Peace Operations during the 1990s

As the Cold War came to an end between 1988 and 1993, peace operations underwent a triple transformation. First, there was a *quantitative transformation*. During this period, the UN conducted more peace operations than it had undertaken in its previous forty years combined. Moreover, traditional peace-keeping contributors were augmented by a flood of new countries, including great powers such as the US, France and the UK, prepared to deploy their troops as UN peacekeepers (see Findlay 1996). Second, there was a *normative transformation* catalysed by a growing belief among some member states that the remit for peace operations should be broadened to take in the promotion of a post-Westphalian conception of stable peace. Finally – and as a result of the normative transformation – there was a *qualitative transformation*. The UN was asked to carry out complex missions reminiscent of ONUC in the 1960s but on a far more regular basis. In places such as Cambodia, Bosnia and Somalia, the UN launched operations that were qualitatively different from earlier missions, marrying peacekeeping with the delivery of humanitarian aid, state-building programmes, local peacemaking and elements of peace enforcement. These missions were also much larger and more expensive than anything the UN had attempted before, with the important exception of ONUC.

By 1995, however, the catastrophes in Angola, Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda had prompted many states to re-evaluate the value of peace operations and the nature of their contribution to them. It also prompted some senior UN officials to question whether the organization should go 'back to basics' and focus only on conducting operations with the consent of the host parties (Tharoor 1995). The number of UN peacekeepers deployed around the world fell dramatically as member states expressed a preference for working through regional organizations and alliances, such as ECOWAS and NATO, and the Security Council became reluctant to create new missions. This ushered in a period of hesitant introspection at the UN, during which the organization produced reports detailing its failings in Rwanda and Bosnia. These reports identified serious problems with the way in which the UN mandated, organized and conducted its peace operations and exposed gaps between the tasks peacekeepers were expected to fulfil in the post-Cold War era and the conceptual and material resources made available to them. At the UN's Millennium Summit in 2000, Kofi Annan called for a special panel of experts – led by the

former Algerian foreign minister Lakhdar Brahimi – to consider the future direction of UN peace operations.

The post-Cold War era was therefore a seminal time for the development of peace operations. This chapter explores this period in four sections. The first two sections examine the causes and the nature of the triple transformation of peace operations, while the third focuses briefly on some of the high-profile missions in the first half of the 1990s, charts the failure of operations in Somalia, Angola, Bosnia and Rwanda, and describes the subsequent decline of UN peace operations as a popular tool for managing violent conflict. The final part of the chapter looks at what lessons were learned from these failures, concentrating on the UN's internal reports on the 1994 Rwandan genocide and 1995 massacre in the Bosnian 'safe area' of Srebrenica.

4.1 The transformation of peace operations

This section examines different explanations for the transformation of peace operations between 1988 and 1993. Put simply, there was no single overarching cause of the transformation but rather a mixture of factors that increased global demand for peace operations and the willingness of international society to supply the missions and troops requested.

On the demand side, it was commonly argued that the ending of the Cold War created a 'new world disorder' in which ethnic rivalries and 'roguish' behaviour previously held in check by the superpowers exploded into civil war (e.g. Kaplan 1994). This, in turn, created heightened demand for the deployment of peacekeepers in these newly 'volatile regions'. The main problem with this account is that, although the number of armed conflicts peaked in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War in 1992, after this high-point the number of conflicts declined significantly (see figure I.1, p. 2). In the medium term, therefore, the end of the Cold War seems to have significantly reduced rather than increased the number of armed conflicts around the world.

An alternative explanation emphasized that many of the conflicts that erupted during this period were of a particular type – what some analysts described as 'new wars' (see chapter 1). In this account the transformation of peace operations represented a principled response to this new barbarism. The central problem with this view is that the 'new barbarism' associated with the end of the Cold War was not new at all. Protracted Cold War conflicts in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola and Central America bore all the hall-marks of barbarism associated with these 'new wars' – deliberate attacks on civilians, warlordism and illegal economic activities (see Slim 2008).

A better place to start is by asking where the requests for peace operations came from. All bar one of the missions created between 1988 and 1993 (UNIIMOG) were 'brokered requests for UN assistance' (Durch 1993a: 17). In other words, they were formally requested by peace agreements or ceasefires

brokered by third parties and endorsed by the parties to the conflict. In most cases, the UN played the role of broker, but there were a number of exceptions: UNTAG was the product of a US-led mediation effort through a Contact Group of Western governments and UNAVEM II the product of an initiative spearheaded by Portugal, the Soviet Union and the US (ibid.: 17, 20–2). Of these, the majority (thirteen of the twenty missions authorized between 1988 and 1993) of peace processes addressed conflicts that preceded 1988 and all of those had some connection to Cold War politics. In other words, this period witnessed the conclusion of many civil wars that had been provoked and sustained by the Cold War's ideological struggle. As the superpowers withdrew patronage with the lessening of Cold War hostilities, so it became harder for local clients to maintain their war fighting effort. This created powerful incentives for belligerents to begin the search for a negotiated settlement, and the deployment of peace operations was widely understood to be an important part of that process. The view that peace operations were critical to peace processes and implementing ceasefires was encouraged by the relative success of the smaller operations launched in 1988 and 1989 (see below). Gradually, peace operations became the tool of choice for conflict management applied to new conflicts as well as old.

A rise in demand alone, however, cannot explain the transformation of peace operations. What explains the greater willingness of governments to contribute to and fund more complex peace operations, especially in strategically unimportant parts of the world? Of course, the answer is different for every troop-contributing country, but there are at least three general factors that played a role. First, the disintegration of the Soviet bloc created a much more permissive Security Council, and for the first time powerful states began to envisage its playing a greater role in policing and peace enforcement. Between 1990 and 2002, only twelve draft resolutions were vetoed – by far the lowest rate of vetoing since the establishment of the UN. Nine of these vetoes were cast by the US, six of which were in response to draft resolutions that were critical of Israel. In comparison, between 1945 and 1990, 238 vetoes were cast, an average of forty-three per decade. Cooperation between East and West played a major role in resolving the Central American wars and conflicts in Afghanistan, Namibia, Angola and Mozambique. Moreover, from the late 1980s, China began to adopt a more positive stance on peace operations, increasingly accepting that the UN Security Council had a legitimate role to play in the resolution of conflict and the amelioration of human suffering (Fravel 1996).

Second, three facets of contemporary globalization – the acceleration of democratization, the spread of human rights and the so-called CNN effect (see Robinson 2002) – led more governments to see peace operations as 'politically desirable' (Jakobsen 2002: 274). Globalization was accompanied by the spread of mass communication technology, which permitted the almost instantaneous reporting of humanitarian catastrophes. Combined with the

putative triumph of liberalism over communism and the apparent success of peace operations in 1988–9 and the first Gulf War (1990–1), this created expectations among publics in the West and elsewhere that their governments would become engaged in resolving violent conflicts and humanitarian crises overseas. As the former UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar suggested in 1991, 'we are clearly witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in public attitudes towards the belief that the defense of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents' (in Scheffer 1992: 4). There is plenty of evidence to suggest that participation in peace operations began to look attractive to governments. For example, the UK and France used their contribution to peace operations as justification for their seats on the Security Council (Rifkind 1993: 4; Treacher 2003: 65). The French foreign minister Roland Dumas even suggested that France would place 1,000 troops under permanent UN command. Similarly, states from the former Eastern bloc which aspired to membership of the EC/EU and NATO participated in peace operations to bolster their claim. States seeking to become permanent members of the Security Council (Brazil, South Africa, India, Germany, Indonesia and Nigeria) also committed troops to peace operations partly to support their case (Findlay 1996: 8). Some middle powers such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand saw themselves as 'good international citizens' (Linklater 1992; Evans 1993) and participated in peace operations to help spread the now universal values of democracy and human rights. Rising demand also created more opportunities for some of the world's poorest states to take part in peace operations. This helped them enhance their international reputations and secure small amounts of foreign currency via the system of reimbursements from the UN (Scobell 1994: 190; Berman and Sams 2000: 253). Moreover, the triumph of liberalism encouraged many in the West to believe that peace operations could be used to stop governments mistreating their people, resolve civil wars and spread democracy (Stedman 2001: 3). These three facets of globalization therefore brought the great (Western) powers, internationalist-minded middle powers, and a range of other states together in articulating a new role for peace operations and the UN.

Finally, with the Cold War coming to a close and with no new major new strategic challenges on the horizon, governments had more military capacity to commit to peace operations, and some militaries themselves had an interest in taking on new roles in order to justify their budgets and guard against excessive cuts as part of the 'peace dividend' (see Freedman 1998: 34–5; Jakobsen 2002: 273). This hard material reality created the capacity for military forces to be redirected away from national security towards the pursuit of internationalist goals through peace operations.

There were thus several reasons for the transformation of peace operations, involving both increased demand and the greater willingness and capacity of governments to supply peacekeepers. They are summarized in table 4.1.

TABLE 4.1   Explaining the triple transformation

Demand	Supply
1 End to civil wars brokered by third parties	1 More cooperative Security Council
2 Request for peace operations to monitor and implement peace accords and ceasefires	2 Globalization: media, democratization, human rights create government interest
3 Recognition that peace operations can play an effective role (after 1988–9)	3 Peace dividend: end of Cold War frees military capacity

4.2 The nature of the transformation

It is important to begin by recognizing the gradual nature of the *quantitative* transformation of peace operations. Although rapid by historical standards, the transformation occurred over a number of years and in a relatively ad hoc fashion whereby early successes translated into heightened demand for more – and more complex – UN peace operations. What is more, the *normative* and *qualitative* transformations came after the initial *quantitative* expansion of peace operations. Between 1988 and 1993, the UN created twenty new peace operations (table 4.2). Although the sheer number of new missions represented a transformation in its own right, it did not represent a straightforward, chronological transition between different generations of peacekeeping (Tharoor 1996; cf. Goulding 1993; James 1994b). Instead, the period experienced first a re-engagement and then a gradual expansion of peace operations conducted along similar lines to those during the Cold War and only then the emergence of a whole new type of operation in Somalia and Bosnia. Significantly, even these two missions started life as relatively traditional types of operation but developed gradually – and according to requirements – into something wholly different to what had come before (see chapters 8 and 9).

The first nine of these new operations, mandated between 1988 and 1991, represented more of a re-engagement with Cold War style peacekeeping than a radical transformation. The first five, all authorized during 1988 and 1989, involved monitoring the withdrawal of foreign forces (UNGOMAP, UNAVEM I), monitoring a ceasefire (UNIIMOG), and supervising and overseeing a peace agreement (UNTAG, ONUCA). And, with the exception of UNAVEM I in Angola, which was superseded by UNAVEM II, all five missions were concluded by 1991. These operations were therefore very similar in type to those of the past, but they showed signs of improvisation and change. For example, the missions in Namibia and Central America contained large civilian components. ONUCA also broke new ground by monitoring elections (early signs of the normative transformation) and disarming and demobilizing former rebels (Weiss et al. 1994: 61).

TABLE 4.2 Peace operations established 1988–1993

Mission	Location (dates)	Description
UNGOMAP	Afghanistan and Pakistan (1988–90)	Monitor Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan
UNIIMOG	Iran–Iraq (1988–91)	Monitor ceasefire
UNAVEM I	Angola (1988–91)	Monitor Cuban withdrawal
UNTAG	Namibia (1989–90)	Supervise transition in Namibia
ONUCA	Honduras, Nicaragua and Guatemala (1989–91)	Monitor compliance with peace agreement
UNAVEM II	Angola (1991–5)	Monitor ceasefire and supervise elections
UNIKOM	Iraq–Kuwait (1991–2003)	Monitor buffer zone
MINURSO	Western Sahara (1991–present)	Organize referendum on independence from Morocco
ONUSAL	El Salvador (1991–5)	Monitor ceasefire, elections, demobilization and human rights
UNAMIC	Cambodia (1991–2)	Plan subsequent UN mission
UNTAC	Cambodia (1992–3)	Monitor ceasefire, organize elections, supervise government, demobilization, refugee return
ONUMOZ	Mozambique (1992–4)	Help implement peace agreement
UNOSOM I	Somalia (1992–3)	Monitor ceasefire, assist humanitarian relief
UNPROFOR	Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia (1992–9)	Monitor and secure ceasefires, support humanitarian relief, protect 'safe areas' (1993–5), protect UN personnel
UNOSOM II	Somalia (1993–5)	Establish a secure environment for humanitarian assistance
UNMIH	Haiti (1993–6)	Help implement peace agreement
UNOMIL	Liberia (1993–7)	Support ECOWAS and government implement peace agreement
UNOMUR	Rwanda and Uganda (1993–4)	Monitor Rwanda–Uganda border
UNAMIR	Rwanda (1993–6)	Help implement peace agreement
UNOMIG	Georgia (1993–present)	Verify ceasefire agreement

All five of these missions were also broadly successful. Deploying a force of fifty military observers, drawn from traditional contributors to UN peace operations (Scandinavia, Ireland, Fiji – but also Poland), UNGOMAP successfully verified the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and faced few obstacles, though commentators agree that success was due more to Soviet

intentions to fulfil the Geneva Accords more than anything UNGOMAP did (see Birgisson 1993). Although UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim had begun attempts to broker peace between Iran and Iraq in 1980, it was not until 1988 – after the two sides had fought themselves to a standstill – that a peace deal was signed. As part of the deal, the UN was invited to deploy an observation mission along the border. With the consent of the belligerents (and more cooperation from Iraq than from Iran), UNIIMOG's 400 observers established and monitored ceasefire lines and conducted confidence-building activities. These activities contributed to cementing what was originally a fragile peace between Iraq and Iran (see Urquhart and Sick 1987). The UN's first attempt to build peace in Angola, UNAVEM I, was a modest contribution to a wider Angolan-led peace effort. Its role was limited to verifying the withdrawal of Cuban fighters from Angola. Though 'not particularly significant' (Fortna 1993a: 385) for Angola itself, assurances of Cuban withdrawal helped mediators build trust in Namibia and sowed the seeds for a more active UN role, embodied in UNAVEM II. This operation had a wider mandate to monitor a ceasefire, with an option for assisting in the organization of national elections (Fortna 1993b).

If UNGOMAP and UNIIMOG helped reaffirm the utility of relatively small UN observation missions in managing the resolution of conflicts between states, the success of the missions in Namibia (UNTAG) and Central America (ONUCA) suggested that, when conducted with the consent of belligerents, UN peace operations could also play an important role in managing the resolution of civil wars. UNTAG stood out as the UN's largest and most ambitious mission since ONUC in the 1960s. Despite several hiccups – including a miscommunicated disarmament process that nearly derailed the whole operation (see Goulding 2002: 139–75) – the operation in Namibia succeeded in overseeing the withdrawal of South Africa and Namibia's transition to independent statehood (see chapter 10). One commentator labelled it 'the first major success' for contemporary UN peace operations (Howard 2008: 52). To this day, Namibia remains one of Africa's most stable states.

The ONUCA mission in Central America had two primary goals – to stop the cross-border supply of arms and fighters into Nicaragua and to build confidence between the government of Nicaragua and the Contra rebels. As with earlier missions, such as UNSCOB, ONUCA proved incapable of detecting and interdicting weapons movement, but it did contribute to creating an environment that made such movements more difficult and therefore less frequent. In 1990, ONUCA's mandate was expanded to include disarming the rebels and overseeing elections. Although some rebels persisted, by the time the mandate expired they numbered fewer than 1,000 and were eventually brought into a negotiated peace process by the Nicaraguan government (Smith and Durch 1993).

Paying attention to these missions suggests that the end of the Cold War did not inspire a sudden and dramatic about-turn in international

perceptions of the role of peace operations in world politics. In fact the UN took on more missions that were similar in type to the majority of missions conducted during the Cold War. As they delivered on their initial aims, some of these missions (e.g. ONUCA, UNAVEM) took on new tasks that involved a deeper engagement with internal conflict. In the case of Namibia, a large and complex operation succeeded in accomplishing its mandate within a relatively short timeframe (see chapter 10). This seemed to suggest that UN peace operations were capable of building peace and transforming war-torn societies in a wider range of circumstances than had hitherto (since ONUC) been thought possible.

