humanitarian assistance to over 200,000 displaced persons (James 1990: 229). The island has been partitioned ever since and UNFICYP has remained in place to patrol the 180 mile-long ceasefire line.

Hammar-skjöld's successor, U Thant, attempted to reinvigorate the peace process by attaching a dedicated UN mediator to UNFICYP. However, lack of progress towards a final settlement in Cyprus raised fundamental questions about the efficacy of traditional peacekeeping more generally (Sambanis 1999), even before the new missions of the 1990s significantly altered the terms of the debate (James 1989). One issue that became particularly apparent in Cyprus is that the presence of peacekeepers can create a stable status quo – a relatively comfortable stalemate – that encourages belligerents to become disinterested in conflict resolution processes because they are not immediately threatened by violent conflict. In Cyprus, as elsewhere, traditional peacekeeping without effective conflict resolution has tended to preserve the status quo.

Similar challenges remain today, particularly after the failure of the parties to implement the so-called Annan Plan, a revised version of which was submitted to the parties by the UN Secretary-General in March 2004 following six weeks of concerted negotiations and consultations. Annan hoped that in simultaneous referenda the two sides of the island would vote for a united Cyprus to accede to the EU on 1 May 2004. Despite support from the Turkish Cypriots, the plan was overwhelmingly rejected by Greek Cypriots, and hence Cyprus joined the EU as a divided island. In light of these developments, in October 2004 the UN Security Council reduced UNFICYP's military component to 860 on the grounds that the situation there had become 'increasingly benign'. Little political progress was made until 8 July 2006, when the Greek Cypriot leader and the Turkish Cypriot leader signed a set of principles and decisions recognizing that the status quo was unacceptable and that a comprehensive settlement was both desirable and possible. Although a resolution has not been achieved, both parties continue publicly to support the principles contained in the July 2006 statement. As Annan noted in 2007, however, the apparent lack of a viable political process, the relatively benign atmosphere on the island, and the annual cost of approximately \$50 million has led an increasing number of actors within international society to question the value added of UNFICYP.

UNMEE in Ethiopia and Eritrea (2000–2008)

The most recent example of a traditional peacekeeping operation was deployed on the cusp of the twenty-first century. This serves as an important reminder that traditional peacekeeping has not become defunct *per se*. Rather it is a tool of conflict management that is best suited to address a phenomenon that has become increasingly rare in world politics: interstate war. However, the fact that UNMEE was terminated in July 2008 highlights the problems of attempting to keep the peace when the belligerent parties withdraw their consent.

After earlier disputes about trade and currency as well as minor border clashes, on 6 May 1998 Eritrean troops launched an attack which took over the Ethiopian-administered settlement of Badme. This prompted a serious escalation in the conflict, as the two sides mobilized between them some 800,000 troops. Various attempts at mediation by the United States, the OAU and the UN proved unsuccessful. In May 2000, therefore, UN Security Council Resolution 1298 imposed an arms embargo on both parties. It was not until 18 June 2000, however, that the two sides signed the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities. By this time the conflict had cost between 70,000 and 100,000 lives and displaced more than 1.2 million people (Adebajo 2004: 581). It was also evident that Ethiopia had gained the upper hand militarily.

The cessation agreement included provision for a small observer operation. The UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) was duly authorized on 31 July by UN Security Council Resolution 1312 with an initial strength of up to 100 military observers (plus support staff). Its mandate was to liaise with the conflicting parties, verify the cessation of hostilities, and assist in planning for a future peacekeeping operation.

On 15 September, and following the UN Secretary-General's report to the Security Council of 9 August, Resolution 1320 authorized the deployment of a peacekeeping operation of up to 4,300 troops. A significant proportion of these troops, notably units from the Netherlands, Canada and Denmark, were deployed relatively rapidly as the first operation of the Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG). Over the years, these Western states gradually reduced their presence in UNMEE, leaving India, Jordan and Kenya as the largest contributors. UNMEE's mandate now included monitoring the cease-fire as well as the redeployment of the armed forces of both sides, in line with the temporary security zone (TSZ) envisaged in the cessation agreement. The Security Council stated that the mandate would end following the conclusion of the delimitation and demarcation process for the Ethiopian–Eritrean border. Defining the exact position of the TSZ proved to be UNMEE's first major political challenge. Indeed, it was not until June 2001 that its location was established – and even then this was in principle rather than in practice. Not only did the conflict parties differ on where they thought the boundaries of the TSZ should lie, both sides proceeded

to break the rules: while Ethiopia refused to withdraw its troops from certain areas that UNMEE believed to be within the TSZ, notably around Irob, Eritrea denied UNMEE freedom of movement outside of the TSZ and persisted in deploying more than 6,000 militia and 3,000 police within the zone, which greatly exceeded the permissible number stipulated in the terms of the agreement (Martin 2004: 138–43). By December 2000, UNMEE was joined by officials from the OAU's Liaison Mission in Ethiopia/Eritrea (OLMEE).

In the meantime, talks between the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments had continued, resulting in the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement – the Algiers Agreement – on 12 December 2000. Under this agreement, the parties decided, among other things, to 'terminate hostilities between themselves' and 'refrain from the threat or use of force against the other' (Article 1.1); 'release and repatriate' all prisoners of war (Article 2.3); establish 'a neutral Boundary Commission...to delimit and demarcate' the disputed border between the two countries (Article 4); and establish 'a neutral Claims Commission' to address 'the negative socio-economic impact of the crisis on the civilian population' (Article 5).


The Boundary Commission announced its decision on the delimitation of the border on 13 April 2002. Under the Algiers Agreement this was supposed to be 'final and binding' on the parties (Article 4.15). Immediately following this announcement, Security Council Resolution 1430 expanded UNMEE's mandate to include de-mining and other assistance in support of the Boundary Commission's demarcation activities. Initially, Ethiopia and Eritrea both accepted this 'April Decision'. In practice, however, Ethiopia, in particular, prevented its implementation by refusing to allow UNMEE and Boundary Commission staff to cross from Eritrea into Ethiopia. They also questioned the Commission's neutrality and refused to work with UNMEE's force commander, General Cammaert.

Part of the problem was that the Commission's April Decision did not specify the final disposition of the settlement of Badme, which had been at the centre of the dispute. In March 2003, in a set of 'Observations' clarifying its ruling, the Boundary Commission awarded control of Badme to Eritrea. Technically, this upheld Eritrea's position that it went to war in 1998 to defend its territory. The Ethiopian government rejected this ruling as 'totally illegal, unjust, and irresponsible' (Lyons 2006: 8). The Commission responded by condemning Ethiopia's actions as 'an attempt to reopen the substance of the April Decision...and to undermine not only the April Decision but also the peace process as a whole' (cited in Adebajo 2004: 584). The UN Security Council also passed several resolutions (1430, 1466, 1507, 1531) in which it called for Ethiopia's full cooperation with respect to the Boundary Commission. It was not until November 2004 that the Ethiopian government accepted the Commission's ruling in principle, but called for a 'peace-building dialogue' (Lyons 2006: 8).

Believing that the process of legal arbitration had upheld its claims, Eritrea became increasingly frustrated with the UN Security Council's inability to enforce Ethiopia's compliance with the Boundary Commission's ruling. Over time, it therefore began to place greater restrictions upon UNMEE, declaring in late 2007 that the UN force was in effect maintaining Ethiopia's 'occupation' of Eritrean territory (UN Secretary-General 2008a: 5). These restrictions included banning UN helicopter flights in Eritrean airspace, banning UNMEE from conducting night patrols, restricting its supply of diesel fuel (which was cut off entirely from 1 December 2007), hindering the movement of UNMEE personnel, and refusing to accept nationals of certain states, among them the United States, Canada and European countries, as UNMEE personnel (*ibid.* 2008a: 2–4). UNMEE reported that such activities would compel it to relocate from Eritrea 'and effectively halt its operations' (*ibid.*: 3). This duly occurred in February and March 2008, when most UNMEE contingents were relocated from Eritrea. (The mission's military personnel on the Ethiopian side continued to carry out their mandated tasks.)

In essence, the problem was that Ethiopia and Eritrea expressed conflicting views on the Boundary Commission's ruling. On 30 November 2007, the Boundary Commission had dissolved itself on the grounds that at that point it considered that it had fulfilled the mandate given to it (UN Secretary-General 2008a: 15). The sticking point was that the Commission did not physically demarcate the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea, not least because the area was heavily mined and it faced significant obstruction from Ethiopia. Instead, it demarcated the boundary with reference to coordinates on a map but without ensuring that these coordinates were represented physically by pillars on the ground. Eritrea accepted what it called the Commission's 'virtual demarcation' as an incomplete but 'important step forward towards the demarcation on the ground' (cited *ibid.*: 16–23). Later, Eritrea's president argued that 'Whether pillars are placed along the border or not is in fact immaterial for all legal and practical purposes' (cited in UN Secretary-General 2008b: 10). Ethiopia, on the other hand, argued that the Commission's demarcation coordinates were 'invalid because they are not the product of a demarcation process recognized by international law' (cited in UN Secretary-General 2008a: 16–23).

The resulting impasse reflected some of the central challenges facing traditional peacekeeping operations. First, without the cooperation of the conflicting parties, the peacekeepers were unable to fulfil the terms of their mandate. Second, by effectively freezing the conflict and stopping the death toll from rising, UNMEE helped create the conditions whereby there was little pressure on either the parties or the Security Council to push for a political resolution to the dispute. After the April Decision, the Security Council did little to push Ethiopia either to accept the Boundary Commission's ruling or to tackle the underlying causes of the conflict until Eritrea's restrictions on UNMEE placed it back under the international spotlight (Lyons 2006: 19).



Map 7.3 UNMEE in Ethiopia and Eritrea

Third, if they fail to implement legitimate rulings, the presence of UN peacekeepers can come to be resented by one side. In this case, Eritrea came to view UNMEE's presence as helping to maintain Ethiopia's occupation of its territory rather than as facilitating an arbitration process. From UNMEE's perspective, because it had neither the mandate nor the resources to impose an outcome upon the belligerents, it was unable to implement the Boundary Commission's ruling and hence became part of a status quo that all parties regarded as unsatisfactory.

As a consequence of these problems, several members of the Security Council, including the US, began to advocate closing down the mission. By April 2008 the situation had become so contested that the Secretary-General outlined four options for the future of the UN's engagement with the dispute: (1) if Eritrea reconsidered its position UNMEE could proceed with its mission; (2) UNMEE could be terminated, leaving no UN peacekeeping presence in the area; (3) a small observer mission could be deployed in the border area; or (4) liaison offices could be established in Asmara and Addis Ababa to maintain UN readiness to assist the parties in the implementation of the Boundary Commission's decision should they agree to proceed with the physical demarcation of the border (UN Secretary-General 2008b: 11). Shortly afterwards, the governments of both states made it clear to the UN Secretary-General that they would not accept any of the options. This prompted Belgium – the lead country on this issue at the time – to circulate a draft resolution proposing UNMEE's termination. On 30 July, the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1827. This terminated UNMEE with effect from 31 July and made no provision for a follow-on mission. As one analysis put it, this left Eritrea 'clinging to the legitimacy of its position – backed by international law' while Ethiopia clung 'to the leverage it has by virtue of the *de facto* situation on the ground' (Security Council Report 2008a: 3).

7.3 Problems

The 'holy trinity' is still widely viewed as a crucial starting point for peace operations, although its limitations have been exposed in many of the UN's more complex operations, raising questions about its wider utility. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that, in terms of their ability to reduce the likelihood of a war reigniting, traditional peacekeeping missions are highly effective, reducing this risk by as much as 95 per cent (see Introduction). While traditional peacekeeping might be an effective tool for preventing war, it has proven less effective at enabling conflict resolution. As illustrated above, there are two principal sets of problems that limit its ability to facilitate conflict resolution. The first refers to its inability to accomplish its own goals. The second relates to its inability to accomplish wider tasks or actively promote conflict resolution.

In many cases traditional peacekeeping operations have not culminated in the former belligerents concluding a lasting peace settlement as envisaged by the theory of this type of operation. Traditional peacekeeping was intended to help provide an environment conducive to conflict resolution by the parties to the dispute. It is based on a Westphalian conception of the liberal peace that looks to create space for states to resolve their conflicts peacefully. However, far from encouraging long-term conflict resolution, traditional peacekeeping operations have been accused of entrenching conflicts and solidifying partitions (Ratner 1996: 10; MacGinty and Robinson 2001: 30). On

the one hand, traditional peacekeeping may help prevent further bloodshed in circumstances where a dispute appears intractable and may facilitate confidence-building measures between belligerents. On the other hand, however, it can remove or at least reduce the imperative to pursue a political settlement. Although traditional peacekeeping aims to create a context in which former belligerents feel confident enough to negotiate a political settlement, such operations were not always explicitly linked to peacemaking efforts and certainly never had control over their outcome.

Moreover, traditional peacekeeping's dependence on the consent of the belligerents creates problems even within the narrow remit of the Westphalian conception of peacekeeping. Reliance on the belligerents' goodwill means that traditional operations are unable to achieve their goals if the combatants do not cooperate. In the case of UNTSO, for instance, persistent violations of the 1949 General Armistice Agreements by all the parties meant that the UN was unable to accomplish its goals. Similarly, as noted above, UNEF I was forced to withdraw from the Middle East in 1967 after continued animosity between Israel and Egypt saw their relationship deteriorate into war. In UNMEE's case, its movement and supplies were restricted, some of its personnel were expelled, and, ultimately, the operation was forced to withdraw completely. Finally, the enforced change to UNFICYP's mandate after the Turkish invasion of 1974 is testimony to the inability of traditional peacekeeping to accomplish goals independently of the wishes of the belligerents.

The second set of problems emerges once peacekeepers are given duties beyond simply monitoring ceasefires and are deployed in environments reminiscent of Kaldor's 'new wars' (1997, 1999). The principle of consent was based on the assumption that the belligerents were states with hierarchical Clausewitzian armies. Consent at the governmental level therefore meant that consent and cooperation could be relied upon lower down the chain of command. This is often not the case in 'new wars'. Not only is consent variable in terms of the appropriate authority changing its mind, it is also multi-layered inasmuch as there is no guarantee that all the combatants will consent to peacekeeping even if their political leaders do.

From this post-Westphalian perspective, the principles of impartiality and minimum use of force may also be problematic. Adherence to these principles has tended to exacerbate the problems peacekeepers face when consent is not forthcoming or is variable. UNEF I and II, UNFICYP, UNMEE and other traditional peacekeeping operations were all powerless to prevent open breaches of the agreements they were meant to oversee. Furthermore, their limited military capabilities have sometimes undermined their ability to defend themselves and achieve their objectives.

Nevertheless, the impact of traditional peacekeeping upon other types of peace operations has been profound. The powerful legacy of the 'holy trinity' frequently restricted imaginative thinking when peacekeepers were deployed

in 'new wars'. Crucially, the successful acquisition and management of consent depends on a number of variables that have often been overlooked because of the insistence that consent be thought of in absolute terms. While it may (sometimes) have been appropriate for operations to monitor buffers between states, experience has shown that it is not an adequate guide for action in other circumstances. Similarly, although the tendency to treat impartiality as synonymous with neutrality may not have been problematic in traditional peacekeeping, experiences in the 1990s suggested that peacekeepers in wider peacekeeping or peace support operations that maintain 'neutrality' could not accomplish their mandate.

The aims of traditional peacekeeping are thus premised on particular assumptions about their environments that have rarely been borne out in practice. Even during the Cold War, operations in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and Congo (ONUC) did not justify these assumptions. After the Cold War, the conflicts and more complex operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and elsewhere challenged the efficacy of the 'holy trinity', leaving peacekeepers physically and conceptually unable to deal with a 'new' environment that was actually not new at all. Many of the problems associated with 'wider peacekeeping' (see chapter 8) can be attributed to the application of traditional peacekeeping principles in pursuit of very different objectives and in very different environments to those that shaped their development.

Wider Peacekeeping

Despite the relative success of several assisting transition operations in the first half of the 1990s (discussed in chapter 10), the growth of UN peacekeeping at that time is often associated with the failures of high-profile missions in Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia and Angola (see chapter 4). For some, a 'crisis of expectations' was caused by the disjuncture between the demands placed on peacekeepers and the means given to them to accomplish their goals (Thakur and Thayer 1995). Peacekeepers took on wider tasks, including both traditional and 'transitional' duties, often within hostile environments, and yet were still expected to adhere to the 'holy trinity' of traditional peacekeeping. While some writers suggest that wider peacekeeping became extinct after the Rwandan and Bosnian bloodbaths, many peace operations have continued to exhibit some of its chief characteristics.

After identifying the central characteristics of wider peacekeeping, this chapter discusses how they shaped international responses to conflict in Bosnia and Rwanda and demonstrates how they can also be detected in more recent missions, such as the African Union's mission in the Darfur region of Sudan, AMIS (2004–7). (An additional case study of the UN operations in Sierra Leone is provided on the companion website.) Finally, the chapter examines some of the weaknesses of wider peacekeeping as a response to the changing conflict environment facing peacekeepers. These weaknesses suggest that, in certain circumstances, 'peace enforcement' and 'peace support operations' may be necessary to accomplish the expanded mandates, though often there is not the political will to authorize or contribute to these types of operations.

8.1 What is wider peacekeeping?

Wider peacekeeping has many different labels. According to the British military doctrine which bears the same name, it refers to 'operations carried out with the consent of the belligerent parties in support of efforts to achieve or maintain peace in order to promote security and sustain life in areas of potential or actual conflict' (HMSO 1995: 2.1). The 'wider' qualification of wider peacekeeping refers to 'the wider aspects of peacekeeping operations carried out with the consent of the belligerent parties but in an environment

that may be volatile' (ibid.). Wider peacekeeping is also sometimes referred to as 'second generation peacekeeping' (e.g. Mackinlay and Chopra 1992; Mackinlay 1996). The 'second generation' was distinct from the first generation because such operations tended to take place within states rather than between them and in an environment where the interposition of blue helmets between organized belligerents was either not possible or ineffective. Another term for wider peacekeeping is 'Chapter 6 ½' peacekeeping – used to highlight the problem that wider peacekeeping falls somewhere between the pacific and consensual provisions of Chapter VI of the UN Charter and the enforcement measures envisaged by Chapter VII (Bailey and Daws 1995). The ambiguous 'Chapter 6 ½' nature of such operations is often claimed to lie at the heart of the failures in Bosnia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone (O'Shea 2002: 147). Other labels for wider peacekeeping include 'peacekeeping by proxy' (Charters 2000) and 'strategic peacekeeping' (Olonisakin 2000), both of which emphasize the gap between the demands placed on peacekeepers and the means made available to them.

All these terms refer to similar practices, although each stresses different aspects. Some focus on the new tasks given to peacekeepers while others pay more attention to the changing conflict environment. However, six key characteristics of wider peacekeeping can be identified.

First, despite the existence of formal ceasefires, these operations occur within a context of ongoing violence. Whereas both traditional peacekeeping and assisting transition operations take place after the belligerents have signed a ceasefire agreement, wider peacekeeping takes place either in the complete absence of such an agreement or in situations where agreements are fragile and prone to collapse. In Bosnia, for instance, UNPROFOR negotiated literally hundreds of ceasefires, most of which were broken within twenty-four hours. Similarly, UN missions in both Rwanda and Sierra Leone were plagued by collapsing peace agreements and violence.

Second, wider peacekeeping operations tend to take place during what Mary Kaldor (1999) has labelled 'new wars' rather than in traditional interstate conflicts. Thus, although the armed conflicts in Bosnia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Sudan, for instance, witnessed significant external involvement, they were not simply interstate wars in the Westphalian sense.

Third, soldiers engaged in wider peacekeeping are given tasks beyond those of traditional peacekeeping, including the separation of forces, disarming the belligerents, organizing and supervising elections, delivering humanitarian aid, protecting civilians and UN personnel, guaranteeing freedom of movement, host-state capacity-building, monitoring ceasefires, and enforcing no-fly zones (Berdal 1993; Doyle et al. 1997). Although peacekeepers involved in managing transitions in Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia and Mozambique also took on many of these roles, the context of enduring violent conflict dramatically altered their nature and salience in wider peacekeeping operations.

Fourth, wider peacekeeping operations witnessed the exponential growth of the civilian 'humanitarian community' with whom peacekeepers were often supposed to coordinate their activities. Compared with traditional peacekeepers such as those in the UNEF missions, for example, wider peacekeepers in Bosnia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Sudan were confronted with literally hundreds of different governmental and non-governmental organizations, each trying to accomplish different goals. For example, over 200 NGOs were active in Rwanda at the height of the conflict, and in the space of just seven months in Yugoslavia, between February and September 1993, the number of NGOs increased from sixty-five to 127 (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999: 176). More recently, by 2005 there were some 12,000 humanitarian aid workers operating in Darfur (UN 2007b). This created problems of coherence and coordination and contributed to the new tasks given to peacekeepers (see Weiss 1995; Slim 1997).

Fifth, wider peacekeeping missions have frequently changing mandates. Between 1991 and the end of 1995, the Security Council passed eighty-three resolutions on the Croatian and Bosnian wars alone (see table 8.1). Many of these resolutions changed UNPROFOR's mandate, composition, equipment or financing. Even resolutions that did not directly refer to UNPROFOR – such as Resolution 713 – affected its operating environment. The UN's mandate in Bosnia changed rapidly, from a humanitarian remit, to one empowered to use force to assist the delivery of humanitarian supplies, to one charged with deterring violence within 'safe areas' and, finally, to one supporting a NATO-led peace enforcement mission.


Finally, wider peacekeeping operations suffer from a significant gulf between means and ends. Although it entails the adoption of more tasks by peacekeepers, the latter are not provided with the necessary means to accomplish those tasks. This situation is often reflected in a financial shortfall. For UN-financed operations, this problem is exacerbated by the fact that the organization's peacekeeping budget lacks capital reserves and is unable to borrow significant amounts to cover arrears (McDermott 1994). This caused practical difficulties in Rwanda, for example, when UNAMIR's commander, General Dallaire, was unable to communicate with all his units because he did not have enough radios (Melvern 2000; see box 8.1).

Wider peacekeeping thus exists where Westphalian and post-Westphalian conceptions of peacekeeping collide. On the one hand, some of the wider tasks peacekeepers are asked to carry out on an ad hoc basis point towards a post-Westphalian conception. The delivery of humanitarian aid, the supervision of displaced people, support for multi-party elections, and the guaranteeing of freedom of movement all point towards a post-Westphalian understanding of the role of peacekeeping because they are concerned with what goes on within the state in question. However, although wider peacekeeping takes place within 'new wars', its guiding principles draw heavily on the traditional 'holy trinity' of consent, impartiality and minimum force.

After its unhappy experience in Bosnia, the British military tried to resolve the problem of responding to 'new wars' by using traditional peacekeeping techniques. As a result, the formal doctrine of wider peacekeeping is Janus-faced. On the one hand, the doctrine writers defined it in terms of the changing conflict environment and the new tasks given to peacekeepers. From this perspective, it takes place in an environment characterized by numerous parties to the conflict, undisciplined belligerents, ineffective ceasefire(s), the absence of law and order, gross violations of human rights, a risk of armed opposition to UN forces, the active involvement of large numbers of NGOs, the collapse of civil infrastructure, large numbers of displaced persons, and an undefined area of operations (HMSO 1995: 1.7). Consequently, wider peacekeepers must perform more tasks than traditional peacekeepers. British doctrine identified five typical tasks in particular: conflict prevention, demobilization of belligerents, military assistance to civilian agencies, humanitarian relief, and the guarantee and denial of movement. While many of these 'new' tasks had been key features of earlier missions, particularly earlier peace enforcement and managing transition operations, their location within 'new war' environments presented peacekeepers with a distinct set of challenges.