Partly as a result of these early successes, at the beginning of the 1990s UN peace operations became international society's conflict management tool of choice, and a new raft of large and complex operations were deployed. Most important among these missions were those in Cambodia, Somalia and Bosnia – all of which are discussed in greater detail in part III of this book. The first of these new types of mission, UNTAC, was deployed to manage the transition from war to peace in Cambodia (see Evans 1993: 107–8; chapter 10). The second, UNOSOM I, was first used to monitor a ceasefire in Somalia and assist in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and the third, UNPROFOR, was initially sent to Croatia and Bosnia to supervise a ceasefire there. In both Somalia and Bosnia, conditions on the ground changed rapidly, and the missions were expanded and given new tasks without necessarily being granted the requisite material resources or doctrinal guidance. Meanwhile, the UN continued to deploy smaller traditional-style missions in Haiti (UNMIH), Liberia (UNOMIL), Rwanda/Uganda (UNOMUR) and Georgia (UNOMIG).

Another important element of this quantitative transformation of peace operations was a growth in the number of states prepared to contribute to UN operations, including many Western states. Before 1992, the US, France and the UK (with the exception of UNFICYP in Cyprus) had not contributed many troops to UN peace operations. Nor, as we noted in chapter 3, was it customary for the great powers to deploy troops, since they were widely seen as being unable to act impartially because of their global interests. However, all three states became actively involved in the peace missions in Cambodia, Bosnia, Somalia and Latin America. This accompanied a general broadening of participation in peace operations, with forty-one states taking part for the first time between 1988 and 1993 (Findlay 1996: 3). Another twenty-one states became involved in non-UN peace operations during this time, most as part of either the US-led multinational force in Haiti (1994) or OSCE and CIS missions in the former Soviet Union (ibid.: 6).

The expansion of peace operations and their seeming effectiveness in helping states and societies to make the transition from war to stable peace encouraged a gradual shift in the *normative* expectations about what peacekeepers ought to do and a *qualitative* change in the tasks they were given. The ending of the Cold War lent credence to the post-Westphalian idea that the

spread of liberal democracy constituted the best path to global stable peace (e.g. Fukuyama 1989; Held 1998: 11). Indeed, in 1996 Boutros-Ghali recognized an 'emerging consensus' on the value of liberal democracy (1996: § 15). With increasing frequency, peace operations were given the task of overseeing elections as part of their mandate, helping to support a rapid move towards democracy that saw the proportion of states holding elections increase from 46 to 60 per cent (Paris 2003: 446).

This changing normative environment was given an institutional voice by Boutros-Ghali in 1992. In his first two months of office, the new Secretary-General established the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and appointed Kofi Annan as its head (Goulding 2002: 31). He followed this up in June 1992 with the release of his important report *An Agenda for Peace*. On 31 January 1992, the Security Council had met for the first time at the level of heads of state and instructed the Secretary-General to prepare 'analysis and recommendations' on strengthening the UN for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. Importantly, the resulting report reflected the commonly held view at the time that, while peace operations had to be adapted to meet the new demand for more complex operations (see box 4.1), the basic concepts and principles of peacekeeping remained sound. The Secretary-General confidently noted that peace operations had 'brought a degree of stability to areas of tension around the world' and that 'the established principles and practices of peace-keeping have responded flexibly to new demands of recent times, and the basic conditions of success remain unchanged' (Boutros-Ghali 1992: §§ 46 and 50). The increasing tendency for operations to be fielded to help implement political settlements presented a range of new challenges for the UN, particularly in relation to providing adequate resources for these new missions. Thus, Boutros-Ghali called for the creation of stand-by arrangements whereby member states would exchange notes with the UN identifying the kind and number of personnel they were prepared to contribute to UN operations (ibid.: § 51); the recruitment of more

Box 4.1 *An Agenda for Peace* on the nature of peacekeeping

§ 50: The nature of peace-keeping operations has evolved rapidly in recent years. The established principles and practices of peace-keeping have responded flexibly to new demands of recent years, and the basic conditions for success remain unchanged: a clear and practicable mandate; the continuing support of the Security Council; the readiness of the member states contribute the military and civilian personnel, including specialists, required; effective United Nations command at Headquarters and in the field; and adequate financial and logistic support. As the international climate has changed and peace-keeping operations are increasingly fielded to help implement settlements that have been negotiated by peace-makers, a new array of demands and problems has emerged regarding logistics, equipment, personnel and finance, all of which could be corrected if Member States so wished and were ready to make the necessary resources available.

Box 4.2 *An Agenda for Peace* and the new world order

We were all expectant. It was thrilling and we saw possibilities of doing...what the organization was expected to do [in 1945]. So we were all excited. (Kofi Annan, reflecting on the early 1990s, in Barnett 2002: 28)

Now we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is the very real prospect of a new world order. In the words of Winston Churchill, a 'world order' in which 'the principles of justice and fair play...protect the weak against the strong'. A world where the United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfil the historic vision of its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations. (President George H.W. Bush 1991)

civilian personnel, especially police; the need for additional training; the creation of a pre-positioned stock of supplies to permit rapid deployment and avoid equipment shortfalls; and the provision of free-of-cost heavy lift capability (ibid.: § 53–4). Recognizing that, in the complex operating environment created by the end of the Cold War, UN operations might have to go beyond peacekeeping and become involved in peace enforcement, Boutros-Ghali called for the creation of 'peace enforcement units' – a variation on the UNEPS proposal (see chapter 1). These units would be kept entirely separate from peacekeeping units. Drawn from member states and comprising troops who volunteer for UN peace enforcement roles, the units would be specially trained, placed on call for use in operations by the Security Council and more heavily armed than peacekeepers (ibid.: § 44).

Although it was an optimistic document, *An Agenda for Peace* issued a thinly veiled warning to member states that it was imperative that they back up their new mandates for larger and more complex peace operations with the requisite resources. In relation to financing, the Secretary-General noted that a 'chasm has developed between the tasks entrusted to this Organization and the financial means provided to it' (1992: § 60). Similarly, the report's conclusion noted that 'the endeavours of the United Nations will require the fullest engagement of all its Members, large and small, if the present renewed opportunity is to be seized' (ibid.: § 80).

The idea that UN peace operations could play a significant and constructive role was warmly received by political leaders and UN officials (see box 4.2). Although some of Boutros-Ghali's proposals – such as the idea of a tax on arms sales and international travel to support UN military operations – were greeted with scepticism (see Meisler 1995: 180; Cockayne and Malone 2007: 80), the US administration initially indicated its intention to help implement some of them. Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, described peacekeepers as 'warriors of freedom', and President George H. W. Bush offered to allow the UN to train peacekeepers at Fort Dix in New Jersey (Traub 2006: 36).

The *normative* transformation and increased participation of Western great powers in peace operations helped shape ideas about the sorts of activities that peacekeepers should undertake. As we noted earlier, additional tasks were grafted onto ongoing peace operations in an ad hoc fashion without much in the way of strategic thinking about their overall function or doctrinal thinking about what was required to accomplish these goals. In 1993, the UK's House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee issued a report on the expansion of UN peace operations, in which it identified the emergence of eight specific tasks for peacekeepers based on the experience in Angola, Namibia, Central America, Mozambique and elsewhere (see box 4.3). For all its merits, *An Agenda for Peace* barely touched on the activities identified by the British.

In summary, the transformation of peace operations at the end of the Cold War was gradual and ad hoc. It began with a re-engagement with small-scale traditional monitoring missions. When these proved effective tools for managing the transition for war to peace, the Security Council began adding new tasks and expanding the remit given to peace operations. Although this was recognized in *An Agenda for Peace*, the Secretary-General did not spell out ways of reforming the UN to meet the challenge of managing these more complex operations in a better way. However, Boutros-Ghali did sound a warning: that giving the UN more tasks without the material or doctrinal resources needed to fulfil them was a recipe for disaster. Just how prescient that prediction was would be made clear before the end of 1994.

Box 4.3 Peacekeeping tasks (1993)

Military: monitoring ceasefires, cantonment and demobilization of troops, location and destruction of weapons, de-mining, reform and retraining of armed forces, protecting borders, investigating claims of the presence of foreign forces, providing security for elections and helping to rebuild infrastructure

Police: visiting police stations, monitoring police activities, investigating alleged human rights violations by national police forces, training new police forces, enforcing arrests of suspected criminals and protecting the electoral process

Human rights: monitoring human rights, conducting human rights education programmes and investigating human rights violations

Information: explaining the peace settlement, reasons for UN deployment, and opportunities for the future of the country

Elections: observation and verification, through supervision and control of nationally conducted elections, conduct of elections by UN itself

Rehabilitation: short-term and long-term development projects

Repatriation: return and resettlement of refugees

Administration: supervising or controlling the administration of states, control foreign affairs, national defence, public security, finance and information

(Paraphrased from House of Commons 1993: § 35)

4.3 Failures and retreat

The world's new-found faith in the UN's ability to resolve violent conflict and alleviate humanitarian distress by using peace operations was short-lived. Faced with the fact that the traditional approach to peace operations (see chapters 3 and 7) and the resources made available by member states were insufficient to accomplish the increasingly ambitious mandates being handed down by the Security Council in environments where peace and ceasefire agreements were often precarious, those responsible for managing peace operations were repeatedly confronted with an awful dilemma: whether to soldier on, making do with the limited resources, authority and political support offered by international society, or advocate withdrawal. This is precisely how Boutros-Ghali (1994: § 45) described the dilemma facing UNPROFOR in 1993: 'the choice in Croatia is between continuing a mission that is clearly unable to fulfil its original mandate in full or withdrawing and risking a renewed war that would probably result in appeals for UNPROFOR to return to restore peace. Given such a choice, soldiering on in hope seems preferable to withdrawing in abdication.'

Although the UN received much of the blame for what happened in Angola, Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda – some of it rightly – it is important to note the crucial roles played by its member states. It was member states, not the UN secretariat, that crafted mandates and determined resources, and the mandates for these four operations were not crafted before warnings had been aired in the Council (see Roberts, Anna 2003). What is more, the bungled operation in Mogadishu in October 1993 that marked the beginning of the demise of UNOSOM II was conducted by US soldiers (not UN peacekeepers); the DPKO had warned the Security Council that without adequate resources the so-called safe areas in Bosnia would be vulnerable to attack; and the decision to stand aside during Rwanda's genocide in 1994 was taken against the advice of the UN's force commander on the ground. These missions are discussed in more detail in chapters 8 and 9, but it is worth providing a brief outline here to provide some context for understanding the retreat from UN peace operations in the second half of the 1990s.

The first signs that the UN's record of relative success was about to come to an end came in Angola in 1992. Following UNAVEM I's success in overseeing the withdrawal of Cuban forces, in May 1991 the Security Council established UNAVEM II to oversee the demobilization of ex-combatants and monitor national elections. To accomplish this task, the mission was afforded 350 military observers and 400 civilian election observers (see Anstee 1996; Howard 2008: 37). Earlier missions of this size, such as UNGOMAP, UNAVEM I, UNIIMOG and ONUCA, had succeeded primarily because the belligerents were themselves deeply committed to the peace process. This was not the case in Angola, and UNAVEM II lacked the capacity to operate without high levels of cooperation. Although it succeeded in creating an efficient monitoring and

verification system (Fortna 1993b: 402), UNITA rebels and the Angolan govern-ment used the lull in fighting to regroup and rearm rather than disarm and demobilize. When UNITA's leader, Jonas Savimbi, lost national elections in September 1992 by a clear margin, he declared them fraudulent. Fighting broke out the following month, most likely initiated by the government (Lodico 1996: 121). Having failed to disarm the belligerents prior to the elec-tion and unable to influence events afterwards, UNAVEM II was forced to stand aside as the fighting claimed the lives of up to 300,000 people. In what was the most intense fighting of the decades-long civil war, Boutros-Ghali

Map 4.1 *Angola*

(1993: 5) reported in September 1993 that a thousand people were being killed each day. Diplomats from the US, Portugal and Russia attempted to broker new agreements, while UNAVEM II soldiered on amid the violence. In early 1995, the parties reached a new ceasefire agreement, and UNAVEM II was replaced with a much larger mission – UNAVEM III.

UNAVEM III was given a broad and ambitious mandate, including monitoring the ceasefire and verifying the withdrawal of combatants, cantoning, disarming and demobilizing combatants, collecting UNITA arms, verifying the movement of government troops, establishing a new national army, clearing mines, coordinating humanitarian activity and overseeing the presidential election. To accomplish this it was provided with 7,000 troops and around 750 civilians (Howard 2008: 39). Once again Savimbi refused to cooperate, first by not cantoning his forces and then by holding back his specialist force from cantonment and refusing to surrender weapons. UNAVEM III lacked the military capability to disarm UNITA forcibly and the civilian capability to assist the government in building state capacity in UNITA-held territory. Thus, when UNAVEM III was wound up on schedule in 1997, it had not come close to completing its mandated tasks. There were, it should be said, some successes. Around 70,000 UNITA soldiers were disarmed and 11,000 were integrated into the national army, humanitarian coordination was improved and shaky coalition government was established (ibid.: 39–40). In the same year, however, UNITA demonstrated its military capacity by intervening in Zaire/DRC in support of Mobutu Sese Seko (Jett 1999: 167) and a year later Angola was plunged back into civil war.

UNAVEM II was the first of the UN's 1990s missions to lack the capacity and mandate to hold a peace together in the face of resistance from belligerents. The mission was unprepared to prevent post-election violence from descending into all-out civil war. The loss of life was probably higher than that of the whole Bosnian war, and its successor UNAVEM III failed to disarm UNITA and prevent the war reigniting in 1998. The failure of UNAVEM II comprised elements typical of later disasters in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda: peacekeepers given ambitious tasks without the mandate, resources or political will necessary to fulfil them and sent into an environment where the consent and cooperation of belligerents was shaky at best. Given all this, it is perhaps surprising that the outbreak of violence in 1992–3 did not produce an international outcry and that Angola is not typically listed as one of the UN's 'great peacekeeping failures' of the 1990s. This was because UNAVEM II did not attract international media attention and the Security Council's engagement with Angola during this period was characterized by ambivalence (Howard 2008: 37; Lodico 1996: 123).

The same cannot be said about the international mission deployed to Somalia less than two months after Angola's descent into violence. The US experience in Somalia marked the beginning of the world's (temporary) disengagement with peace operations and was the direct catalyst of the Security

Council's catastrophic 1993 decision to deploy only a small and cheap mission to Rwanda. In January 1991, the so-called United Somali Congress – a loose coalition of warlords led by Mohammed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi – drove the government of Siad Barre out of Mogadishu. Soon afterwards, the former allies turned on each other and Somalia descended into anarchy. Attacks on the civilian population and destruction of food sources compounded droughts and caused a massive famine that killed up to 350,000 people in 1992 (Wheeler 2000: 174; Weiss 1999: 78). Although international society had belatedly responded to the crisis by despatching large amounts of emergency aid, without armed protection a significant proportion of it was looted by warlords and thus failed to reach the intended recipients among Somalia's civilian population. In response, the US deployed over 30,000 soldiers in December 1992 to help secure the delivery of aid and assist UN peacekeepers (see chapter 9).

Relations between the US, the UN and various Somali warlords were strained, especially when the peacekeeping mandate was enlarged to include the disarmament of armed militia in addition to securing the delivery of humanitarian relief. On 5 June 1993, militia loyal to Mohammed Aidid killed more than twenty Pakistani peacekeepers who were inspecting a weapons dump as part of the disarmament process (see chapter 9). In the face of such a serious challenge to the credibility of UN peace operations around the world, within days the Security Council issued Resolution 837, which authorized the use of force ('all necessary measures') against those responsible for the attack. The US component of the mission thus became preoccupied with bringing Aidid to justice. Throughout the summer of 1993 the US conducted numerous combat operations against his supporters, killing hundreds of belligerents and Somali civilians. Matters came to a head on 3 October, when US Rangers and Special Forces raided what they thought was a gathering of tribal elders sympathetic to Aidid at the Olympic Hotel. Over 500 Somalis and eighteen Americans were killed in the ensuing battle. Shortly afterwards, President Clinton announced that all American troops would be withdrawn within six months (see Hirsch and Oakley 1995; Lyons and Samatar 1995; Clarke and Herbst 1997).