Although British doctrine recognized that the peacekeeping environment had changed, it largely retained the conceptual tools of traditional peacekeeping, claiming that 'wider peacekeeping tasks post Cold War do not reflect a novel development but rather a *changing emphasis* in terms of scale, participation and involvement' (HMSO 1995: 2.4). There was no substantive difference, it reasoned, between traditional peacekeeping and wider peacekeeping. The task at hand was not, therefore, to rethink the role of peacekeeping in global politics. Rather, it was to adapt Westphalian tools to the new environment.

Wider peacekeeping doctrine thus retained traditional peacekeeping's 'holy trinity', including the notion that the preservation of consent was a prerequisite for a successful mission. As figure 8.1 shows, wider peacekeeping doctrine viewed the issue of consent as marking a fundamental distinction between wider peacekeeping and peace enforcement. A wider peacekeeping mission that inadvertently crossed the 'Mogadishu line' (Rose 1998) into peace enforcement would always fail to achieve its goals. A mission could not, it was argued, move from wider peacekeeping to peace enforcement and back again. Consent could be maintained only by adhering to the other two aspects of the 'holy trinity'. First, wider peacekeepers must remain impartial, defined here as being synonymous with neutrality rather than as treating belligerents equally in relation to their adherence to the mandate (as set out in the Brahimi Report or the concept of peace support operations; see chapter 12). As a result, 'all dealings by UN troops, whether operational, administrative or social, should be conducted without favour to any particular party or *any single point of view*' (HMSO 1995: 4.3; emphasis added). Second, the use of force



Source: adapted from HMSO (1995: 2.6).

Figure 8.1 *The central role of consent in wider peacekeeping doctrine*

by peacekeepers was identified as the main threat to consent. Field commanders were therefore advised to keep the use of force to a minimum (*ibid.*: 4.6).

Wider peacekeeping can therefore be understood as an attempt to apply the principles of traditional peacekeeping – based on ideas about managing Westphalian interstate conflict – in a post-Westphalian environment. It is important to remember that, although it claimed to be prescriptive, the British doctrine was in fact descriptive, trying to make sense of the British experience in Bosnia. It is unsurprising, therefore, that wider peacekeeping should make use of established canons, because it is an ad hoc response to a changing conflict environment and the addition of new tasks.

8.2 Wider peacekeeping in practice

UNPROFOR in Bosnia (1992–1995)

UNPROFOR provides an exemplary illustration of wider peacekeeping. Indeed, the British military doctrine outlined above has been criticized for drawing too heavily on the British experience in Bosnia (Connaughton 1995). Between 1992 and 1995 peacekeepers in Bosnia confronted all six characteristics of wider peacekeeping (outlined above) and tried to resolve the dilemmas they posed in an ad hoc fashion. The result, according to most commentators, was a ‘miserable and conspicuous disaster’ that ‘reflected the flawed logic of bravado that underscored the conception and function of “second-generation” peace operations’ (Adibe 1998: 107). A more judicious assessment found that UNPROFOR was ‘agonised by tough-sounding resolutions [see table 8.1] followed-up with inadequate human, material, and financial resources’ (Biermann and Vadset 1998: 21).

UNPROFOR’s experience can be divided into three phases. The first phase, from June 1992 to April 1993, saw UN peacekeepers given two primary tasks

TABLE 8.1 UNPROFOR'S changing mandate

| Security Council Resolution | Date | Purpose |
|-----------------------------|---------------|---|
| 713 | 25 Sept 1991 | Arms embargo against former Yugoslavia |
| 743 | 21 Feb 1992 | Establishes UNPROFOR to monitor a ceasefire in the UNPAs in Croatia |
| 757 | 30 May 1992 | Imposes sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro |
| 758 | 8 June 1992 | Increases UNPROFOR mandate to include Bosnia and the safe delivery of humanitarian supplies |
| 764 | 13 July 1992 | Empowers UNPROFOR to secure Sarajevo airport and its environs |
| 770 | 13 Aug 1992 | Demands access to all refugee and prisoner of war camps |
| 776 | 14 Sept 1992 | Enlarges UNPROFOR mandate to include the protection of convoys |
| 781 | 9 Oct 1992 | Creates a no-fly zone over Bosnia |
| 787 | 16 Oct 1992 | Deployment of observers to Bosnia's borders to enforce compliance with sanctions |
| 816 | 31 March 1993 | Gives members the right to enforce the no-fly zone |
| 819 | 16 April 1993 | Designates Srebrenica a 'safe area' which should be 'free from armed attack' |
| 824 | 6 May 1993 | Designates Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac as 'safe areas' and authorizes the strengthening of UNPROFOR by 50 military observers |
| 827 | 25 May 1993 | Creates the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) |
| 836 | 4 June 1993 | Gives UNPROFOR the task of 'detering' attacks on the safe areas including the use of air strikes |
| 913 | 22 April 1993 | Gives UNPROFOR responsibility for collecting and storing belligerents' heavy weapons around Gorazde |
| 998 | 16 June 1995 | Welcomes the creation and deployment of the NATO rapid reaction force |
| 1035 | 21 Dec 1995 | Authorizes the deployment of IFOR |

(though even this was done incrementally). Created in February 1992, UNPROFOR was initially mandated to monitor a ceasefire agreement between Croatia and Serbia. This agreement signalled a temporary end to six months of violence between the new Croatian state and Croatian Serb militias fighting alongside the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) that had virtually destroyed Vukovar and Dubrovnik. Together, the rebel Serbs and the JNA had seized



Map 8.1 Bosnia and Hercegovina

around one-third of Croatia's territory. Having agreed a ceasefire, the Croats and Serbs accepted the creation of UN Protected Areas (UNPAs) in the Serb-held regions. The UNPAs were to be free from armed attack by the Croats but were also to be demilitarized by the Serbs. UNPROFOR was to supervise compliance with the ceasefire agreement (a traditional peacekeeping task). The opposing sides had agreed a ceasefire, and peacekeepers were interposed between them while political leaders sought a lasting political settlement.

At the outset UNPROFOR consisted of 13,000 troops, civilian personnel and a largely ineffective civilian police element (Gow and Smith 1992). Strangely, given that UNPROFOR's mission was originally confined to Croatia, the UN decided that its headquarters should be in Sarajevo, Bosnia. Its deployment took many months owing to disagreements about who would pay for the mission, what its rules of engagement would be, and who would command it (Gow 1997), and it did not become fully operational until June 1992. By that time, the decision to locate the UN's headquarters in Sarajevo looked most apposite. Although the situation in Croatia remained relatively calm the violence had spread to Bosnia, with the Bosnian Serbs backed by the JNA seizing great tracts of land in eastern Bosnia and forcing hundreds of thousands of Muslim and Croatian Bosnians from their homes (Burg and Shoup 1999).

By the summer of 1992, the UN was confronting a humanitarian catastrophe in Bosnia. The Bosnian Serb strategy of ethnic cleansing had created 500,000 refugees at the time of UNPROFOR's creation and three times that number by the time it was deployed. The death toll had also begun to increase alarmingly towards 50,000 (by the end of the war that figure reached 250,000). The Security Council reacted by enlarging UNPROFOR's mandate. In June 1992 it was officially extended into Bosnia and given the additional task of supporting the delivery of humanitarian aid. Peacekeepers were given little or no guidance about how precisely they were supposed to do this, and their primary mission remained the supervision of a ceasefire that did not exist. 'How can we keep the peace when there is no peace to keep?' was a question asked by many soldiers given just that task (see Stewart 1993). Along with the European Community Monitoring Mission, UNPROFOR's ceasefire supervision role became an irrelevance, limited to providing reports (albeit important) of the shifting frontlines, civilian casualties and flows of displaced persons.

The additional task, then, was to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid by international organizations such as the World Food Programme and NGOs such as Oxfam. This presented a number of problems, especially as regards the mandate and the use of force. All the belligerents (but the Bosnian Serbs in particular) attempted to control the flow of aid around the country. Roadblocks often obstructed aid convoys, and international lorries carrying aid became prime targets for looting and destruction. However, UNPROFOR lacked both the means and the mandate to enforce the delivery of aid. The problem was that the mandate stipulated that UNPROFOR could use force only in self-defence. Even if a commander decided to interpret self-defence in broad terms – as several contingents tended to do – the UN lacked the resources to follow such a policy through. Both UNPROFOR and the aid agencies therefore depended on the consent of warlords to carry out their tasks, and by negotiating and dealing with them the peacekeepers inadvertently enhanced the warlords' legitimacy. By paying 'taxes' in goods and cash to secure the transit of aid they also enriched the warlords and helped fund the

war (Schierup 1999). UNPROFOR was confronted with a Faustian dilemma: bargain with the warlords and deliver *some* aid or refuse to bargain and deliver much less aid. Most UNPROFOR commanders chose the first option.

As disquiet began to grow in the Western media and among peacekeepers about the UN's failure to halt the bloodshed, questions were raised about the possibility of extending UNPROFOR's mandate to include the use of force. In October 1992 the Security Council declared a 'no-fly zone' over Bosnia and gave member states authority to enforce it. NATO took up this authorization. However, the no-fly zone did little to affect the situation on the ground, which continued to worsen. Although humanitarian aid sustained thousands of people through the harsh Bosnian winter, the peacekeepers had little noticeable impact on the fighting.

Spring 1993 saw UNPROFOR enter a new phase. In the face of continuing violence, the Security Council created 'safe areas' in Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Gorazde, Zepa, Tuzla and Bihac. The safe areas were all major towns or cities held by the Bosnian government but besieged by Bosnian Serb forces, who systematically targeted civilians with shells and sniper fire. The Security Council demanded that civilians be 'free from armed attack' and authorized UNPROFOR to deter such attacks. But problems stemmed from the belief that there was a rigid distinction between wider peacekeeping and peace enforcement. In his report to the Security Council, Boutros-Ghali advised that, for the safe areas policy to work, UNPROFOR would need to be reinforced by 34,000 additional troops. However, the Security Council opted for a 'light option' and authorized only 7,600 additional troops (UN 1994: 2). As a result, the Secretary-General noted, 'the effective implementation of the safe-area concept depends on the degree of consent by the parties on the ground' (ibid.: 3). In other words, the success of the safe areas policy depended upon the Bosnian Serbs.

UNPROFOR was not authorized to use force to ensure that humanitarian supplies were delivered. Besieged towns such as Srebrenica were therefore dependent for supplies on Bosnian Serb goodwill. But goodwill was in short supply, and malnutrition and disease set in. A by-product of creating so-called safe areas was that most of Bosnia became a hostile region in which UN peacekeepers had very little power. Moreover, when, in summer 1995, the Bosnian Serbs decided to overrun the safe areas, UNPROFOR had neither the capability nor the mandate to prevent them from doing so. In July 1995 the Bosnian Serbs seized the safe area of Srebrenica from a small contingent of Dutch peacekeepers, massacring more than 7,500 civilians as they did so (Honig and Both 1996). The Dutch commander in Srebrenica, General Herrimans, requested air strikes to repel the Serbs – as he was entitled to do under Resolution 836 (4 June 1993), which permitted UNPROFOR to 'deter attacks against the safe areas'. But UNPROFOR's commander, General Joulwan, and the Special Representative to the Secretary-General, Yasushi Akashi, feared that substantial air strikes would take UNPROFOR across the 'Mogadishu

line' and so blocked the demand. The Bosnian Serbs seized the safe area and massacred its male inhabitants virtually unimpeded by the UN.