The White House also subsequently adopted a much tougher line on peace operations, announced by President Clinton at the 1993 General Assembly (see box 4.4). As the then US ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, put it at the time: 'we are coming to the day when countries in need will call the global 911 and get a busy signal' (*The Times*, 13 May 1993). The administration also set out strict guidelines, limiting the potential for future US participation in peacekeeping under Presidential Decision Directive 25 (May 1994). This identified failings in the UN itself as the main reason for the US failure in Somalia and outlined seventeen conditions that would have to be met before the US would take part in a UN operation (Weiss 1997: 223). Since then the US has placed its troops under UN command only as part of the

Box 4.4 US retreat from United Nations peace operations

In recent weeks, in the Security Council, our nation has begun asking harder questions about proposals for new peacekeeping missions: is there a real threat to international peace? Does the proposed mission have clear objectives? Can an end point be identified for those who will be asked to participate? How much will the mission cost? . . . The United Nations simply cannot become engaged in every one of the world's conflicts. If the American people are to say yes to UN peacekeeping, the United Nations must know when to say no. (President Clinton to the UN General Assembly, 27 September 1993, in Parsons 1995: 252)

preventive mission in Macedonia (UNPREDEP; see chapter 6). As it turned out, the country in need of the global 911 that got no response would be Rwanda.

This US-led retreat from peace operations had a massive impact on the UN's response to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, not least through the US insistence that any UN mission deployed to Rwanda be small and cheap and its repeated argument in favour of terminating the hapless UNAMIR force once the genocide was under way. In what can only be described as a 'grave accident of timing' (Melvern 2000: 79), the question of what sort of peace operation was required to oversee the implementation of the recently concluded Arusha Accords for Rwanda came up in the Security Council only a week after the eighteen Americans were killed in Mogadishu. Not surprisingly, the US was disinclined to despatch any new mission to Africa, but it was persuaded by European and African governments to consent to a peace operation on the condition that the force be given a narrow monitoring role and costs be kept as low as possible (see Melvern 1997: 335).

The US was not alone in its scepticism towards peace operations. Following the murder of ten of its peacekeepers by extremist militias at the start of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, Belgium reversed its earlier strong support for UNAMIR and decided to withdraw the remainder of its contingent on the grounds that there was no peace to keep and consequently little point placing its soldiers in harm's way. Echoing US sentiment after the death of its troops in Somalia, the Belgian government argued that continued participation in the UN mission was 'pointless within the terms of the present mandate' and exposed its soldiers to 'unacceptable risks' (in Wheeler 2000: 219). The Bangladeshi contingent quickly followed suit. In response, Major-General Roméo Dallaire recommended the reinforcement of his mission in order to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. The Security Council, however, decided instead formally to reduce the UN's presence in Rwanda. Downgraded to a skeleton staff and volunteers, UNAMIR was unable to prevent the genocide, protect the civilian population or punish the perpetrators. In one hundred days, approximately 1 million Tutsi and Hutu moderates were slaughtered – a rate of killing higher than that of the Nazi Holocaust.

Things did not go well in Bosnia either. In Srebrenica alone, between 6 and 16 July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces seized the 'safe area' proclaimed by the Security Council. They expelled the 23,000 Bosnian Muslim women and elderly people and massacred over 7,600 Muslim men and boys – almost all of them were civilians and thousands were first captured and then lined up, shot, and dumped in mass graves. The 'safe areas' policy, devised as a stop-gap by the Security Council amid the unfolding turmoil in Angola, Somalia and Rwanda, was under-resourced and lacked direction (see chapter 8). The Dutch peacekeepers charged with protecting Srebrenica, for example, did not have a mandate to protect the 'safe area' and the civilians sheltering within it, only to defend themselves. Moreover, even if they had enjoyed a more robust mandate, the peacekeepers did not have the numbers, the equipment or the support needed to protect Srebrenica and its people from the Bosnian Serb Army (see Honig and Both 1996). The UN's failure to protect Srebrenica and prevent Europe's worst massacre since the Second World War stimulated a dramatic rethink of Western policy towards Bosnia. The result was a shift to peace enforcement led by a NATO air campaign (Operation Deliberate Force) against the Bosnian Serbs and a more open strategy of providing military support to the Muslim and Croat armies on the ground. In place of the UN, Western states chose to employ force through NATO. Britain and France deployed a NATO rapid reaction force, NATO conducted air strikes, Americans (not the UN) led the Dayton negotiations that brought peace to Bosnia, and the force deployed to keep the peace after the Dayton Accords in 1995 was the NATO-led IFOR.

The political will of member states to mandate and contribute to UN peace operations is related to the operational effectiveness of the organization itself (Berdal 1993: 5). It is not surprising, therefore, that the repeated failure of peace operations between 1992 and 1995 encouraged member states to curb their earlier enthusiasm and limit their commitment. The disasters in Angola, Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia partly caused (in the case of Somalia) and were partly caused by (in the case of Rwanda) a retreat from peace operations as dramatic as the triple transformation that began between 1988 and 1993. The change in sentiment at the UN can be seen in the words of the Secretary-General in 1994 and 1995 (box 4.5).

One of the obvious consequences of this retreat was the reduction in the number of UN peacekeepers around the world – from over 70,000 in 1993 to fewer than 20,000 in 1996. UN member states, particularly those in the West, were reluctant either to support renewed engagement with the world's trouble spots (Somalia, Afghanistan, Zaire/Congo, Burundi) or to place their troops under UN command and provide the global institution with the resources it needed. Thus, the 20,000 UN peacekeepers were augmented by a further 40,000 working under the command of regional arrangements such as NATO, ECOWAS and the OSCE (see McCoubrey and Morris 2000). Within this context of retreat, the Security Council displayed a growing reluctance

Box 4.5 Boutros-Ghali on the failure of UN peace operations

The international community appears paralysed in reacting...even to the revised mandate established by the Security Council. We must all recognise that in this respect, we have failed in our response to the agony of Rwanda and have thus acquiesced in the continuing loss of human lives. Our readiness and capacity for action has been demonstrated to be inadequate at best, and deplorable at worst, owing to the lack of collective political will. (31 May 1994, in Wheeler 2000: 230)

Peace-keeping in such contexts is far more complex and more expensive than when its tasks were mainly to monitor cease-fires and control buffer zones with the consent of the States involved in the conflict. Peace-keeping today can involve constant danger...It must also be recognized that the vast increase in field deployment has to be supported by an overburdened Headquarters staff that resource constraints have held at levels appropriate to an earlier, far less demanding, time. Meanwhile, there is continuing damage to the credibility of the Security Council and of the Organization as a whole when the Council adopts decisions that cannot be carried out because the necessary troops are not forthcoming. (Boutros-Ghali 1995a: §§ 15, 17, 98)

The limits of peace-keeping in on-going hostilities starkly highlighted by the distressing course of events in the former Yugoslavia have become clearer, as the Organization has come to realize that a mix of peace-keeping and enforcement is not the answer to a lack of consent and cooperation by the parties to the conflict. The United Nations can only be as effective as its Member States may allow it to be. The option of withdrawal raises the question of whether the international community can simply leave the afflicted population to its fate. (Boutros-Ghali 1995b: § 600)

Should there be a mismatch between the international force's mandate and its resources, there would be a risk of failure, of international casualties, and of undermined credibility for those who had put the force into the field. (Boutros-Ghali 1995c)

to authorize new missions, with the largest UN mission deployed in the second half of the 1990s being UNAVEM III in Angola. Between 1995 and early 1999, the Security Council created only three new (and small) missions in regions where the UN was not already active (UNSMIH/UNTMIH, UNOMSIL and MINUGUA). The largest of these was the UNSMIH mission in Haiti, which comprised 1,500 civilian and military personnel, though this was soon reduced to 250 when it handed over to UNTMIH in August 1997. UNOMSIL in Sierra Leone and MINUGUA in Guatemala were both limited to approximately 200 personnel.

In February 1995, before the Srebrenica disaster, Boutros-Ghali had published a supplement to his *An Agenda for Peace* in which he outlined a far less ambitious future for peace operations than that enunciated less than three years earlier. In it he argued that the experience of the previous three years had damaged the credibility of the Security Council and the UN as a whole, because the Council had adopted decisions that could not be carried out since

the necessary troops were not forthcoming (see box 4.6). In addition, a lack of funds imposed 'severe constraints' on the UN's ability to deploy the troops that had been offered (Boutros-Ghali 1995a: §§ 98–9).

It appears as if a lack of political will on the part of the P-5 states in particular, combined with the UN's institutional inability to cope with the transformation of peace operations, contributed to a series of high-profile failures. By conservative estimates, around 1.5 million civilians were killed while peacekeepers were present in Angola, Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia. The failures, the deliberate killing of peacekeepers and the comparatively high financial costs of these missions prompted many states to temper their earlier enthusiasm both for the UN as the primary global agent for international peace and security and for peace operations themselves. On the one hand, states reluctant to place their troops under UN command began to make greater use of regional arrangements or to act unilaterally. On the other hand, for most of the latter half of the 1990s, states were reluctant to authorize, fund or participate in peace operations, despite the continuation of violence in many parts of the world. The final part of this chapter asks what lessons were learned from these experiences.

4.4 Lessons learned?

In November and December 1999, the UN issued landmark reports accepting responsibility and detailing the many failings that had led UN peacekeepers to stand aside amid genocide in Srebrenica and Rwanda respectively. This section provides a brief background and overview of the main findings of these two reports, which helped set the scene for new thinking about the role and proper composition of peace operations evident in many twenty-first-century missions. However, we should begin by focusing on two earlier reports that were not so damning in their criticism of the UN.

The first of the UN's 'lessons learned' reports was produced in February 1994 but not publicly released. The Commission of Inquiry created by the Security Council to investigate the armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel in Somalia made two important observations and issued a damning recommendation that could be read as an endorsement of the retreat of peace operations. It argued that the mission failed principally because its different military components had no means of communicating with each other directly. A complex and slow process of decision-making was required for one contingent to request assistance from another (Commission of Inquiry 1994: 40). Second, the Commission noted that there was very little coordination at UN headquarters. The US component of UNOSOM II distanced itself from UN elements, creating a situation where information was not shared and common operating procedures and rules of engagement were not established. Importantly, the Commission concluded by insisting that:

The United Nations should refrain from undertaking further peace enforcement actions within the internal conflicts of states. If the United Nations decides nevertheless to undertake enforcement operations, the mandate should be limited to specific objectives and the use of force would be applied as the ultimate means after all peaceful remedies have been exhausted. (Ibid.: 42)

Most of these recommendations have been heeded. From the mid-1990s to around 2005, the UN tended to refrain from using enforcement measures in civil conflicts, leaving that to NATO, ECOWAS and other regional bodies. It has been inclined to limit the size of its missions both functionally and temporally. As chapter 5 demonstrates, however, from around 2005, UN peace operations have gradually grown in size and begun to use force in order to protect themselves and civilians under their care as well as to coerce 'spoilers'.

The UN was slow to acknowledge its role in facilitating the Rwandan genocide. In 1996, the newly created Lessons Learned Unit of the DPKO issued an internal report which attempted to exonerate the UN while blaming member states. 'UNAMIR', it found, 'seemed always to be one step behind the realities of the situation in Rwanda.' This was a product of operational problems such as the mission's critical lack of transportation (of twenty-two armoured personnel carriers requested, UNAMIR received only eight – all seconded from other missions, and only five of which were roadworthy) and a breakdown of communication between peacekeepers on the ground, troop-contributing countries and UN headquarters in New York. The last encouraged 'a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the conflict [which] contributed to false political assumptions and military assessments' (DPKO 1996: § 3). According to the report, UNAMIR's failure to prevent or halt the genocide, however, was also the fault of member states because, 'at the height of the crisis, the unilateral decision of some Governments to withdraw their national contingents left the remnants of UNAMIR even more vulnerable and unable to provide protection to civilians at risk' (ibid.: § 2). Despite this, the report found, UNAMIR persevered and played a constructive role in Rwanda:

The United Nations and its family of agencies, although after some delay, did exert considerable efforts to assist the Rwandese people, particularly in the rehabilitation of the country's justice system and to alleviate the very harsh conditions of many of the roughly 60,000 detainees in the prisons. UNAMIR itself was instrumental in restoring the telecommunications capabilities of the country, doing road and bridge repairs and rehabilitating basic infrastructure. (Ibid.: § 3).

Although many of the report's forty-three recommendations identified key areas in need of improvement (see table 4.3), they stopped short of assigning institutional responsibility or fault on the part of the UN's agencies, officers and personnel. Moreover, although it identified key problems (e.g. the gap between mandate and means; late/non-deployment of troops), some of its recommendations were contradictory, and it omitted some important pieces

TABLE 4.3   Key DPKO recommendations from *Comprehensive Report* on UNAMIR (1996)

Recommendation	Description
1 Mandates should reflect realities on the ground and be matched with the means to implement them.	UNAMIR's mandate and means were based on a misunderstanding of the conflict and a false assumption that parties supported Arusha Accords.
3 Peacekeepers require intelligence.	UNAMIR and UN headquarters lacked capacity to collect intelligence.
6 Requests for troops should focus on capabilities not numbers.	UNAMIR lacked logistical and communications capabilities.
7 Troops must deploy in a timely fashion.	Authorized expansion of UNAMIR in May 1994 not translated into enhanced capacity on account of late deployment and unwillingness of non-Africans to contribute.
8 Contingents must be fully equipped.	Some African peacekeepers lacked basic equipment.
9 Unilateral troop withdrawals should be discouraged.	Belgian withdrawal announced without consultation; undermined whole mission.
32 An effective political and humanitarian early warning system is needed.	Human Rights Commission reports of deteriorating situation were not circulated across UN system.
34 Missions should have a joint civil–military operations centre (CMOC).	Little coordination of political, military and humanitarian agencies.
36 Protection of civilians is an important humanitarian contribution.	UN should have had a human rights office in Rwanda working with UN police (CIVPOL).
37 Peacekeepers should strive to maintain impartiality in appearance and perception.	Negotiations with Rwandan government and RPF impaired UNAMIR impartiality.

of information. Thus, in response to its recommendation concerning the protection of civilians, the report called merely for the creation of a (civilian) human rights component within UNAMIR with access to the peace operation's logistics. The UN's troops and police officers would have thus been 'made aware of the human rights dimension of the situation in Rwanda' (DPKO 1996: § 16). Kofi Annan himself has argued that it was not lack of knowledge about the human rights situation in Rwanda but the lack of political will on the part of member states to act upon that knowledge that was crucial (in Meisler 2007: 103). In similar vein, it is difficult to see how Recommendation 36 on the protection of civilians does not contradict Recommendation 37, which insists that peace operations remain impartial, in both appearance and fact. Without reconceptualizing impartiality, it is

hard to perceive how peacekeepers could stay faithful to the principles of traditional peacekeeping (see chapter 7) while protecting civilians in a hostile environment.

Moreover, the DPKO's report failed to include some important pieces of information. One piece of now well-known information missing from this report is that, shortly before the genocide, one of Major-General Dallaire's cables advised UN headquarters that he had received intelligence about preparations for genocidal killing. In the cable he asked for permission to seize arms caches belonging to militia groups. The cable was passed to the deputy head of the DPKO, Iqbal Riza, who responded on behalf of Annan. Riza replied to the Secretary-General's Special Representative (SRSG) in Rwanda (not Dallaire) that the peacekeepers should not act until given clear instructions from headquarters. The SRSG, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, replied that he had high-level political verification of Dallaire's intelligence and that UNAMIR planned to act on it in the next day or two. Riza's response was that UNAMIR did not have a mandate to seize weapons caches or protect civilians and must therefore refrain from doing so. UN headquarters would pass on the intelligence to the US, France, Belgium and the Rwandan government. Riza infamously ended his cable by declaring that 'the overriding consideration is the need to avoid entering into a course of action that might lead to the use of force and unanticipated repercussions' (in Traub 2006: 52). Although the cables were all copied to the Secretary-General, the DPKO did not specifically bring the matter to Boutros-Ghali's attention, nor did they ask the Secretary-General to alert the Security Council. The overarching concern in the wake of Somalia was to guard against overextension in a context where the US was actively arguing against UN peace operations. As Annan explained, 'you can't look at Rwanda without thinking of what happened in Somalia; in fact, they were happening almost simultaneously' (ibid.: 53).

This tendency to try to shield the UN from criticism over Rwanda persisted after the report. In 1998, Kofi Annan was widely criticized for mincing his words on a trip to Rwanda to issue a belated apology. In response to questions at a press conference in Nairobi, he characterized criticism of the DPKO's role (which he led at the time of the genocide) as 'an old story which is being rehashed', telling reporters, 'I have no regrets' (in Traub 2006: 114). While member states must obviously shoulder the blame for providing inadequate support to UNAMIR and then ordering its withdrawal in the face of genocide, the DPKO's report and Annan's public statements failed to address equally troubling questions about the UN's performance. For example, the *Report of the Independent Inquiry* in 1999 argued that, even given its limited size, UNAMIR should have been able to do more to prevent the genocide and protect civilians (Independent Inquiry 1999: 28).

Partly in response to mounting public criticism of the UN's refusal to examine its mistakes in Rwanda properly, and partly in response to internal advice that a more critical examination was a prerequisite for regenerating UN peace operations, in 1999 Annan established an Independent Commission

comprising the former Swedish prime minister Ingvar Carlsson, the former South Korean foreign minister Han Sung-Joo, and a retired Nigerian general, Rufus Kupolati, to investigate all aspects of the UN's performance in Rwanda. When Annan received a draft copy of the report, his first inclination was to order its revision, believing that it was too critical of the UN. However, on the advice of senior advisers such as Mark Malloch Brown and the new head of the DPKO, Jean-Marie Guéhenno (2002: 72), who argued that only by reconciling fully with the past could the UN move forward and begin to rebuild credibility and support for peace operations among member states, Annan agreed to leave the text as written by the Inquiry.

The *Report of the Independent Inquiry* opened with a damning but general criticism, insisting that the Rwandan genocide resulted from the failure of the whole UN system (see box 4.6). The 'overriding failure', it argued, was the lack of resources and lack of will to take on the commitment that would have been necessary to prevent the genocide and protect its victims. The lack of resources and will was manifested in UNAMIR not being adequately 'planned, dimensioned, deployed or instructed' in a way that would have 'provided for a proactive and assertive role' in the face of the deteriorating situation in Rwanda (1999: 2). The mission was smaller than recommended by the DPKO, slow to deploy owing to the reluctance of states to contribute troops and debilitated by administrative difficulties. When troops did arrive, they were generally inadequately trained and equipped (ibid.).

All this meant that, when the genocide erupted, UNAMIR was not functioning properly and was mired in problems associated with dysfunctional command and control and a lack of military capacity. 'A force numbering 2,500' (UNAMIR's strength at the time of the genocide), the Inquiry concluded, should have been able to stop or at least limit massacres of the kind which began in Rwanda' at the start of the genocide (1999: 2). That UNAMIR failed to do this was the result of 'fundamental capacity' problems. Among the report's many criticisms and recommendations were ten points critical to improving future UN peace operations.

Box 4.6 Rwanda: failure by the whole UN

The failure by the United Nations to prevent, and subsequently to stop the genocide in Rwanda was a failure by the United Nations as a whole. The fundamental failure was the lack of resources and political commitment devoted to developments in Rwanda and to the United Nations presence there. There was a persistent lack of political will by Member States to act, or to act with enough assertiveness. This lack of political will affected the response by the Secretariat and decision-making by the Security Council, but was also evident in the recurrent difficulties to get the necessary troops for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). Finally, although UNAMIR suffered from a chronic lack of resources and political priority, it must also be said that serious mistakes were made with those resources which were at the disposal of the United Nations. (Independent Inquiry 1999: 1)

1 *Inadequacy of the mandate*   The scope of UNAMIR's mandate was unsuited to the situation in Rwanda and lacked contingencies and fall-back positions. This was a product of a lack of will on the part of member states but also the UN's failure to inform the Security Council accurately about the situation in Rwanda before the genocide.

2 *Implementation of the mandate*   UNAMIR's mandate was implemented cautiously, focusing on preserving the appearance of neutrality under a traditional peacekeeping mandate that was unsuited to the context. UNAMIR should have done more to alert headquarters and the Security Council to the inadequacy of this approach.

3 *Confusion over the rules of engagement*   UNAMIR never received a response to requests for guidance about the rules of engagement, resulting in a critical lack of clarity regarding which rules were in force.

4 *Failure to respond to the genocide*   At the beginning of the genocide, UNAMIR failed to take steps – such as establishing roadblocks and protecting VIPs – to respond to the early massacres. It said that it would protect politicians and failed to do so; civilians who fled to UN compounds in search of protection were sometimes abandoned to their fate. This failure stemmed from poor intelligence and information and the inability of UNAMIR's commander to exert practical command over his troops.

5 *Inadequate resources and logistics*   UNAMIR had only five roadworthy armoured personnel carriers, one helicopter and insufficient medical supplies for its personnel. Troops in Kigali reported that they had one to two days' worth of drinking water, up to two days' worth of food rations and two to three days' worth of fuel reserves.

6 *Inappropriate focus on ceasefire*   Once the genocide had begun, UNAMIR and UN headquarters were focused more on negotiating a ceasefire than they were on protecting civilians. From the Secretary-General down, UN officials held meetings with those associated with the *genocidaires* in which they focused on securing a ceasefire rather than conveying outrage at the genocide.

7 *Lack of analytical capability*   UNAMIR lacked sufficient focus or the institutional capacity systematically to gather and analyse information in order to build an accurate picture of the situation or provide early warning.

8 *Failure to protect*   UNAMIR failed to protect political leaders, civilians and national staff even where promises to protect had been made or where people had gathered seeking the UN's protection. 'Tragically', the report found, 'the trust placed in UNAMIR by civilians left them in a situation of greater risk when the UN troops withdrew than they would have been anyway' (ibid.: 43).

9 *Flow of information*   The flow of information was sporadic, resulting in critical information either being lost or not getting into the hands of appropriate decision-makers. Several members of the Security Council complained that they were not made aware of Dallaire's now famous cable.

10 *Organizational problems*   Poor personal relations and unclear lines of com-
munication and authority within UNAMIR and between the Secretary-
General, UN staff and the Security Council hindered the transfer of
information.

The report concluded, therefore, that the UN's failure in Rwanda was created
largely by a critical disjuncture – endemic in many UN operations at the time
and explored further in chapter 8 – between the tasks given to the peacekeep-
ers and their conceptual and material tools. For largely political reasons
(because the US would not support a large complex operation so soon after
Somalia), UNAMIR was conceived in traditional terms, even though its opera-
tional context meant that the basic assumptions necessary for traditional
peacekeeping were not in place (see chapter 7). These conclusions echoed
those of the UN's report on the Srebrenica massacre, issued a month earlier.

Unlike the Rwanda report, the UN's report on Srebrenica was written by
the UN Secretariat and issued in the name of the Secretary-General. What
made this report different, however, was that, on the advice of those such as
Malloch Brown and Guéhenno, who believed that the UN needed to be full
and frank in its analysis of past mistakes, the report was not revised by politi-
cal officers and senior officials. Usually, UN reports are redrafted and the
wording finessed as they make their way through the system. When it came
to the Srebrenica report, Malloch Brown argued that the integrity and
wording of the original report should be preserved, and Annan agreed (Traub
2006).

The report argued that the collapse of Srebrenica was particularly shocking
because the town had been designated a 'safe area' by the UN and thousands
of civilians had fled there seeking protection. However, the Dutch peacekeep-
ers were denied the resources, support and mandate necessary to protect
Srebrenica. In relation to resources, it was garrisoned by approximately 200
Dutch peacekeepers with limited mobility and armed only with light weapons.
The peacekeepers were not regularly resupplied and confronted critical short-
ages of fuel, ammunition and other basic supplies. They faced approximately
2,500 Bosnian Serb soldiers equipped with heavy artillery. In relation to
support, on at least three occasions the Dutch commander in Srebrenica
requested aerial support – a request denied by UNPROFOR's leadership (with
the backing of UN headquarters) for mainly political reasons. In relation to
the mandate, Dutch peacekeepers were not expressly authorized to use force
to protect civilians in the safe area, and the commander was issued a directive
to place force protection ahead of all other considerations (Annan 1999e: §§
471–4). Annan conceded that 'we were, with hindsight, wrong to declare
repeatedly and publicly that we did not want to use air power against the
Serbs' (ibid.: § 483).

The report found that, as in Rwanda, these operational problems were
rooted in deeper political problems in the Security Council. Once again, the

Box 4.7 Humanitarian aid as a response to ethnic cleansing

Nor was the provision of humanitarian aid a sufficient response to 'ethnic cleansing' and to an attempted genocide. The provision of food and shelter to people who have neither is wholly admirable, and we must all recognise the extraordinary work done by UNHCR and its partners in circumstances of extreme adversity, but the provision of humanitarian assistance could never have been a solution to the problem in that country. The problem, which cried out for a political/military solution, was that a State Member of the United Nations [Bosnia-Hercegovina], left largely defenceless as a result of an arms embargo imposed upon it by the United Nations, was being dismembered by forces committed to its destruction. This was not a problem with a humanitarian solution. (Annan 1999e: § 491)

Security Council was focused on trying to keep the peace when there was no peace to keep (Annan 1999e: § 488) and delivering humanitarian aid in the false belief that this would help remedy the situation (see box 4.7). Moreover, decisions about the nature and direction of UNPROFOR were taken on the basis of false assumptions about Serbian war aims (ibid.: §§ 496-7). As a result, peacekeepers were put into situations where they might be required to use force but without the political support or resources to do so effectively and pursue the strategy through to its conclusion (see Goulding 1996: 15-17).

The report identified a series of lessons for the future, three of which are particularly important here. First, it stated that, when they are deployed without the general consensus of the Security Council and as a substitute for such consensus, peace operations are likely to fail. Peace operations and war fighting are distinct roles, the report argued, and the former must only be deployed with clear mandates and clear support from the UN membership, backed up by the commitment of adequate resources. It is worth quoting the report at length on this point:

> Peacekeepers must never again be told that they must use their peacekeeping tools – lightly armed soldiers in scattered positions – to impose the ill-defined wishes of the international community on one or another of the belligerents by military means. If the necessary resources are not provided – and the necessary political, military and moral judgments are not made – then the job simply cannot be done. (Annan 1999e: § 498)

Second, the report argued that, while safe zones could play a useful role in protecting civilians, it was important to clarify the precise nature of the zone. 'Protected zones', 'safe areas' or 'safe havens' should fall into one of two types. The first are properly demilitarized zones created under the authority of international humanitarian law and enjoy the consent of the belligerents. Safe areas that are not demilitarized or do not enjoy the consent of the belligerents should be 'fully defended by a credible military deterrent' (ibid.: § 499). The two concepts are absolutely distinct and should not be confused, the report argued. Yet this is precisely what happened in Bosnia, where 'safe areas were established by the Security Council without the consent of the

parties and without the provision of any credible military deterrent' (ibid.). This problem was foreseen by several members of the Security Council and UN officials, but their warnings went unheeded.

The third and 'cardinal' lesson from Srebrenica was that a strategy of genocide and ethnic cleansing could only be met 'decisively with all necessary means, and with the political will to carry the policy through to its logical conclusion' (Annan 1999e: § 502). Ultimately, only the appropriate threat and use of force is likely to deter attacks and protect the civilian population, and UNPROFOR, like UNAMIR before it, was ill-equipped to fulfil this role.

The double denunciation of UN peace operations in Rwanda and Srebrenica prompted many in the UN Secretariat and several governments to begin thinking about peace operations in new ways. It stood to reason that, if peacekeepers were to be in the business of protecting civilians from genocide and mass atrocities, enforcing ceasefires in the face of wilful defiance and supporting peace agreements even when the commitment of the parties themselves is in doubt, new thinking would be needed about how missions were mandated, staffed and equipped. This led to an emerging view that peace operations should be more complex, multidimensional, forceful and well-equipped, a view which came to be increasingly widely accepted at the beginning of the twenty-first century (Malone and Wermester 2001; Wilkinson 2000).

4.5 Conclusion

Between 1988 and 1993 a triple transformation of UN peace operations began, comprising quantitative, normative and qualitative changes to their role and scope. During this period the UN gradually took on more, and more complicated, operations than in its previous forty years combined. Factors associated with the end of the Cold War, the putative triumph of liberalism, and the acceleration of globalization encouraged governments and the UN to believe that peace operations could help transform war-torn societies by protecting human rights, fostering democracy and enforcing peace. These attitudes were encouraged by important early successes in Central America, Namibia and Cambodia. However, the gradual expansion of peace operations without a requisite growth in the UN's institutional capacity, member states' willingness to provide troops and financial support, and the development of doctrinal thinking left the organization overstretched. In Angola, Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia, peace operations were despatched without appropriate mandates, information, political support, troops, resources and guidance, and these shortcomings were swiftly and brutally exposed. In Angola, peacekeepers deployed to monitor a ceasefire and elections were utterly ill-prepared and ill-equipped to prevent and mitigate a sharp descent into the worst violence of that country's decades-old civil war. In Somalia, well-intentioned but misguided policies led to peacekeepers being

targeted by militias. In Rwanda and Srebrenica, member states and the UN Secretariat lacked the institutional capacity and political will to support their words with appropriate action.

These very public failures damaged the reputation of the UN and prompted a retreat from peace operations as dramatic as their earlier transformation had been. States preferred to use regional mechanisms rather than the UN, and the Security Council became deeply reluctant to endorse anything other than small observation-style missions. UN peace operations thus confronted a 'fork in the road' (Diehl 2000). They faced a choice between going 'back to basics' or reconceptualizing the basics themselves (Tharoor 1996). This was accompanied by a period of introspection at the UN in which important lessons were identified in a series of reports. Building on the momentum generated by these reports, Annan appointed a high-level international panel chaired by the respected former Algerian foreign minister Lakhdar Brahimi to make recommendations for reforming UN peace operations (Malone and Thakur 2001: 11). This sowed the seeds for a reconceptualization of peace operations, which in turn laid the foundations for their resurgence in the twenty-first century.

Peace Operations in the Twenty-First Century

As noted in chapter 4, the end of the 1990s was characterized by a period of introspection where states became much more cautious about using peace operations as a tool of conflict management. This began to change in 1999 with high-profile operations in Kosovo and East Timor. During the same year, the Security Council authorized new missions to Sierra Leone and the DRC. This renewed demand for peace operations helped prompt the UN Secretary-General to commission a major report into the conduct and management of peace operations, and a panel of experts under the chairmanship of Lakhdar Brahimi made a series of recommendations which laid the groundwork for a new approach to UN peace operations. This chapter examines the new approach and its impact on contemporary peace operations. We begin by examining the increased demand for peacekeeping at the turn of the twenty-first century, highlighting the hostage crisis in Sierra Leone in May 2000 as a crucial turning point. The second section focuses on the Brahimi Report and its implementation, while the third and final sections explore some of the political issues that have influenced contemporary peacekeeping, the process of UN reform, and experiences in peace operations since 2001.

5.1 Peacekeeping reborn? 1999–2002

In March and September 1999, two military operations began which gave renewed impetus to peace operations by creating fresh demands for peace-keepers and partially restoring faith in their ability to make a positive con-tribution to international peace and security and the protection of endangered populations. On 24 March, NATO launched Operation Allied Force to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo caused by Serbian ethnic cleansing there. Spearheaded by the KLA, a year earlier the province's politically repressed Albanian population had risen up against the Serbian government. The Serbs retaliated with a wave of killing and ethnic cleansing that claimed the lives of up to 5,000 people. After several aborted attempts to secure a peaceful resolution, NATO intervened with force (see companion website). The intervention, which was not authorized by the Security Council because Russia threatened to veto any such resolution, proved very controversial. A few months later, in September 1999, Australia led a coalition of states into

East Timor to put an end to violence by pro-Indonesian militia in the wake of a UN-supervised referendum on independence. Deployed with the consent of the Indonesian government, INTERFET dramatically improved the security situation, though most of the militia had retreated to Indonesia before the mission's deployment (Annan 2000a; Smith and Dee 2003; and companion website).

These operations created a demand for two new UN peace operations – UNTAET in East Timor and UNMIK in Kosovo – as well as a large NATO-led operation in the Balkans (KFOR). In the same year, the UN Security Council also authorized the deployment of peacekeeping operations to the DRC and Sierra Leone. Within twelve months, therefore, the number of UN peacekeepers around the world more than doubled. The number of peacekeepers deployed under the auspices of non-UN actors also began to grow significantly. There were at least five reasons for this resurgence in peacekeeping.