The fall of Srebrenica, the subsequent fall of Zepa and the near collapse of Gorazde and Bihac prompted the Security Council to rethink its strategy. The British and French created and deployed a rapid reaction force (RRF) that had more robust rules of engagement. After consistent pressure from the US, on 30 August 1995 NATO launched Operation Deliberate Force. Supported with artillery from the RRF, Deliberate Force was a sustained air campaign against the Bosnian Serbs. This was the end of wider peacekeeping in Bosnia and the start of peace enforcement (see chapter 9). Within four months the Bosnian war was over.

UNAMIR in Rwanda (1993–1994)

UNAMIR confronted many of the same problems that plagued the wider peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. It was deployed to keep a peace based on the Arusha Accords of August 1993 but was given neither the means nor the mandate to accomplish its mission. UNAMIR peacekeepers were therefore unable to deter or halt the genocide that began only hours after President Habyarimana's plane was shot down at Kigali airport on 6 April 1994. In 100 days, *Interahamwe* and *Impuzamugambi* militias and their Hutu supporters killed approximately 800,000 Tutsis and up to 50,000 of their Hutu opponents.

Although the difference between 'Hutus' and 'Tutsis' in Rwanda is unclear, most accounts suggest that the Belgian imperialists favoured the minority Tutsis, whom they deemed culturally superior to the Hutus. However, during the transition to independence, which began in 1959, the Hutus seized control of the state in a bloody conflict that led to a mass exodus of Tutsis. This large refugee population proved to be an ideal recruiting ground for armed militia, and the Tutsis staged a number of armed incursions into Rwanda aimed at toppling the government. The government responded with violent repression, such as in 1973 when a Tutsi attempt to seize power was met with severe reprisals. At the same time, however, Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu, staged a coup and seized control of the state. The relative stability enjoyed by Rwanda was threatened in 1990 by the emergence of a new Tutsi army, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which was based in Uganda. Three years of guerrilla war followed, with the RPF claiming substantial amounts of territory in Rwanda. This was in spite of the fact that the French government had deployed soldiers to help Habyarimana's forces fend off the RPF assault (see Krosiak 2007). In 1993, facing defeat and fearing opposition from more extremist Hutu politicians, and pressurized by international society, Habyarimana concluded a power-sharing agreement with the RPF under the Arusha Accords. UNAMIR was created to observe compliance. The primary problem the mission faced was that some of Habyarimana's Hutu opponents

had a more radical agenda and, probably after killing the president, unleashed their planned genocide on the country (see Prunier 1995; Melvern 2006). For the 100 days of genocide, UNAMIR was powerless to stop the slaughter in many areas, although at one stage it did manage to protect up to 30,000 people (Des Forges 1999: 689).

The Arusha Accords had three key facets: a ceasefire agreement, an agreement to create a transitional government that included the RPF, and the deployment of a peacekeeping force to supervise their implementation (Destexhe 1995: 46). Although international society had been instrumental in pressurizing the parties to sign, there was little will to organize an effective peacekeeping force (Jones 2001). Article 54 of the accords called for a neutral international force to provide security for the inhabitants of Rwanda's capital, Kigali, by protecting civilians, supervising arms dumps and disarming militias (Uvin 1998: 97). This clearly implied that a force capable of more than traditional peacekeeping was needed. Unlike UNPROFOR, which was initially envisaged as a traditional interpositionary force, the peace that UNAMIR was meant to keep was dependent on the adoption of wider tasks that required greater capabilities than its peacekeepers possessed.

When the question of creating UNAMIR came before the Security Council, the political will to create and pay for a force capable of accomplishing wider peacekeeping tasks was lacking. Security Council Resolution 872 (5 October 1993) envisaged it as a small operation assisting transition, limiting its task to monitoring the agreement and restricting even that to a 'weapons secure area established by the parties'. A major reason for the Council's reluctance to establish a stronger presence was that the decision on whether to create it and what kind of mission it should be came only two days after the death of eighteen American soldiers in Mogadishu, Somalia (see chapters 4 and 9). It was, as Linda Melvern (2000: 79) put it, 'a grave accident of timing'. However, it was not only American reluctance to countenance another Somalia that dictated that UNAMIR would be conceptualized in traditional terms. Although Boutros-Ghali campaigned for a UN peacekeeping mission, his reports insisted that it should be of the traditional variety.

UNAMIR was thus incapable of facilitating the implementation of the Arusha Accords. For example, according to the UN Secretariat, it did not have a mandate to collect weapons, protect civilians, or assist with the repatriation of refugees as had been stipulated (Adelman and Suhrke 1996: 7; Melvern 2000: 79–80). Instead, the Council authorized a force that was too small to manage Rwanda's transition. The initial assessment of force commander General Roméo Dallaire and the DPKO had been that 8,000 troops were necessary. This assessment had been reduced to 4,500 to deter a Security Council veto, but still the Council authorized the deployment of only 2,548 peacekeepers. In the wake of Somalia and an American Congressional decision to cancel an emergency peacekeeping contingency fund, the US pushed to reduce UNAMIR's budget. At the insistence of the American Ambassador to the UN,

Madeleine Albright, the Security Council instructed the Secretary-General to 'consider ways of reducing the total maximum strength of UNAMIR...[and] to seek economies' (Bennis 2000: 128). The Americans argued that the mission should not cost more than \$10 million a month (Melvern 2000: 85). As a result, four months later only half the authorized number of peacekeepers had been deployed, and those that were remained woefully under-equipped.

Some of the negative effects that this had on UNAMIR are described in box 8.1. It was a small and cheap force conceptualized in traditional terms, even though its original rationale, set out in the Arusha Accords, called for a force capable of managing the transition from civil war to peace. At the beginning of 1994 it became clear to Dallaire and others that arms were being imported and distributed throughout the country. It was also clear that UNAMIR had neither the mandate nor the means to prevent that from happening, a point recognized by both Dallaire and the Special Representative to the Secretary-General, Jacques Booh-Booh (Prunier 1995: 206; Dallaire 2003).

The Security Council met to discuss extending UNAMIR's mandate for a further six months on 5 April 1994, shortly before the genocide erupted. On the one hand, the US argued that progress towards democracy was too slow and that the UN should consider withdrawing completely. On the other, Boutros-Ghali reported that progress was being made, though he omitted to tell the Council that Dallaire had complained about the lack of resources at

Box 8.1 UNAMIR: small and cheap

UNAMIR was forced to operate without adequate resources. From the very start, the operation found it difficult to obtain even basic supplies such as eating utensils, and at one stage was unable to file situation reports because it ran out of paper. One symbolic story suggested that, after months of begging for them, flashlights arrived but were without batteries. Many of the peacekeeping troops that did appear lacked not only training but also basic items such as boots. Despite this desperate situation, in the initial stages of the genocide UNAMIR's personnel watched a series of cargo planes arrive empty and without provisions into Kigali airport and leave with foreigners aboard. UNAMIR's military component fared little better. The official version was that it consisted of three infantry battalions, one engineer company, a transportation section (with four utility helicopters), one logistics company, one medical platoon, 331 military observers, a force headquarters, a movement control unit and a field hospital. It was to have at its disposal twenty-two armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and eight military helicopters in order that it could respond rapidly to developing events. In practice, however, no military helicopters arrived, while only five of the eight APCs that found their way to Rwanda were serviceable. These were Czech-made BTR-80s (on loan only), which arrived in early March 1994. Unfortunately, they lacked tools, spare parts, mechanics and manuals and had only limited ammunition. In addition, they were worn out from use in the UN mission in Mozambique, and shortly after their arrival they became inoperable.

Sources: Barnett (2002: 92, 100); Melvern (2000: 85).


his disposal and warned about the imminent danger of mass killing (Melvern 2000: 113). The Council agreed to extend but further restrict the mandate, and demanded that UNAMIR should withdraw if the transitional government was not fully operational by the end of the extended period of time. One day later, Habyarimana was dead and the genocide had begun.

The UN now discussed three main options: withdraw UNAMIR because it was a traditional peacekeeping force with no peace to keep; escalate the mission to a peace enforcement operation; or keep a symbolic UNAMIR presence in place – a traditional peacekeeping force inside a bloody wider peacekeeping context. The situation deteriorated when ten Belgian peacekeepers were killed by Hutu militia, prompting Belgium – which had provided the strongest military contingent – to order an immediate withdrawal of its forces (Suhre 1998). Boutros-Ghali pressurized Dallaire to advocate a complete withdrawal, but he refused, insisting that UNAMIR could still serve a useful purpose no matter how small (Magnarella 2000: 34). After much prevarication, the Security Council decided formally to reduce UNAMIR to 270 observers, although approximately 450 chose to remain (Melvern 2000: 174). The downsized UNAMIR did what it could. It organized prisoner transfers, conducted mediation and tried to support the delivery of humanitarian aid. There were repeated attempts to withdraw the force until, on 17 May, the Security Council authorized a force of 5,500 troops to join the mission. In practice, however, Resolution 918 was a sham: 'no equipped troops were available for Rwanda, and, even if there had been, there was no airlift' capability (ibid.:197). As a result it was not until early July that foreign soldiers arrived in Rwanda. At this stage France led an operation to the southwest of the country to create safe areas and protect displaced people. But by that time most of the killing had stopped (see Prunier 1999). As the genocide progressed, the RPF gradually defeated the Rwandan government's army and the militia forces, eventually driving many of them out of the country.

UNAMIR's inability to prevent or halt the genocide prompted a considerable amount of soul searching at the UN. In presenting the report of an independent inquiry as to what went wrong, Kofi Annan admitted that

All of us must bitterly regret that we did not do more to prevent it. There was a United Nations force in the country at the time, but it was neither mandated nor equipped for the kind of forceful action which would have been needed to prevent or halt the genocide. On behalf of the United Nations, I acknowledge this failure and express my deep remorse. (Annan 1999f)

As mentioned in chapter 4, the inquiry found that 'the failure by the United Nations to prevent, and subsequently to stop the genocide in Rwanda was a failure by the United Nations system as a whole' (Independent Inquiry 1999: 1). That failure was a product of the lack of resources and a lack of will on the part of international society (ibid.: 22). There was a critical disjuncture, endemic in wider peacekeeping, between the tasks given to peacekeepers and



Map 8.2 Rwanda

their conceptual and material tools. UNAMIR was conceived in traditional terms, even though its operational context was very different to those of successful assisting transition operations (see chapter 10). The rhetoric of shame that followed the Rwandan experience prompted Western states in particular to think about peacekeeping in new ways. Rather than focusing on consent, they turned their attention to the capabilities needed to fulfil the wider tasks. This led to an emerging view that peacekeepers should be more forceful and better equipped. As we discussed in chapter 5, this view is now most commonly associated with the Brahimi Report. After Rwanda there was a growing tendency to think of peacekeeping in terms of enforcing peace (see chapter 9) and peace support (see chapter 12). Unfortunately, even after the terrible experiences of UN peacekeepers in Bosnia and Rwanda, several peace operations – particularly in Africa – continued to display the characteristics of wider peacekeeping. A good example of this is the African Union's mission in the Darfur region of Sudan.

AMIS in Sudan (2004–2007)

In early 2003 two rebel movements, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), launched a series of

attacks against Sudanese government targets in the western region of Darfur (see map 5.1, p. 150). The government retaliated by conducting a counter-insurgency campaign against the rebels and their supporters wherein its troops were supported by a variety of militia forces popularly referred to as the *janjawid*. By early 2004 the war in Darfur had left thousands dead and hundreds of thousands displaced from their homes, and pushed millions into the UN's category of 'conflict affected people' (see Flint and de Waal 2005; Prunier 2005). Throughout 2004, Darfur's conflict was characterized by large-scale and systematic war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated primarily by the government's forces and the *janjawid* militias it supported (see International Commission 2005). Because the government of Sudan did not consent to a UN peace operation in Darfur, it was left to the African Union (AU) to muster a response.

The catalyst for the AU's peacekeeping operation in Darfur was the signing on 8 April 2004 of the N'djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement between the government of Sudan, the SLM/A and the JEM. This helped produce the Addis Ababa agreement on 28 May 2004 which included the formation of a Ceasefire Monitoring Commission. At this point the AU decided to deploy military observers and a small protection force to monitor the agreement. In early June about eighty AU observers were deployed, along with some 300 Nigerian and Rwandan troops. Unfortunately, the ceasefire agreement quickly broke down and the AU observers were left to monitor events in an ongoing war zone.

Spurred on by international calls to 'do something' in response to the civilian suffering evident in Darfur, the AU expanded its peace operation in a series of phases. On 20 October 2004 it authorized an increase in the number of AMIS personnel to 3,320, and in April 2005 this number was expanded to more than 6,000 troops and 1,560 civilian police. The further expansion came after the AU acknowledged that its force was 'extremely stretched to implement its mandate' (AU 2005a: § 3). It also recognized that, in spite of its efforts, 'the number of people displaced and at risk in Darfur has doubled since last year and continues to rise' (AU 2005b: § 103). Elements of the enhanced force were to be deployed with external assistance (the US flew in the Rwandan battalion while France provided airlift for the Senegalese contingent). In addition, Canada provided twenty-five transport helicopters and 100 armoured personnel carriers. By this stage the AU was publicly envisaging a force of some 12,000 uniformed personnel being deployed to Darfur by the spring of 2006. As it turned out, its numbers peaked at just under 8,000.

Although it is fair to say that in its areas of deployment AMIS personnel made some significant differences, the operation was plagued by three major problems – mandate issues, incapacity issues, and operating in an environment of ongoing conflict – each of which are depressingly familiar for wider peacekeeping missions and badly hampered its ability to bring stability to Darfur.

Like that of other wider peacekeeping operations, AMIS's mandate underwent a series of changes. The first controversial issue concerned whether or not the Nigerian and Rwandan troops that made up the initial protection force would undertake civilian protection tasks. In late July the AU Assembly stated that the protection force's mandate would include 'the protection, within the capacity of the Force, of the civilian population' (AU 2004a: § 8). In August 2004 Rwanda's president, Paul Kagame, announced that his 'forces will not stand by and watch innocent civilians being hacked to death like the case was here in 1994. If it was established that the civilians are in danger, then our forces would certainly intervene and use force to protect civilians.' Nigeria, on the other hand, agreed with the Sudanese government's position that AU peacekeepers were to use force only in self-defence.

The next problem also revolved around the issue of civilian protection and came with the expansion of AMIS's mandate in October 2004. At this point, the AU Peace and Security Council authorized 'the enhanced AMIS' to undertake a wide range of tasks. Among these were contributing to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief and the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes; monitoring and verifying events throughout Darfur; checking that the police were performing their tasks properly; investigating allegations of violations of the ceasefire; and protecting civilians and conducting humanitarian operations.

Not surprisingly, it was the civilian protection element of the mandate that generated the most immediate problems. The AU's communiqué of October 2004 stated that AMIS should 'Protect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability, it being understood that the protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the Government of Sudan'; and 'Protect both static and mobile humanitarian operations under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within capabilities' (AU 2004b). This phraseology caused considerable confusion among AMIS commanders on the ground, most of whom were unsure of how they were supposed to relate to government forces when they encountered civilians in 'imminent threat'. It was also very unclear as to what type of civilian protection initiatives were within AMIS's 'resources and capability', given its meagre and thinly stretched force levels. In many respects this situation left AMIS in the worst of all worlds inasmuch as local civilians expected its personnel to protect them from the *janjawid* militias and government soldiers, for they had neither the force levels nor, indeed, a crystal-clear mandate to do so. Eventually, even the chairperson of the AU Commission, Alpha Omar Konare, admitted that 'AMIS' current mandate...is not clearly understood by commanders at all levels' (AU 2006: § 105v).

The third debate about AMIS's mandate came after the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006. The agreement's security provisions gave AMIS what Kofi Annan called 'a myriad of new and formidable tasks' (2006: § 29). These included civilian protection and (potentially forcible)

disarmament of parties that did not sign the agreement, as well as drawing all the maps of which parties controlled what areas (see Stimson Center 2006). The AU also acknowledged that it was 'acutely aware of the limitations of the capacity of AMIS to fulfil the onerous responsibilities for monitoring and verification under the DPA.... To undertake the numerous tasks specified requires additional forces, improved logistics, and a more robust mandate' (*Sudan Tribune* 2006).

As it turned out, the DPA, which initially was signed only by the government of Sudan and one breakaway faction of the SLM/A led by Minni Minawi, quickly collapsed. This left AMIS in an even more precarious position than it had been previously, because its role as overseer of the DPA's security provisions meant that the rebel groups that had not signed up to the agreement accused the AU peacekeepers of siding with the government, which still claimed that the DPA represented a legitimate peace deal and called for AMIS to take action against parties that would not agree to it.

The final set of problems related to the question of how best the UN could help support the beleaguered AU force. On 31 August 2006, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1706. This authorized the UN's peacekeeping mission in southern Sudan, UNMIS (which had been deployed there in 2005 to assist in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement which ended the civil war between the government and rebels in the south of the country), to help AMIS 'support implementation of' the DPA and N'djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. To this end it authorized UNMIS to expand by up to 17,300 troops and 3,300 civilian police. Although the resolution stated that deployment should begin no later than 1 October 2006 and that the process of transition to a UN force should be completed 'no later than 31 December 2006', the sticking point was that it 'invited' the consent of the Sudanese government. The government of Sudan, however, refused to accept the resolution and demanded that any peacekeeping operation in Darfur must consist primarily of African troops.

AMIS also faced major problems because of its lack of resources. This left it unable to fulfil numerous aspects of its mandate. First, it lacked sufficient numbers of troops to monitor the whole of Darfur – an area the size of France. To give an indication of how badly under strength AMIS was it is useful to recall that two rules of thumb are commonly used to calculate the necessary force size for civilian-protection operations. The first is based on the assumption that two to ten soldiers are required for every 1,000 inhabitants within the crisis zone. Given Darfur's population of approximately 6 million, on this calculation AMIS should have had between 12,000 and 60,000 personnel. The second method is based on the protection force being at least the size of the largest indigenous armed force. According to the best available estimates, roughly 40,000 to 45,000 government troops were operating in Darfur and the *janjawid* forces were between 10,000 and 20,000 strong. On this measure AMIS should have comprised a minimum of 10,000 and potentially 45,000

troops. On either of these measures, it was far too small to offer genuine protection to a majority of Darfur's civilians.

The other major problems were that AMIS was under-resourced in the crucial areas of logistics, transport and communications. Partly because of a lack of vehicles such as APCs and helicopters, and partly because of restrictions of movement placed on it by the government, it was not well equipped to enable it to get around Darfur. It also lacked vital equipment, from GPS facilities to night-vision goggles. In addition, by mid-2005 it became apparent that many AMIS personnel were not receiving their salaries.

The final and in many ways the most fundamental problem that AMIS faced was the lack of a workable political settlement to end the war in Darfur. As a consequence its personnel were left trying to engage in wider peacekeeping tasks in the midst of a live war zone. Not only did this leave it literally caught in the crossfire, but it began to be seen as another participant in the war rather than as a facilitator of peace. AMIS personnel started being fired upon in early 2005 and suffered their first casualties in October that year. The largest single massacre of peacekeepers occurred on 29 September 2007 at its Haskanita camp. This left ten peacekeepers dead and several more wounded, bringing the total number of AMIS deaths to nearly thirty. Later that year, in the face of mounting international pressure, the government of Sudan finally agreed to allow a hybrid AU-UN force known as UNAMID to deploy to Darfur. This officially replaced the AMIS mission on 31 December 2007. In practice, however, the remaining AMIS peacekeepers were simply re-hatted and new peacekeepers were slow to arrive.

How did AMIS fare in relation to its long and complicated mandate (see Williams 2006)? First of all, in the areas where it established a presence, both the security and the humanitarian situations did tend to improve. As the Joint Implementation Mechanism concluded in June 2005, AMIS's presence 'provided a very positive influence' (cited in Annan 2005b: 17). In particular, the number of clashes between the belligerent parties diminished, as did the number of attacks on civilians. However, as Kofi Annan noted, by that stage in the war 'the decrease in attacks may also be a function of a reduced number of targets' (ibid.: 11). In terms of the wider elements of the mandate relating to civilian protection, AMIS did not fare so well. Indeed, it is important to recall that responsibility for the direct physical security for the IDP camps lay primarily with the Sudanese police – a police force widely distrusted by the IDPs because many of them turned out to be 're-packaged' *janjawid* or government soldiers. Furthermore, AMIS was criticized for allowing militias to attack civilians and each other in its presence. The force also suffered the indignity of having local SLM/A commanders impede its deployment to an increasing number of rebel-held areas.

Of course, these problems do not mean that all AMIS personnel performed poorly as individuals. The peacekeepers on the ground should not be blamed for factors beyond their control, including a lack of relevant training,

doctrine, materiel (especially communications equipment and vehicles), and intelligence-collection capacity. In short, AMIS personnel had insufficient resources to achieve the mandate.

After several years in the field, AMIS proved unable to facilitate the return of the IDPs and refugees to their homes; nor was it able to repair the damage done to the land, settlements and livestock by the *janjawid* and government forces. In addition, it was unable to address the underlying governance issues that lay at the heart of Darfur's crisis. In this sense, despite the best efforts of AMIS personnel, stable peace in Darfur remained elusive.

8.3 Problems


Although the major problems with wider peacekeeping were identified in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, several peace operations continued to bear its hallmarks. The UN's independent inquiry into its failure in Rwanda gave a useful indication of the central problems associated with wider peacekeeping (also see chapters 4 and 5):

- inadequate mandate. UNAMIR's mandate was based on the ill-founded assumption that the parties would adhere to the Arusha Accords. As the report pointed out, 'the UN mission was predicated on the success of the peace process. There was no fall-back, no contingency planning for the eventuality that the peace process did not succeed' (Independent Inquiry 1999: 23). The same can be said for UNPROFOR, AMIS and other peace operations.
- the mandate could not be implemented. The mandates were worded vaguely, using words such as 'assist'. In all the cases discussed above, where there was a situation of ongoing violence and a breakdown in the peace process, it became unclear as to what or whom it was that peacekeepers should be assisting.
- confusion over the rules of engagement. Because the mandates were unclear, the peacekeeper's rules of engagement were also vague and subject to constant change. As a general rule, each of the missions considered here treated the 'Mogadishu line' of consent (figure 8.1) as absolute, even if that meant that the mission was unable to accomplish its wider goals. This approach raised particularly acute dilemmas with regard to civilian protection issues (see chapter 15).
- inadequate resources and logistics. At least initially, all three missions discussed above lacked the troops, equipment and logistical capability to fulfil their mandates. The 'safe areas' policy in Bosnia resulted in peacekeepers (in Srebrenica in particular) being stranded without supplies for months on end. The same is true of peacekeepers deployed in outlying regions of Darfur, and virtually the entire UNAMIR force.
- the failure of political will. James Gow's (1997) diplomatic history of the Bosnian war was aptly titled *The Triumph of the Lack of Will*. Sitting at the

crossroads of Westphalian and post-Westphalian conceptions of peace operations, wider peacekeeping reflects the idea that peacekeeping in contemporary war zones requires the adoption of 'wider' tasks, but it also reveals a deep reluctance on the part of UN member states to give the organization's peacekeepers the means to fulfil these objectives successfully. In each of the cases analysed here, states were willing to authorize new peacekeeping missions but were unwilling to pay for them to be appropriately resourced.