First, the mid-1990s saw an increased interest in humanitarianism and, perhaps more importantly, the merging of the international development and security agendas (Duffield 2001, 2007). This merger has been dubbed the 'security first' philosophy or the 'new aid paradigm' (Duffield 1997). Its proponents included international institutions such as the UNDP, IMF and World Bank and state-based agencies such as Britain's DFID, USAID and Australia's AUSAID. Towards the end of the 1990s, these institutions began to argue that

TABLE 5.1 Peacekeeping reborn? UN-authorized operations started in 1999

Mission	Location	Lead actor	Mandate	Size (max. deployed)
INTERFET	East Timor	Australia	Deter and disarm militias; provide security	11,000
UNTAET	East Timor	UN	Transitional authority	10,700
MONUC	DRC	UN	Monitor implementation of ceasefire agreement; facilitate humanitarian assistance; protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence	3,700
UNAMSIL	Sierra Leone	UN	Assist in implementation of the Lomé Agreement; DDR; facilitate humanitarian assistance; protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence	17,500
UNMIK	Kosovo	UN	Transitional authority	1,000 (civilians)
KFOR	Kosovo	NATO	Verify Yugoslav withdrawal; maintain security; disarm KLA	50,000

'a prerequisite for social development and human rights protection is the security and stability that comes through an effective, impartial and humane introduction of law and order, alongside the extension of sound governance to the military sector itself' (Cooper and Pugh 2002: 14). Following the lessons learned from Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda, there was widespread recognition that long-term development programmes and humanitarian assistance depended on a relatively secure environment. Without that security, aid would be pilfered and development programmes scuppered by corruption and violence. Thus, throughout the Western aid community there emerged a belief that effective peacekeepers were a vital component of broader humanitarian and developmental programmes.

Second, Western governments became concerned with humanitarian problems in their own neighbourhoods. The interventions and follow-on peace operations in Kosovo and East Timor, for instance, were justified primarily by humanitarian concerns. Attempting to justify NATO's use of force against Yugoslavia, British Prime Minister Tony Blair articulated a vision of a 'new international community', similar in parts to George H. W. Bush's 'New World Order' (see chapter 4). Blair argued that in a globalizing world 'the principle of non-interference must be qualified in important respects', including in instances of large-scale and systematic human rights abuse, ethnic cleansing and genocide (see box 1.7, p. 37). Similarly, prior to the INTERFET operation a US State Department official had noted the existence of a 'massacre quotient' that, when surpassed, would trigger serious international involvement, while observers in Canberra argued that, once the Indonesian-backed militia had started its reign of terror, 'no Australian government could have survived if it stood by and did nothing' (Chalk 2001: 42).

Third, in the case of Kosovo and East Timor (and later Sierra Leone), Western states undertook operations without placing their own troops under the UN's general command structure. In this sense they acted as *pivotal states* working outside, but in support of, the UN (see chapter 2). In particular, NATO (in Kosovo) and Australia (in East Timor) took responsibility for the creation, organization, command and large parts of the funding of the operations. In Kosovo, NATO argued that its unified command structure allowed it to overcome many of the problems associated with the UN: it could take decisions quickly, insist upon basic levels of inter-operability, thus ensuring consistency and proper coordination, and could ensure that the mission was properly staffed and equipped. All these things were thought to be very difficult to achieve within the UN command structure. Australia fulfilled an almost identical role in East Timor. Both operations were conducted in the neighbourhood of the pivotal states/organizations and were motivated by a blend of humanitarianism and perceived national interests. In Kosovo, NATO was concerned that inaction would permit a repeat of the Bosnian bloodbath, generate massive refugee flows and prompt geopolitical instability. Similarly, Australia was confronted with a situation in which continued appeasement

of Indonesia became untenable, not least because the US had pressurized its government to permit East Timorese independence and the presence of an international force, and because Canberra's commercial interests (particularly the exploitation of mineral and oil resources in the Timor gap) demanded some form of conflict resolution (Chalk 2001: 4). By devolving responsibility and control over operations to the troop-contributing countries, the Security Council allowed states to participate without placing their soldiers under UN command. This was a particularly important consideration for the US, which was happy to participate in NATO-led operations in the Balkans but was deeply sceptical about UN-led missions (MacKinnon 2000: 38–61).

Fourth, the rebirth of peace operations in Africa was assisted by the activities of states such as Nigeria and South Africa, and the development of regional capacities through Western-sponsored training initiatives such as the US African Crisis Response Initiative (and later the Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance), Britain's African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme, and France's Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities programme (RECAMP). From late 2004, these initiatives were largely folded into the G-8 broader Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), which aimed to train 75,000 new peacekeepers worldwide but with a focus on Africa by 2010.

A large part of the rebirth of UN peacekeeping in Africa was a belated response to regional peacekeeping efforts. In both Liberia and Sierra Leone, the UN was slow to support Nigerian-led operations conducted under the auspices of ECOWAS. In Liberia, the UN force (UNOMIL, 1993–7) eventually worked with ECOMOG troops, while in Sierra Leone a significant UN presence did not materialize until early 2000, after Nigeria had decided to withdraw its forces. In South Africa's case, its desire to play a positive international role after apartheid met with mixed results, with the bungled SADC operation in Lesotho in 1998 (Coleman 2007: 160–93) being only partially offset by South African peacekeepers' constructive engagement in Burundi's civil war. South Africa was initially unwilling to commit its peacekeepers to the DRC after the ongoing war there caused a major rift between SADC leaders (Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia had deployed troops to the DRC in support of embattled President Laurent Kabila initially without SADC's formal approval; see ibid.: 116–59).

Finally, renewed confidence in peace operations was partly induced by attempts to learn from the mistakes of the 1990s and develop new doctrines, institutions and procedures. This saw the emergence of the new concept of 'peace support operations' (see chapter 12). At its fiftieth anniversary summit in 1999, NATO unveiled a new strategic concept that included the traditional alliance goals of collective defence but also developed a new set of missions under the rubric of 'crisis response'. Similarly, the EU announced plans to create a 60,000 strong multinational rapid reaction force capable of fulfilling a range of humanitarian and peacekeeping tasks. In addition, as we noted in

chapter 4, the UN embarked on a more systematic process of lesson learning, culminating in the release of the Brahimi Report in 2000 (see section 5.2).

These five factors coalesced at the end of the 1990s to bring about a rebirth of peace operations. As with the transformation of peace operations at the end of the Cold War, the rebirth was slow, incremental and hesitant. This was reflected in the fact that between 1999 and 2002 the UN also terminated six missions (see table 5.2). Moreover, in the years following 1999, only three new missions were created: a traditional peacekeeping operation along the Ethiopia–Eritrea border (UNMEE), a NATO-led security assistance force in Afghanistan (ISAF) and a scaled-down assistance mission for East Timor (UNMISET).

At the end of July 2000, the Security Council authorized a force of just over 4,000 soldiers and civilians to monitor a cessation of hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Conceived as a traditional peacekeeping operation, UNMEE was mandated to monitor the 'Temporary Security Zone' between the two states' armed forces and to observe and verify their withdrawal. The mission's civilian component was limited to assisting humanitarian agencies with a de-mining programme. Importantly, Security Council Resolution 1320 (15 September 2000) stated that, should the cessation of hostilities agreement collapse, UNMEE would be terminated (see chapter 7).

On 20 December 2001, the Council authorized the deployment of the ISAF in Afghanistan (see chapter 12). Resolution 1386 authorized Britain to lead a force of approximately 4,800 peacekeepers to provide security in the Kabul area after the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom had toppled the Taliban regime. Although ISAF was given a broad mandate, it was initially limited to

TABLE 5.2   UN missions terminated between 1999 and 2002

Mission	Location (dates)	Description	Size
MONUA	Angola (June 1997–Feb 1999)	Peacebuilding, confidence-building, democratization	3,500
UNPREDEP	Macedonia (March 1995–Feb 1999)	Preventive mission	1,100
UNOMSIL*	Sierra Leone (July 1998–Oct 1999)	Monitor security situation, disarmament and demobilization	200
MIPONUH	Haiti (Dec 1997–March 2000)	Assist government with police reform	500
UNMOT	Tajikistan (Dec 1994–May 2000)	Monitor ceasefire	100
UNTAET**	East Timor (Oct 1999–May 2002)	Transitional administration	11,000

Notes: *Replaced by UNAMSIL.
**Replaced by UNMISET.

operating in Kabul and its environs. Over time, the mission was brought under NATO command and expanded its area of operations, and by 2007 had been increased in strength to over 40,000 troops. ISAF also began to participate in enforcement action against remnants of the Taliban and its al-Qa'ida supporters (see ICG 2008a).

The third new mission was actually a scaling-down of the UNTAET operation in East Timor, following the province's transition to full independence in May 2002. Specifically, Security Council Resolution 1410 (17 May 2002) authorized a new mission, UNMISET, which cut the number of UN personnel in East Timor by half, to 5,000. East Timor's transition to independence came earlier than had originally been planned on account of political pressure stemming from accusations that the UN had adopted a quasi-imperial approach to governing by not consulting sufficiently with local actors (Chopra 2000a, 2002). UNMISET's three primary goals were to provide assistance to core administrative structures critical to the viability and political stability of the new state; to ensure interim law enforcement and public security and to assist in the development of a new law enforcement agency, the East Timor Police Service; and to contribute to the maintenance of the external and internal security of East Timor. Rather than building and running the structures of a state, as UNTAET had done, UNMISET's primary role was to assist and supervise the new indigenous authorities. Some analysts (Caplan 2005) worried that the UN's involvement with East Timor had been scaled back too quickly – concerns borne out in 2006, when the country descended into anarchy and was rescued only by renewed foreign intervention (see section 5.3).

Although the new missions in Kosovo and East Timor were configured to take account of the lessons learned from Rwanda and Srebrenica, in both Sierra Leone and the DRC the operations suffered from the familiar problems associated with unclear mandates and a gulf between ends and means. Matters came to a head in Sierra Leone in the first half of 2000, when a deterioration of the security situation exposed weaknesses in the UNAMSIL mission and badly undermined the credibility of UN peace operations once again (see box 5.1 and companion website). UNAMSIL was saved from ignominious failure only by a British military operation launched in May 2000 and subsequent rapid restructuring by the DPKO thereafter.

As with the UN's missions to Somalia, Rwanda, Angola and Bosnia, the mandate for UNAMSIL was prefaced on the false assumption that the principal parties to the conflict in Sierra Leone were committed to the Lomé Peace Accords. In reality, the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF) was determined to prevent the UN deploying to the diamond-rich areas in which it operated and was deeply concerned about potential reprisals from self-defence groups, known as *kamajors*. On paper, UNAMSIL was one of the UN's larger missions: its initial authorized strength of 6,000 was increased in early 2000 to 11,000 and later to 17,500. However, the mission was not configured

Box 5.1 Sierra Leone: a crucial test for twenty-first-century peace operations

Sierra Leone may be a small country, but this is an enormous challenge for the United Nations. It is in effect no less of a test of the United Nations commitment to conflict resolution in Africa than what we are contemplating for the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is a test not just of our willingness to intervene...but of the United Nations' actual ability to deliver effective peacekeeping of lasting impact and value. (Sir Jeremy Greenstock, British Ambassador to the UN), S/PV.4099, 7 Feb. 2000, pp. 3–4)

Intended to be 11,000-strong, the force there is the largest UN peacekeeping army in the world. Yet it is pathetically failing. It has become hostage...to the armed gangs of rebel forces who are destabilising the regime it should be defending...If this massive UN presence is incapable of sustaining peace, against a disorderly and largely untrained rabble, one must ask what future there can ever be for the entire principle of humanitarian peacekeeping intervention by the UN. (Hugo Young, in *The Guardian* (UK), 18 May 2000)

to operate in potentially hostile territory. It was painfully slow to deploy, underfunded, poorly organized and commanded, and lacked critically important equipment and properly trained troops. Even UNAMSIL's Indian commander, Vijay Jetley, observed that some contingents 'did not come up to the mark and were an embarrassment both to the countries and to the UNAMSIL' (in Adebajo and Keen 2007: 260). Despite this assessment, Jetley decided to deploy his forces throughout the country and proceed with disarmament and demobilization (Hirsch 2001: 60–1).

When UNAMSIL tried forcibly to disarm RUF fighters in diamond-rich Kono province, the RUF reacted by attacking UNAMSIL, killing four Kenyan peacekeepers and seizing 500 others within a week, including an entire Zambian battalion (Adebajo and Keen 2007: 262). The newly emboldened RUF forces then began to advance on Sierra Leone's capital, Freetown. At that point, Britain sent approximately 1,300 troops to evacuate British and Commonwealth citizens from Freetown in a mission that eventually widened to include supporting UNAMSIL and the government of Sierra Leone. The DPKO also acted swiftly to recalibrate its mission by consolidating its forces around Freetown and the Lungi peninsula (see Hirsch 2001, 2004; Williams 2001). Disaster was narrowly averted in Sierra Leone, but the May 2000 hostage crisis and the factors that contributed to it exposed the fact that much more needed to be done to act on the lessons learned in the 1990s.

For similar reasons, the UN's new mission in the DRC (MONUC) also hung in the balance as the Brahimi panel set about its deliberations. MONUC was initially mandated to oversee the implementation of the Lusaka Peace Agreement (1999), signed by the governments of Angola, the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe, and later by two rebel groups. It was also tasked with facilitating humanitarian assistance and protecting international

staff and the civilian population wherever possible (Roessler and Prendergast 2006: 230). The ceasefire was broken almost as soon as the agreement was signed, and the governments of Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe – all of whom had soldiers deployed inside the DRC – indicated that they would not be withdrawing immediately. To accomplish this large, complex but very vague mandate in a country the size of Western Europe, MONUC was granted an authorized strength of just 5,500 troops. In addition, its deployment was to be conducted in phases that were dependent on the consent and good behaviour of the conflicting parties. Because the latter persisted in fighting, it was not surprising that troop contributors were deeply reluctant to provide soldiers to implement a mandate that was so clearly unachievable within the parameters set by the Security Council. As a result, MONUC peacekeepers did not begin arriving in the DRC in significant numbers until early 2001.

The principal reason for this huge gulf between mandate and means lay in the mission's origins. The basic problem was that 'the war in the Congo was too gruesome and devastating for the West to ignore, but too difficult and too low a priority to address seriously' (Roessler and Prendergast 2006: 253). With the situation deteriorating into what became known as 'Africa's world war', calls grew for the UN to 'do something' to stop it (see Prunier 2009). African leaders in the Security Council had called for the deployment of a large force of 15,000 to 20,000 troops and France called for 10,000 troops, arguing that only an international deployment would bring an end to the fighting. However, in the midst of the crises in Kosovo, Sierra Leone and East Timor, the US and to a lesser extent the UK were reluctant to authorize another large mission. Following precisely the same line of decision-making that had caused the UN to deploy a small and weak force to Rwanda in 1993, the US administration authorized a UN mission to the DRC but insisted that it be limited to 5,000 troops and that it should avoid trying forcibly to disarm non-state actors (Roessler and Prendergast 2006: 250–1). As in Sierra Leone, by 2004–5 MONUC was confronting multiple crises, presenting the Security Council with the option of withdrawing or strengthening the mission (see section 5.3).

In summary, a combination of factors coalesced to bring about a rebirth of peace operations in the early years of the twenty-first century. In particular, there was a palpable surge in the force of humanitarian arguments which made it more difficult for governments simply to ignore widespread suffering. The pragmatic use of pivotal states and regional organizations also opened opportunities for Western states to contribute to peace operations without placing their forces under UN command. However, the crises in Sierra Leone and the DRC highlighted that two major problems had not yet been addressed. First, both missions were deployed on the incorrect assumption that all local actors were genuinely committed to the peace agreements they had signed. Second, the means given to these operations were not sufficient to achieve their stated objectives. It was in this context that the UN

Secretary-General was asked to conduct a thoroughgoing review of the organization's approach to peace operations.

5.2 The Brahimi Report

In March 2000, the UN Secretary-General set up the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations in response to a combination of factors, including the organization's institutional failings, the General Assembly's decision to end the practice of providing 'gratis military staff' to the DPKO, the renewed demand for peace operations, and the near collapse of the UN's mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) (Durch et al. 2003: 2–3). The panel was chaired by the former Algerian foreign minister Lakhdar Brahimi and comprised a mixture of former diplomats and soldiers. The research and writing was directed by William Durch, senior associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, DC, and a leading analyst of peace operations. The panel was given the task of identifying the principal weaknesses in UN peace operations and making practical recommendations to overcome those weaknesses. The Secretary-General promised to do what he could to implement the panel's recommendations (ibid.: 5).