- wider peacekeeping suffers from organizational problems. Sometimes, rifts appear across different national contingents within the same peace operation, as occurred most publicly in UNAMSIL after a confidential report written by the force commander, General Jetley, was leaked to the international media (see companion website). But it is also a problem in the sense of coordinating across different agencies which often get in each other's way and work at cross-purposes. In Bosnia, for instance, peacekeepers were mandated to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid, but there was no wider assessment of the impact that this was having on either the belligerents or the suffering civilian populace. Not only can the militarization of an aid operation jeopardize years of progress in fields such as confidence-building but, conversely, uncoordinated activities by aid agencies can hamper peacekeeping operations by, for instance, sustaining local warlords and militating against the use of force by the UN or other engaged organizations. Moreover, the UN secretariat, and the DPKO in particular, were unable to manage the vast flow of information generated by these operations. The stories of both Srebrenica and Rwanda are littered with examples of information flows breaking down, of complex decision-making processes producing inertia, and of multiple lines of communication spreading confusion.

As we have seen, wider peacekeeping operations are plagued by the gulf between means and ends. They are an ad hoc response to the challenges raised by 'new wars' but they have remained founded upon Westphalian concepts and habits. In Bosnia, Rwanda, Darfur and other war zones, international society has called upon peacekeepers to undertake a long list of onerous tasks beyond the traditional activities but proved reluctant to give them the means to achieve them. In practice, therefore, states retained what they believed were tried and tested peacekeeping techniques in inappropriate conditions. Thus, consent was placed at the conceptual heart of wider peacekeeping and its maintenance was understood as being the most important aspect of the operation. But, as the case studies in this chapter have highlighted, consent was always precarious, since at least one side usually benefits from the use of force. Moreover, while formal wider peacekeeping doctrine suggested that it was the actions or inactions of peacekeepers that were the primary cause of a loss of consent, in these four cases, compared to the strategic calculations



Source: adapted from HMSO (1999).

Figure 8.2 Consent and capability: the unenviable position of wider peacekeeping

of the belligerent parties, the actions of the peacekeepers themselves had little influence on the breakdown of consent and the upsurge in violence.

The arrows in figure 8.2 represent the preferred operational direction of a peacekeeping operation. In terms of its practical experiences, wider peacekeeping sits in the bottom left-hand corner, the environment that an operation – even one deployed to a hostile environment – should avoid at all costs. Nevertheless, all the operations discussed here find themselves in this unenviable position, one in which they lacked the consent of the parties and the capability to enforce the mandate. This is caused by the combination of continuing support for the Westphalian conception of peacekeeping coupled with the failure of adherents to the post-Westphalian conception to back their words with actions and money in areas of the world that are peripheral to their geostrategic interests. The next chapter analyses those operations where the need to enforce the will of the UN Security Council was considered more important than achieving the consent of the local parties.

CHAPTER NINE

Peace Enforcement

Peace enforcement is generally considered to be synonymous with activities sanctioned under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Occasionally, the UN resorted to peace enforcement measures during the Cold War, but it was not until the 1990s and the dramatic increase in the passage of Chapter VII resolutions that the concept became widely utilized. The issue of peace enforcement has raised several important questions about the UN's role in maintaining international peace and security, not least whether the organization is capable of using force to preserve its values and, perhaps more fundamentally, whether it should.

This chapter starts by exploring the distinctive characteristics of the UN's concept of peace enforcement. It then examines peace enforcement in practice by considering both an example of Westphalian enforcement that is closely related to collective security and was orchestrated by the UN Security Council (Korea) and an example of the post-Westphalian variety, conducted in Somalia, which aimed to maintain order and public security. (Several other cases of peace enforcement are discussed on the companion website.) Finally, the chapter outlines some of the main challenges associated with this type of operation.

9.1 What is peace enforcement?

As the UN and other actors became involved in more complex operations, so the neat distinctions between traditional types of peacekeeping and peace enforcement have eroded in practice. In conceptual and legal terms, however, there remain important characteristics that continue to distinguish peace enforcement from other types of operations. In particular, peace enforcement is concerned with activities that fall under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: 'Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression'. Enacting Chapter VII gives the Security Council the authority (1) to determine when a threat to, or breach of, international peace and security has occurred; (2) to order provisional measures under Article 40; and (3) to order enforcement measures to be taken against a state or entities within a state.

Although this seems relatively clear in theory, in practice it has not always been easy to identify either when the Security Council has invoked Chapter

VII or which sections of a resolution refer to Chapter VII and which do not. As a consequence, it is important to understand how Security Council practice on this issue has developed. As was argued in a recent study by the organization Security Council Report (2008b), among the most relevant questions are: Does the form of a Council decision matter – is an explicit mention of Chapter VII necessary? Is a reference to Chapter VII necessary to authorize member states to use force? Is a reference to Chapter VII necessary to authorize a robust mandate for a UN operation involving the use of military force? Is it the Council resolution or the rules of engagement (ROE) and concept of operations that determine whether a UN operation will be able to use force? And is a reference to Chapter VII necessary to impose sanctions? Some of the study's answers to these questions are summarized in box 9.1.

It is reasonably clear that between 1946 and 1989 the UN invoked Chapter VII on twenty-four occasions (see table 9.1). In comparison, between 1990 and 1999 there were a further 166 Chapter VII resolutions (and the number has continued at a similar rate into the twenty-first century). Enforcement measures usually refer to the imposition of either economic sanctions (under Article 41) or military sanctions (under Article 42). To date, the UN has authorized the use of military force for a wide range of purposes. Among these have been to restore or maintain international peace and security; to enforce sanctions; to defend the personnel of peacekeeping operations; to provide physical protection to civilians in conflict zones; to protect humanitarian activities; and to intervene in so-called internal conflicts.

For many commentators and practitioners alike, the idea of collective security provides the intellectual basis for the UN's conception of peace enforcement (see box 3.4, p. 78). In its classic sense, the concept of collective security referred to 'a system, regional or global, in which each state in the system accepts that the security of one is the concern of all, and agrees to join in a collective response to threats to, and breaches of, the peace' (Lowe et al. 2008: 13). As Boutros-Ghali suggested, in *An Agenda For Peace*,

[i]t is the essence of the concept of collective security as contained in the Charter that if peaceful means fail, the measures provided in Chapter VII should be used, on the decision of the Security Council, to maintain or restore international peace and security in the face of a 'threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or an act of aggression'. (1992: § 42)

This general rule, however, is qualified by Article 51, which preserves 'the inherent right of states to individual or collective self-defence', at least until the Security Council has taken the appropriate measures. In practice, of course, the UN has functioned in a far more selective manner than envisaged in an ideal system of collective security. This has led some analysts to suggest that the UN was neither set up as a collective security system – the Charter contains no reference to collective security and contains several departures from such a system, not least the veto power of the P-5 (which kept the great

Box 9.1 Security Council action under Chapter VII

The Council has general powers under articles 24 and 25 to adopt binding decisions, and such decisions do not always need to be taken under Chapter VII. Even when the Council does use its Chapter VII powers, it is not essential to have an explicit reference either to the chapter itself or to a particular article thereof. Resolutions adopted under Chapter VII may also (and usually do) include provisions which are non-binding.

Interpretation of Council resolutions is, therefore, a complex art. In order to ascertain the Council's intent and the powers it may be using in a particular resolution, it is necessary to analyse (1) the overall context; (2) the precise terms used in the resolution; and (3) (sometimes) the discussions in the Council – both at the time of adoption and subsequently. Although the express mention of Chapter VII is not essential, the Council seems in recent times to recognize increasingly the significant importance of clarity. The clearer the language adopted, the better the prospects for effectiveness and credibility of Council decisions. This may not be possible on every occasion, but it seems that on balance the Council is conscious of the need to avoid ambiguity.

Chapter VII powers must be used for the establishment of Council-mandated sanctions regimes – although an explicit reference to the chapter or Article 41 is not essential. Similarly, use of Chapter VII powers is required to authorize member states or a UN peacekeeping operation to use force – but again an explicit reference to the chapter is not essential. However, the problems generated by uncertain consent, concern about legal ambiguity, and deployment in increasingly hostile operational environments increasingly led the Council to begin to approve UN operations and to authorize the use of force with explicit reference to Chapter VII. In recent times, therefore, authorizing resolutions have consistently included: (1) a determination in accordance with Article 39; (2) the chapeau 'acting under Chapter VII'; and (3) an operative paragraph containing a 'decision' to authorize member states to use force.

Such was the case with authorizations regarding Iraq (resolutions 678, 1483 and 1511), Somalia (resolutions 794 and 1744), Bosnia (resolutions 770, 787, 816, 820, 836, 908, 1031, 1088, 1174 and 1575), Albania (resolutions 1101 and 1114), Rwanda (Resolution 929), Haiti (resolutions 875, 940 and 1529), the Great Lakes/Democratic Republic of the Congo (resolutions 1080, 1484 and 1671), the CAR (Resolution 1125), Sierra Leone (Resolution 1132), Kosovo (Resolution 1244), Timor-Leste (Resolution 1264), Afghanistan (resolutions 1386 and 1510), Liberia (Resolution 1497), Côte d'Ivoire (resolutions 1464 and 1528) and Chad/CAR (Resolution 1778).

The practical conduct of UN peacekeeping operations – and whether force is actually used or not – is typically influenced more strongly by factors such as the concept of operations and ROE rather than by the language of the mandate itself. In such cases, what happens in practice may be largely dependent upon the political and operational environment in which the mission is expected to discharge its mandate.

Source: paraphrased from Security Council Report (2008b: 1–2, 22, 36–37).

powers safe from Council action against them) and Chapter VIII's reference to regional arrangements (which acknowledged that the UN would be unable to address all threats to international peace and security) – nor operated as such a system in practice (Lowe et al. 2008: 13). Compared to the League of Nations, however, and in terms of the three characteristics of collective secu-

TABLE 9.1 Chapter VII resolutions, 1946–1989

| 24 resolutions | |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| Palestine | 54 (1948); *62 (1948) |
| Korea | †82 (1950); †83 (1950); †84 (1950) |
| Congo | *146 (1960); †161 (1961); †169 (1961) |
| Southern Rhodesia | †217 (1965); †221 (1966); *232 (1966); 253 (1968); 277 (1970); 288 (1970); 314 (1972); *386 (1976); 388 (1976); 409 (1977) |
| East Pakistan | †307 (1971) |
| Cyprus | †353 (1974) |
| South Africa | 418 (1977); †421 (1977) |
| Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) | †502 (1982) |
| Iran–Iraq | *598 (1987) |

Notes: * Resolution refers to a specific article in Chapter VII, but not explicitly to Chapter VII itself.

† Resolution uses wording that contains only an implicit reference to Chapter VII.

Source: Chesterman (2001: 237).

rity systems (certainty, utility and inclusivity) that we discussed in chapter 3, the UN can be understood as an imperfect system of collective security.

One serious problem with the application of Chapter VII measures stems from the fact that, while the Charter's authors envisaged the Security Council possessing its own armed forces, in practice the UN has been forced to try and establish a system of collective security by authorizing other entities to use force on its behalf. Although the Charter created an institutional framework for such a force in Article 43, which established the Military Staff Committee, we have already discussed (in chapter 6) the numerous (failed) attempts to establish standing forces for the UN. This has left a persistent gap between the theoretical provision for UN military enforcement measures and the practical lack of a UN military capability. In *An Agenda for Peace*, Boutros-Ghali (1992) suggested that the Military Staff Committee should be resuscitated in the context of Chapter VII operations rather than traditional peacekeeping operations. To this end, he called for member states to make armed forces available to the UN. Such a step, he argued, would itself be a deterrent to potential aggressors, since it would advertise that the Security Council possessed a means of response (see box 9.2). The Military Staff Committee did not establish an auspicious track record in this regard. By the time of the 1991 Gulf War, it had held no substantive meetings since 1948, had undertaken no preparatory staff work or contingency planning, and had concluded no agreements with member states to make forces available to the Council under Article 43 (Urquhart 2000: 83).