The report was officially launched at the UN's Millennium Summit in September 2000. As instructed, it focused upon how the UN Secretariat's staff working on peace operations might better manage planning, mission support, decision-making and personnel in the field to produce more effective results. But it also contained important insights into how peace operations themselves might be conducted in the future (Gray 2001: 288; and box 5.2).

In order to promote better management of peace operations the report made dozens of recommendations, which for the purposes of summarizing can be divided into four broad areas.

1 *Improving decision-making at UN headquarters* As noted in chapter 4, the UN's reports on the failures in Rwanda and Srebrenica identified major problems with the way that key strategic decisions about peace operations were made. For example, the UN's failure to stop the genocide in Rwanda was caused in part by a breakdown in communications between the peacekeepers in the field and decision-makers in New York, which resulted in members of the Security Council – including its president at that time, New Zealand – not being properly informed about the impending threat of genocide. As New Zealand's permanent representative to the UN at the time later reflected, 'the Rwanda experience proves that the United Nations must drastically improve the quality of the background information received by members of the Security Council about situations that come before them...even in 1993, the situation in Rwanda was more complex and dangerous than was ever indicated to the members of the Council' (Keating 2004: 500–1).

In order to address this problem, the Brahimi Report made several recommendations aimed at improving the flow and quality of information

Box 5.2 The Brahimi Report and the future of peace operations

The United Nations was founded, in the words of its Charter, in order 'to save suc-ceeding generations from the scourge of war'. Meeting this challenge is the most important function of this Organization, and to a very significant degree it is the yardstick with which the Organization is judged by the peoples it exists to serve. Over the last decade, the United Nations has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge, and it can do better today. Without renewed commitment on the part of Member States, significant institutional change and increased financial support, the United Nations will not be capable of executing the critical peacekeeping and peace-building tasks that the Member States assign to it in coming months and years. There are many tasks which United Nations peacekeeping forces should not be asked to undertake and many places they should not go. But when the United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence, with the ability and determination to defeat them... The Panel concurs that consent of the local parties, impartiality and use of force only in self-defence should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping. Experience shows, however, that in the context of intra-state/transnational conflicts, consent may be manipulated in many ways. Impartiality for United Nations operations must therefore mean adherence to the principles of the Charter: where one party to a peace agreement clearly and incontrovertibly is violating its terms, continued equal treatment of all parties by the United Nations can in the best case result in ineffectiveness and in the worst may amount to complicity with evil. No failure did more to damage the standing and cred-ibility of United Nations peacekeeping in the 1990s than its reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor. (UN 2000: § 1, 9)

transmitted from the field to UN headquarters. It called for more consulta-tion between the Security Council, which mandates operations, and the TCCs that provide the personnel, and for the creation of a standing committee to facilitate this relationship. It also insisted that the Secretariat should be better able to provide timely and accurate advice to the UN's decision-makers and requested the establishment of an Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS) capable of collating and disseminating this information. Moreover, the panel insisted that the way that peace operations were planned and managed should be reorganized to improve professionalism and coordi-nation. Personnel should be recruited exclusively on the basis of expertise rather than on the basis of national quotas. The DPKO's capacity to provide effective and timely guidance would be improved by the creation of a 'Best Practices Unit' responsible for discovering and disseminating 'lessons learned', collating the best new research on peacekeeping, and conducting systematic analysis of relevant issues. Finally, the panel noted that advance planning was not well coordinated and called for the setting up of Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs) comprising officials from the DPKO, DPA, OCHA and the UN's humanitarian and development agencies. IMTFs would coordi-nate and lead advance planning for peace operations, contributing to their overall effectiveness.

2 *Mandating and resources*   Problems connected with unclear mandates and the gulf between an operation's mandate and the resources given to it were recurring themes in the 1990s that were highlighted in the inquiries into the massacres in Rwanda and Srebrenica. All too often, the Security Council expanded an operation's mandate once it had deployed without ensuring that the mission was given the resources it needed to fulfil the new mandate. The gulf between ends and means that developed as a result was the principal cause of the failures in Srebrenica, Rwanda and Angola.

In order to address this problem, the Brahimi Report made four important recommendations designed to ensure that missions would not be deployed with unrealistic mandates or without the means to implement them properly. First, the DPKO should give realistic advice to the Security Council about the situation on the ground and the potential for a peace operation to work effectively. UN officials should be prepared to spell out precisely what the UN could and could not realistically hope to achieve and to recommend against the deployment of peacekeepers if they did not believe that the conditions for likely success are satisfied (UN 2000: § 64). Second, the Security Council should ensure that mandates are clearly worded and realizable. Third, the Security Council should not authorize an operation until it is confident that it has the means to accomplish its goals. Consequently, Security Council resolutions detailing a mission's mandate and the resources required to fulfil it should be left in draft form until the DPKO advises that member states have promised to provide the necessary resources in a timely fashion. Finally, the report recommended that the way peace operations were financed should be reformed so that financial arrangements are in place before a mission is deployed. In order to meet demands for rapid deployment (see below), it called for the Secretary-General to be granted the authority to utilize up to $50 million from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund to secure key capabilities and services in advance of a mission being authorized by the Security Council.

3 *Rapid and effective deployment*   Once operations are mandated, the UN should be able to deploy its peacekeepers rapidly and effectively. One of the key problems that dogged UNPROFOR from the outset was that, by the time it deployed, the ceasefire it was supposed to monitor (between Croatia and Serb militia) had broken down and the conflict in Croatia had been surpassed by the explosion of war in Bosnia-Hercegovina. In 1994, twenty-seven states had designated themselves 'Friends of Rapid Deployment' and aimed to provide the DPKO with a rapidly deployable headquarters (RDHQ) through the provision of gratis staff. The RDHQ concept, adopted and developed by Canada, promised to provide the UN with the capacity to plan and manage the deployment of new operations rapidly. However, as we noted earlier, some General Assembly members opposed the provision of gratis staff to the DPKO on the grounds that most of these staff were Westerners and this practice disrupted the national balance in UN staffing

(Langille 2000: 228). Although this proposal failed to win political support, it provided the catalyst for a number of subsequent studies on rapid deployment. For example, in 1995 a Canadian report called for the creation of an effective rapid reaction capability that would require an early warning mechanism, an effective decision-making process, reliable transportation and infrastructure, logistical support, sufficient finances, and well-trained and equipped personnel (Miall et al. 2005: 156). In the same year, Sir Brian Urquhart (1995), one of the pioneers of peacekeeping, added his own thoughts on the idea of a rapid deployment capability. However, Secretary-General-elect Kofi Annan (1996) rejected calls for the UN to develop such capabilities. Conscious of the need to secure consensus among member states, he warned that such a capability would create legal and financial difficulties, was unlikely to deliver the necessary rapid deployment capabilities and – even if it were possible – would take too long to develop.

Working within these parameters, the Brahimi Report made four recommendations aimed at improving the UN's capacity to deploy peacekeepers rapidly and effectively. First, the UN should have the ability to generate forces rapidly by using forces under the Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS), whereby member states are invited to nominate with varying degrees of specificity forces that they are prepared to assign to UN duties in order to quicken the composition of missions (see chapter 2). Ideally, the panel concluded, a traditional mission should be deployable within thirty days and larger, more complex, missions within ninety days. Second, the UN should have the capacity to deploy the forward elements of a peace operation within a few days of a mandate being handed down by the Security Council. Third, to accomplish these goals the Secretariat should be given the capacity to take decisions and make plans rapidly. It would be assisted in this by the creation of EISAS and IMTFs. Finally, the panel concluded that the rapid and effective deployment of the forward elements of a mission required that the UN have its own deployable logistics and communications capabilities.

4 *Effectiveness of deployed forces*   On the question of how to improve the effectiveness of deployed peace operations, the Brahimi Report identified three core requirements. First, in order to avoid repeating the mistakes made in Rwanda, Bosnia, Angola, Somalia and elsewhere, the military component of a peace operation should be robust enough to defend itself effectively, 'confront the lingering forces of war and violence' and protect civilians under its care. 'Peacekeepers who witness violence against civilians should be presumed to be authorised to stop it' within their means (UN 2000: § 62). The report made it clear, however, that this presumed mandate needed to be balanced against the need to match mandate and means, and that the Security Council and Secretariat should avoid writing 'blank cheques' by proffering wide protection mandates without fully examining what would be required to fulfil them. Second, the recommendation was made that UN peacekeepers be required to have basic skills and comply with 'best practices' common to

all UN missions. Finally, this demand would be supported by a renewed emphasis on training for peacekeepers and senior civilian personnel.

The UN membership – including all five of the Security Council's permanent members – welcomed the report (Gray 2001: 268). Nevertheless, the Secretariat experienced considerable difficulty persuading member states to implement its main recommendations (see table 5.3). In particular, several states – many of them key contributors to UN peace operations such as in India – expressed doubts about the legitimacy of 'robustness', arguing that Brahimi's vision constituted an unwelcome departure from the traditional tenets of peacekeeping (ibid.). Some states argued that the scope of peace operations should not be enlarged in the way envisaged by the panel and that 'basic principles' such as consent, impartiality and the minimum use of force only in self-defence should be preserved (UN General Assembly 2002: 2; see section 5.3). They even feared that the switch of language from 'peacekeeping' to 'peace operations' could legitimize forcible humanitarian intervention (ibid.: 3). A Special Committee, created by the General Assembly to follow up on the report, therefore adopted a more cautious and traditional position on peacekeeping than that taken by the Brahimi panel (Gray 2001: 270).

Shortly after the report was published, the Secretary-General outlined the steps necessary to implement its recommendations. In particular, Annan agreed that improving coordination between the Security Council and TCCs was crucial. The Secretariat, he noted, could also 'improve the way it assesses force requirements and devises concepts of operations. It could enhance the quality of military guidance provided in the field. It could promulgate standard operating procedures for a whole host of activities' (Annan 2000b: 9). These goals would be met by establishing IMTFs that would coordinate the efforts of the UN's different agencies and enhance the organization's rapid deployment capabilities. The Secretary-General also called for states to participate more fully in the UNSAS (ibid.: 15–17). Annan requested 'additional resources for the Secretariat', without which the reforms would have little hope of producing results on the ground. However, in a revealing admission, he acknowledged that his 'request does not represent our complete needs, but it is a realistic indication of the areas that need to be strengthened on a priority basis' (ibid.: 22). The following year, the Secretary-General identified five strategic goals for implementing the panel's recommendations and improving UN peace operations (see box 5.3).

Although it was meant to be holistic in its approach to peace operations, in practice the political aspects of the Brahimi Report's recommendations have been sidelined, and UN officials themselves admit that there has been least progress on the decision-making and strategic issues (Harland 2003: 2). For example, some permanent members reportedly worried that, should the Security Council leave mandates in draft form as recommended, political support for a mission could dry up while waiting for the Secretary-General to verify troop commitments. In place of the draft resolutions, the Council

TABLE 5.3 Implementing the Brahimi Report: a scorecard

Issue area	Progress	No progress
Decision-making	– Improved informal consultations between Council and TCCs – Heightened informal consultation between P-5 – 'Planning mandates' issued (MONUC) – IMTFs established for Afghanistan, Liberia and Sudan	– No standing liaison committee for TCCs – Security Council rejects idea of leaving resolutions in draft form until resources provided – DPKO Best Practices Unit created and subsequently expanded and renamed 'Best Practices Section' – IMTFs become briefing venues rather than joint planning venues
Mandate and resources	– DPKO has improved advice on threats and limits to what peacekeepers can achieve – Mandates are clearer, more specific and carefully demarcated – Pre-approval of advance discretionary funds for the Secretary-General denied but process quickened for case-by-case approval (MINUCI, UNMIL)	– Missions authorized without necessary resources being available (e.g. UNAMID)
Rapid deployment	– UN Logistics Depot created at Brindisi, Italy – UN can deploy small number of transport assets and communications at short notice – Small missions deployed in less than one week (e.g. Iraq, Côte d'Ivoire)	– Average duration to full deployment remains around eighteen months – Critical delays in Sudan, Darfur, eastern DRC
Effective deployment	– Missions typically given robust mandates – Peacekeepers taking proactive role in preventing spoilers and protecting civilians (e.g. Haiti, DRC) – Best practice guidelines developed – 'Capstone doctrine' developed – UN Staff College strengthened and training for SRSGs formalized – UNITAR programme on peace operations expanded into a comprehensive programme	– Significant capacity problems remain – UN unable to insist on compliance with best practices – Training of non-UN personnel remains entirely voluntary – Complaints of abuse by UN peacekeepers

Source: based on Annan 2000b, 2000c, 2001c, 2001d; Durch et al. 2003)

Box 5.3 Implementing the Brahimi Report: five strategic goals
1 Enhancing the rapid deployment capability for peacekeeping operations
2 Strengthening the relationship with member states and legislative bodies
3 Reforming the DPKO's management culture
4 Reforming the DPKO's relationship with field missions
5 Strengthening relationships with other parts of the UN system

Source: paraphrased from Annan 2001d: § 7.

...it must be remembered that the success or failure of peacekeeping operations derives above all from the will of the parties to the conflict, of the Security Council, and of other Member States to use this invaluable instrument wisely and well. Regardless of the excellence of any system or machinery, a peacekeeping operation cannot succeed if there is no peace to keep, if it lacks an appropriate mandate, or if it is not given the necessary material and political support in a timely fashion. (Annan 2001d: § 83)

offered 'planning mandates' that would allow the Secretariat to approach potential contributors before a final mandate was handed down (Durch et al. 2003: 19). This approach was trialled in relation to MONUC (UN Security Council Resolution 1327, 2000) but has not been widely used since. Nor has there been significant progress towards institutionalizing cooperation between TCCs, the DPKO and the Security Council, despite Annan having identified this as a priority. In 2001 the Security Council resolved to institutionalize cooperation (in Resolution 1353), but little tangible progress was made thanks to differences over the precise role of TCCs. While a group of thirty-six troop contributors sought a formal subsidiary body as recommended by Brahimi, four of the five permanent members of the Security Council opposed this move, fearing that it had the potential to devolve the Council's authority and hinder its work (see Gray 2001: 283). The problems connected with an absence of consultation were made plain in 2003, when 750 Uruguayan military observers and soldiers not configured for a hostile environment were deployed into the town of Bunia in eastern DRC to replace around 9,000 battle-hardened Ugandan soldiers who were withdrawing at the request of the Security Council. Despite clear warnings pointing to the likely deterioration of the security situation after Uganda's withdrawal, the Uruguayans were deployed with no UN background briefings, no special training, and no guidance about how to interpret and implement their mandate in this context (Ross 2003; see also chapter 15).

In the main, both the report and its implementation focused on the institutional capacity of the UN Secretariat and the bureaucratic organization of individual missions. Issues such as political will, funding and the responsibility of the Security Council have been further marginalized during the subsequent implementation process. This occurred in spite of the importance that

the panel attached to these political dimensions (see box 5.3) but was as much a consequence of bureaucratic disputes between the DPKO and DPA over the nature and proper place of 'political' issues as it was a product of pressure from member states (Berdal 2001: 50–1). Of course, a report such as this cannot by itself generate political will, but it could have reiterated its importance in the strongest possible terms. The preoccupation with technical issues looks even more out of place when we remember that the UN reports on Rwanda and Srebrenica clearly demonstrated that *political factors* rather than bureaucratic/institutional factors were primarily responsible for the respective failures. This, of course, is no great revelation. Recall that in 1992 Boutros-Ghali warned that one of the most serious problems facing the UN was the danger of its member states assigning it more and more onerous tasks without giving it the requisite resources to fulfil them (Boutros-Ghali 1992: §§ 4, 7). This issue remains central to the contemporary agenda but, apart from proposing that resolutions be left in draft form until the requisite resources were available and strengthening standby arrangements, the Brahimi Report did not make much headway (though cf. Malone and Thakur 2001).

As table 5.3 attests, even the report's technical recommendations did not necessarily command support when it came to implementation. For a start, the proposal for improved strategic planning and analysis for peace operations was rejected largely because of long-standing opposition to the idea that the UN should have its own information/intelligence-gathering capabilities (see Chesterman 2006). The UN is also still having difficulty obtaining sufficient pledges of reserve contingents of troops. Moreover, even when pledges have been forthcoming, member states have sometimes reneged on them. To give one example, before 2007 the entire UN force in the DRC was covered by just one reserve battalion. This problem is indicative of the fact that member states often make declarations of intent but are less likely to commit money and troops.

Other technical recommendations simply did not work as intended. For example, the IMTF model was widely supported and put into practice in relation to missions in Afghanistan (2001–2), Liberia (2003) and Sudan (2004). But the task forces attracted a high number of participants (over fifty), making it difficult for them to do more than simply offer updates and briefings (Durch et al. 2003: 48). In the end, the DPKO convened its own smaller ad hoc working group for Liberia to perform many of the same tasks envisaged for the IMTFs.

In addition to these difficulties, the report was criticized on a number of grounds. Most significant, given the pressing need to find additional troop capacity to close the gulf between means and ends, was the panel's failure to address non-UN peacekeepers. This was important given that in 2002, for instance, there were approximately 39,000 UN peacekeepers but around 50,000 non-UN peacekeepers deployed around the world (Durch 2003: 4; see Diehl 2008: 66–7) While this oversight is understandable given the report's remit, it is less clear why the panel failed to explore more fully the UN's

relationship with regional organizations and other peacekeeping actors, despite its increasing reliance on those actors and the emergence of 'hybrid' operations (see chapters 13 and 14).

In addition, some commentators criticized the report for not going into detail about command and control and the financial aspects of peace operations (Cardenas 2000: 72–3; White 2001: 137–8). Critics have also chided it for ignoring conflict prevention and not devoting enough attention to civil-military relations or the relationship between the UN and local actors in conflict zones. In particular, it was taken to task for not suggesting that UN peace operations should hire more local staff, thereby cultivating the skills and leadership of local citizens (Bell and Tousignant 2001: 44). That said, the question of which locals to hire is clearly a complicated issue. Finally, the report was criticized for being 'largely silent on gender issues' and its apparent inability to draw upon work already undertaken on these issues within the UN system (Whitworth 2004: 127; see chapter 16).

These criticisms notwithstanding, the Brahimi Report marked a significant step forward for UN peace operations, not least by redefining the core tasks of peacekeeping, refocusing basic principles, and setting out a relatively comprehensive programme of UN reform. Although some significant gaps remained, it helped set the agenda for twenty-first-century peacekeeping and laid the foundations for the UN to respond to heightening demands for its peacekeepers. The following section focuses on this more recent expansion of peace operations and shows how the groundwork laid by the Brahimi Report helped change the way the UN conducts peace operations.

5.3 Peace operations after Brahimi

The final section of this chapter examines the progress of peace operations after the Brahimi Report. It begins by reviewing some of the key political issues, focusing on questions about the relationship between peacekeepers and the International Criminal Court and the impact of the US-led 'Global War on Terror' – especially the 2003 invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq. The second part considers the question of UN reform and one of the main post-Brahimi changes in the way the UN thinks about peace operations – the development of 'capstone doctrine.' Finally, we briefly discuss the practical experience of peace operations themselves and identify some key signs of progress, but also some major challenges and potential dangers.

Politics

The twenty-first century has been a relatively tumultuous time for UN peace operations, especially in terms of the UN's relationship with George W. Bush's administration and the impact of the latter's approach to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Global War on Terror (GWOT).

It is well known that one of the keys to making the UN work effectively is maintaining a good relationship with its principal donor - the US. However, the establishment of the ICC on 1 July 2002 placed a considerable strain on the relationship. Although it was heralded by many states and international lawyers as the most progressive development in international law since the establishment of the UN itself, US opposition to the ICC has caused significant problems for peacekeepers. The Bush administration opposed the Court because it feared that US military forces operating overseas would be vulnerable to what it described as 'politicized prosecutions'. Not only did the Bush administration 'unsign' the treaty establishing the ICC, it threatened to veto the renewal of every UN peacekeeping operation until it achieved a blanket amnesty for US and other peacekeeping personnel. Since most UN peacekeeping operations have their mandate renewed by the Security Council every six or twelve months, it was not long before a mission renewal came before the Council - that of UNMIBH in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The US duly vetoed the extension of UNMIBH, even though the operation enjoyed the consent of the Bosnian government and the support of the other permanent members of the Security Council and involved only forty-five Americans (in July 2002 the US had fewer than 750 personnel deployed worldwide with the UN, all but two of whom were civilian rather than military personnel). Ironically, the US did not consider withdrawing its troops from the NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, despite the fact that the peacekeepers there came under the jurisdiction of the ICTY. Neither did it withdraw its forces from the territories of states such as Britain, Germany and Japan, all of which had ratified the ICC Statute. Fortunately, by 2002, UNMIBH comprised mainly a police-training programme that was due to hand over to the EU later that year. A compromise was finally reached whereby the US permitted the mission to stay in place in return for a swifter transition to EU control. After some very strained negotiations, an agreement was reached whereby peacekeeping personnel were granted immunity from prosecution by the ICC for a renewable period of one year.

A second issue that affected relations between the US and UN, and impacted in other ways on peace operations more generally, was the GWOT and especially the 2003 invasion of Iraq. There are at least two different ways of thinking about the impact that the GWOT and the Iraq War have had on peace operations. The first can be described as 'optimistic', because it sees peace operations being more likely on account of the perceived convergence between Western national security interests and humanitarian concerns that occurred after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (Wheeler and Bellamy 2005: 572). The second perspective is that the 'sun has set' on the nascent humanitarianism evident in the 1990s, primarily because the GWOT in general and the West's operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in particular will make them less likely to contribute large numbers of troops to UN operations (Weiss 2004a: 135). In addition, the abuse of humanitarian justifications for the invasion of

Iraq has severely undermined the credibility of the US and the UK in particu-
lar to act as champions of more robust civilian protection operations in the
future (Evans 2004). As the director of Human Rights Watch put it, one of the
most troubling consequences of the attempts to justify the Iraq War in
humanitarian terms was that 'it will be more difficult next time for us to call
on military action when we need it to save potentially hundreds of thousands
of lives' (Roth 2004: 2–3).

The impact of the GWOT and Iraq War on peace operations is therefore
hotly contested. Nevertheless, we think at least three trends are clearly appar-
ent. First, the commitment of large numbers of Western troops to Afghanistan
and Iraq make the TCCs less likely to contribute to UN and other non-UN
peace operations. Second, the moral credibility of states that participated in
the invasion of Iraq was diminished, making it more difficult for these tradi-
tional leaders to play a major role in shaping the world's response to crises
in Darfur, Somalia, the DRC and elsewhere. Finally, the overriding of sover-
eignty in the case of Iraq has made many states in the global South more
wary of international activism without the consent of the host government.
As we discuss below, the deferral to host-state consent has made it difficult
to craft an effective response to the conflicts in Darfur, Chad and the Central
African Republic (CAR). In short, therefore, as demand for peace operations
increases, not only has the West become less willing and able to contribute
its personnel but the global consensus on international activism has weak-
ened (see chapter 2).

UN reform

Reforming the UN was a centrepiece of Kofi Annan's bid to become Secretary-
General and a central demand of the US. The George W. Bush administration
encouraged an anti-UN political atmosphere in Washington, which only
intensified with Annan's criticism of the invasion of Iraq and the UN's 'oil-
for-food' scandal. In 2004 Henry Hyde introduced legislation into Congress
aimed at halving America's dues to the UN, which would have caused a finan-
cial crisis for the organization overnight. The Bill passed Congress, suggesting
that there was some sympathy for it at the White House, and it was widely
thought that the Senate would only kill it off (as it subsequently did) if the
US was satisfied with the progress of UN reform (Traub 2006: 362).

In September 2003, Annan commissioned a High-Level Panel to examine
challenges to international peace and security and the contribution that the
UN could make to address those challenges more effectively. In its December
2004 report, the panel set out a range of recommendations relating to the
function of the Security Council, the capacity of the Secretariat and the cre-
ation of new institutions (UNSG High-Level Panel 2004). Among the recom-
mendations was a call for the UN to create a standing police capacity to
improve its ability to deploy police officers at short notice – a clear response

to the emergence of police-led operations (see chapter 17). In place of Brahimi's call for mandates to be left in draft form, the panel suggested a system of indicative voting whereby Council members could call for states to declare and justify their positions publicly prior to an actual vote (ibid.: § 257). Annan accepted almost all the High-Level Panel's recommendations in his own blue-print for UN reform, which was taken to a summit of world leaders in 2005 (Annan 2005a). Many of these proposals were adopted at the summit, though in considerably weakened form (see table 5.4 for those most relevant to peace-keeping). For example, the standing police capacity was limited to twenty-five people, hardly enough to make an impact on the UN's seventeen peace operations.

Thus, while progress was made at the 2005 World Summit, it was limited progress at best, and the limitations placed on the Peacebuilding Commission and standing police capacity threatened seriously to constrain their ability to make a positive contribution to peace operations. Even less progress was made on issues such as management reform, with the Secretary-General seeking the authority to make appointments on the basis of merit alone but the UN membership reserving for itself the right to confirm appointments – ensuring that the appointment of senior UN staff will continue to be made for political as much as merit-based reasons.

As we noted in chapter 2, the DPKO itself has undergone a period of reform and restructuring. At the same time, progress has been made on the develop-ment of doctrine to guide UN peace operations in the field. There was no UN doctrine (in the normal military sense of the term) owing largely to political

TABLE 5.4 UN reform and the 2005 World Summit: relevant outcomes

Area	2005 outcome	Implementation
Peacebuilding	– Agreement to create a Peacebuilding Commission to spearhead UN's efforts in this area	– Commission supported by a new Peacebuilding Support Office and Peacebuilding Fund – Confused authority: Commission sits under Security Council, General Assembly and ECOSOC – PBSO given limited resources (around twenty staff) – Donations to the Peacebuilding Fund are voluntary and slow to arrive
Standing police capacity	– Agreement to create a standing police capacity	– Capacity limited to twenty-five – No new financial or personnel resources provided
Responsibility to protect	– Endorsement of responsibility to protect principle	– Secretary-General creates a special adviser position to develop plans for translating the principle from words into deeds

sensitivities about the UN prescribing behaviour to member states and a lack of strategic capacity in the DPKO. As we noted earlier, the Brahimi Report's call for the DPKO to be given a capacity for strategic planning and analysis was rejected principally on account of concerns about the potential for such a capacity to challenge the decision-making authority of member states. However, there are signs that states are beginning gradually to lessen their hostility to UN doctrine, and the UN has developed a series of 'guidelines'.

Some progress was also made in terms of thinking about the meaning of key concepts such as 'impartiality' and translating lessons learned into better practice. For example, the 2003 *Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations* insisted that 'impartiality...does not mean inaction or overlooking violations'. It instructed peacekeepers to 'actively pursue the implementation of their mandate', even if that meant going against the wishes of one or more of the parties to the conflict (DPKO 2003: 56–7).

The *Handbook* was followed up in December 2005, when Kofi Annan (2005d) called for the development of an inventory of terms and peacekeeping doctrine to address various issues, including the protection of vulnerable populations. Shortly afterwards, in March 2006, member states signalled their willingness to address the question of developing UN doctrine, with the General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping calling upon the Secretariat to prepare a glossary of terminology for 'further development of a peacekeeping doctrine, guiding principles and concepts' (UN General Assembly 2006: § 7).

The development of what was initially labelled 'capstone doctrine' for UN peace operations was led by the DPKO's renamed Best Practices Section. Drafts of the 'doctrine' were written by DPKO staff and presented to member states and experts through a series of regional roundtables. During the consultation process, it became evident that many member states remained reluctant to embrace the very idea of 'capstone doctrine', let alone a systematic rethinking of the way that peace operations were conceptualized and conducted in line with the recommendations of the Brahimi Report. These differences are apparent when comparing early drafts of the doctrine with the final product in two important domains: the status of doctrine and principles of peacekeeping.

Status of doctrine　The most important difference between the early drafts and the finished product was the underlying purpose of the document itself. Whereas the initial intent was to provide guidance and common principles for UN peacekeepers, the final version appeared more an exercise in summarizing the current state of play, much like the 2003 *Handbook*. The third draft of the doctrine (29 June 2007) contained the phrase 'capstone doctrine' in its title and stated that it 'constitutes the highest-level in the doctrine and guidance framework for UN peacekeeping'. The draft continued: 'it is in effect the strategic guidance' for the wider body of material on the conduct of peace

operations (DPKO 2007: § 4). Reflecting member states' concerns about UN doctrine, the final draft dropped the phrase 'capstone doctrine' from its title, removed all references to 'doctrine', insisted that the document was 'internal' to DPKO and deleted the intention to provide 'strategic guidance' (DPKO 2008a: § 4). Whereas the original draft purported to offer 'a multi-dimensional doctrine to embrace the complex operations of today' (2007: § 6), the final version simply 'reflect[ed]' the multi-dimensional nature of contemporary operations (2008a: § 6).

Principles of peacekeeping   The draft doctrine argued that the traditional principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence should be revised and augmented. In their place, the draft proposed six new principles.

1 *Consent*: Peacekeepers should be deployed with the consent of the parties to the conflict.
2 *Impartiality*: 'UN peacekeepers should be impartial in their dealings with the parties to conflict, but not neutral in the execution of their mandate' (DPKO 2007: § 66).
3 *Restraint in the use of force*: Although force must be used in a restrained fashion, it may be employed in circumstances other than self-defence. Peacekeepers may use force to protect themselves, their mandate and groups identified by the mandate (e.g. civilians, humanitarian workers) (§ 69).
4 *Credibility*: To operate effectively in volatile environments, peace operations must be credible. Credibility requires rapid deployment, proper resourcing, ability to deter spoilers and the ability to manage expectations (§§ 73–5).
5 *Legitimacy*: Operations must be seen as legitimate. Legitimacy is conferred through the legal mandate, the firm and fair exercise of the mandate, circumspect use of force, discipline of the peacekeepers, and respect shown to the local population (§§ 76–7).
6 *Promotion of national and local ownership*: Peacekeepers should promote national and local ownership of the peace process (§ 79).

These proposed changes to the basic principles of peacekeeping met with stiff resistance from states reluctant to augment the traditional principles and unwilling to expand the remit of UN activism. In the final draft, credibility, legitimacy and local ownership were downgraded from 'principles' to 'success factors' (DPKO 2008a: §§ 76ff.). Likewise, the proposed expansion of the role of force was revised to read 'non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate' (§§ 70ff.). Whereas the Brahimi Report had advised that peacekeepers be 'presumed' to have a mandate to protect civilians (with force if necessary) and the draft had permitted force to protect peacekeepers, the mandate and others, the final draft insisted that force could be used only

in self-defence and defence of the mandate, when authorized by the Security Council (§ 70). Where neither the Brahimi Report nor the early drafts of the capstone doctrine required that peacekeepers be explicitly authorized to use force to protect civilians, the final version of the 'principles and guidelines' made the use of force in such circumstances contingent on Security Council authorization.

Important changes were therefore made to the proposed capstone doctrine in order to make it less authoritative as a guide to UN peacekeepers and less progressive in the way that it conceptualized the principles of peacekeeping. Nonetheless, the formulation of 'principles and guidelines' itself marks an important step towards clarifying the nature and purpose of UN peace operations as well as best practice. Moreover, the strengthening of the Best Practice Section in the DPKO (see chapter 2) means that this process is likely to be ongoing.

Missions

The years following the release of the Brahimi Report saw a steady increase in the number and size of UN peace operations. By 2008 there were seventeen ongoing operations and over 80,000 troops, police and civilian personnel deployed under the auspices of the UN (see figure 5.1 and table 5.5). In addition, there were also sizeable non-UN deployments (see table 5.6).