Box 9.2 Peace enforcement units

- 43) ...The ready availability of armed forces on call could serve, in itself, as a means of deterring breaches of the peace since a potential aggressor would know that the Council had at its disposal a means of response. ...It is my view that the role of the Military Staff Committee should be seen in the context of Chapter VII, and not that of the planning or conduct of peace-keeping operations.
- 44) ...I recommend that the Council consider the utilization of peace-enforcement units in clearly defined circumstances and with their terms of reference specified in advance. Such units from Member States would be available on call and would consist of troops that have volunteered for such service. They would have to be more heavily armed than peace-keeping forces and would need to undergo extensive preparatory training within their national forces. Deployment and operation of such forces would be under the authorisation of the Security Council and would, as in the case of peace-keeping forces, be under the command of the Secretary-General. I consider peace-enforcement units to be warranted as a provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter. (Boutros-Ghali 1992)

Today, the UN still has no 'peace-enforcement units' as envisaged by Boutros-Ghali. The Security Council has therefore been forced to delegate its Chapter VII powers to UN principal organs, UN subsidiary organs, UN member states or regional arrangements (Sarooshi 2000: 4). According to Boutros-Ghali, such delegation was necessary because 'neither the Security Council nor the Secretary-General [had] the capacity to deploy, direct, command and control operations for [enforcement purposes], except perhaps on a very limited scale' (1995a: § 77). When a particular entity is delegated Chapter VII powers by the Security Council it is conferred with the UN's seal of legitimacy to carry out the necessary enforcement measures. In turn, the way in which the delegate exercises those Chapter VII powers will affect the Security Council's future as a source of international legitimacy. The delegation of Chapter VII powers does not involve a complete transfer of power, since a delegation can always be revoked and the Security Council retains its right to exercise those powers (Sarooshi 2000: 7).

On the positive side, the process of delegation provides the UN with an enforcement capacity it would not otherwise have, is more legitimate than the unilateral use of force by states without UN authorization, and can provide a greater degree of operational coherence. On the other hand, the arrangement can have a negative impact on the UN's credibility and stature, and entities authorized to carry out Chapter VII tasks may go beyond their delegated mandate (Boutros-Ghali 1995a: § 80). In the experiences analysed below, the main culprit in this regard was the United States, particularly in the Congo (covertly) and Somalia (overtly). This highlights the historically close relationship between US interests and the Security Council's authorization to use force. This, in turn, raises the uncomfortable point that the main

deterrent to would-be aggressors is fear of US military power rather than the UN's security system *per se* (Urquhart 2000: 86).

From the outset, the UN's architects realized that the organization would need to have a mixture of military and non-military means at its disposal. In particular, the Charter envisaged the use of various types of sanctions (Article 41) and military force (Article 42) as the organization's primary coercive instruments. Before 1990 the use of economic sanctions and arms embargoes by the UN was relatively rare, but their use increased markedly during the 1990s. Their main purpose was 'to modify the behaviour of a party that is threatening international peace and security and not to punish or otherwise exact retribution' (Boutros-Ghali 1995a: § 66). Since 1990 the Security Council has imposed economic sanctions on some twenty targets, with mixed but always controversial results (see Cortright et al. 2008). During the early 1990s, a significant part of the controversy stemmed from the widespread recognition that the use of general trade sanctions was a blunt instrument that raised questions about the legitimacy of inflicting suffering on a population as a whole in order to exert an uncertain degree of pressure on political leaders whose primary concern may not be the welfare of their citizens. By far the most contentious case in this regard was Iraq (see Lynch 2008).

Partly in recognition of this problem, since 1994 all new UN sanctions regimes have been targeted. That is, they consist of various packages of financial sanctions, travel bans, arms embargoes and commodity boycotts rather than general trade sanctions (Cortright and Lopez 2000, 2002). Financial sanctions, for instance, were initially imposed only on government assets. Starting with the case of Haiti in 1994, the Council has also targeted the accounts of designated individuals and groups, such as the Haitian military junta, UNITA leaders in Angola and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In 2001 the UN imposed sanctions upon Liberia because of its continued material and financial support for the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone (Security Council Resolution 1343). This was the first time that it had imposed sanctions upon one state because of its defiance of sanctions against another (Cortright and Lopez 2002: 17). The following year the UN significantly broadened the scope of sanctions by demanding that member states take action within their own borders to criminalize the financing of terrorist activities (Security Council Resolution 1373). However, while sanctions form an important part of the UN's enforcement armoury, they do not directly require the involvement of peacekeepers. Arguably the closest association between peace operations and sanctions has been in relation to arms embargoes, the results of which have been the subject of considerable debate (see Tierney 2005; SIPRI 2007b). The remainder of this chapter concentrates upon the UN's use of the military instrument.

In *An Agenda for Peace*, Boutros-Ghali (1992: § 43) made clear that the option of taking military action in defence of the Charter's principles 'is essential to the credibility of the United Nations as a guarantor of international security'.

Because the UN lacks its own armed forces, once Article 42 has been invoked it is up to the member states to make armed forces and facilities available to the Security Council so that it may carry out its mandate or delegate its powers to an appropriate entity. In practice, it is possible to distinguish two varieties of the use of military force: Westphalian and post-Westphalian. Westphalian peace enforcement refers to those occasions when the UN has authorized the use of force against a particular state in response to an act (or acts) of interstate aggression. From this perspective, the liberal peace thesis requires enforcement measures to promote liberal practices between states, such as refraining from the use of force (except in self-defence) and respecting diplomatic protocol and the territorial integrity of other states. Such practices evolved out of the European states system of the nineteenth century and were central components of Woodrow Wilson's liberal vision of the post-First World War order (see chapter 3). Examples are the UN's authorization of force against North Korea following its invasion of South Korea in June 1950 and against Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.

Post-Westphalian enforcement, on the other hand, refers to those occasions when the UN has authorized the use of force against a state or non-state entity in response to acts of violence that may have occurred primarily within the borders of a particular state, such as the massacre of civilians or attacks against UN personnel. Examples of this sort of enforcement activity include the UN's use of force in the Congo in the early 1960s, in Somalia in the early 1990s and in eastern DRC in the early twenty-first century. NATO's use of force in Bosnia during Operation Deliberate Force, the multinational force assembled to evict the military junta in Haiti in 1994, and INTERFET in East Timor in 1999.

9.2 Peace enforcement in practice

Westphalian forms of collective peace enforcement have been relatively rare. The case analysed here is the UN's involvement in the Korean War – specifically, its delegation of its enforcement powers to a US-led coalition of member states. The post-Westphalian variety of peace enforcement was relatively rare until the early 1990s, after which the numbers of this type of operation increased substantially. The example offered here is of the international intervention in Somalia during the early 1990s. Additional examples of both types (the Gulf War, ONUC and MINUSTAH) are available on the companion website.

The unified command in Korea (1950–1953)

The Korean War was the first occasion when the UN authorized the use of force by a coalition of states under Chapter VII (see Stueck 2008). The authorization came in response to North Korea's invasion of South Korea on 25

June 1950 across the 38th parallel. The 38th parallel represented the military boundary between the two halves of Korea established in 1945. Within three days the Security Council passed two resolutions, both under Chapter VII. Resolution 82 (25 June 1950) defined North Korea's 'armed attack' as a 'breach of the peace' and called upon the 'authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel'. Resolution 83 (27 June) recommended that UN member states 'furnish' South Korea with 'such assistance...as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area'. Just over a week later, on 7 July, the Security Council recommended that 'all Members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States' (Resolution 84). This resolution also requested that the US designate a commander for the forces. On 8 July, President Truman duly assigned General MacArthur to that role. The Security Council delegated command and control to the US primarily because of the overwhelming contribution it made to the UN force (Sarooshi 2000: 110). This generated significant criticism of the UN, which many states believed was acting as a stooge for the US to carry out its own war aims throughout the conflict.

All forces and other assistance by member states were given on a voluntary basis, and in total fifteen states provided troops for the operation. In the face of such an effective opposition the North Korean forces were soon pushed back beyond the 38th parallel, and by November 1950 the UN forces were nearing Korea's border with China. Not surprisingly, this prompted Chinese intervention, which successfully drove the UN forces back towards the 38th parallel. After causing approximately 4 million deaths and stimulating intense disagreements between and within both sides, the war ground to a halt with the signing of an armistice on 27 July 1953. This established a new truce line close to the 38th parallel.

The Korean case raises two particularly relevant issues for a discussion of UN peace enforcement. The first concerns the decision-making process whereby the UN Security Council authorized the use of force in Korea. The initial resolutions on Korea (resolutions 82 to 84) were only possible because the Soviet Union was boycotting the Council at the time over its decision not to allow a representative from the People's Republic of China to sit in place of the member representing Chiang Kai-shek. Although the Soviet absence undoubtedly made it easier for the US to get its own way in the Council, several non-permanent members, notably Egypt, India and Yugoslavia, were not totally uncritical of Washington's proposals, and all of them either abstained or voted against the first resolutions. When the Soviet Union resumed its seat at the Council on 1 August it was able to wield its veto to preclude any further Security Council resolutions. This prompted the United States to transfer its efforts into the arena of the UN General Assembly. After much politicking, on 3 November 1950 the Soviet veto in the Council



Map 9.1 The Democratic People's Republic of Korea

was circumvented when the Western powers successfully transferred debate on the issue of Korea into the General Assembly by invoking what has become known as the 'Uniting for Peace' procedure (see chapter 2). While the Soviets voted against the proposal, they could not veto it because the transfer of an issue from the Council to the Assembly is considered a procedural issue and therefore not subject to the veto. In the resolution the Assembly confirmed the mandate of the US-led forces in Korea, perpetuated the legality of the military action, asked the Collective Measures Committee to consider addi-

tional actions to meet the North Korean and Chinese attacks, and kept the UN involved in the diplomatic efforts to end the war (Zaum 2008: 159). This scenario demonstrates how peace enforcement is often inextricably related to the wider context of relations between the great powers and the P-5 states within the Security Council. In this case, the context was one of Cold War rivalry. The episode also 'persuaded Moscow once and for all of the advantages of full participation' within the Security Council (Stueck 2008: 277).

The second issue concerns the outcomes that peace enforcement measures are intended to achieve. The problem that faced the US commanders of the UN force in Korea was discerning what outcomes would constitute the successful completion of their mandate, given the vague nature of the phrase 'restore international peace and security to the area' (Resolution 83). The US commanders had to decide whether their mandate simply required the North Korean forces to be repelled beyond the 38th parallel or whether they should pursue the fleeing North Korean forces beyond the 38th parallel in line with the General Assembly's wishes (under Resolution 376 (V), 7 October 1950) and contribute to the establishment of an independent, democratic and united Korea (see Sarooshi 2000: 115–19).

As it turned out, the UN forces initially advanced north of the 38th parallel but were subsequently themselves repelled by the Chinese and North Korean forces and settled for an armistice based upon a truce line near the 38th parallel. Indeed, MacArthur's decision to pursue the North Korean forces to the Chinese border exceeded his own president's orders. Arguably because of the military balance, the UN force also decided that the establishment of a united and democratic Korea lay beyond the mandate's terms. As the US secretary of state argued at the time, although the US and UN both desired a united and democratic Korea, 'I do not understand it to be a war aim. In other words, that is not sought to be achieved by fighting, but it is sought by peaceful means, just as was being attempted before the aggression' (in Sarooshi 2000: 118). In this case, therefore, the Security Council's inability to define a clear political outcome for its enforcement measures was resolved primarily by the balance of military forces on the ground. This was to happen regularly in future operations as well.