There are several important points to draw from these tables. First, post-Brahimi peace operations cover the broad spectrum of types, from


Figure 5.1 *UN peacekeepers in the twenty-first century (figures based on 30 June of each year)*

TABLE 5.5 UN peace operations, 30 June 2008

Name	Location	Mandate	Size (deployed)
MINURSO	Western Sahara	– Supervise referendum	223
MINUSTAH	Haiti	– Support the government in maintaining order – Help build government capacity	8,836
MINURCAT	Chad/CAR	– Humanitarian assistance – Facilitate return of IDPs by protecting civilians	270
MONUC	DRC	– Maintain peace and security – Protect civilians – Assist in reconstruction	18,271
UNAMID	Darfur	– Protect civilian population – Monitor ceasefire – Implement Darfur Peace Agreement	9,000 (of authorized 26,000)
UNDOF	Middle East	– Observe disengagement of forces	1,043
UNFICYP	Cyprus	– Monitor ceasefire	915
UNIFIL	Lebanon	– Verify withdrawal of forces – Monitor ceasefire	13,264
UNMEE	Ethiopia–Eritrea	– Monitor ceasefire – Patrol demilitarized zone	1,686
UNMIK	Kosovo	– Contribute to building state institutions – Oversee establishment of Kosovo Police Service	2,069 (mainly police)
UNMIL	Liberia	– Oversee implementation of peace agreement – Contribute to peace and security	15,318
UNMIS	Sudan	– Oversee implementation of comprehensive peace agreement	10,066
UNMIT	Timor-Leste	– Assist government in maintaining peace and security – Establish effective government institutions	1,668
UNMOGIP	India/Pakistan	– Monitor ceasefire	44
UNOCI	Côte d'Ivoire	– Monitor ceasefire – Contribute to peace and security – Assist in the implementation of a peace agreement	9,196
UNOMIG	Georgia	– Monitor ceasefire	147
UNTSO	Middle East	– Monitor ceasefire	151

TABLE 5.6 Non-UN peace operations, 30 June 2008

Name	Actor	Place	Mandate	Size
AMISOM	AU	Somalia	Support transitional government of Somalia; maintain order	2,200
MAES	AU	Comoros	Defeat insurgents; support government; collect arms; support electoral process	1,500
FOMUC	CEMAC	CAR	Monitor ceasefire	378
Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Force	Russia-Moldova-PMR	Moldova (Transdnestr)	Monitor ceasefire	1,174
CIS Peacekeeping Forces in Georgia	CIS	Georgia (Abkhazia)	Monitor ceasefire	1,600
South Ossetia Joint Force	Russia-Georgia-S. Ossetia	Georgia (South Ossetia)	Monitor ceasefire	1,500
EUFOR Althea	EU	Bosnia-Hercegovina	Establish Bosnian Police Service	2,504 (police)
EUFOR Chad/CAR	EU	Chad/CAR	Monitor ceasefire; deter violence; oversee implementation of peace agreement	3,000
KFOR	NATO	Kosovo	Maintain peace and security; establish security forces in Kosovo	15,109
ISAF	NATO	Afghanistan	Maintain peace and security; support government of Afghanistan	41,118
MFO	Coalition	Egypt (Sinai)	Observe ceasefire	1,691 (milobs)
Operation Licorne	France	Côte d'Ivoire	Contribute to maintenance of peace and security; support UNOCI	2,400
RAMSI	Australia / Pacific Islands Forum	Solomon Islands	Maintain law and order; disarm rebels; support government rebuilding	750
ISF	Australia and New Zealand	Timor-Leste	Support government in maintaining law and order	1,020

traditional monitoring (see chapter 7) to complex peace support operations with robust mandates (see chapter 12). It is too simplistic, therefore, to argue that the traditional precepts of peace operations have been replaced by new doctrines, because traditional and monitoring-style operations account for half of all UN operations and around a third of all non-UN operations. Moreover, not all traditional operations are small in size. UNIFIL, deployed to Lebanon as part of a peace deal that brought the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah to an end, is a relatively large operation with a basically traditional mandate. Second, the growth in non-UN operations has not come at the expense of UN operations (see Heldt 2008). As often as not, UN and non-UN actors operate alongside one another, as in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Côte d'Ivoire and Timor-Leste. Indeed, measured in terms of personnel, the number of UN peacekeepers has grown considerably in the twenty-first century (see figure 5.1), while, with the exception of NATO's mission in Afghanistan, the overall number of troops deployed on non-UN missions has remained relatively static (CIC 2008: 3). Third, the Brahimi Report's call for missions to have the capability to protect themselves, their mandates and – where possible – imperilled civilians was reflected both in this partnership between UN and non-UN actors and in the increased average size of UN peace operations. With the notable exceptions of the four missions deployed in Sudan, Chad and the CAR, in 2008 none of the missions listed in tables 5.5 and 5.6 were confronted with a gulf between means and ends as dramatic as that experienced by UNAMSIL in 2000 or UNAMIR in 1994. Fourth, the composition of these operations demonstrates an increased willingness to fit forces to missions. Contemporary missions include military-led operations as well as traditional peacekeeping led by military observers and a new breed of 'rule of law' operations led by police officers (see chapter 17). Finally, in 2008 the overall record of the UN's ongoing operations was relatively strong, despite a number of serious challenges caused primarily by stalling peace processes, a reluctance to contribute forces to the UNAMID operation in Sudan, and a general neglect of the spiralling crisis in Somalia (ibid.). This reluctance to engage in Sudan stood in stark contrast to the rapidity with which contributors moved to deploy 10,000 troops to Lebanon in the space of just four months in 2006.

There are multiple reasons for this growth in the size and number of peace operations, not least a steady increase in demand. Increased demand, however, was not a simple product of higher levels of armed conflict, because this has actually reduced during this period (Human Security Centre 2008). Instead, perceptions of success in places such as the Balkans, Timor-Leste, Burundi and West Africa helped elevate the status of peace operations as a valued tool of conflict management once again. In Sierra Leone and Burundi, for example, UN peacekeepers accomplished their mandates in 2005 and 2006 respectively and handed over to political missions, which came under the auspices of the new UN Peacebuilding Commission.

The fact that peace operations have once again become conflict manage-ment tools of choice was most clearly demonstrated after the war between Israel and Hezbollah in July–August 2006. Before that conflict, analysts had questioned the continuing utility of UNIFIL, which had originally been estab-lished in 1978 to assist in the provision of security in south Lebanon follow-ing Israel's invasion during the Lebanese civil war (CIC 2006). During the 2006 conflict, however, both the parties and the mediators recognized the need for a strengthened deployment of peacekeepers to ensure the demilitar-ization of southern Lebanon. Although UNIFIL was not authorized to disarm Hezbollah or secure the Lebanese border, it was given a mandate to ensure that southern Lebanon not be used as a staging post for attacks on Israel. Just as importantly, UNIFIL was also provided with the means to accomplish its mandate, with European states (especially France, Italy, Spain and Germany) contributing around 5,500 troops to a mission operating in a relatively small geographic area.

This level of European participation in a UN operation, which had not been seen since the end of UNPROFOR and UNTAES in the Balkans, was facilitated by a unique command structure centred around a strategic military cell (SMC) based at UN headquarters. The SMC, created at the insistence of France and Italy, provides a conduit between the mission commander and the DPKO and ensures that the troop contributors (principally the Europeans) have more control over the mission's operational direction (CIC 2007: 86). The key point here is that the strengthening of a floundering UN peace operation in south-ern Lebanon was widely seen as a fundamental part of the conflict resolution process. The remainder of this section briefly explores this expansion of peace operations.

As we noted earlier, a key test for UN peace operations in the twenty-first century came in the DRC. We discuss that case in relation to the protection of civilians in chapter 15. Here, however, we are most interested in how the Security Council responded to the crises of 2003–4, when various militia groups in the DRC broke ceasefire agreements and began to wage war on each other and the civilian population in a context where the UN peacekeepers lacked the means and mandate to deter violations, enforce compliance and protect civilians. Most notably, in 2003 militias overran the town of Bunia and posed a very real threat of genocide that was averted only by the timely intervention of the French-led IEMF. The following year, rebels loyal to General Laurent Nkunda overran the town of Bukavu in South Kivu, despite the pres-ence of MONUC peacekeepers, seriously undermining the mission's credibil-ity (CIC 2008: 43).

Unlike in Somalia and Rwanda, when the Security Council responded to challenges such as this by downsizing and withdrawing – effectively leaving the civilian population to its fate – the Council strengthened MONUC. From June to September 2003, France led a coalition of the willing into the town of Bunia in eastern DRC to stem the tide of attacks on civilians.

The relative – though limited – success of that operation provided a catalyst for the staged strengthening of MONUC's mandate and the means placed at its disposal. Between 2005 and 2007, the much-strengthened mission worked alongside government forces to coerce and sometimes forcibly disarm recalcitrant militia and, with the support of an EU Reserve Deployment (EUFOR RD), oversaw national elections. The EU mission helped ensure that post-election violence in Kinshasa, responsible for the death of thirty-two people, did not escalate into more generalized violence or undermine the political process in the DRC (see chapter 6). Throughout the period, sporadic fighting, especially in Ituri province and North and South Kivu, caused widespread civilian displacement, and MONUC peacekeepers often come under attack, sustaining heavy casualties. In all, twenty-two peacekeepers were killed in violent attacks in 2005 and 2006 (CIC 2008: 229).

Similar patterns have also been evident in Côte d'Ivoire and Timor-Leste, which both confronted (and survived) major crises. In 2002, elements of Côte d'Ivoire's military ('Forces Nouvelle') rebelled and launched a failed coup attempt against President Laurent Gbagbo. Fearing a repeat of the bloodshed seen in Côte d'Ivoire's West African neighbours and spurred by France in particular, which had a long-standing relationship with the government and military bases in the country, the Security Council authorized the deployment of a UN mission to operate alongside the French Operation Licorne and to take over from a hastily assembled West African force, ECOMICI. The UN force, UNOCI, was deployed in 2004 to monitor a ceasefire between the two sides in the civil war, maintain a demilitarized 'zone of confidence' between the parties and help implement a peace agreement (Linas–Marcoussis Accords). In late 2004, government forces attacked French peacekeepers, prompting a retaliatory air strike against the Côte d'Ivoire air force and the swift imposition of an arms embargo by the Security Council. As the peace process stalled towards the end of 2005, tensions boiled over and pro-Gbagbo demonstrators began attacking UN personnel, forcing the UN to withdraw from several towns (DPKO 2004b). In the face of this resistance, in 2006 the Security Council increased UNOCI's mandated size by 1,100 and redeployed peacekeepers and UN personnel to the troubled districts. With the support of Nigeria and the African Union, a new peace agreement was concluded at the end of 2007 (the Ougadougou Accords) and the 'zone of confidence' was replaced by a UN policed 'green line', indicating significant (though hesitant) progress towards national unification (CIC 2008: 106–7).

Following Timor-Leste's successful transition to independence in 2002, UNTAET handed over to a smaller support mission (UNMISET) tasked with providing interim law enforcement, assisting in the creation of rule of law institutions, and enabling capacity-building across the government administration. In 2005, amid superficial signs of progress and an absence of violence, the UN's engagement with Timor-Leste was further downsized. This turned out to be premature, as one year later the government dismissed a large

portion of the armed forces, sparking an armed rebellion. Timor-Leste's new institutions proved too fragile to maintain law and order, and by May 2006 the state had all but collapsed amid widespread disorder and large-scale population displacement. At the request of the government, Australia and New Zealand deployed peacekeepers to help restore order, and the Security Council – tacitly recognizing that it had authorized a premature withdrawal – established a new mission (UNMIT) with greater capacity to impose law and order and build Timorese capacity. The two missions were augmented at the government's request by a deployment of Portuguese police. This rapid international engagement, spearheaded by Australia, prevented the state's collapse and descent into more generalized violence, though serious tensions remained – made evident by the attempted assassination in 2008 of Timor-Leste's president (Jose Ramos Horta) and prime minister (Xanana Gusmao) (CIC 2008: 84–5).

In Côte d'Ivoire and Timor-Leste, peacekeepers confronted serious challenges that could have undermined the mission. But in both these cases the Security Council, pivotal states, the UN Secretariat and the peacekeepers themselves responded with renewed resolve. The result was a gradual restoration of order. Although serious underlying problems remain in both countries, discernible progress was made. This was in stark contrast to international society's failure to stem the commission of large-scale crimes against humanity in Darfur and other conflicts involving the government of Sudan.

The most serious threat to this new, more robust and confident approach to peace operations comes from the various conflicts – and missions – involving Sudan. The government of Sudan and its proxies are involved in wars or fragile peace processes in the south, east and west of the country, as well as in Chad and the CAR. These conflicts have witnessed the deployment of a UN mission (UNMIS), an AU/UN hybrid mission (UNAMID), two small forces in Chad/CAR (EUFOR Chad/CAR and MINURCAT) and an even smaller CEMAC mission in the CAR. All of these missions are critically vulnerable.

UNMIS was deployed to oversee implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). This included provisions for a government of national unity until the future of the south was decided in a referendum on full independence scheduled for 2011. Although relatively large compared to other UN missions, it is important to bear in mind that UNMIS covers a huge area of underdeveloped territory, lacks crucial capabilities and operates in what is sometimes a hostile environment. What is more, the security situation was complicated by the presence of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a brutal Ugandan rebel organization composed mainly of abducted child soldiers, which maintained bases in southern Sudan until a combination of pressure from the SPLA and UNMIS forced it to relocate much of its operation to the DRC – creating new problems for the peacekeepers in

Map 5.1 *Sudan and its neighbours*

MONUC. These problems were compounded by the lack of political progress towards national integration, primarily because the National Congress Party regime in Sudan did not fulfil its commitment to share oil revenues and because integration of the armed forces has not progressed. The widely expected resumption of hostilities started in earnest in mid-2008 around the contested town of Abyei. Meanwhile, UNMIS lacked the capacity to push the process forward or deter significant violations of the CPA. These problems have also been compounded by the disaster in Darfur, which we discuss in chapter 8.

The situation in Sudan has been further compounded by instability in Chad and the CAR. In Chad, a combination of cross-border raids by *janjawiid* militias and an influx of nearly 300,000 refugees from Darfur, along with ongoing fighting between the government and at least three domestic rebel groups, caused over 350,000 people to flee their homes. In 2007 the government of Chad rejected calls for a UN mission to be deployed to Chad and the CAR, consenting only to the deployment of unarmed military observers and police. However, the government's long-standing relationship with France made it amenable to a small EU force deployed mainly in the east of the country (near the border with Sudan/Darfur), with a mandate to protect civilians, especially refugees and IDPs, and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian relief. The small mission of some 3,700 troops known as EUFOR Chad/CAR ran into difficulties even before it deployed, when rebels apparently backed by the government of Sudan attacked Chad's capital, N'Djamena, in early 2008. The violence succeeded in delaying the EU's deployment and reinforcing European reluctance to contribute to it. The EU's efforts are supported by a small UN force known as MINURCAT.

International society's commitment to support peacekeepers in the CAR has been even weaker than in Chad. The small CEMAC mission and the government of the CAR have proven utterly incapable of stemming the tide of violence in the country's north, which effectively descended into anarchy in 2007, causing around 200,000 people to flee their homes – in addition to the approximately 3,000 refugees from Darfur. Although the CAR government supported proposals for a large UN mission to be deployed there and to Chad, these proposals were scuppered by Chad's opposition (CIC 2008: 100).

The gap between international society's rhetorical commitment to peace and security and the protection of civilians, on the one hand, and its lack of political will to provide the necessary troops and resources, on the other, has not only produced a failure to stem the tide of violence in the interconnected conflicts in Sudan, Chad and the CAR. It has also left a string of highly vulnerable, relatively weak and under-resourced peace operations made more problematic by their complex mandates and the inter-institutional relationships between the UN, AU, EU, CEMAC and the relevant governments – not to mention more than ten major rebel groups.

5.4 Conclusion

Significant strides have been made towards making peace operations more effective in the field. There has also been significant – if somewhat limited – progress on reforming the way that peace operations are managed. However, although there has been a general improvement in the performance of peace operations, several missions continued to hang in the balance (especially MONUC), some faced major challenges (UNMIL, UNOCI, MINUSTAH) and others contained some of the ingredients of the worst failures of the 1990s

(most notably UNAMID). Moreover, with the increasing size, frequency and complexity of missions, contemporary peacekeeping faces a host of challenges, including delivering on civilian protection, honing the relationship between the UN and non-UN actors, mainstreaming gender, and operationalizing police contingents and police-led missions. These and other contemporary challenges are addressed in detail in part IV of the book. But first, part III provides an overview of the many different types of operations, their assumptions and their limitations.