UNOSOM I and II and UNITAF in Somalia (1992–1995)

The UN's involvement in Somalia followed a deadly combination of protracted civil war and famine that killed at least 350,000 Somalis in 1992 alone and left 70 per cent of the population suffering severe malnutrition (Clark 1993: 213–14; see also Clarke and Herbst 1997). By the time Somalia's representative at the UN formally requested assistance in January 1992, the country had no functioning government (see Sahnoun 1994). In response, the Security Council adopted Resolution 733. This called for a ceasefire between the warring factions, imposed an arms embargo, called for the Secretary-General

to deploy a fact-finding mission, and requested increased levels of humanitarian assistance. In light of the ongoing violence within Somalia the UN established a peacekeeping force, UNOSOM, under Security Council Resolution 751 (24 April 1992). It was intended, among other things, to protect the humanitarian assistance operations. However, the small force (which eventually numbered approximately 3,500) was unable to operate effectively in the context of ongoing violence and persistent attempts by various militias to steal humanitarian relief supplies or extort concessions from international agencies attempting to deliver aid.

In an effort to create a stable environment in which humanitarian assistance could be effectively disbursed, in December 1992 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 794. This authorized the Secretary-General and any cooperating member states to use 'all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia'. It also provided the legal basis for Operation Restore Hope, the name given to the US-led Unified Task Force designed to create such an environment. The UNITAF operation comprised some 38,000 troops, approximately 25,000 of whom were American. Confronted by such an overwhelming display of force, the vast majority of Somali warlords and their militias curtailed their activities against the UN and personnel from the various aid agencies. Unfortunately, such cooperation did not endure.

UNITAF's problems began in earnest when its commanders and the Secretary-General differed over the definition of what constituted 'a secure environment' for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The key disagreement revolved around the issue of disarming the various factions in and around Mogadishu. The Secretary-General argued that, because UNITAF had not disarmed these various militia forces, it had not completed its objectives within the capital city, let alone the rest of Somalia. Washington took a different view, claiming that UNITAF had achieved what it had set out to do. Amid these arguments, UNITAF's mission officially expired on 4 May 1993, at which point many of its troops were absorbed into the successor force, UNOSOM II. Shortly before this, the Secretary-General had recommended that the new mission be given the right to use military force. On 26 March 1993, therefore, the Security Council passed Resolution 814. This duly stated: 'Acting under Chapter VII... UNOSOM II [should] assume responsibility for the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia... and... to organise a prompt, smooth and phased transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II.' UNOSOM II was given the unenviable objectives of providing 'a secure environment' and ensuring 'the rehabilitation of the political institutions and economy of Somalia'. Unlike UNITAF, UNOSOM II was placed under the command of the Secretary-General's Special Representative to Somalia, a retired American admiral, Jonathan Howe, until his resignation in February 1994.



Map 9.2 Somalia

Left with the task of disarming the various warring factions, UNOSOM II was inevitably drawn into Somalia's fractious clan politics. This presented the peacekeepers with a series of difficult challenges. In particular, UNOSOM II needed to devise strategies that would persuade the warlords to cooperate with the disarmament process without bestowing unwarranted political legitimacy upon them. The difficulty was that, while the warlords and their supporters were responsible for extorting humanitarian NGOs and looting aid deliveries, they also commanded a not insignificant degree of political

support within the local population. For the peacekeepers it was important to engage the warlords in dialogue, for they could not be ignored, but simultaneously to ensure that they were not treated as the only representatives of the local populace. Since the warlords did not appear to command the loyalty of the majority of locals (see Sahnoun 1994), the peacekeepers needed to engage more effectively with other local organizations and associations who had a greater stake in peace, and in all likelihood would speak for greater numbers of people whose voices had been marginalized by the fighting. In the case of General Mohammed Farah Aidid, UN peacekeepers chose to confront his supporters without making a credible case for disarmament as part of a viable broader political strategy for Somalia's reconstruction.

The situation took a deadly turn on 5 June, when twenty-three Pakistani soldiers were killed while trying to disarm militia loyal to Mogadishu's most powerful leader, General Aidid (Melvern 1995: 324). In response, the Security Council passed Resolution 837, which authorized the arrest and prosecution of those responsible for the attack. This decision effectively placed the UN's peacekeepers in a state of war with Aidid's militia. It also intensified two significant problems that had been facing General Howe and the UN for some time. The first is a common feature of many peace enforcement operations. The problem was that several national contingents within UNOSOM II persisted in taking their orders from their national capitals rather than from Howe. The Italian contingent, for example, even went as far as paying various Somali leaders not to attack it and failed to support other contingents when they came under fire (Clapham 2002: 204). The second problem revolved around the fact that there were also forces from UN member states operating in Somalia which were not formally part of UNOSOM II. Chief among them were the US soldiers under the command of Major General William Garrison, who had been ordered to capture Aidid or his senior officials whenever the opportunity arose. These were the troops involved in the infamous 'Black Hawk down' operation on 3–4 October 1993 that resulted in the deaths of eighteen US servicemen and an unknown number of Somalis. In all, there were three independent US commands (Sarooshi 2000: 189–90). Clearly these factors made it very difficult for UNOSOM II to maintain cohesion and achieve its objectives.

The situation calmed somewhat after 9 October, when Aidid's faction declared a unilateral cessation of hostilities against UNOSOM II. Nevertheless, stung by the loss of its soldiers, Washington announced its intention to withdraw its troops from Somalia by 31 March 1994. European governments quickly followed suit, thus effectively ending the military enforcement action in the country (UNOSOM II's ability to carry out military enforcement action was officially terminated with the passing of Security Council Resolution 897 on 4 February 1994). The last UN troops left Somalia in March 1995. For all the bloodshed, they left behind a situation not too dissimilar from the one they had initially encountered in 1992.

9.3 Challenges

The UN has been relatively successful, within its own limited terms of reference, when it has engaged in Westphalian enforcement operations, as in the Korean and Gulf wars. Such cases have, however, been relatively rare compared to situations where the UN has authorized enforcement measures in response to internal wars with significant international dimensions – that is, post-Westphalian enforcement. This latter type of operation is concerned with what transpires within states and enters a qualitatively different terrain from Westphalian enforcement. The important question for the world's peacekeepers is whether post-Westphalian enforcement operations are something that the UN and other actors should be in the business of conducting, and, if so, in what circumstances they should take place (see Tharoor 1995).


As we can see from the historical cases discussed above, peace enforcement operations raise several challenges. First, the often vaguely worded nature of many enforcement mandates has generated questions of interpretation, particularly over the specific conditions that need to be achieved in order to terminate enforcement measures. Such arguments were particularly evident in the operations in Korea and Somalia. In addition, the debates that occurred prior to the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 were at least partially related to the way in which the previous set of enforcement measures, conducted against Iraq since 1990, had been concluded. This case shows that, even in what appear to be relatively clear-cut cases of Westphalian enforcement, establishing criteria for success can be difficult.

In the post-Westphalian environment the challenges are even more pronounced. As a result, analysts have called for greater clarity in the use of enforcement mandates. In relation to the UN, for instance, Trevor Findlay has argued that all UN missions involving armed military personnel should be given Chapter VII mandates; that the Security Council should stop using the euphemism 'all necessary means' and be more precise in its intentions; that a UN Staff College be established to prepare senior officers for leadership roles in UN operations; and that the UN must overcome '[t]he great lacuna in all efforts to improve UN peace operations...doctrine' (2002: 384). Findlay's points are particularly pertinent in relation to civilian protection tasks. As we discuss in more detail in chapter 15, especially since 1999, a variety of peace operations have engaged in low-level enforcement activities in the name of civilian protection but have done so without clear mandates and relevant doctrine.

Second, given the lack of a UN army and the organization's overstretched and under-funded bureaucratic mechanisms, there are a variety of prudential concerns about whether the UN is in any position to conduct large-scale enforcement measures effectively. These include the fact that the UN's member states have been unwilling to pay for effective forces; that when the member states have deployed troops, they have been loath to place them

under foreign control; that the UN's members lack a common military doctrine; that the UN's bureaucratic structures are ill-prepared to oversee the day-to-day management of large-scale military operations; and that the UN's political process means it is often reluctant to distinguish victim from aggressor – exhibited most starkly in Bosnia and Rwanda. Aside from the crucial practical questions of command and control involved in enforcement operations, of particular importance here is whether the contributing states can maintain the political will to sustain enforcement measures when faced with rising costs and the increased likelihood of casualties. Although the UN's two Westphalian enforcement operations in Korea and the Gulf achieved the specific terms of their mandates, they generated very large numbers of casualties in the process. Post-Westphalian enforcement, on the other hand, has met with mixed results. While on occasion military power has been used with some success to promote humanitarian activities (for example UNITAF in Somalia), other operations (such as UNOSOM II) have experienced severe problems and resulted in the deaths of significant numbers of peacekeepers. Figure 9.1 shows a clear increase in UN peacekeeping fatalities in the early 1960s (at the height of the ONUC operation) and again in the early 1990s, when peacekeepers engaged in enforcement action in Somalia, Bosnia and elsewhere. It also shows that during the twenty-first century, when most operations involved some form of enforcement activity beyond self-defence, the UN has sustained consistently high levels of fatalities.

The third issue revolves around whether the UN should be engaged in war fighting at all. Westphalian enforcement measures are clearly designed to



Source: Compiled by the authors from DPKO figures at www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/factsfigs.shtml.

Figure 9.1 UN peacekeeping fatalities, 1 January 1948 to 31 December 2008

protect a pluralist society of states, to guard against imperialism and to reduce the use of force between states. As a result, they have received support from the vast majority of the UN's member states. In contrast, the UN's attempts at post-Westphalian enforcement have been criticized as constituting a form of neo-imperialism because they impose Western preferences about the organization of polities, societies and economies through the use of force if necessary (see Chandler 2000). This problem has often been exacerbated because of the close association between the use of US military power and the UN's enforcement activities. In both the cases analysed here the United States was central to the enforcement measures concerned. This has raised concerns among the UN's members who are wary of Washington's political agenda. It also raises the more general question of whether the UN and other actors can undertake large-scale peace enforcement operations without American participation.

Finally, there is a series of debates about whether enforcement measures might prove counter-productive to the goal of building stable peace in the longer term. According to the Westphalian conception of peace operations, enforcement measures are specifically intended to maintain peace between sovereign states. From this perspective, the occasional use of force to restore international order is a price worth paying to uphold the norm of non-intervention and the general rule of non-use of force in international society. From a post-Westphalian perspective, however, not only does the use of force become necessary far more often but its future benefits in cases of civil war are far less obvious. From this perspective, force may often be required to deal with groups who persistently refuse to commit to peace agreements and continue to use violence to impede peace processes. Stedman (1997) has labelled such groups 'spoilers'. Using force against spoilers raises a number of difficult challenges for the UN and other actors. Not only is there a problem of identifying who the spoilers are in any given theatre of operations, there is also a quandary if the spoiler groups represent a significant proportion of the local population. In particular, using force against popular local groups may make the process of national reconciliation exceedingly difficult and jeopardize the chances for building stable peace.

Peace enforcement thus raises a host of difficult challenges. Indeed, for some, the phrase itself is an oxymoron. It was at least partly in an attempt to provide more coherent answers to these difficult questions and analyse how military power could be used to build stable peace that the UN and other actors developed the concept of 'peace support operations'. We examine these operations in more detail in chapter 12.